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Abstract 
The important role of affected communities in reconstruction projects has long 
been acknowledged by academics, reconstruction practitioners and major sponsor 
organisations. It is indisputable that affected people are in fact the prime stakeholders of 
reconstruction projects and that their involvement in such projects can ultimately lead to 
more sustainable project outcomes. Project success is often directly proportional to the 
level of community engagement in reconstruction, meaning that the more effective the 
participation of the affected community, the higher become the chances of project 
success. There is also a greater assurance of project success if the capacity required to 
make effective participation possible actually exists in the affected communities. 
 In a post-disaster environment, housing reconstruction projects frequently face 
enormous difficulties due to the various, often apparently ill-considered, internal and 
external factors. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) operating in post-disaster 
settings such as Afghanistan continue to face blame over the failure of reconstruction 
projects, and worse, they are sometimes even viewed as being corrupt entities. While it is 
not always possible for NGOs to eliminate or reduce the impact of factors that are 
outside their control, they certainly can increase the chances of project success by 
placing considerable emphasis on working more effectively with the affected 
communities through a structured community capacity development initiative.  
A synthesis of the extant literature and prior knowledge is presented in the thesis, 
which advocates that the failure to involve affected communities in reconstruction 
projects is attributed primarily to inadequate understanding of the factors affecting 
community participation and the lack of any effective frameworks to guide and manage 
participatory strategies.  
To achieve maximum community participation in post-disaster reconstruction 
projects in Afghanistan, this research develops a specific logical framework to guide the 
process of community participation in post-disaster housing reconstruction. To address 
the identified problem and assist with the development of the logical framework this 
research sought to answer the following questions: 
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1- What are the major challenges (barriers) for community participation? 
2- How do these barriers impact community participation? 
3- How can the impact of these challenges be eliminated or reduced? 
A mixed methods sequential explanatory design was applied to collect and 
analyse quantitative and qualitative data from a wide range of participants. Using this 
method, data was collected and analysed in a sequential order in which the quantitative 
phase was followed by a qualitative phase. The use of a mixed methodology approach to 
this study enabled to investigate the research problem from both quantitative and 
qualitative standpoints. The intentional collection, integration and analysis of both 
qualitative and quantitative data was undertaken to obtain more valid answers to the 
research questions.  
The research supports the view that post-disaster housing reconstruction projects 
are complex and that they can exist in diverse environmental and political conditions. 
These projects have their unique socio-cultural, religious and economic requirements, 
meaning that two instances of similar or different post-disaster reconstruction projects 
can rarely be the same. Therefore, each post-disaster reconstruction project needs to be 
dealt with in its own unique way to suit the context within which it operates. A one-size-
fits-all approach to reconstruction has a reduced chance of delivering successful projects. 
Housing reconstruction policies are effective if they are formulated based on the needs of 
the affected people. These projects are owned by the affected people and thus the people 
are required to have adequate participation in decision making and in the subsequent 
rebuilding process of their houses.  
Major findings from the research also suggest that community participation in 
post-disaster reconstruction projects faces many challenges. Depending on the specific 
context within which post-disaster reconstruction projects are implemented, these 
challenges may originate from a range of different sources. In the context of 
Afghanistan, some government policies and the lack of a robust government 
administration system for reconstruction, the lack of adequate capacity demonstrated by 
many local as well as international aid organisations, issues related to gender inequality 
and the lack of adequate security currently pose serious challenges for community 
participation in reconstruction. Results from this study indicate that community capacity 
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plays a crucial role in establishing the level of community engagement in decision 
making and in different phases of the actual reconstruction. 
Keywords: Post-disaster reconstruction projects, community participation, 
logical framework, Afghanistan. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The idea of participation is not a new one, people have been participating in 
developing their communities for many years (Midgley 1986, 13). However, the concept 
of community participation as it is known today, is relatively new. The notion of 
involving communities in social and environmental development and that considering 
involving the most vulnerable members of communities in decision making should be 
central to any participation, has gain prominence since the 1960s. Since then, various 
authors have attempted to explain the nature of community participation and provide 
analysis characterising the different levels of people’s participation in development 
projects and programmes. The following two ladders ‘The ladder of citizen participation 
by Arnstein’ (1969) and ‘The ladder of community participation by Choguill’ (1996) 
provide the ranking and evaluation of community participation in developed and 
developing countries respectively.  
The ladder of citizen participation by Arnstein (1969) has eight rungs. The 
‘ladder’ has been divided into two parts: “participation and non-participation”. The 
bottom rungs of the ladder represent manipulation and therapy and are “non-
participation”. The next level is “tokenism” (there are three rungs in this level): 
informing, consultation and placation, which allows communities to have their voice and 
be heard. The top level comprises “degrees of citizen power” which also has three rungs: 
partnership, delegated power and citizen control. On these high level rungs of the ladder, 
citizens possess the capability of both decision making and managerial power. Figure 
 1-1 depicts the ladder of citizen participation by Arnstein (1969). 
The ladder of community participation by Choguill (1996) was formed 
specifically for application in underdeveloped countries because existing models of 
community participation, such as Arnstein’s (1969), while adequately providing for 
analysis of stakeholder participation in developed countries, did not appear to fit the 
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context within the developing countries. Choguill (1996) suggests that the level of 
involvement of a sponsored organisation in a community mutual-help project needs to be 
examined when developing a tentative classification for the evaluation of participation. 
Choguill’s ladder of involvement is comprised of the following rungs: empowerment, 
partnership, conciliation, dissimulation, diplomacy, informing, conspiracy and self-
management. The highest rung on Choguill’s ladder for developing countries is 
“empowerment”, a characteristic predominantly controlled by community. The lowest 
rung on the ladder is “self-management” which has no active participation from the 
government, local NGOs or private financial institutions.  
Figure  1-2 displays the ladder of community participation in under developed 
countries. 
 
8 Citizen control  
Degree of 
Citizen Power 
7 Delegated power  
6 Partnership  
5 Placation  
 
Degree of  
tokenism 
4 Consultation  
3 Informing  
2 Therapy  
Non-
participation 1 Manipulation  
 
Figure  1-1: A ladder of community 
participation for developed countries 
by Arnstein (1969) 
 
8 Empowerment  
Citizen control 7 Partnership  
6 Conciliation  
5 Dissimulation  
Manipulation 4 Diplomacy  
3 Informing  
2 Conspiracy  Rejection 
1 Self-management  Neglect 
 
Figure  1-2: A ladder of community 
participation for underdeveloped 
countries by Choguill (1996) 
 
As depicted above, both the Arnstein and the Choguill ladders show that 
regardless of whether projects are occurring in developed or underdeveloped countries, 
maximum community participation can only be achieved if communities are empowered 
and have adequate influence in development projects. Even though these ladders provide 
typologies of community participation under normal environmental and political 
circumstances in developed and developing countries, they can also facilitate 
understanding of the overall concept and the different levels of community participation 
in post-disaster reconstruction projects. 
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Contemporary research into post-disaster housing reconstruction advocates that 
effective participation of all stakeholders, particularly the inclusion of affected 
communities in reconstruction, is an important principle for successful projects (Lawther 
2009; Barakat 2003; Barenstein 2006; Pearce 2003). Affected communities that are 
professionally informed and adequately empowered are able to participate effectively in 
all phases of post-disaster reconstruction (Duxbury and Dickinson 2007; Denters and 
Klok 2010; Chen, Liu and Chan 2006; Lawther 2009). The inclusion of affected 
communities in reconstruction is particularly important when post-disaster 
reconstruction projects are implemented by governmental organisations (GOs) with no 
effective or current post-disaster strategies, international humanitarian non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs), or private sub-contractors (Arnold 2006; Oliver-Smith 1996; 
Hayles 2010). It is generally believed that effective participation enables affected 
communities to influence decision-making in all phases of reconstruction projects. 
However, the often ill-designed participatory approach (Alam 2010; Saunders 2004),  
resulting from the lack of a specific framework to logically guide community 
participation processes leads to undesirable project outcomes (Davidson et al. 2007).  
Afghanistan has been the scene of major reconstruction works over the past 
decade. After the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, the military intervention by the 
coalition forces and the arrival of an unprecedented amount of foreign aid resulted in a 
new era of rehabilitation and reconstruction in Afghanistan. Despite substantial financial 
aid having arrived in, or transitioned through Afghanistan, much of it has so far done 
little good to support any of the planned or ongoing reconstruction efforts. According to 
a survey conducted by the UNHCR (2013), of the 5.7 million refugees who have so far 
returned to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, many were not able to reintegrate 
into their communities due to the lack of suitable land and shelter. Sopko (2012) in his 
report to the United States Congress warns that the U.S. government’s $400 million 
donation for Afghanistan reconstruction in 2011 may ultimately be wasted due to poor 
project performance. The author (ibid 2012) has also expressed concerns that the gap 
already existing between the sponsor organisations and the affected communities was 
increasing and the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan were ineffectual due to the lack 
of community support. The same report (Sopko 2012) to the United States Congress 
stresses the importance of community involvement in reconstruction. It (ibid 2012) also 
highlights that achieving a desirable reconstruction outcome necessitates a revision in the 
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current guidelines and project selection criteria, in order to encompass vital community 
participation elements and to rehabilitate the fast fading trust. 
1.2 PURPOSE 
The important role of the affected communities in reconstruction has long been 
acknowledged by academics, practitioners of reconstruction and major sponsor 
organisations. It cannot be disputed that affected people are in fact the prime 
stakeholders of reconstruction projects and that their involvement ultimately leads to 
more sustainable project outcomes. Project success is viewed as being directly 
proportional to the level of community engagement in reconstruction, which means that 
the more effective the participation of the affected community, the higher the chances of 
project success. However, whilst community participation is important for delivering 
reconstruction projects successfully, affected beneficiaries can only participate 
effectively in rebuilding their houses if they have the power to influence decision 
making, are adequately equipped with the necessary knowledge about reconstruction and 
have the skills required for the actual rebuilding works. Any lack of adequate decision 
making power and functional capacity in the affected community may lead to delays in 
completing reconstruction projects. Community involvement driven by a lack of 
understanding of the concept of “participation”, and/or poor overall participatory 
approach, often leads to unsatisfactory project results.  
This research investigates the current contextual factors affecting the outcomes 
of post-disaster reconstruction projects. It then examines the challenges for effective 
community participation and explains how these challenges impact community 
participation. Finally, it explains how the impact of these challenges can be eliminated or 
reduced to allow for more effective community participation in post-disaster 
reconstruction projects.  
1.3 RESEARCH AIM 
The aim of this study was to develop a framework for community participation 
that can inform a participatory approach more effectively when planning and developing 
post-disaster reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. The sample population for this 
study was drawn from the recipients of some post-disaster reconstruction projects, and 
concerned donor organisations and implementing partners operating in Afghanistan. 
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Research activities included reviewing the extant literature, administering a 
questionnaire survey, conducting interviews with experts, and data analysis. Research 
findings were utilised to develop a logical framework for community participation in 
post-disaster reconstruction projects. 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE 
Post-disaster reconstruction projects are extremely dynamic and for this reason 
necessitate effective community participation. Nevertheless, reconstruction practices and 
outcomes continuously move away from the policy statements leading to a general 
perception that reconstruction projects often fail to satisfy the needs of affected 
communities. Several authors and practitioners of reconstruction argue that in many 
cases the failure to effectively respond to community needs for housing reconstruction 
can be linked back to the lack of an absolute and in-depth understanding of the post-
disaster environment to guide effective community participation.   
Although some organisations (such as the Sphere Project, the World Bank and 
the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance [ALNAP]) have 
developed a number of handbooks and minimum quality standards for post-disaster 
recovery and reconstruction, they do not provide a complete checklist of all that needs to 
be done in the variety of contexts that exist. These guidelines, although not explicitly 
prepared for participatory implementation of post-disaster reconstruction projects in 
Afghanistan, do provide useful universal guidance and are considered a basis of good 
practices. General guidelines, however, cannot always be applied uniformly to all 
projects regardless of their context. According to Davidson (2010), post-disaster 
reconstruction projects are diverse in nature, meaning that they widely vary in scale 
having their own specific requirements. Therefore, reconstruction projects are more 
likely to be successful if they are guided by a strategy that is well-suited to the context in 
which they are implemented. 
This research identifies factors affecting community participation in post-disaster 
reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. The research provides analysis of factors 
characterising the complex nature of reconstruction projects, and the extreme situations 
and conditions in which these projects may be required to operate. In the most 
challenging environments such as that found in Afghanistan, natural disasters coupled 
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with the effects of a prolonged war can result in the emergence of all these factors, 
combining to have a negative impact on community participation in reconstruction.  
The outcome of this research will add to the current knowledge of post-disaster 
reconstruction projects and complement the existing guidelines. With the aim of 
improving community participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects in 
Afghanistan, this study will produce a logical framework for community participation, to 
assist both the affected communities and non-governmental aid organisations to 
effectively collaborate and so achieve more sustainable project outcomes.  
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE 
The evidence presented thus far in this chapter advocates that community 
participation is vital for achieving the immediate, as well as the long term, strategic 
objectives of post-disaster reconstruction projects. However, community participation in 
reconstruction projects is not always evident in the vicinity of reconstruction and as a 
result many reconstruction projects either completely fail to meet their objectives or 
undergo massive modification by the beneficiaries after completion. This research sets 
out the current issues affecting community participation in reconstruction and in 
particular investigates the specific challenges for community participation in post-
disaster reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. 
This thesis consists of the following chapters:  
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis. It presents the structure of the thesis and briefly 
touches upon the current issues in post-disaster reconstruction projects.  
Chapter 2 reviews the extant and current literatures of reconstruction. It begins 
with a discussion of some of the critical success factors for reconstruction projects. The 
chapter then follows on to explain the main factors contributing to the failure of these 
projects, and then identifies and explains some of the important challenges for 
community participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects. The chapter concludes 
with a brief explanation of the concept of a logical framework, employed as a guide in 
this research, to logically present information about the key components to be considered 
for community participation in reconstruction projects.  
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Founded on these chapters, Chapter 3 sets the conceptual framework for the 
research leading to the establishment of the research questions to achieve the research 
aim: 
1- What are the major challenges (barriers) for community participation? 
2- How do these barriers impact community participation? 
3- How can the impact of these challenges be eliminated or reduced? 
The chapter discusses the rationale for choosing the mixed methods research for 
collecting and analysing the required data.  
Chapter 4 reports on the findings of the online questionnaire survey. It 
investigates fundamental factors that are believed to pose critical challenges for effective 
community involvement in post-disaster reconstruction that ultimately lead to a 
reduction of stakeholder satisfaction.  
Chapters 5 and 6 report on the results of the qualitative interviews. Both chapters 
explain in detail the major challenges for community participation in post-disaster 
reconstruction. Chapter 5 explains the nature of these challenges and the ways in which 
they negatively impact community participation. Chapter 6 firstly provides a detailed 
description of the outputs that need to be attained to eliminate or reduce the impact of 
these challenges, and then explains the major project assumptions (conditions) that need 
to be met.  
Chapter 7 discusses the main findings of the research and provides answers to the 
three research questions.  
Chapter 8, which is also the last chapter, presents a summary of the main 
findings, the research contribution and limitations of the research. The chapter concludes 
this study by providing recommendations for further research in the area of post-disaster 
project management. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this literature review is to develop a written perspective, driven 
by credible evidence from the existing body of knowledge about post-disaster 
reconstruction project management, which will logically justify and support the thesis 
conclusions. Machi and McEvoy (2009, 4) define a literature review as: 
“... a written document that presents a logically argued case founded on a 
comprehensive understanding of the current state of knowledge about a topic 
of study. This case establishes a convincing thesis to answer the study’s 
questions”. 
This literature review, building on the work of Machi and McEvoy (2009, 61) 
will use two propositions, namely the argument of discovery and the argument of 
advocacy to support the research. The argument of discovery will attempt to explain 
what is known about post-disaster reconstruction practices and the argument of advocacy 
will analyse and critique the resultant explanation and this in turn will facilitate the 
development of research questions.  With the aim of exploring the current literature on 
post-disaster reconstruction projects, this chapter has been structured as follows: in 
Section 2.2 case studies of past projects from around the world are examined and factors 
which positively support and influence post-disaster reconstruction outcomes are 
identified. Section 2.3 outlines and discusses factors that contribute to the failure of post-
disaster reconstruction projects and the subsequent immediate and long term negative 
impacts of failure on project outcomes. Section 2.4 identifies lack of community 
participation as being the major factor for project failure. The section then outlines and 
discusses some of the common barriers for effective community participation in post-
disaster reconstruction projects. 
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2.2 POST-DISASTER HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS – 
SUCCESS FACTORS 
The reconstruction of domestic dwellings in large quantities after a significant 
disaster often faces many socio-economic, cultural, religious, political and 
environmental challenges and is a daunting task (Blanco et al. 2009; Hutanuwatr, Bolin 
and Pijawka 2012; Rafieian and Asgary 2013). Reconstruction projects are constantly 
threatened by such challenges right from their initiation through to their closure. For 
example Özerdem and Rufini (2013) in their study of post-disaster reconstruction in 
L’Aquila, Italy, identified that weak project ownership by the affected community 
resulting from the political instability at a local level, lack of coordination of 
reconstruction efforts and widespread corruption, created real challenges for 
reconstruction, leading to major delays in project implementation and ineffectual project 
outcomes thus far. The same authors (ibid 2013) argue that the root problem leading to 
these major challenges has been the politicisation of the L’Aquila reconstruction by the 
then prime minister Silvio Berlusconi. 
In another example, Pyles (2007) in her study of “Community Organizing for 
Social Development” argues that poor consideration of community organising is a 
challenge for social development of affected communities after a disaster. Williams 
(2006) undertook a study of community participation in post-apartheid South Africa and 
revealed that the lack of existence of any community organisations was the main 
impediment to effective community participation in reconstruction. Hayles’ (2010) 
research into challenges for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in post-
disaster reconstruction identified that amongst other, the lack of an appropriate 
mechanism for engaging the affected communities in reconstruction presented a major 
challenge for implementing agencies to achieve project objectives. In another instance, 
Fayazi (2003) compared the outcome of two different methods used in the reconstruction 
of permanent houses after the Manjil earthquake in 1990. The author (ibid. 2011) 
identified that the absence of an appropriate reconstruction program, neglect of the main 
principles of traditional architecture and failure to consider environmental effects on 
buildings were some of the main problems encountered during the rebuilding of 
permanent houses. Although some efforts have been made in the past by both 
professional bodies and academic researchers to determine the most common factors 
contributing to the poor performance and reasons for failure of some of the least 
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successful projects, post-disaster reconstruction management and planning as a whole 
and in particular factors supporting reconstruction still remain quite under-researched. 
This section outlines and discusses factors that significantly contribute to the successful 
delivery of post-disaster housing reconstruction projects. 
2.2.1 Community Participation 
Although those people and communities directly affected by a disaster are the 
first to engage with the emergency, they are often perceived as being mere victims rather 
than the potential critical driving force behind reconstruction (Jha et al. 2010; Pius 
Mulwanda 1992; Hutanuwatr, Bolin and Pijawka 2012). This leads to a neglect of the 
philosophy that shelter is in fact a process that is directly linked to the very notion that 
survivors are active stakeholders of reconstruction, rather than passive recipients of 
humanitarian assistance (Fan 2012).   
 Local communities and the survivors of disasters play a crucial role in post-
disaster reconstruction and their participation ultimately determines project success 
(Lawther 2009; Lyons 2009; Lemanski 2008; IFRC and ICRC1994). Post-disaster 
reconstruction is a complex and highly demanding process that involves a number of 
different and well coordinated courses of action. Therefore, it is vital  that these complex 
activities are well planned (Roseberry 2008) and subject to thorough consultation, and 
effective collaboration with a  wide range of community members (John 2008; Pius 
Mulwanda 1992; Olshansky, Hopkins and Johnson 2012). Since community members 
have the most knowledge about their own communities and specific building 
requirements, often possessing a good technical knowledge of appropriate building 
techniques, it is critical to involve them when conducting community needs assessments 
and planning reconstruction projects (Lawther 2009). Communities must also be 
encouraged and supported to use their own reconstruction techniques when rebuilding 
their houses (Pomeroy et al. 2006; Jha et al. 2010; Gaillard and Texier 2010; 
Kaklauskas, Amaratunga and Haigh 2009; Geis 2000; Ganapati and Ganapati 2009). 
Communities play a vital role in rescuing human lives and reducing personnel 
casualty during the immediate post-disaster emergency and humanitarian relief phases 
(Shaw 2006; Dikmen 2005). Affected people also have an important role to play in 
planning and developing the medium-term recovery and long-term reconstruction; they 
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are active collaborators with systematic contribution in the process of building 
community resilience and enhancing the overall capacity for disaster reduction (Zhang, 
Yi and Zhao 2013). 
In the aftermath of a large disaster, governments are required to make many 
important decisions at the same time in order to respond to the fast evolving emergency. 
However, in the wake of a major disaster, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, a 
government’s ability to rapidly gather information about the scale of the disaster to plan 
and coordinate emergency recovery and the subsequent reconstruction of hundreds of 
communities can be severely weakened or obliterated (Storr and Haeffele-Balch 2012). 
In such circumstances, affected people can help and support the gathering and 
disseminating of important information directly from the affected area to the local and 
central authorities (Olshansky, Hopkins and Johnson 2012).  
A study of community participation in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami revealed the significant role that the Aceh-Indonesia community played in 
disseminating information about the scale and effect of the disaster to relief agencies, 
when many government units did not function and could not provide this critical 
information. The information provided by local communities in Aceh-Indonesia, 
expedited relief efforts and established the way forward for planning of post-disaster 
reconstruction (Steinberg 2007). Affected communities in Aceh-Indonesia also played a 
key role in establishing the identities of those individuals and families affected by the 
Tsunami, and their eligibility for assistance (Da Silva and Batchelor 2010; Fan 2012). 
An analysis of the factors contributing to success, failures and processes of two housing 
reconstruction policies adopted in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami 
concluded that owner-driven programmes in Sri Lanka had higher success rates than 
donor-assisted programmes. While the number of dwellings produced by owner-driven 
programmes reached 48,981 (73% of all houses) by December 2006 (two years after the 
tsunami), the number of houses produced through donor-assisted programmes remained 
at only 12,207 (19% of all houses) (Lyons 2009).  
According to Andrew et al. (2013), project sustainability is directly linked to the 
appropriateness of the approach to reconstruction. These authors argue that of the 
different approaches to the reconstruction of domestic dwellings, an owner-driven 
approach, if adopted successfully, has great chances of achieving sustainable project 
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outcomes. The opportunity for the affected communities to adopt the coping strategies of 
their choice to reduce the impact of future disasters, with the immediate benefit of 
increasing morale, self-esteem, and greater sense of project ownership, is the simplest 
logic and the foundation for adopting an owner-driven approach.  
Thus, it is clear that community participation is important at all stages of post-
disaster reconstruction, and since a community is composed of different groups of 
people, suitable methods to actively include and encourage these groups in the process of 
reconstruction need to be devised (Lloyd-Jones 2006). Attention must be paid to ensure 
that disadvantaged members of the affected communities, such as vulnerable women, 
children, the elderly and persons with disabilities (El-Masri and Tipple 2002; Pyles 
2007; Lankatilleke 2010; Leon et al. 2009; Lloyd-Jones 2006; Juran 2012) are properly 
included in the reconstruction process, and that the design of post-disaster reconstruction 
projects responds to their fundamental requirements (Barakat 2003; Snider and Takeda 
2008; Krishnadas 2007). Effective participation must begin with, and be promoted by, 
effective community empowerment (El-Masri and Tipple 2002). Empowering affected 
communities to participate in reconstruction enables them to have their input in decisions 
that are important for their immediate recovery and building desirable resilience; as well 
as to improve their capabilities for further strategic development (Peng et al. 2013). 
2.2.2 Community Empowerment 
Empowering communities to participate in reconstruction can also provide an 
opportunity for community members to contribute their knowledge and skills to the 
process that will in turn most deeply affect their future lives. Empowerment is made 
possible when affected communities are effectively involved in all stages of the post-
disaster reconstruction (Jha et al. 2010; Peng et al. 2013). Highlighting the existing 
complex relationships between the multiple stakeholders, and the significance of these 
relationships in post-disaster reconstruction, Davidson (2010) argues that the selection of 
procurement strategies must best suit the requirements of the reconstruction programme. 
In the context of post-disaster reconstruction and disaster management, empowering 
local communities should not be perceived as merely a technical capacity-building 
exercise. Rather, it should be seriously accepted as a holistic approach towards utilising 
local knowledge and involving affected communities and local institutions in the process 
of reconstruction (Allen 2006). 
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Community empowerment in a post-disaster project must include improving 
community access to information and services, and thus enabling community 
participation in decision-making (Maier 2001; Bosher and Dainty 2011; Maginn 2007) 
and increasing control over the procurement and consumption of local and natural 
resources (Pomeroy et al. 2006; Alireza 2008). Building local capacity is vital for 
effective participation during reconstruction as well as for producing a more sustainable 
built environment (Pyles 2007; Allen 2006; Pomeroy et al. 2006; Hayles 2010). After the 
2006 Jogjakarta earthquake in Indonesia, a cash grant for construction materials and a 
skills exchange reconstruction project facilitated the building of 12,250 shelters in 10 
months; and in Kenya after the violence surrounding the 2008 election, the affected 
community was successful in building 255 transitional shelters. The Kenyan pilot shelter 
project was successful mainly because the community received technical training and 
also construction materials prior to project implementation (Leon et al. 2009). Case 
studies relating to the transitional settlement and shelter processes in Afghanistan, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan, which 
were compiled and analysed by these authors (ibid. 2009), revealed that empowerment 
enabled affected communities to participate more productively in a transitional 
settlement and building of sustainable houses. The work and involvement of Denise 
Thornton, a resident of New Orleans, provides a prominent example of community 
participation in reconstruction. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Thornton’s 
dedication and motivation to rebuild her destroyed house inspired the entire community 
to return to their devastated homes and demonstrated to them that rebuilding was indeed 
possible (Maret and Amdal 2010).  
After the 2004 Indian tsunami hit Thailand, a community institution building 
initiative was undertaken by a Thai advocacy group to respond to the chaotic and 
challenging situation that posed critical barriers for managing temporary housing at one 
of the housing camps for displaced people. From the very onset, the planning for 
establishing the community centre was driven by a different approach to the disaster 
affected communities (Hutanuwatr, Bolin and Pijawka 2012). The theoretical 
underpinnings that affected people are not mere victims of a disaster, as is the cultural 
perception of many aid organisations, but are the principal owners of reconstruction 
projects, were adopted and applied in the Thai example. The community centre, which 
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initially comprised a small community group, recruited the affected people from within 
the temporary camp to participate in disaster relief management activities. These 
members were then tasked to empower other residents to select and introduce their 
representatives for the newly established community management committee. As more 
members of the affected community joined the community centre, more small 
committees were created to focus on other specific issues such as camp security, the 
provision of basic services to the affected people, managing donations and participating 
in discussions about the reconstruction of permanent houses. This case study (2012) 
clearly illustrates the importance of empowering communities to take responsibilities for 
organising themselves as a cohesive community to manage the many uncertainties and 
unforseen challenges that disasters impose on them. 
Interestingly, the Thai community centre, although initially established to 
manage emergency relief response, did not cease functioning once the emergency phase 
was over. In order to provide further assistance to the affected displaced people living in 
the relief camp (3,500 internally displaced persons from Bann Hadd Diaw), the 
community centre took on another strategic initiative to organise its own community 
bank. The bank, initially established to manage donations, is now providing microcredit 
loans for small businesses. The profit that the bank generates is largely used for 
supporting community welfare programmes in the affected area. The community centre 
also played a crucial role in building community resilience by providing better security 
to the affected community and conducting regular emergency response exercises as part 
of the preparedness and evacuation strategy.  As reported by the same authors (ibid 
2012), in a little over three years time after the tsunami, as a result of this collaborative 
initiative by the affected people, 95% of those displaced were able to move to their 
newly constructed permanent dwellings.  
As part of the integrated approach to successful post-disaster reconstruction 
management, community participation and empowerment require a strong line of 
communication and information dissemination (Lawther 2009). 
2.2.3 Communication and Information Dissemination 
In post-disaster situations, it is imperative to establish a strong and reliable line of 
communication and an information dissemination system. People’s awareness of the 
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existing opportunities for participation and their relevant importance for immediate 
recovery and long term housing reconstruction is crucial (Lawther 2009; Galtung and 
Tisné 2009). According to (PMI 2008, 243), effective communication establishes a 
bridge between various stakeholders involved in a project. It helps everyone involved to 
understand the cultural and organisational backgrounds of the project stakeholders, their 
interests in, and expectations from, the project outcomes as well as the context in which 
the project operates.  In May 2000, Roombeek, a city of Enshede in the Netherlands, was 
destroyed by the explosion of fireworks stock being stored in a warehouse (Denters and 
Klok 2010). A case study of the post-disaster reconstruction conducted by these authors 
(ibid. 2010) revealed that in the aftermath of the explosion, the established information 
rules had been successful in stimulating wider public participation in rebuilding 
Roombeek. These rules ensured that the rebuilding process was transparent and that 
residents were well informed of the participatory process and the available opportunities 
for participation. Chang et al. (2011), in their investigation of reconstruction resourcing 
after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China, concluded that post-disaster 
environments are complex and dynamic, necessitating a great degree of resources 
coordination and communication among stakeholders. These authors (ibid 2011) suggest 
that well established and successful resource coordination requires systematic data 
collection, good information systems, and communication and coordination 
mechanisms. In relation to the significance of communication and information 
dissemination in post-disaster reconstruction, El-Masri and Tipple (2002) argue that 
local authorities should promote dissemination of knowledge about the cultural and 
social conditions of the affected communities amongst stakeholders. 
2.2.4 Community Culture and Beliefs 
An understanding of the community involved in reconstruction is of the utmost 
importance in establishing a criterion for delivering successful projects and managing 
community participation (Allen 2006). Housing design must meet both the socio-
economic and cultural requirements of the affected communities and should also allow 
for future expansion of such accommodation based on people’s changing needs (Diacon 
1997; El-Masri and Tipple 2002). Housing reconstruction as a process should not be 
limited to, or focused only on, producing physical residential dwellings. It must ensure 
that the social, cultural, psychological and economic needs of the various stakeholders, 
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particularly those of the affected people, are identified, defined and responded to 
throughout the project lifecycle (Nadiruzzaman and Kanti Paul 2013). 
The role of religious groups can be vital in mobilising and persuading affected 
communities to return to the affected area and actively participate in rebuilding their 
houses (Denhart 2009). As a direct result of Hurricane Katrina, 1,300 people died and 
1,000,000 were evacuated (Colten, Kates and Laska 2008). In order to rebuild New 
Orleans in the aftermath of Katrina, the affected communities had to make the difficult 
decision to return to the devastated area, which largely depended on whether their 
displaced neighbours also returned. The main issue affecting decision-making was the 
ambiguity as to whether returning individually to the original places was beneficial in the 
long term. Since individual families could only benefit if they all returned as a 
community and reconstructed disrupted social networks, each individual decision to 
return and participate in reconstruction was largely influenced by the decisions of other 
community members (Grube and Storr 2013).  
In this uncertain and difficult time, members of the Mary Queen of Vietnam 
(MQVN) Catholic Church in New Orleans East played a key role in organising and 
mobilising a wider displaced population through working with its lay leadership, 
facilitating a great level of social coordination and providing emergency assistance to 
returnees (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2009). Although MQVN assisted the most affected 
community severely suffering from the disaster, it had the highest returning population 
rates in the whole of New Orleans. MQVN soon became an extraordinary news story 
because of their success in reconstructing their damaged houses, returning the 
community operation back to normal faster than many other parts of the city. Although 
the MQVN community had over 12 ft of flooding in some areas, the community was one 
of the fastest to rebound. The success that the MQVN achieved can be linked back to 
their capacity for social coordination, the immense leadership role demonstrated by the 
church leaders, and the stable social networks that existed prior to Katrina (Grube and 
Storr 2013).    
Alexander (2004) suggests that giving consideration to the affected communities’ 
emotional and economic attachment to their home areas increases the chances of success 
as compared to adopting a more radical solution that has a propensity to ignore past 
attachments. El-Masri and Kellett (2001) in their study of post-war reconstruction in the 
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village of al Burjain in Lebanon, highlighted that even though the displaced members of 
the affected community had total control over the reconstruction of their new houses in 
the host village, most of them expressed strong positive attachment towards their original 
villages and dwellings and had a strong desire to return. The authors (ibid 2001) 
concluded that it is imperative to consider both the socio-economic and cultural aspects 
when planning reconstruction. According to Lijo and Ramesh (2012) the role of 
religious institutions can be particularly important in providing relief and recovery 
assistance to people in underdeveloped areas who might already be challenged by 
extreme poverty, lack of basic infrastructure and unstable sources of livelihood.  
Following a major disaster, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami or the 2005 
Hurricane Katrina, religious institutions such as local mosques and churches can develop 
as an integral part in the recovery and reconstruction process by organising and 
mobilising volunteers, serving as focal points (Grube and Storr 2013), facilitating crucial 
meetings, and providing psychological support to the survivors of disasters (Storr and 
Haeffele-Balch 2012).   
2.2.5 Support from Local Government 
Following large scale disasters, the rebuilding of houses requires a more 
contributive community capacity that may not be immediately available locally. So, the 
affected members may not be able to reconstruct their houses without substantial 
external support (Alam 2010). Central and local governments have considerable 
discretion in exercising their powers and responsibilities and in planning, coordinating 
and directing national and local resources towards helping the affected areas. 
Governments play a vital role in establishing budget priorities and are able to establish 
effective lines of information dissemination that can help other stakeholders make more 
informed and logical decisions (Olshansky et al. 2008). Therefore, incorporating the 
initiatives from local governments in disaster management is another important 
contributor to effective post-disaster response (Ye and Okada 2002). As mentioned 
previously, communities often possess great intellectual and physical resources; 
however, these resources may be obliterated by the disaster/displacement event. While a 
community may still be able to transform itself without external aid, effective interaction 
with governments and non-governmental organisations through a well defined 
framework can substantially expedite the reconstruction process (Gauthamadas, Negi 
and Shyamprasad 2005).  
Chapter 2 - Literature Review  
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 19 
A comparative case study of factors affecting resource availability following the 
2004 Indian tsunami that hit Indonesian coasts, and also the Wenchuan earthquake in 
China, conducted by Chang et al. (2012), revealed that the subsequent legislation and 
policies established by the Chinese government in response to the disaster played a 
significant determining role in resourcing post-Wenchuan earthquake reconstruction as 
well as its future development. Unlike the Indonesian post-tsunami reconstruction policy 
that heavily relied on NGOs (often without adequate resourcing capacity) for resourcing 
local government and communities, the policy formulated by the Chinese government 
was largely founded on nation-wide resources mobilisation and deployment. According 
to these authors (2012) the policy formulated by the Chinese government was more 
effective, achieving better results than the one formulated by BRR (Badan Rehabilitasi 
dan Rekonstruksi) in Indonesia.       
In the aftermath of the May 2000 fireworks store explosion, the role of the 
Roombeek-Netherlands local government in providing opportunities for participation in 
rebuilding the city was critical (Denters and Klok 2010). During the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami in 2004, the water that severely devastated Tamil Nadu (India) penetrated 
almost 1.5 kms inland. An estimated 984,564 people were affected and 126,182 houses 
damaged or completely wiped out (Srinivasan and Nagaraj 2006). In an effort to bring 
life back to normality, a massive reconstruction effort had to be undertaken. To 
effectively coordinate and strengthen the recovery mechanism, the state government 
selected personnel from different departments across the state. These personnel were 
placed at different managerial levels and were delegated considerable decision making 
and financial authority. The study conducted by these authors (ibid 2006) revealed that 
the level of administrative authority and the lack of political and bureaucratic influence 
over the recovery process led to a more effective response compared to other states and 
even countries.  
Whilst it is true that local community participation is possible even without the 
commitment from local governments or non-governmental agencies, often more 
successful participation is assured by such commitment from, and effective cooperation 
of, the external agencies (Lawther 2009). The role of local government is crucial in 
enhancing the resultant human settlements and developing resilient communities. Local 
authorities are responsible for the implementation of development projects and 
application of central government policies (El-Masri and Tipple 2002). Pyles (2007) 
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advocates that community based reconstruction efforts must involve participation from 
the most vulnerable members in order to further strengthen the capacity of local 
community and government.  
This section touched upon some of the common factors that are believed to 
impact positively on the outcomes of post-disaster housing reconstruction projects. The 
next section will present a review of the common factors that negatively impact on the 
outcome of such projects. 
2.3 POST-DISASTER HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS – 
FACTORS FOR FAILURE 
Unlike most normal construction projects, post-disaster housing projects are 
diverse in nature, have unique socio-cultural and economical requirements and are 
extremely dynamic and thus necessitate a meaningful and dynamic response (Davidson 
2010; Fan 2012; Doberstein and Stager 2013). As explained by Fan (2012), the concept 
of ‘shelter as a process’ is neither simple nor straightforward to implement. 
Post-disaster reconstruction practices that lack a strategy compatible with,  the 
severity of disaster, community culture and socio-economic requirements, environmental 
condition, government legislations, and technical and technological situations, frequently 
fail to operate and respond effectively to the needs of the wider affected population 
(Kaklauskas, Amaratunga and Haigh 2009). In the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami, at least 15 government and NGO relief organisations were established to help a 
population of 6000 people in Bann Hadd Diaw, Thailand. Since these organisations had 
an inflexible and already specified (rather than a well designed community rehabilitation 
process) recovery mission, they failed to address adequately the fundamental political-
economic issues of the affected population, leading to further vulnerability rather than 
improving community resilience. The already specified activity scope meant that no 
room was left to accommodate what these organisations were at the time unaware of, 
when they were planning their recovery efforts (Hutanuwatr, Bolin and Pijawka 2012). 
Despite the identification of the need for some further systematic research 
(Amaratunga and Haigh 2010), the strengthened global interest amongst media, 
government/non-governmental organisations and academics in the area of post-disaster 
reconstruction, and an already established requirement (Blanco et al. 2009) to find ways 
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to help improve the current practices employed for post-disaster reconstruction projects 
(Saunders 2004; Lloyd-Jones 2006), this subject area continues to remain poorly 
researched (Chang et al. 2010).  
Factors that frequently pose real threats to the eventual success of reconstruction 
projects are rarely given appropriate consideration when such projects are being planned 
and designed. Research into past reconstruction practices has shown that ignoring these 
factors altogether, or failing to give them meaningful consideration, can effect housing 
reconstruction projects so that they either miss their targets altogether, or undergo serious 
modifications after their occupancy, which subsequently results in an overall loss of 
project resources. In spite of the growing literature focusing on emergency recovery, 
little work has thus far been done to systematically identify and investigate the impact of 
socio-cultural, economic, and environmental factors on housing reconstruction. As 
argued by Jordan and Javernick-Will (2013) there is little expert knowledge about how 
the success of community rehabilitation should be measured. The authors (ibid 2013) 
suggest that any theories supporting post-disaster recovery and reconstruction must 
include consideration of physical, social, economic and natural environment dimensions. 
This section outlines and discusses some of the factors that contribute to the failure of 
post-disaster housing reconstruction projects and the subsequent immediate and long 
term negative impacts of failure on project outcomes. 
2.3.1 Lack of Community Participation  
Case studies of past post-disaster reconstruction projects indicate that projects 
without a local component or active community involvement stand a greater chance of 
falling flat and destroying community cohesion (Alam 2010; Lemanski 2008; Galtung 
and Tisné 2009; Dikmen 2005; Johnson, Lizarralde and Davidson 2006; Hayles 2010; 
Ophiyandri, Amaratunga and Pathirage 2010). For example, a case study of a flood 
rehabilitation project in Bangladesh revealed that a public latrine built adjacent to 
neighbouring dwellings without prior community consultation caused severe tension 
among the neighbours (Alam 2010).  
A case study of public housing assistance by Nadiruzzaman and Bimal (2013) 
revealed the negative effects that the reconstruction strategy initiated by the government 
of Bangladesh without  community participation had on the overall coping ability of the 
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affected coastal communities following Cyclone Sidr in 2007. The approach to housing 
reconstruction was non-participatory mainly driven by contractors with no, or minimal, 
participation of the affected beneficiaries. The application of top-down design and the 
lack of input from the beneficiaries in the actual reconstruction phase, resulted in poor 
final housing quality in contrast to what initially was promised by the government. The 
government’s housing strategy failed to provide adequate living space for the numerous 
extended families, leading to frustration among the affected villagers. Many of the 
affected communities accused the government of being unfair towards disadvantaged 
members as in many instances larger families received equal or smaller size space then 
that given to the unmarried sons of rich families. In addition, since the affected 
beneficiaries did not have input in the design, these single room-houses did not 
sensitively accommodate many desired cultural and social elements. The houses did not 
provide adequate privacy for women, had significant construction defects (lacked proper 
roofing - too hot during summer and very cold during winter) and were generally found 
to be uninhabitable. Again as had been the case with many failed reconstruction projects 
in the past, these houses were either not occupied at all or abandoned shortly after their 
initial occupancy.  
In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 in Aceh-Indonesia many 
non-governmental organisations outsourced what initially was to be a purely community 
driven effort, and tendered works directly to large construction companies. The 
companies did not encourage community participation and so did not pay any attention 
to the needs of the affected beneficiaries. The houses built by these companies were 
ultimately found to be structurally defective, culturally inappropriate and failed to meet 
the essential budgetary requirements, thus creating further tension and anger within the 
affected Acehnese communities. The lack of permitted community involvement 
subsequently led many families to refuse to live in the houses (Smirl 2008). A study by 
Dikmen (2005) also revealed that hasty decisions made by government authorities, 
without a thorough analysis of the needs of the affected beneficiaries, led to great 
dissatisfaction with a post-disaster housing reconstruction project in Cankiri, Turkey. 
A further example of government agencies often making hasty decisions without 
consulting with affected communities, can be drawn from a Sri Lankan case study. After 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, the government of Sri Lanka developed a buffer-
zone policy preventing building of certain structures within perceived tsunami extended 
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tide reach areas without considering its socio-economic impact on affected communities. 
The policy had many practical flaws and led to delays in the recovery of affected coastal 
communities. After disrupting community life and reconstruction efforts for many 
months, the policy was subsequently amended in December 2005 to reduce the buffer-
zone (Shaw and Ahmed 2010; Boano 2009).     
Another example of the adverse effects of excluding communities from 
participation in post-disaster reconstruction can be found in the case of Gujarat, India. 
After the Gujarat earthquake in 2001, a contractor-driven method of reconstruction was 
adopted which did not allow affected communities to have effective involvement in the 
reconstruction process, leading to great loss of people’s historical and cultural identity 
and negative long term psycho-social consequences (Barenstein 2010).  
In another Indian case in Cuddalore,  there was a perceived negative impact due 
to poor coordination with the local community; the large amount of project funding 
available to local and international NGOs for recovery and reconstruction of the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami-affected Cuddalore coast led to intense competition among the 
organisations involved in implementing aid.  In an attempt to secure their position in the 
relief effort and ensure their involvement in post-tsunami reconstruction by any means, 
aid organisations offered a diverse range of appealing assets to the affected coastal 
communities. This initiative was poorly coordinated, not driven by community 
participation, and exhibited a lack of awareness of the potential socio-economic, cultural 
and environmental impacts. This eventually triggered the prevailing underlying tensions 
that already existed in an ethnically sensitive environment (Gauthamadas, Negi and 
Shyamprasad 2005).  
After the destruction of Sri Lankan coastal communities by the tsunami in 2004, 
Kumburupiddi site (located a long distance away from the sea in the Trincomalle 
district) was identified as a new site for building houses and for permanently relocating 
the affected fishing communities. The construction work at this site encountered two 
major problems: 1) the site was perceived to be ready for new construction, but in reality 
it required major pre-construction preparation work, and 2) there were six different 
international NGOs involved in construction programmes, each adopting diverse 
approaches, varying house designs and different time frames. This government initiative, 
which was implemented by INGOs without any community participation, led to great 
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anxiety amongst the affected population and delays in construction implementation. 
Both the new site and the design of the houses to be placed upon it did not meet the 
socio-economic and cultural needs of the affected community. In December 2005, the 
houses were handed over to the community, however, in April 2006, these houses still 
remained unoccupied and the beneficiaries had no desire to return to live in them (Boano 
2009). 
Based on these examples and on other research (Lizarralde, Johnson and 
Davidson 2010; Barakat 2003), ignoring the views of affected communities appears to 
always have produced negative impacts on the outcomes of reconstruction projects. In 
1970 after major earthquakes inflicted much damage and many deaths occurred in Peru 
and Turkey, governments in both countries having no previous experience or expertise in 
post-disaster reconstruction, began large reconstruction projects, often involving 
relocation. Affected communities were given no opportunities to participate in the 
process of project planning and subsequent execution, which meant that houses were 
built for people without any consideration of their specific needs and requirements 
(Blaikie et al. 1994) . A study conducted by Schilderman (2010) revealed that after forty 
years these houses still stood empty and the affected communities went back to their 
familiar old ways of building to provide accommodation for themselves. 
 A more recent example of the outcomes of disregarding community 
participation in post-disaster housing reconstruction occurred in the Australian-funded 
housing project “The Alice-Ghan” built 30 kilometres north of Kabul, Afghanistan. The 
intention of this project was to rehouse forcibly deported Afghan refugees back in their 
home country of Afghanistan. All major stakeholders, such as UNDP, CARE 
International and the Afghan Government, had their specific roles to play during the 
early and subsequent stages of the housing project; nonetheless, the most crucial 
stakeholder “the recipient community” was excluded. The project outcomes were 
reported as being unsuccessful, particularly in terms of meeting the socio-economic and 
cultural needs of the recipient community (Kelly 2010). 
Kelly (2010) further reports: 
 “Like every resident spoken to, Assadullah Mohammed Yacoub, 48, says he is 
grateful to the Australian government for its assistance but wishes it had asked 
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people what they needed instead of building a Western suburb in the middle of the 
Hindu Kush”.  
Although reconstruction of residential dwellings has increasingly been assigned 
to aid organisations, the complexity involved in the delivery of such projects has led 
many authors and shelter practitioners to question whether aid communities are truly 
able, as many would claim, to turn the concept of shelter as a participatory approach into 
reality on the ground. Fan (2012) argues that even though many aid organisations have 
strived to embrace the notion of community participation, so far there is little evidence to 
suggest that shelter as a process involving the affected communities has consistently 
been implemented successfully. 
2.3.2 Problems Associated With Community Participation 
Although community participation has been acknowledged as being vital for 
reconstruction projects, according to some authors, it can have long term negative 
impacts on community development if the basic principles of community participation 
are neglected (Mafukidze and Hoosen 2009). Such a contrary view is expressed in a 
study of community participation by Lizarralde and Massyn (2008) which concluded 
that in the African cities of Netreg, Freedom Park and Mfuleni, the community-based 
approach led to urban fragmentation and limited opportunities for economic growth. 
These authors (2008) also argue that the overall performance of low-cost housing 
projects does not necessarily depend on community participation and that some aspects 
of community participation need revision. 
In an effort to reconstruct houses for the community affected by the Indian 
Ocean tsunami in December 2004, Foundation of Goodness (FoG), a Sri Lankan local 
non-for-profit agency, invested substantial time and effort in designing two-storey 
houses. The design was carried out in consultation with the community and a model was 
produced before the construction work could actually begin. When initially polled, the 
community supported the building of two storey houses as they believed that the second 
floor would reduce vulnerability to future tsunami destruction and damage. However, 
problems started to emerge after the community moved in. They soon found that the 
kitchen did not allow for bio-fuel cooking, the stairs were too steep (which made it 
difficult for aged members to access the second floor) and there was a lack of outdoor 
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space. However, that was not the major problem; what could not have been easily 
predicted by the community during the design and implementation was the excessive 
heat that made the second floor uninhabitable. In this case the community had been 
consulted on a regular basis, however the lack of technical and environmental 
knowledge made community participation less effective leading to great dissatisfaction 
during post-construction occupancy (Shaw and Ahmed 2010).  
In another Sri Lankan case, the intended recipients in New Town and Mandanai 
were delegated the task of monitoring the construction work of their houses. This 
practice, coupled with the lack of technical knowledge led many recipients to jeopardise 
their entitlements by abusing their role, and in some cases becoming trouble makers 
rather than contributors (Shaw and Ahmed 2010).  
Choguill (1996) advocates that community control does not necessarily equate to 
success, supporting his statement by providing an example of a community initiated 
settlement project, Comuneros-2, in Cali-Colombia the "Corporación" (Ridgley 1989, 3) 
and for which community members attempted to resolve their water needs, bringing the 
project almost to the brink of total failure. Furthermore, adopting a community 
participation approach does not always establish grounds for full community 
mobilisation. In Sri Lanka, for example, some NGOs faced enormous challenges when 
beneficiaries lacked the desire to contribute to rebuilding their own houses and villages 
(Lyons 2009).  
In the Maldives, in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, the 
government allocated a plot of land to build 250 houses for an affected community. The 
community was invited to participate in the design phase of their houses. However, the 
government deliberately excluded them from the reconstruction process to avoid an 
over-reaction and unreasonable interference from owners excessively obsessed with the 
quality of “their” houses (Lawther 2009). 
Community participation if inaccurately defined can have a negative impact on 
project outcomes. This view is expressed by Ganapati and Ganapati (2009) in a case 
study of the World Bank’s housing reconstruction in Turkey. Although information in 
relation to housing characteristics was received by the planners, community participation 
largely remained problematic. Two main issues in relation to the process of community 
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involvement were identified. Firstly, community participation was limited to 
involvement of the project beneficiaries only. Secondly, the input from the local 
community was not included in the plans. Although the local government and 
community-based organisations had extensive information about local conditions and 
rich practical experiences from past disasters, their participation was limited to attending 
a few preliminary project planning meetings. This produced a narrowly defined scope 
based on only a facade of community participation and thus raised a number of concerns. 
One such concern resulted from the building of an unneeded extra school in the project 
area in Sirinkoy, but ignoring Saryli-Orcun where a school was actually required and 
should have formed a key part of the reconstruction. Project resources could have been 
directed to meeting more legitimate needs had the planners extended their views of 
community participation beyond merely including limiting the exposure of individual 
project recipients to attending a few secondary meetings.  
2.3.3 Relocation 
Planners and developers of post-disaster reconstruction projects have the 
tendency to relocate and resettle disaster-affected communities. Housing reconstruction 
projects implemented by national/international NGOs or governments, particularly those 
that necessitate relocating affected communities, are often determined by a rigid top-
down approach. Top-down approaches to housing reconstruction are characterised by 
reduced or total absence of community consultation and community involvement in 
planning and in the actual execution of reconstruction projects (Andrew et al. 2013).  
Contemporary literature advocates that “place” has a significant role in the 
establishment of community identities and the unique socio-cultural and historical life of 
community people (Oliver-Smith 1996). However, little consideration is often given to 
the significance of ‘place’ in the formation of community identity and socio-cultural and 
economic relations when relocation of affected communities is instigated (Oliver-Smith 
1996; Perry and Lindell 1997; Boano 2009).  
Research suggests that affected communities do not willingly accept relocation, 
which can often lead to further deprivation (Schilderman 2010).  In the wake of the 2009 
L’Aquila earthquake which occurred in the region of Abruzzo in central Italy, the Italian 
government’s attempt to relocate the affected communities to another place and build 
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completely new towns faced strong public opposition, exacerbating the existing tension 
in the communities. Since the government’s top-down approach was mainly driven by 
the government’s political interests and the interests of the private sector, the entire 
reconstruction effort suffered problems with inequality, a high level of corruption and 
alienation of the local community (Özerdem and Rufini 2013; Alexander 2012).   
A study of housing reconstruction by Dikmen (2005) following the earthquake of 
June 2000 in Cankiri, Turkey revealed that relocating communities from their original 
place can be problematic. The study indicated that houses reconstructed insitu were fully 
occupied, whereas, most of those constructed on new sites that did not consider the 
lifestyle of the beneficiaries, stood empty. 
The earthquake that killed nearly 20,000 people and affected 7,633 out of 18,356 
villages in Gujarat has been recorded as one of the deadliest and the most destructive 
earthquakes in India (UNDP 2001). Following the earthquake, the Gujarat State Disaster 
Management Authority (GSDMA), which was established by the state government, 
publicised its rehabilitation policy. The policy had three approaches; relocation of utterly 
destroyed villages, assistance for in-situ reconstruction of both severely damaged and of 
less affected villages and assistance for the reconstruction of houses and buildings in 
urban areas. A survey of three villages conducted in 2004 as a result of this policy 
approach, revealed that under the participatory approach 90.8 per cent of the recipients 
expressed satisfaction. However, this level declined to 71.8 per cent when houses were 
delivered by contractors. Amongst the three approaches, the least effective and least 
efficient was the donor-driven approach. This approach did not involve affected 
communities and failed to consider community needs. Since this approach involved 
relocation of the affected people it severely disrupted family networks and community 
cohesion. The outcome of this approach satisfied only 22.8 percent of the beneficiaries 
(Barenstein and Iyengar 2010). 
Both as a result of past practice and according to contemporary studies, all agree 
that community relocation needs thorough analysis and meaningful planning because it 
involves more than merely relocating a mass of physical bodies. Relocation is a risky 
endeavour that can result in project failure if it involves anything less than relocating the 
entire community (Boen and Jigyasu 2005). In Sri Lanka in 2004, the relocation of 
fishing communities many kilometres inland severely undermined people’s ability to 
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access their only livelihood, i.e., the sea. Not only the men, but also the women and 
children were devastated as they were no longer able to take up any sort of employment 
(Lyons 2009).  
2.3.4 Fraud, Corruption and Waste of Project Funds  
Unlike green field construction, post-disaster reconstruction is complex, dynamic 
and chaotic in nature (Davidson 2010; Chang et al. 2011; Olshansky et al. 2008; Lyons 
2010), which therefore represents many challenges (Roseberry 2008). The task of 
reconstruction, as indicated by Le Masurier, Rotimi and Wilkinson (2006) and Lloyd-
Jones (2006) necessitates a high level of coordination and a rigorous managerial 
approach. Besides the inherent challenges such as inflexible short deadlines, mobilising 
widely dispersed affected communities, budgetary constraints and at the same time 
ensuring housing quality (Roseberry 2008; Olshansky 2006), reconstruction projects can 
also fall prey to fraud and corruption resulting in huge losses of project funding (Lyons 
2009; Bosshard 2002; Alexander 2012). Although major disasters cause enormous 
destruction often resulting in long lasting suffering, they also bring about opportunities 
for advancement and developing community resilience. However, in the case of 
L’Aquila earthquake, the disaster and the subsequent politicisation of the reconstruction 
process did not only open up development opportunities but created favourable 
conditions which the local members of ‘the Mafia’ exploited and under which many 
corrupt entities formed (Alexander 2012). 
A substantial amount of project resources can also be wasted on managing and 
alleviating tension with the host governments. This is evident from a case study 
conducted in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 in Sri Lanka, where 
NGOs had to divert a considerable amount of their resources towards negotiating and 
restoring relations with the government of Sri Lanka after they had become stretched due 
to the slow progress of the post-disaster housing reconstruction (Shaw and Ahmed 
2010).  A further example of wasted project funding is the delivery of thousands of 
unsuitable tents to the internally displaced population (IDPs) in Sri Lanka following the 
2004 tsunami. In an attempt to temporarily house these IDPs, thousands of tents arrived 
from neighbouring towns and other countries. These tents were soon found to be of the 
wrong design as they were not suitable for the coastal climate, and thus people refused to 
use them (Boano 2009).  
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A more serious example of wastage of aid funding was the supply of clothing to 
southern India after the 2004 tsunami; aid organisations generously sent tons of warm 
clothes, including thick sweaters, to one of the hottest places in India. The clothes 
severely disrupted local traffic when they were dumped on roads and also caused danger 
to livestock that tried to eat them. The resultant chaotic situation demanded a massive 
cleanup and removal operation diverting municipal personnel from the major recovery 
effort (Lloyd-Jones 2006).   
In post-disaster operations in both Sri Lanka and in Aceh-Indonesia, many 
community leaders were perceived as constituting a major obstacle to community 
consultations when they failed to pass on, or misreported and distorted, important 
information. The Acehnese community also related concerns about their local leaders 
being corrupt and abusive of their leadership role. In both countries the lack of 
transparency and the corrupt nature of community leadership led to many concerns 
related to inequitable distribution of housing (Christoplos 2006). An examination of 23 
recent case studies of post-disaster settlements by Leon et al. (2009) revealed that a 1999 
transitional settlement and shelter programme in post-conflict Ingushetia, Russia, faced 
numerous fairness and equity challenges. The programme was intended to provide cash 
grants to host families to shelter displaced families in private houses. The programme 
suffered when individual community members fraudulently falsified documents in order 
to meet eligibility criteria for the programme. 
In the aftermath of large disasters, governments as well as NGO employees can 
potentially become particularly susceptible to fraud and corruption when hasty 
disbursement of large sums of recovery funding and distribution of aid assistance was ill-
coordinated and incompetently monitored (Smirl 2008). In Sri Lanka, after the effects of 
the tsunami in 2004, the buffer-zone policy that had already caused much anxiety to 
affected communities led to anger and aggravation when incidences of unfairness and 
corruption in relation to land allocation became public. Even after the government’s 
raising of buffer-zone limits, people’s right to access their affected land and to 
reconstruct their houses remained at the discretion of the Sri Lankan government, 
ultimately causing grave confusion amongst many international NGOs over whom to 
assist. As at August 2007 (nearly three years after the Indian Ocean tsunami), because of 
the slow progress of the reconstruction project, more than 30 families who could not 
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make it back to their previous land were still waiting for their new houses to be built 
(Brun and Lund 2008).   
During the tsunami recovery operations in Aceh, Indonesia, the Save the 
Children and Oxfam charities had to suspend their reconstruction projects after they 
realised they had fallen prey to corrupt contractors. As a result Save the Children lost 
more than USD 800,000 of its project funding when some of the building contracts had 
to be written off. Oxfam, also lost tens of thousands of dollars of aid money in Banda 
Aceh, which the Aceh Anti-Corruption Movement subsequently called for an 
investigation by the to determine the scale of corruption (Lloyd-Jones 2006).  
2.3.5 Ignoring Local Needs/Culture 
Evidence suggests that affected communities do have the ability to overcome 
disasters and also have the most extensive knowledge of their own needs. However, 
reconstruction is often delivered in such a way that at best only responds to the 
requirements of its implementers rather than to those of the affected population (Pius 
Mulwanda 1992; Shaw and Ahmed 2010) and as a result, these projects often suffer 
because community needs are eclipsed by the constructors’ greater interests such as 
project costs and speed (Lloyd-Jones 2006; Brun and Lund 2008; El-Masri and Kellett 
2001; Rawal et al. 2005; Alam 2010; Pius Mulwanda 1992).  
A field investigation carried out in 2008-2009 in Chennai, India exposed flaws 
resulting from developers ignoring community culture. Some newly built apartments had 
toilet doors fixed next to the kitchens, which was considered an unhealthy arrangement. 
Another culturally sensitive issue that was largely overlooked was the positioning of 
internal doors. Most apartments had three interior doors aligned facing each other. 
Driven by the belief that such positioning would bring bad luck, many families at their 
own expense changed the position of at least one door. This issue could have been 
avoided, if pertinent cultural values had been considered as part of the design (Shaw and 
Ahmed 2010). 
A study of six housing projects conducted by Hutanuwatr, Bolin and Pijawka 
(2012), revealed that 1,368 houses produced by NGOs and the local government after 
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Thailand proved to be unacceptable, for mainly 
cultural reasons. The design and location of these projects were not adequately informed 
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by consultation with the affected beneficiaries. Since the NGOs used their own housing 
design and adopted and strictly adhered to the top-down approach to rebuilding, the 
houses they produced lacked important traditional features and many of them were too 
small to accommodate the housing needs of beneficiaries’ with extended families. As a 
result, these houses either remained permanently unoccupied or rented out or sold, with 
their owner seeking to build houses designed by them. 
In a similar situation following the 2004 tsunami in Aceh-Indonesia and Sri 
Lanka, many construction plans included indoor toilets and kitchens, both of which were 
considered unhygienic and culturally inappropriate, and thus, in many cases indoor 
kitchens were transformed into storage facilities. Thus in the cases of Chennai, and 
Aceh-Indonesia, as well as in Sri Lanka, cultural traditions and norms related to the most 
acceptable placement of fundamental housing elements such as walls, doors and 
windows have been ignored (Christoplos 2006). 
The general perception that housing reconstruction is the highest immediate 
priority for disaster-affected communities is not always true, and even in the most 
catastrophically affected areas, communities may not accept houses that do not meet 
their socio-cultural and economic needs. A case study into a reconstruction project in 
Colombia (Lizarralde, Johnson and Davidson 2010) revealed that the building of 
infrastructure such as sanitation networks, roads, small industries and production 
facilities had greater priority for the community than rebuilding of their houses. In many 
cases affected communities invested a larger portion of their assets and aid money into 
fixing damaged infrastructure. A relatively large body of literature suggests that affected 
communities either refuse to accept houses, or abandon them after occupancy, basically 
because the designs and physical provisions do not respond to their basic needs 
(Barenstein 2010). For example in cases in Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Yemen, 
Afghanistan, Indonesia, India and Sri Lanka many families abandoned their houses 
because they did not cater for the basic living conditions of the occupant beneficiaries, 
such as provision of potable water and need for proximity to employment (Lizarralde, 
Johnson and Davidson 2010; Kelly 2010; Barakat 2003). 
The earthquake that hit the Marathwada region of Western India in 1993 caused 
immense destruction to the traditional vernacular housing. Immediately after the 
earthquake, a quick damage assessment showed that the traditional approach to housing 
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construction was to blame for loss of lives and properties, and as a result, all traditional 
and local housing techniques for a period following this time were scrapped. New 
housing designs were produced and many villages were relocated. However, eight 
months afterwards major problems started to emerge. Firstly, some villages were 
relocated onto agricultural land that belonged to other villages, and some villages lost 
their land allocation to other villages, or were relocated as far as five kilometers away 
from their original lands; in addition to these losses inflicted upon the affected 
communities, the new housing designs and spatial planning of developments did not 
consider the villagers’ way of life. Instead of narrow traditional streets and open spaces 
for religious and other public activities, a city style plan with large streets and linear rows 
of housing was designed leaving no space for numerous important traditional activities. 
Furthermore, the new villages were far bigger in size than the old ones, making it 
financially impossible for the villagers to sustain the resultant enlarged infrastructure 
which the government had provided. As a result, many villagers decided to leave these 
relocated villages and return to their previous sites, re-employing their traditional 
techniques of building and planning; however, techniques to make these preferred 
traditional houses more resistant to potential earthquakes were not incorporated (Boen 
and Jigyasu 2005).  
This section described five common factors that are believed to impact 
negatively on the outcomes of post-disaster housing reconstruction projects. The next 
section will briefly explain some of the challenges for community participation in post-
disaster reconstruction projects. 
2.4 CHALLENGES FOR EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
Effective community participation is an important criterion for delivering 
successful post-disaster reconstruction projects. Professionally informed and adequately 
empowered communities are able to participate productively in all stages of post-disaster 
reconstruction. Community participation in post-disaster recovery and reconstruction 
increases chances of project success and is an essential element for delivering sustainable 
housing projects. Community participation is of paramount importance for successful 
completion of reconstruction projects when these projects are implemented by 
governmental organisations (GOs) with no effective, or current, housing reconstruction 
strategy, national and international humanitarian non-governmental organisations that 
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lack adequate knowledge of the local conditions in which they operate (Rahmani 2012), 
or private sub-contractors with non-participatory approaches to rebuilding houses. 
Although on some occasions in the past national and international humanitarian 
organisations have made some attempts to adopt a participatory approach to allow for 
more community participation, these attempts have mainly been made as a token 
response to donors’ demands for community involvement rather than as a strategy for 
enhancing project outcomes. This section discusses, amongst other, five major 
challenges for community participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects. 
2.4.1 Community Attitude 
Lizarralde and Massyn (2008) indicate that community participation is deeply 
influenced by a number external factors such as project resources, time for completion, 
donors’ requirements etc., and the way these multifaceted relationships are integrated. 
Even though community participation is a requirement for successful projects, it can be 
affected by the level of willingness to participate and whether the affected communities 
are actually committed to rebuilding their houses (ALNAP2009).  
Organising and mobilising affected communities to participate in rebuilding their 
houses requires substantial amounts of time and effort and can be particularly difficult to 
undertake immediately after a disaster when people are still deeply pre-occupied with the 
loss of their family members (Steinberg 2007; Dikmen 2005; ALNAP 2009). Despite 
good intentions of developers to involve people in rebuilding their houses, a proliferation 
of meetings at the time when affected communities still mourn the loss of their relatives 
can discourage communities from participation. Following the 2004 tsunami in Aceh 
and Nias, Indonesia, failed attempts were made to encourage people, by means of 
lengthy and frequent planning meetings for reconstruction, as a result some communities 
soon started asking for action instead of everlasting meetings, and those who were 
deeply disappointed, decided not to participate in the reconstruction efforts (Steinberg 
2007).  
Resettlement of returnees after a long conflict is a complex task. Repatriation and 
reintegration programmes involve a number of lengthy meetings with the affected 
beneficiaries before a decision to provide them with relief aid could be made. One 
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resident of the Nahrin district in Afghanistan frustrated by the number of lengthy 
meeting said:  
“A long time we are sitting in discussion and winter is coming, and time is lost. 
If you are coming for humanitarian aid, please bring your aid.” Quote taken 
from ALNAP (2009, 51). 
In another Indonesian example in Aceh, the involvement of inexperienced and 
unprofessional contractors in the reconstruction of domestic houses caused major 
disappointment among the affected communities. These projects were designed to be 
implemented by the affected beneficiaries; however, as aid organisations began to 
outsource these projects to local contractors, people’s willingness to participate in 
reconstruction of their houses declined. The fact that there was an abundance of aid 
organisations lining up to do the job for them also added to the complexity already 
created by some NGOs, making it harder to persuade people to participate in rebuilding 
their own houses (Kennedy et al. 2008).  
Effective participation requires strong commitment from both the sponsors and 
the affected community. This is particularly important in situations when people are 
under immense economic, social and cultural pressures. After the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake in China, the Huaxi village of Puyang Town, which adopted reconstruction 
in situ, demonstrated that rural victims’ unwillingness was the primary factor leading to 
the failure of the government initiative for concentrated rural settlement. The research 
conducted by Peng et al. (2013) revealed that the refusal by the affected beneficiaries to 
participate in the concentrated rural settlement scheme was largely linked to the lack of 
adequate information on how the immediate as well as the long-term economic interests 
of the affected rural beneficiaries would be protected, if they moved from their destroyed 
villages to a concentrated rural settlement.  
Hutanuwatr, Bolin and Pijawka (2012) argue that any planning for participation 
needs to consider the different cultural priorities of the affected population. A study 
conducted by these authors (ibid 2012) revealed that following the Indian tsunami in 
2004 that swept across parts of southern Thailand, many tsunami-affected villagers 
refused to participate in large meetings in which plans for reconstruction of their houses 
were discussed. In the case of Bann Hadd Diaw, in spite of the many attempts that the 
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designated Community Centre made to encourage the affected population to participate 
in discussions, many ethnic minority groups chose not to due to certain cultural 
differences. For example, one ethnic minority, Moken, indicated that it was culturally 
inappropriate for them to argue issues in the presence of a huge crowd, but instead they 
needed to be solved in small gatherings. They also felt that their participation might 
create an opportunity for the other Thais in the community to abuse their resources and 
treat them unfairly. 
It is also true that when communities participate in meetings, they do so at the 
cost of putting off their other important income-generation activities, therefore it is 
crucial for project teams to be time conscious and fully appreciate peoples’ contributions 
(ALNAP 2009).  
2.4.2 Lack of Communication and Transparency 
Communication helps raise cultural awareness, boost community morale, and 
allows for a sustainable two-way flow of important information (Trim 2004; Duxbury 
and Dickinson 2007; Pearce 2003). Lizarralde, Johnson and Davidson (2010, 132) 
describe the distribution of information in post-disaster situations as “gold in the dust”. 
The effective flow of such information results in successful rebuilding projects (Lawther 
2009; Ingram et al. 2006). Lack of effective communication, however, can provoke 
anger, frustration and enormous dissatisfaction among the recipients of post-disaster 
projects, and it is not considered “good practice”  (Christoplos 2006, 47). A disorderly 
psychological situation develops when affected people are confused about government 
legislation and misled by false promises or are kept in dark about aid plans (Olshansky et 
al. 2008). For example, in the cases of Indonesia and Sri Lanka after the tsunami in 2004 
and in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, many affected communities 
were not fully informed about the reconstruction strategies, which in turn made it 
difficult for them to continue with their own efforts (Christoplos 2006; Olshansky et al. 
2008).  
The reconstruction process after the Bam earthquake in Iran faced many socio-
economic, cultural and technical problems when reconstruction efforts initiated by a 
number of aid organisations and the government failed to deliver their promises. These 
unfulfilled promises provoked anger among the affected people resulting in mass public 
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demonstrations in 2004. The protest was held to express public frustration with the 
ambiguity in the reconstruction process and to demand a more direct involvement in the 
entire process (Rafieian and Asgary 2013). In a similar situation in Bangladesh, the 
government failed to provide good quality houses to the affected beneficiaries. The 
initial promises that the affected people would receive large brick houses were not met 
which led to frustration in the communities. Again , as in the example given earlier, in 
the case of the post-Sidr reconstruction in Bangladesh, many reconstruction projects and 
housing allocations suffered problems with poor communication, inequality, a lack of 
consideration for local culture and corruption (Nadiruzzaman and Kanti Paul 2013). 
A longitudinal research project in a village called “Westlake” in Cape Town, 
South African conducted during January – June 2004 and September – December 2006, 
found that lack of information and clarity in the development process had long lasting 
negative consequences on community progress, dividing the pre-development 
community into different factions and groups. Developers of the housing project 
deliberately manipulated information dissemination about the housing plans by 
employing a “divide and rule” strategy. A number of leaders of the smaller community 
groups in Westlake were employed by the developers to perform the role of community 
consultants for which they were regularly paid as well as being given access to other 
benefits for their support of the development proposal. The community representation 
role entrusted to the employee-leaders quickly changed from being the voices of 
community into being the voices of the employing agency. The lack of timely and 
adequate information coupled with ambiguity in processes caused several community 
groups to believe they have been deliberately excluded from participation (Lemanski 
2008). Even though beneficiaries were shown the development plan, their new houses 
considerably mismatched the initial plan (Lemanski 2008, 405-406).  
“When we were shown the development pictures … it looked nothing like this.  
We were meant to have lawns and pavements and clean roads.” 
“In the beginning, when people began moving into the community, they told 
us we would get big houses, but it’s not true.” 
“We have me and my husband and eight children in this house – the 
government must extend my house.” 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review  
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 38 
A study conducted by Pardasani (2006) revealed that reconstruction efforts in the 
Maldives, in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, faced many challenges. One such 
challenge was the lack of communication between international aid organisations (World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank) and the affected communities. The community needs 
assessment was conducted mainly by external aid organisations with no substantial 
knowledge about the local culture, which negatively impacted on community 
participation. 
To ensure effective community participation in reconstruction, local leaders must 
have access to information about funded projects. The lack of transparency within 
international aid and private contracting systems often delays post-disaster 
reconstruction projects. This is particularly the case when such projects are implemented 
in underdeveloped countries. For example in Afghanistan, community attempts to 
acquire even the token knowledge about the financial aid allocated for rebuilding their 
own houses has never been successful. Communities are too often reluctant to get 
involved in opaque processes, particularly when large portions of reconstruction work 
are outsourced to other companies and incompetent non-governmental aid organisations 
(Galtung and Tisné 2009).  
2.4.3 Political and Social Pressure  
To have maximum effectiveness, community participation requires adequate 
time for planning and organisation, and yet governments tend to refrain from involving 
communities in reconstruction projects as this may slow down the overall impression 
that reconstruction is speedily progressing (Dikmen 2005; Ye and Okada 2002; Ingram 
et al. 2006; Sinha 2008). Participation entails involvement from multiple stakeholders, 
however, there is a danger that this process may be influenced by particular groups, 
resulting in the most vulnerable populations such as women, elderly and disabled being 
excluded (Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris 2004; Lankatilleke 2010; Ganapati 2013). This 
is very true in conflict situations where government authorities may directly be involved 
with, or be sponsoring, a particular ‘warrior’ group, making community participation 
disputable and less productive (ALNAP 2009).  
In the aftermath the of Indian Ocean Tsunami in Sri Lanka, the Muslim 
community in the Eastern Province suffered the most during and after the tsunami. This 
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marginalised community was excluded from participation in relief and reconstruction 
planning for political and religious reasons. Apart from some haphazard support, for 
example “plastic sheeting” offered to them by the Sri Lankan bank, they were given too 
little formal assistance by the state government and international donor organisations. 
This was clearly reflected in their reported living conditions after the tsunami and the 
indefinite waiting period imposed for permanent houses. The study conducted by 
Ruwanpura (2009) revealed that a year on from the tsunami, this politically and socially 
excluded minority still lived in plastic tents without any official information or assistance 
with regard to the likelihood of when they would be offered permanent housing.   
In another example in Weragamawatta, Kalutara District in Sri Lanka, the aid 
association German Rotary Club built 100 houses. These houses were built and finished 
externally, but without absolute knowledge about community needs, and with a lot of 
work still to be done to the houses internally. However, after these “effectively empty 
boxes” (Boano 2009, 17) were eventually handed over to the affected communities in 
December 2005, a later 2006 case study conducted by the same author (ibid. 2009) 
revealed that they still stood vacant.  The project failed because the German Rotary Club 
considered housing merely as a physical objective and a knee-jerk response to disaster as 
opposed to a long term, or permanent, resettlement effort. The project was also heavily 
driven by political interest, which led to the affected community being excluded from the 
process.  
In another post-tsunami case in 2004, resources were pledged for building 4,591 
houses in Hambantota district of Sri Lanka while in fact only 1,057 were destroyed. 
Christoplos (2006) points out that the apex body for rebuilding Sri Lanka, Task Force for 
Rebuilding the Nations (TAFREN) was powerless either to tackle obviously politically 
preconceived notions or to direct aid organisations towards places where aid was needed 
the most.  
In the Indian state of Tamil Nadu the government shelter policy failed to support 
housing reconstruction. After the tsunami’s destructive waves shattered a vast area in 
Tamil Nadu in 2004, a large reconstruction project to build 17,461 across 80 villages 
was instigated by the state government and reportedly 43 national and international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (Barenstein and Iyengar 2010). The government to 
a major extent, and the INGOs to a lesser extent, adopted the contractor-driven model. 
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Even though the INGOs introduced some modification in relation to the size of rooms, 
the quality of these houses remained far below the acceptable standard.  The urgency 
derived from the social crisis on the one hand, and political pressure on the other, 
resulted in houses being built with bad sanitation and drainage that were highly 
vulnerable to future disasters. Houses also failed to meet the minimum fire and safety 
standards. Although INGOs and the state government provided a large number of houses 
in a very short time, they failed to promote public participation which led to frustration 
among the affected communities. The agencies simply failed to discharge their 
obligation to provide safe shelter to the affected population (Rawal et al. 2005).  
In a recent example, the L’Aquila’s reconstruction was used as an opportunity by 
the then Italian government to demonstrate its managerial ability amid the next 
provincial elections. As reported by Özerdem and Rufini (2013) the then premier 
Berlusconi visited the affected area 23 times in the month following the L’Aquila 
earthquake to try to repair the damaged reputation of his government and to cover his 
other personal issues that were airing in the media. As a result of Berlusconi’s top-down 
decisions many permanent new towns and neighbourhoods, that initially were to be an 
emergency post-earthquake response for shelter need, were built without consultation 
with the affected people and the local authorities.   
It is typical for local and state governments to ignore public participation when 
community level projects are implemented. Affected communities are often kept away 
and decisions are made for them. This non-participatory approach often results in active 
members of communities becoming passive receivers, project funds being wasted and 
development opportunities lost (Negrón 2010; Maier 2001; Williams 2006; Saunders 
2004).  
2.4.4 Gender Imbalance in Community Participation  
Women experience disaster differently from men (Rostami Povey 2003). The 
female population suffers far greater losses of life, shelter and livelihood than the male 
population due to various factors such as division of labour (women work at home while 
men mostly work outside), additional responsibilities to rescue children and elderly as 
well as biological conditions etc.  (Juran 2012). This trend is quite likely to continue in 
the future as male population continues to have greater influence on family and social 
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affairs within the family circle and in the society as compared to female population 
(Sonak, Pangam and Giriyan 2008; Hamilton and Halvorson 2007; Christoplos 2006; 
Merilyn 2006; Lloyd-Jones 2006). One apparent pre-existing notion working against the 
involvement of women in post-disaster relief, recovery and housing reconstruction is that 
they are generally misconceived as being incapable of contributing to the actual 
reconstruction effort. Therefore, and as a result of such prevailing prejudice, their 
potential for effective participation is often disregarded (Ariyabandu 2009; UNDP 2010; 
Merilyn 2006; Juran 2012). Several case studies highlight that the present attitudinal and 
operational mindset towards post-disaster planning must change to allow for greater and 
more effective women’s participation in recovery and reconstruction (Yonder, Akçar and 
Gopalan 2009). As argued by Alston (2013) women have fundamental local wisdom and 
capacity that can redevelop and restore a devastated community, however, their gender-
based vulnerabilities often impede this wisdom to be captured. A study of post-tsunami 
recovery in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia revealed that recovery efforts were largely 
focused on reviving men’s livelihood needs (e.g. boats, tools and nets), however, the 
needs of the affected female population (e.g. sufficient space in the house to manufacture 
saleable products such as handicrafts) were largely ignored. Thus the delays in housing 
reconstruction led directly to delays in restoration of the livelihood needs of women in 
particular (Christoplos 2006). 
In the event of a disaster, women often play an exclusive and critical role in 
taking their children, elderly and disabled community members to safety. They also 
rescue animals, essential household items and food reserves from being lost during the 
disasters (Merilyn 2006). In addition to being the prime carers for children and the 
elderly, women have also provided magnificent support to reconstruction projects 
(Negrón 2010). Despite the critical role women play in supporting the family and the 
society as a whole, their contribution to improving society is hardly ever acknowledged 
(Shaw 2009). They are too often ignored in the political arena and their right to actively 
participate in decision making is denied (Lankatilleke 2010; Lloyd-Jones 2006; Zaidi, 
Kamal and Baig-Ansari 2010; Hamilton and Halvorson 2007). In extreme cases and 
during large scale disasters, they may often be physically abused or even killed 
(Hamilton and Halvorson 2007). Following the earthquake in September 1993, 
Kavitabai, the women’s group representative in Maharashtra, India was severely beaten 
by the village leaders and subsequently removed from the stage by the government 
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rehabilitation officer and community leaders. This happened when she raised concerns 
about corruption, missing aid materials, widows’ right violation, and the supply of water 
that was unfairly channelled to community elites (Krishnadas 2007).  
A study of four affected districts of Tamil Nadu – Chennai, Kanyakumari, 
Nagapattinam and Cuddalore in India a year on from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, 
revealed that the special needs of women, such as adequate privacy and appropriate 
sanitation, were largely ignored in relief camps. In order to ease the post-tsunami social 
crisis and administrative problems created by the lack of existing data, the reconstruction 
process had to rely on the assistance from and leadership of the fish workers local 
council “Panchayats”. Panchayats are male dominated local groups which do not allow 
female membership. This local practice consequently led to affected women being 
excluded from the design and reconstruction process (Srinivasan and Nagaraj 2006). 
Women’s livelihood rehabilitation was also not considered as livelihood revival projects 
largely focused at responding to the needs of the powerful fishing societies (which were 
exclusively male) (Manecksha 2005).  
2.4.5 Neglecting the Needs of Community 
Based on the earlier discussion, if more effective participation in reconstruction 
projects produces better outcomes, the antithesis is that neglecting the needs of affected 
communities can produce disappointing results, with affected communities refraining 
from effectively engaging in the reconstruction process (Pardasani 2006).  
Research into the impact of disaster on the socio-economic sphere of community 
has shown that the poor and disadvantaged members bear most of the impact compared 
to the society elite (Dikmen 2005; Lloyd-Jones 2006; John 2008; Hamilton and 
Halvorson 2007; Morrow 1999; Buttenheim 2010). Despite the greater suffering 
inflicted upon the poor, government funding for housing reconstruction seldom reaches 
the most needy and disadvantaged persons (Owusu 2013). The funding is often captured 
by the economic and political strong members of the society (Freeman 2004). As 
reported by Fan (2012) after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 that devastated Aceh 
Indonesia, the poor and most disadvantaged members of the community, particularly the 
renters and squatters and those who had lost their only small piece of land to the tsunami, 
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were largely excluded from the government housing support scheme, which resulted in 
the forced displacement of almost 70,000 people.    
A study conducted by Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris (2004) examined the 
implementation of post-disaster U.S. federal assistance programmes for housing 
reconstruction after the Northridge earthquake that hit Los Angeles in 1997. The study 
also included an examination of the link between aid distribution and long term recovery 
outcomes.  The findings revealed that the U.S. post-disaster recovery plan failed to 
address the housing needs of the wider disadvantaged affected population. Efforts were 
made by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to ensure that fund 
reached equally to all areas hit by the earthquake. However, the recovery programme 
was designed in such a way that it limited access to federal assistance in places occupied 
by Hispanic people, economically underprivileged people and families isolated by 
language barriers. The study also linked the failure of the recovery programmes to the 
lack of policy guidelines for identifying the most needy members of the population and 
actively seeking their participation in the process of recovery.  
After the category 5 Hurricane Mitch hit Honduras in 1998, aid was directed 
primarily towards those who had more assets during the disaster rather than being 
allocated on the basis of who was more eligible. As a result of this scheme, a large 
percentage of the poor population, who were primarily perceived to have lost little or 
nothing, received no or little aid. The policy adopted to identify the wider disadvantaged 
population failed to embrace the basic principles of community participation leading to 
mass exclusion from the recovery process  (Skoufias 2003).  
So far in this chapter data about the current situation pertaining to post-disaster 
reconstruction was gathered and analysed. The findings revealed the current state of 
knowledge about these projects which sets a basis for developing the arguments of 
advocacy. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, the argument of advocacy will 
analyse and critique the information gathered from the synthesis of the current literature 
and this in turn will facilitate the development of research questions. The argument of 
advocacy is also referred to as “a deductive argument” by Machi and McEvoy (2009, 
66). 
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2.5 1st ARGUMENT OF ADVOCACY (related to success factors) 
The existing literature suggests that an absolute knowledge of the complexity of 
reconstruction, a detailed understanding of the factors contributing to failure, as well as 
those supporting reconstruction, are crucial for rebuilding domestic dwellings 
successfully after a major disaster. The findings from the existing literature presented in 
section 2.2 reveal that reconstruction projects can be delivered satisfactorily when 
amongst others, factors such as community participation and community empowerment, 
effective communication among the stakeholders (in particular with members of the 
affected communities), community cultures and beliefs and support from the local 
government, are considered as part of the reconstruction strategy. Community 
participation that ensures the inclusion of beneficiaries from all sectors of the affected 
community and at all stages of post-disaster reconstruction is important and should be 
enhanced by effective community empowerment. Successful post-disaster reconstruction 
projects require a strong and reliable line of communication and an information 
dissemination system, which can be established with the support of the local 
government. Housing designs that are considerate of the socio-cultural and economic 
requirements of the affected communities are more acceptable and therefore stand a 
better chance of success. The uniqueness of post-disaster reconstruction projects and 
their contextual requirements mean that the sponsors and practitioners involved in these 
projects must adapt their practices to respond to the complexity inherent in these projects 
and so achieve more desirable outcomes.  
2.6 2nd ARGUMENT OF ADVOCACY (related to factors for project failure) 
In section 2.3, case studies of failed reconstruction projects across the world are 
examined, and five common factors that often have an impact on the outcomes of post-
disaster housing reconstruction projects are outlined and explained. The findings reveal 
that in the majority of post-disaster housing reconstruction projects already implemented, 
failure can be linked-back to lack of, or problems with, community participation, 
relocation issues, fraudulent use and waste of project funds, and ignoring the local needs 
and culture. 
Housing reconstruction projects that are poorly designed often do not respond to 
the community socio-cultural and economic needs. Therefore, the houses produced by 
such projects are most likely to either undergo massive modification by the affected 
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recipients, or will fail either in-part or even entirely, to meet their objectives. Housing 
reconstruction is not always the highest immediate priority for disaster-affected 
communities, and regardless of the effects of the disaster, communities will not accept 
donations of houses that do not meet their socio-cultural and economic needs (Audefroy 
2010; Kelly 2010). Understanding the complexity and the nature of post-disaster 
reconstruction projects necessitates sponsors of these projects to shift their perception 
from merely seeing housing reconstruction projects as a response to the resultant 
immediate emergency, to providing assistance that responds to the long term strategic 
needs of the affected populations.  
2.7 3rd ARGUMENT OF ADVOCACY (related to challenges for community 
participation) 
The existing literature clearly indicates that effective community participation is 
a major key to success in post-disaster reconstruction. Affected communities have the 
knowledge crucial for designing successful reconstruction projects. Furthermore, they 
have a specific role to play in post-disaster housing reconstruction and their participation 
ultimately determines project success. Davidson et al. (2007) and Barenstein (2010) state 
that the wider international community broadly appreciates and supports the value of 
community participation, however, the knowledge to effectively apply these principles at 
the strategic level is very limited. The lack of knowledge often results in reconstruction 
practices moving far away from the extant policies of governments and the theories for 
effective community participation processes and management. The undesirable and 
unfortunately systematic unsuccessful outcomes of many post-disaster housing projects 
and their failure to effectively engage affected communities in all phases of post-disaster 
housing reconstruction necessitates further study in this area. 
2.8 LOGICAL FRAMEWORK APPROACH 
As explain in chapter 1, this research employs the logical framework approach to 
address the research problem and present the research findings in a clear, concise and a 
logical way. The Logical Framework Approach (LFA) was initially developed in 1969 
for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to enhance 
evaluation of small scale projects funded by the agency (Rosenberg, Posner and Hanley 
1970). Since then, it has been adopted and modified by many humanitarian organisations 
globally (Crawford and Bryce 2003). The LFA is a powerful management approach 
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which can be employed in diverse and often demanding complex humanitarian situations 
(CIDA 1997).  
2.8.1 What Is The Logical Framework Approach? 
“A basic principle in all development projects is that they should be designed 
to satisfy the needs of people, not the internal needs of institutions”  
(NORAD 1999, 57) 
The logical framework approach (LFA) (also known as objective oriented project 
planning) is a method used for structuring the main components in a project. It presents 
and logically justifies relationships between the inputs, project activities and the intended 
outcomes. It is based on a systematic investigation of the key development problems, 
and of the solutions for effectively and efficiently responding to those problems 
(AusAID 2005). The LFA is participatory in nature and is centred on key stakeholders 
with a particular emphasis on the inclusion of the target groups (affected communities). 
The LFA can be applied in a range of situations and to different types of aid activities. 
Although customarily used in the earlier stages for certain types of aid activities, at 
present it is increasingly applied for developing and managing a wide range of different 
forms of project activities such as program support and a whole range of other projects 
and programmes including public investment initiatives (AusAID 2005; NORAD 1999). 
Being a simple, easily understandable and more flexible project design and management 
framework, the LFA has gained much popularity among humanitarian aid organisations, 
and is used primarily with the aim of promoting participation and building participants’ 
capacities. In addition to being a participatory and a stakeholder centred approach, the 
LFA has many advantages over the traditional project management approaches as far as 
the project goals of community development are concerned. According to Crawford and 
Bryce (2003) humanitarian projects implemented in the developing world have their 
own specific socio-cultural and economic requirements. These projects are often 
required to operate in totally diverse geographical and changeable political environments 
necessitating more adaptable project management approaches than the ones traditionally 
used in more stable settings in the developed world. According to AusAID (2005) and 
NORAD (1999) the following are some of the advantages of the LFA:  
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- It uses a participatory approach to establishing development problems 
and options for addressing them. A well-designed LFA ensures that it can 
be used as a tool to enhance stakeholder participation by promoting 
agreement on project scope and activities.  
- It is focused on responding to beneficiaries’ needs rather than those of the 
project implementing organisation. 
- It provides a better basis for systematic monitoring and analysis of the 
effects of projects.  
- It facilitates common understanding and better communication between 
project stakeholders. 
- The nature of humanitarian projects often requires recruiting project 
personnel on short-term agreements. The use of LFA ensures continuity 
of approach when major changes to organisation structure and executive 
team occur.  
The logical framework matrix (also known as the logframe) is the final 
documented product of the LFA.  
2.8.2 Logical Framework Matrix (Logframe) 
The logical framework matrix (logframe) is a table (usually one or two pages) 
which encompasses essential information about the important elements of the project in 
a logically consistent and simple form. It is also an effective tool for encapsulating 
project related vital information and communicating it to the intended stakeholders. For 
many large humanitarian organisations (such as the UN, CIDA, AusAID, NORAD etc.) 
the logframe is an integral part of their project design and approval documentation and is 
a means to communicate more complex projects in a concise and clearly understandable 
structure. Prior to constructing a logframe, it is necessary to conduct a structured analysis 
of the current situation. The logframe is generally based on the analysis of the following 
elements: 
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- Problem analysis 
- Stakeholder analysis 
- Objective analysis 
 Problem Analysis 
Problem analysis plays a key role in identifying the main problems by mapping 
out the causal relationships that result in these problems. Problem analysis is a 
systematic exercise aimed at identifying the chief causes and effects related to an 
identified problem. Once the main development problem has been identified, 
subsequently it is decomposed or subdivided into smaller, more manageable components 
and logically placed in a structure called a “problem tree”. The problem tree, as a 
structure, is a problem-oriented hierarchical decomposition of the known problem to be 
addressed by the project in a systematic manner. The problem tree depicts all of the 
known cause and effect relationships around the problem. Figure  2-1shows a generic 
problem tree structure. 
 
Figure  2-1: Generic problem tree structure (cause and effect diagram) Adopted from 
AusAid (2005) 
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Stakeholder Analysis 
The previous sections of this chapter have provided compelling evidence to 
suggest that the lack of knowledge among sponsors and implementing partners of 
reconstruction projects about the needs of the community people affected by disasters is 
a common factor in the resulting poor outcomes of these projects. It is however 
understandable that humanitarian organisations, both national and international, and 
government authorities involved in reconstruction projects, will have their own 
individual and strongly competing interests to satisfy (AusAID 2005). However, 
interests of organisations should not obscure the needs and requirements of the affected 
communities. A well-designed reconstruction project will set up objectives that reflect 
the needs of all stakeholders and not just those of the sponsor or project implementing 
agencies. Stakeholder analysis therefore involves identifying the needs and listing the 
views of all stakeholders (including the affected beneficiaries) whether directly or 
indirectly affected by the project. Once the needs of all parties involved in the project 
have been identified, it is then determined whose needs and views need to be given 
greater priority.  
Stakeholder analysis is conducted for the following reasons:  
 to understand and collect the requirements of project stakeholders and 
relate them to the purpose of the project (PMI 2008, 248) 
 to determine the existing capacities of both the implementing agency and 
that affected community to address the known problems 
  to provide a logical basis for defining activities that appropriately 
address the problems  
Objective Analysis 
Objective analysis involves developing the objective tree. The structure of the 
objective tree is similar to that of the problem tree except that in the objectives tree the 
problems (negative terms) are reworded, thus making them into objective (positive 
statements). While the problem tree presents cause-effect relations between the 
problems, the objective tree shows the means-end relations between the objectives. 
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Although the means-ends structure represents a direct solution to addressing the 
identified problems in the cause-and-effect structure, difficulty in rewording may 
sometimes occur when problems are transferred into the objectives tree (NORAD 1999). 
Some negative statements from the problem tree may not make perfect sense when they 
are simply reworded into positive terms and transferred to the objectives tree. Therefore 
it is necessary to make sure that all statements in the objectives tree are easily 
understandable and they are logically and sufficiently linked with each other. A well-
constructed objectives tree will ensure that enough objectives are attained at one level to 
achieve the intended result at the level above.  
The objectives tree is used as a basis for structuring the logframe. Once the 
objectives tree has been prepared, the main components from the objectives tree are 
transferred into the first vertical column of the logframe titled “Activities description”. 
The objectives at the upper tree level are transferred (after being adjusted if required) 
into the logframe to help frame the top elements (goal and objectives); and those at the 
lower level are considered to help formulate the outputs statements. Figure  2-2 shows a 
basic objectives tree structure. 
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Figure  2-2: Basic objective tree structure (means-ends diagram) - source: 
AusAid (2005) 
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The Structure 
A standard logframe usually takes the form of a table with four columns and four 
rows (sometimes five). The first (column 1) and the last column (column 4) explain the 
vertical logic. The first column presents the hierarchy of objectives and clarifies the 
contributory relations between them. The fourth column lists the important assumptions 
(pre-conditions) outside the project control.  
The two columns in the middle (column 2 and 3) explain the horizontal logic. 
Column 2 specifies the indicators (also referred to as objectively verifiable indicators 
(OVI)), which help to determine whether the objectives have been achieved at different 
levels. Column 3 contains the means of verifications (MoV), which clarifies how (e.g., 
document review, physical measurement, direct observation, questionnaire survey, 
interviews, focus groups, etc.) and from what sources (e.g., affected people, local 
government office, etc.) the information about individual indictors will be collected. 
The logframe is a powerful means for facilitating communication and 
understanding of the project between the varied stakeholders (CIDA 1997). Therefore it 
should be prepared in a way that is easily understandable for all stakeholders particularly 
the affected beneficiaries. For the reason of simplicity, the logframe does not contain 
technical design such as the network diagram and detailed scheduling of all activities and 
tasks (the lowest level of efforts on a project or a sub-division of activities) (Haugan 
2002, 3), required to produce outputs. These details are normally part of the project 
implementation plan in the form of a separate document concerned with the project 
cross-cutting elements and other aspects such as the logistics, etc. Table  2-1 provides a 
brief explanation of typical logframe elements. The numbers show the traditional 
sequence of project planning.  
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Table  2-1: Standard Logical Framework Matrix 
 Activity 
Description 
Measurable 
Indicators 
Means of 
Verification 
Important 
Assumptions 
Goal 
(1) 
The ultimate 
result to which 
the activity is 
contributing 
(10) 
Measures (direct 
or indirect) to 
verify to what 
extent the goal is 
fulfilled 
(11) 
Specifies how 
data on goal 
achievement is to 
be collected 
 
Purpose 
(2) 
Refers to what the 
activity actually 
achieve 
(12) 
Measures (direct 
or indirect) to 
verify to what 
extent the purpose 
is fulfilled 
(13) 
Specifies how 
data on outcome 
achievement is to 
be collected 
(9) 
Important events, 
conditions or 
decisions outside 
the control of the 
project which 
must be fulfilled 
for the outcome to 
be attained 
Objectives 
(3) 
If a project entails 
a number of 
outputs 
(component), 
each output is 
given an objective 
statement. 
(14) 
Measures (direct 
or indirect) to 
verify to what 
extent the 
objective is 
achieved 
(15) 
Specifies how 
data on objectives 
achievement is to 
be collected 
(8) 
Important events, 
conditions or 
decisions outside 
the control of the 
project which 
must fulfilled for 
the objectives to 
be achieved 
Outputs 
(4) 
The actual 
product produced 
as result of the 
planned tasks 
(16) 
Measures (direct 
or indirect) which 
verify to what 
extent the outputs 
are produced 
(17) 
Specifies how 
data on progress 
is to be collected 
(7) 
Important events, 
conditions or 
decisions outside 
the control of the 
project which 
must prevail for 
the results to be 
produced 
Tasks 
(5) 
The 
activities/tasks 
that need to be 
undertaken by the 
project in order to 
produce outputs 
 
Project 
management plan 
(activity duration 
and scope) 
 
Progress reports 
(6) 
Important events, 
conditions or 
decisions outside 
the control of the 
project which 
must fulfilled for 
the activities to be 
undertaken 
Source: AusAid (2005), NORAD (1999) and Crawford and Bryce (2003) 
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2.8.3 Conclusion 
This review of the extant and current literature identifies two main aspects, 
namely “success” and “failure” of post-disaster reconstruction projects and it discusses 
the relative positive and negative effects of the factors by which these aspects are 
influenced. It was revealed that affected communities play a vital role in housing 
reconstruction. The literature review has also identified and discussed other factors such 
as community empowerment, community culture and the belief in, and the importance 
of, government support for successful project outcomes, that all need to be established to 
support effective community involvement. Communication and information 
dissemination was identified as playing a vital role in raising cultural awareness and 
informing people of the rebuilding plans. Conversely, it was also discovered that the 
absence of these positive factors often results in poor project outcomes with a lack of 
effective community participation being the prime reason for the majority of failed 
projects. Furthermore, challenges for community participation are identified and 
assessed. The literature revealed that in most unsuccessful projects, failure was linked to 
insufficient community involvement resulting from the lack of a workable framework 
for community participation.  This literature review, although adequate to present a 
logically argued case, is limited to reporting selective cases representing the current 
situation in post-disaster reconstruction.  
In section 2.5 of this chapter a brief explanation of the logical framework 
approach (LFA) was provided which will be adapted and adopted in this research to 
address the knowledge gap identified in the literature review.  LFA as an activities 
planning and management tool can be used in a variety of contexts. The basic logic 
behind the LFA is that the probability of project success can improve if both the project 
objectives and the assumptions are fulfilled as project outcomes. LFA constitutes a 
participatory project planning approach that ensures that the requirements of all 
stakeholders, particularly those of the affected beneficiaries, are considered and included 
in the planning and the subsequent phases of the project. In this research the LFA has 
been adopted to analyse the fundamental challenges for effective community 
participation in post-disaster reconstruction and to formulate a proposal for a clear and 
logically based solution to these challenges. Unlike the version of LFA currently in use 
by many aid organisations worldwide and by the UN, this research identifies the 
capacities and competencies of NGO’s as an important assumption/condition that needs 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review  
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 54 
to be permanently placed in the logframe and that needs to exist in order to ensure 
progress towards achieving project objectives. 
The next chapter discusses the proposed methodology for this research. The 
chapter discusses the mixed methods approach used as a framework for this research.   
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Chapter 3 
Research Design 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The literature review presented in chapter 2 revealed factors contributing to the 
failure of reconstruction projects as well as those supporting such endeavours. It was also 
revealed that success and failure of a reconstruction project was highly dependent on the 
level and effectiveness of community participation in the entire lifecycle, as well as 
during the post-implementation phases of the project. The previous chapter concluded 
that in most unsuccessful projects already implemented and reported worldwide in 
developing countries and in particular in Afghanistan, the failures were linked to 
insufficient community involvement resulting from the lack of a workable framework 
for community participation, which is the central problem that this study seeks to 
address.  
Chapter 3 discusses the mixed methods approach used as a conceptual 
framework for this research. The sequential explanatory model for data collection and 
analysis was adopted to address the central research problem by answering the research 
questions (presented in Chapter 1 and reiterated below in section 3.2 of this chapter). The 
use of a mixed methods approach ensured that the research questions could be answered 
from a quantitative as well as a qualitative perspective. This chapter is divided into five 
main sections: Section 3.2 discusses the research problem and presents the three research 
questions. In Section 3.3 the research framework along with a brief orientation of the 
four philosophical assumptions informing the study are presented. Section 3.4 discusses 
the mixed methods research approach. Sub-sections 3.4.1 to 3.4.4 discuss the 
appropriateness of adopting mixed methods sequential design and the process of 
quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. Section 3.5 present a visual 
model of the mixed methods sequential explanatory design used for this research. The 
issues related to research ethics are addressed in Section 3.6. 
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3.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
As posited in the previous chapter, community participation is imperative for 
reconstruction projects to be able to deliver sustainable project outcomes. The lack of 
community participation results in poor project performance, eventually leading to a loss 
of reconstruction and development opportunities and ultimately even to losing project 
funding.  
In earlier chapters, factors that negatively affect the outcomes of reconstruction 
projects were identified and discussed. It was identified that, amongst many other 
factors, lack of community participation prominently played a negative role resulting in 
the production of uninhabitable domestic dwellings and other unsustainable project 
outcomes. Although the need for involving affected communities in all phases of 
reconstruction is already strongly recognised by the wider international aid community 
and governments, reconstruction projects designed and implemented by these entities 
continue to operate on the basis of “providing for” rather than “working together with” 
the affected people when addressing housing needs. In a few past reconstruction projects 
some efforts have clearly been made by the implementing agencies to embed at least 
some of the basic principles of community participation. This has meant that affected 
community members have actually been involved to some degree in a few of the 
preliminary meetings to at least inform them of the general intent of reconstruction 
projects affecting them. However, these efforts have mostly been made as a matter of 
diplomacy and as a visible response to the donors’ growing demands for community 
inclusion in reconstruction, rather than in the best public interest (Mafukidze and Hoosen 
2009; Bradshaw 2002). As discussed, despite the ever growing interest in and 
appreciation of the participatory approach to post-disaster housing reconstruction among 
policy-makers and international funding bodies, the actual reconstruction activities 
undertaken by implementing partner organisations repeatedly fail to put the concept of 
community participation into practice and as a result reconstruction projects 
systematically move away from donors’ policy statements (Lizarralde, Johnson and 
Davidson 2010; Alam 2010; Lyons 2009; Hemson 2007; Lawther 2009; Pearce 2003; 
Davidson et al. 2007; Lloyd-Jones 2006; Barenstein 2010).  
Post–disaster reconstruction projects are often considered ineffectual or 
unproductive because on many occasions in the past they have performed extremely 
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poorly during post-contract occupation, or have failed altogether to deliver acceptable 
outcomes (Shaw and Ahmed 2010). In some cases, these projects have already failed 
even before their completion, leading many sponsor aid organisations to hold some of 
the most infamously poorly completed projects up as examples of how not to deliver 
housing reconstruction (Cookes 2010). Research into previous unsuccessful projects has 
revealed that most often the lack of adequate knowledge regarding the context and a well 
thought-out participatory approach to planning and implementation of these projects has 
generally been responsible for their failure (Alam 2010; Davidson et al. 2007).  
A synthesis of the extant literature and prior knowledge presented in the earlier 
chapters advocate that the failure to involve affected communities in housing 
reconstruction projects is attributed primarily to inadequate understanding of the factors 
affecting community participation and the lack of any real effective frameworks to guide 
and manage participatory shelter strategies. 
Post-disaster reconstruction projects are complex in nature, often very context-
specific and they can vary widely in magnitude. Despite such complexity and the 
demanding nature of these projects, they can still have a high likelihood of achieving 
their intended objectives if the wider affected community supports them. Community 
participation is a key success factor, which if successfully applied, can enhance project 
performance and organisation efficiency. Good outcomes can be achieved when 
planners and practitioners ensure that all members of the affected communities are 
effectively involved in the design and implementation of reconstruction projects, right 
through from their instigation, all the way through to their closing. Therefore, to achieve 
maximum community participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects in 
Afghanistan, a logical framework to guide and manage community participation needs to 
be developed. In order to achieve this aim the following questions need to be answered: 
1. What are the major challenges (barriers) for community participation? 
2. How do these barriers impact community participation? 
3. How can the impact of these challenges be eliminated or reduced?  
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3.3 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
This section explains the research framework that was adopted to establish and 
outline the most appropriate courses of action and that formed a preferred approach to 
this research. In order for any researcher to understand which approach (qualitative, 
quantitative or mixed methods) to select, Creswell (2003, 3) suggests that it is necessary 
to understand what philosophy the research actually subscribes to, the general procedure 
(s) for inquiry that the research employs and the specific methods that it uses for data 
collection and data processing. 
3.3.1 Philosophical Assumption 
This section outlines the philosophical thinking behind this research. 
Methodological assumptions, although not always explicitly reflected in the research 
studies, represent the philosophical foundation on which the choice for appropriate 
approach to inquiry lies. 
There are four philosophical positions about knowledge claims that research can 
take to inform the way in which data about the topic under study will be collected, 
analysed and reported. Creswell (2013, 6) describes these positions as postpositivism, 
constructivism, transformative and pragmatism. Figure  3-1depicts the constituent 
elements of these worldviews. 
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Postpositivism 
- Determination 
- Reductionism 
- Empirical observations and 
measurement 
- Theory verification 
Constructivism 
- Understanding 
- Multiple participant meanings 
- Social and historical construction 
- Theory generation 
Transformative 
- Political 
- Empowerment issue-oriented 
- Collaborative 
- Change-oriented 
Pragmatism 
- Consequences of actions 
- Problem-centered 
- Pluralistic 
- Real-world practice oriented 
 
Figure  3-1: The essentials of philosophical worldviews (Source: Creswell (2013, 6) 
 
Post positivist assumptions represent the traditional form of research and use a 
fixed scientific method for data collection and analysis to support the creation of new 
knowledge. With experimentation being the main instrument for data collection, the 
form of data collected under this assumption is of a pure quantitative nature. Data is 
collected on the basis of careful observation and measurement of the behaviour of the 
subject under study to establish the cause and effect relationships (Patton 1990, 37; 
Creswell 2013, 7). 
In sharp contrast to Postpositivism, Constructivism utilises a qualitative approach 
to inquiry. With the aim of studying complex human experiences, constructivists claim 
knowledge through interaction with the wider human society and by looking into the 
complexity in views of participants on the situation being investigated. In other words, 
theories are developed inductively as the researcher begins by interpreting the meanings 
individuals make of the phenomenon and moves on towards constructing a meaning of 
the situation (Cavana, Sekaran and Delahaye 2001; Patton 1990, 37). Researchers 
holding a constructivist worldview usually use open-ended questions as an instrument 
for data collection (Creswell 2003, 19). The data collected through use of this 
philosophical position is qualitative in nature.  
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Transformative assumptions, on the other hand, represent a worldview that 
especially engages socially disadvantaged populations (Mertens 2010). This 
philosophical assumption was born during the 1980s and 1990s in response to the need 
felt by individual researchers for inclusivity when social knowledge was being garnered. 
Researchers adopting this philosophical approach believe that neither postpositivist nor 
constructivist assumptions furnish adequate directives for responding to the socio-
cultural and political needs of the most disadvantaged members of the wider community 
(Gergen 1994, 111). This philosophical view, as stated by Creswell (2013, 9) and 
Mertens (2010), focuses on the needs of the most disadvantaged members such as ethnic 
minority groups, persons with disabilities, widows, indigenous people, bisexual and 
transsexual people as well as migrant students. It focuses on responding to the issues 
arising from socio-political inequalities. Transformative approaches can involve the 
collection of both qualitative and quantitative data and can vary in nature and length of 
participation with the community. However, specific methods that can be informed by, 
and associated with, the transformative paradigm do not yet exist. Therefore, the method 
for data collection and analysis used under this philosophical stance is generally aligned 
with either Postpositivist or Constructivist assumptions, or both in combination, 
depending on the nature of the inquiry (Mertens 2010). 
The next philosophical stance is Pragmatism, which is the worldview informing 
this particular research. Pragmatism is broadly viewed as the theoretical underpinning 
for much mixed methods research. It distinguishes itself from the other worldviews by 
not being committed to any one belief system and nature of reality (Cherryholmes 1992; 
Morgan 2007; Creswell 2013, 11). What this effectively means is that in a mixed 
methods study design, knowledge is claimed using both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to inquiry. Patton (1990, 39) advocates pragmatism as a “paradigm of 
choices” that effectively refuses procedural conventions as criteria for evaluating 
methodological appropriateness. Instead, pragmatism insists upon the possibilities of 
action (Cherryholmes 1992). Pragmatism, as the paradigm of choices, concerns itself 
with understanding the problem in social science by using a sensible approach and 
seeking solutions to the problem rather than focusing on antecedent conditions. 
Otherwise stated, the researcher takes an assortment approach to method selection given 
the nature of inquiry, the research questions and the available resources (Patton 1990, 39; 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004). According to Creswell (2013, 11) [referring to 
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Morgan (2007) and Cherryholmes (1992)], pragmatism is characterised by the following 
key philosophical assumptions: 
 Pragmatism is not committed to any one system of philosophy and 
reality.  
 Individual researchers have a freedom of choice to choose the methods, 
techniques, and procedures of research that best meet their needs and 
purpose. 
 Pragmatists do not see the world as an absolute unity. In a similar way, 
mixed methods researchers look to many approaches for collecting and 
analysing data rather than subscribing to only one way (e.g., qualitative 
or quantitative). 
 Truth is what works at the time.  
 The pragmatist researchers look to the what and how to research based on 
the intended consequences, i.e., where they want to go with it. 
 Pragmatists agree that research always occurs in social, historical, 
political, and other contexts. 
 Pragmatists have believed in an external world independent of the mind 
as well as that lodged in the mind.  
 Thus, for the mixed methods researchers, pragmatism opens the door to 
multiple methods, different worldviews, and different assumptions, as 
well as different forms of data collection and analysis. 
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The following table (Table  3-1) illustrates how knowledge claims, strategies, and 
methods contribute to the nature of a research approach (Creswell, (2003, 18).  
Table  3-1: Knowledge claims, strategies and methods 
 
Tend to, or typically 
are… 
 
 
Qualitative 
Approaches 
 
Quantitative 
Approaches 
 
Mixed Methods 
Approaches 
Philosophical 
assumptions 
Constructivist/transformative 
knowledge claims 
Postpositivist 
knowledge claims 
Pragmatic 
knowledge claims 
Strategies of 
inquiry 
Phenomenology, grounded 
theory, ethnography, case 
study, and narrative 
Survey and 
experiments 
Sequential, 
concurrent, and 
transformative 
Methods for data 
collection 
Open-ended questions, 
emerging approaches, text or 
image data 
Closed-ended 
questions, 
predetermined 
approaches, 
numeric data 
Both open-and 
closed-ended 
questions, both 
emerging and 
predetermined 
approaches, and 
both quantitative 
and qualitative data 
analysis 
 
Research practices  Positioning him – or 
herself 
 Collecting participant 
meanings 
 Focusing on a single 
concept or phenomenon 
 Bringing personal values 
into the study 
 Studying the context or 
setting or participants 
 Validating the accuracy 
of findings 
 Making interpretations of 
the data  
 Creating an agenda for 
change or reform 
 Collaborating with the 
participants 
 Testing or 
verifying 
theories or 
explanations 
 Identifying 
variables to 
study 
 Relating 
variables in 
question or 
hypotheses 
 Using standards 
of validity and 
reliability 
 Observing and 
measuring 
information 
numerically 
 Using unbiased 
approaches 
 Employing 
statistical 
procedures 
 Collecting both 
quantitative and 
qualitative data 
 Developing a 
rationale for 
mixing 
 Integrating the 
data at different 
stages of inquiry 
 Presenting 
visual pictures 
of the 
procedures in 
the study 
 Employing the 
practices of both 
quantitative and 
qualitative 
research  
 
3.4 MIXED METHODS DESIGN  
As described in section 3.1, this research uses a mixed methods approach as a 
theoretical framework to address the research questions. Mixed methods research is 
Chapter 3 – Research Design  
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 63 
referred to by Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010) as the “third methodological movement” 
and by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) as “third wave”, is a research methodology 
that involves the intentional collection and integration of both qualitative and 
quantitative data in a single study in order to answer the research questions (Creswell 
2013, 14). The rationale for collecting and combining quantitative and qualitative data as 
argued by Rossman and Wilson (1985), Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), Morgan 
(2007), and Creswell (2013, 15), is that quantitative and qualitative methods in 
combination can provide a more accurate response to the research questions than by 
using each separately. The notion of using more than one research strategy in a single 
study is not a new one. Mixed methods design was initially applied back in the 1950s by 
Campbell and Fiske (1959) to establish the validity of psychological measures. Various 
forms of mixed methods approaches have been applied since then to social research by 
many authors, including Patton (1990), Howe (1988), and in more recent studies by 
Creswell, Fetters and Ivankova (2004), Zander, Stolz and Hamm (2013) and many 
others.  
The intent of this study was to develop a logical framework for effective 
community participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects. A mixed methodology 
design was applied to collect and analyse different, but complementary, data to answer 
the research questions. Data was collected sequentially with equal priority given to both 
quantitative and qualitative data collection regardless of the sequence in which they 
occurred. Priority, as defined by Ivankova, Creswell and Stick (2006) refers to the order 
of importance a researcher gives to the selected approach (quantitative or qualitative, or 
both) for data collection and analysis. The aim of the quantitative phase was to validate 
the identified challenges for community participation from the literature and to answer 
the first research question. In the second phase, results from the quantitative data were 
followed up with qualitative research to explore and better explain these results. The 
qualitative phase provided answers to the second and third research questions. 
Creswell (1994) and Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) support the philosophy of 
combining research methods because of the potential advantages of being able to obtain 
a better understanding of the concept being investigated. In general terms, as described 
by Leedy and Ormrod (2001, 101), the purpose of using quantitative research is to 
determine how measured variables are interrelated with each other so as to explain, 
predict and control phenomena, while qualitative research answers questions on the 
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complex nature of the phenomena to enable the researcher to depict and comprehend the 
knowledge of participants. 
 There are a vast variety of mixed methods designs reported in the literature a 
researcher may apply to their research. The six commonly used design models as 
identified by Creswell (2003) are: “Sequential explanatory, sequential exploratory, 
sequential transformative, concurrent triangulation, concurrent nested and concurrent 
transformative”. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this study employed a sequential 
explanatory design for the collection and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative 
data.  
3.4.1 Mixed Methods Sequential Explanatory Design 
This research utilised a sequential explanatory design, which enabled the 
collection of quantitative and qualitative data from a wide range of participants. In this 
methodology, the quantitative phase is followed by a qualitative phase. Otherwise stated, 
quantitative data is initially collected, analysed and then explained in more depth and 
detail in the subsequent qualitative phase. The rationale underpinning sequential 
explanatory mixed methods research is that: firstly, its pluralistic sequential approach 
provides the opportunity to further explore the general knowledge claimed in the initial 
phase by exploring participants’ views, and secondly, it is simple and more 
straightforward than the other mixed methods models. However, as with all research 
methods and models, the sequential explanatory model also has limitations. The major 
limitation of this design model is the lengthy time and resources required for collecting 
both the quantitative and qualitative data (Ivankova, Creswell and Stick 2006), which 
may not always be readily available. 
In this study firstly quantitative data was collected and analysed and this data was 
then used for the formulation of interview questions thus integrating it into the 
qualitative phase of the research.  
3.4.2 Quantitative Phase 
The aim of the quantitative phase was twofold. Firstly, to collect participants’ 
opinions on the 41 measures (challenges) expressed in the form of individual statements 
outlined in the questionnaire. Secondly, to identify other major issues for community 
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participation, specific to the Afghan settings and additional to those already reported in 
the current literature. The 41 measures initially identified through thematic analysis of 
the related literature were incorporated into a web-based questionnaire to examine 
whether these measures represented critical challenges for community participation 
within the context of Afghanistan (see Appendix A). Respondents who had been 
involved in post-disaster reconstruction projects in the past 10 years were invited to 
participate in the survey. Respondents were asked to indicate their opinions on individual 
statements presented on a five-point Likert-type scale where 1 indicated strong 
agreement, and 5 strong disagreement. The survey questionnaire was piloted and the 
details of this pilot are discussed below. Subsequent statistical analysis of the scale items 
(scale reliability and validity Cronbach’s alpha), correlation between items, and principal 
component analysis (PCA) were undertaken to establish the reliability and validity of the 
survey items. Survey participants were identified and selected with the help and 
cooperation of the United Nations Office in Afghanistan.  
3.4.3 Pilot Study  
Pilot testing of the questionnaire before embarking on a large scale study is 
important for the success of the research study (Brace 2003, 163).  Although pilot testing 
does not necessarily guarantee success in the subsequent larger scale study, it does 
increase the chance of collecting more accurate data, and so increases the likelihood of 
success in the study (Edwin van and Hundley 2002).  A well designed questionnaire, as 
argued by Fallowfield (1995), increases the reliability of responses. To ensure the 
appropriateness and readability of survey questions, a pilot of the survey questionnaire 
for this study was conducted to address the following points: 
a) Do the survey participants understand the questions? 
b) Do the questions posed adequately address challenges for community 
participation in reconstruction projects? 
c) How long does it take to complete the questionnaire? 
d) Are there any technical problems accessing and navigating the online 
survey? 
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The questionnaire was written in two languages, English and Dari. As mentioned 
earlier, the questionnaire was administered online using Queensland University of 
Technology (QUT) software called “Key Survey”. For the pilot phase, the web-based 
link to the survey was initially provided to 15 participants for their comments. Except for 
a few minor changes (such as changing the direct translation of the word “warlords” to “ 
“armed militia groups”)  in the Dari version of the questionnaire, no adverse comments 
were received from the respondents. The questionnaire was improved based on the 
comments from the pilot study participants and the final draft was reviewed by four 
participants, two of them having adequate proficiency of English language and the other 
two being proficient in both English and Dari languages. 
3.4.4 Qualitative Phase 
As explained in sub-section 3.4.1 this study employed a sequential explanatory 
design approach in which the initial, quantitative phase was followed by the second, 
qualitative, phase. In the qualitative phase, interviews were conducted to gather 
explanation around the questions:  
a) How did the challenges, identified in the first phase, impact community 
participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects?  
b) How could the impact of these challenges be reduced or eliminated to allow 
for more effective community involvement in rebuilding houses after a major 
disaster? 
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) explain that the use of interviews as a research 
method involves careful questioning and listening, for the purpose of constructing 
systematically tested knowledge about the phenomenon that interests both the 
interviewer and the interviewee. Interviews are considered one of the most effective 
instruments for collecting data in qualitative research because they enable the researchers 
to purposefully collect useful data (Cookes 2010; Birks and Mills 2011, 4). Bell (2005, 
159-160)  identifies three distinct formats of interviews: unstructured, structured, and 
semi-structured.  
Initial interviews are generally conducted in an unstructured style with the aim of 
identifying important areas or topics that are of the most concern to people. Unstructured 
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interviews are most appropriate when a researcher is trying to identify important 
concepts for the research that will require further investigation (Ayres 2008). Data 
collected as a result of unstructured interviews do not require complex data analysis 
techniques or the use of sophisticated computer software for analysis. Since unstructured 
interviews are mostly used for identifying general concepts for inclusion in a study, a 
researcher with good note-taking ability would be able to successfully conduct 
interviews of this kind.  
Structured interviews, on the other hand, are generally used for collecting survey 
data, or testing hypotheses generated in the previous study phase such as the literature 
review or a pilot study (Firmin 2008). In structured interviews, all participants are asked 
relatively standardised questions (mostly close-ended) and in the same order. Structured 
interviews are mainly controlled and administered by the researcher with equal 
opportunity being given to all participants to provide full data on the topic being 
investigated.  
Semi-structured interviews are a method for collecting qualitative data in which 
interview participants are asked a predesigned set of carefully worded open-ended 
interview questions about a topic to be explored (Ayres 2008). In contrast to 
unstructured interviews, questions asked in semi-structured interviews are focused on 
exploring the already identified concept with an aim of extracting new knowledge from 
people as they reveal their experience, feelings and understanding of the concept in an 
interview. In this research, semi-structured interviews were used as the main method for 
collecting qualitative data. Fifteen participants, most of them from the previous research 
phase, were selected for the interviews in this study. The interview brief (Appendix C), 
consisting of nine interview questions along with necessary background information 
about the research, was sent to the interview participants ahead of the interview. 
Participants were also provided with a scheduling sheet to indicate the most convenient 
time and preferred method of communication for the interview (e.g. by telephone or by 
internet means using Skype software). Except for one participant, who chose to be 
interviewed on the phone, all participants selected to have their interviews using the 
internet. Internet, or computer-assisted interviews according to Kvale and Brinkmann 
(2009, 148-150) is similar to face to face interview with the advantage of having the 
opportunity to talk to people who are geographically distant from the researcher. As 
shown later in Chapter 5, although the interview participants for this research were 
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located in different countries, the interviewer was able to converse with them with the 
help of the internet. The use of the internet also allowed conversation to be voice-
recorded. A more detailed explanation of the implementation and analysis of the 
interviews has been provided in Chapter 5.  
The data analysis process for this research was supported by the qualitative data 
analysis software (QSR International’s NVivo 9 software) and the statistical analysis 
computer programme (SPSS). The following two Chapters provide a more detailed 
explanation of the quantitative and qualitative data analysis undertaken. 
3.5 VISUAL MODEL 
Authors writing on the use of mixed methods research such as Tashakkori and 
Teddlie (2012) and Creswell et al. (2008) suggest that a one-page visual model or 
graphical representation of the mixed methodology is necessary to help the reader 
understand the procedures undertaken. A visual presentation makes it easier for the 
reader to comprehend the multi-stage format and the order in which data was collected, 
the priority given to the method, and the point at which data collected through the 
different approaches was integrated (Ivankova, Creswell and Stick 2006). Figure  3-2 
illustrates the sequential explanatory research design approach used for this research.  
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Phase  Procedure 
 Internet based opinion survey 
 Complete responses N = 147 
 
 
 
 Data screening   
 Principal component analysis (PCA) 
 Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U 
test 
 Non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test 
 Statistical analysis report 
 SPSS Quantitative analysis software 
v.19 
 
 Purposefully selecting interview 
participants (n=15) from within the 
survey respondents and using 
snowball sampling technique 
 Developing interview questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 Individual face to face online  
interview with 15 participants using 
Skype 
 Reports  
 Concurrent literature review 
 
 
 
 Transcription (verbatim and written) 
 Coding and thematic analysis 
(inductive and deductive) 
 QSR International NVivo 9 
qualitative analysis software 
 
 
 
 Interpretation and explanation of 
the quantitative and qualitative 
data 
 
 
Product 
 Research  ethics (QUT 
ethics approval 
number 1100001200) 
 Numeric data 
 
 
 
 Descriptive statistic, 
missing data, 
incomplete responses 
 Factors loading 
 Test statistics 
 
 
 
 
 Problem three 
analysis 
 Research ethics 
clearance certificate 
(amendment) 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 individual 
interviews with 
experts 
 Text data (Interview 
transcripts), report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Qualitative data 
analysis  
 Result report 
 Codes and themes 
 Objective three 
 Logical framework 
 
 
 
 
 Discussion 
 Future research 
 
Figure  3-2: Visual model for mixed-methods sequential explanatory design 
procedure -adopted and adapted from Ivankova, Creswell and Stick  (2006)  
Quantitative data 
collection 
Quantitative data 
analysis  
Connecting 
quantitative and 
qualitative 
phases 
Qualitative data 
collection 
Qualitative data 
analysis 
Integration of 
the quantitative 
and qualitative 
results 
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3.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
At Queensland University of Technology (QUT), researchers and research 
students are required to fully comply with all relevant policies, procedures and 
regulatory obligations and abide by all of the provisions articulated in the QUT Code of 
Conduct for Research (QUT 2013). To fully ensure that all relevant ethical issues were 
addressed, an application ‘kit’, comprising two separate sets of application forms, the 
first one covering ethical issues related to the questionnaire survey and the second 
pertaining to conducting the qualitative interviews, was prepared and submitted to the 
Research Ethics Unit for ethical clearance. The ‘kit’ provided information about the 
research team (i.e. contact details of the principal researcher and his supervisor) and fully 
addressed all ethical issues related to potential risks for the interview participants, 
privacy, confidentiality of responses and the anonymity of participants’ identity. 
Participants were also provided the information and contact details of the QUT Research 
Ethics Unit for addressing of any concern or complaints about the research.  
The research has been awarded ethical clearance. Approval number: 1100001200 
3.7 SUMMARY  
In this chapter the research methodology adopted for this research was introduced. This 
chapter firstly introduced the research problem and outlined the research questions. Next, 
the different philosophical assumptions were discussed. Pragmatism as the philosophical 
underpinning for using a mixed methods research approach was selected as the 
worldview informing this research. Section 3.4 discussed the notion of mixed methods 
research approach, addressing the different mixed methods models for data collection 
and data analysis.  After that a detailed explanation of, and reasoning for, selecting the 
sequential explanatory design approach was presented and both the quantitative and 
qualitative phases for data collection were described. A one-page graphical display of the 
mixed methods sequential explanatory design was presented, to aid readers in 
understanding the principles of mixed methods research methodology and, specifically, 
the method adopted for data collection and data processing in this research. Section 3.6, 
which is also the last section in this chapter, explained how the ethics issues involving 
people (interview and questionnaire survey participants) in this research were addressed. 
The next chapter reports on the findings from the questionnaire survey. 
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Chapter 4 
Survey Results 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings of the survey administered online using the 
QUT online survey software called “Key Survey”. The survey was open for the period 
from 01-11-2011 to 23-01-2012. Chapter 4 encompasses the fundamental measures that 
pose critical challenges to effective community involvement in post-disaster 
reconstruction projects and which ultimately contribute to the reduced stakeholder 
satisfaction. The chapter will begin with the demographic characteristics of the 
respondents and will continue on to explain the data analysis process undertaken.    
4.2 DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS  
The primary focus of the survey was to gather data from people with different 
demographic characteristics who were involved in post-disaster reconstruction projects. 
On the basis of the qualitative findings from the extensive review of the contemporary 
and extant literatures conducted in the preceding year, a questionnaire containing 41 
measures (Appendix A) was designed and administered in two languages (English and 
Dari) in early 2012. The use of two languages enabled the collection of opinions from a 
wider spectrum of stakeholders - including the people affected by disasters, sponsors of 
projects and their implementing partners, i.e. non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
Participants from different age groups (ranging from 21 to over 50 years) and with 
different levels of education were invited to take part in the survey (Table  4-1). A 
graphical display of the demographic distribution of the survey respondents is shown in 
Appendix B. 
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Table  4-1: Demographic characteristics of survey respondents 
Respondents' Characteristic Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Gender Male 120 81.6 81.6 81.6 
 Female 27 18.4 18.4 100.0 
 Total 147 100.0 100.0  
Survey language English 65 44.2 44.2 44.2 
 Dari 82 55.8 55.8 100.0 
 Total 147 100.0 100.0  
Participant's role 
in reconstruction  
Beneficiary 
Project Staff 
65 
54 
44.2 
36.7 
44.2 
36.7 
44.2 
81.0 
 Other 28 19.0 19.0 100.0 
 Total 147 100.0 100.0  
Age 21 - 30 39 26.5 26.5 26.5 
 31 - 40 58 39.5 39.5 66.0 
 41 - 50 41 27.9 27.9 93.9 
 50 - over 9 6.1 6.1 100.0 
 Total 147 100.0 100.0  
Level of 
education 
Some High School 
education 
1 .7 .7 .7 
 High School Diploma 10 6.8 6.8 7.5 
 College Diploma 30 20.4 20.4 27.9 
 Bachelor Degree 77 52.4 52.4 80.3 
 Master's Degree 27 18.4 18.4 98.6 
 Doctoral Degree 1 .7 .7 99.3 
 Other 1 .7 .7 100.0 
 Total 147 100.0 100.0  
Country Afghanistan 144 98.0 98.0 98.0 
 Indonesia 2 1.4 1.4 99.3 
 Pakistan 1 .7 .7 100.0 
 Total 147 100.0 100.0  
 
4.3 PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
The analyses presented in the following sections are based on the 147 completed 
responses to the survey. In order to validate the questionnaire containing 41 measures 
rated on a 1-5 Likert-like scale, principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted 
using an oblique (direct oblimin) rotation.  
4.3.1 Principal Component Analysis (Round 1 and 2) 
The initial results from the PCA conducted on 41 items suggested eleven 
components with eigenvalues above Kaiser’s minimum criterion of 1. Item number 22 
‘Unfamiliar technology and construction materials’ was found to constitute a single 
component, which by itself added little (explaining only 2.781% of total variance) to the 
model except for additional complexity with no or too little added value. Item 22 was 
thus excluded. 
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PCA was then conducted on the remaining 40 items using oblique (direct 
oblimin) rotation and a 10 factor solution was suggested. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO = 0.817 and all KMO 
values for the individual items were >0.5. 
4.3.2 Reliability Analysis 
Reliability analysis was conducted on the 40 measures revealing that item 40 
“Militarisation of humanitarian aid by foreign military forces” Cronbach’s α = 0.697 
(see Table  4-2) and item 15 “Inappropriate behaviour of local and international 
employees towards the affected beneficiaries” Cronbach’s α =0.671 (Table  4-4) would 
increase the reliability if they were deleted (see Table  4-3and Table  4-5).  
Table  4-2: Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Number of Items 
.697 4 
 
Table  4-3 Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Pressure from government on donors and local 
officials for quick results 
6.94 6.044 .599 .557 
Government agencies’ attitude that they are the single 
responsible body for reconstruction 
7.07 6.516 .588 .575 
Hasty decisions made by government 7.22 6.668 .499 .624 
Militarisation of humanitarian aid by foreign military 
forces 
6.79 6.948 .295 .764 
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Table  4-4: Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Number of Items 
.671 3 
 
Table  4-5: Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Inappropriate behaviour of local and international 
employees towards the affected beneficiaries 
3.75 2.861 .414 .711 
Lack of or low competency 4.15 3.019 .598 .427 
Corruption in Non-government organisation 4.54 3.743 .482 .595 
 
4.3.3 Principal Component Analysis (Round 3 and 4) 
Once items 40 and 15 were excluded, the PCA was rerun on the remaining 38 items. In 
Table  4-7, the values in the column Corrected Items-Total Correlation, they are all 
above 0.3 except for item 10 “Corruption in government” which is 0.082. This indicates 
extremely poor internal consistency and identifies item 10 as a potential problem. The 
value for item 10 in the column titled ‘Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted’ (see Table  4-7) 
indicates that the reliability Cronbach’s α= 0.637 (see Table  4-6) would increase if it was 
deleted and thus it was removed.  
Table  4-6: Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Number of Items 
.637 4 
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Table  4-7: Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Corruption in government 7.02 7.048 .082 .748 
Pressure from government on donors and local 
officials for quick results 
6.03 4.526 .497 .506 
Government agencies’ attitude that they are the single 
responsible body for reconstruction 
6.16 4.562 .589 .441 
International donors' urgent completion of housing 
reconstruction projects 
6.09 4.355 .532 .476 
 
After deleting items 10, 15, 22, and 40, the PCA was rerun on 37 items. The 
correlation matrix (see Table  4-8) comprising the remaining 37 measures indicated a 
large number of correlations exceeding 0.3. The KMO measure (see Table  4-9), verified 
the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO = 0.821 “meritorious” according to 
Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999, 225). As shown in the anti-image matrix (see Table 
 4-10) almost all KMO values for the individual items were >0.6 (Table 10), which is 
above the acceptable level of 0.5 (Field 2009, 660). Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2 (666) 
= 2981.751, p < 0.001, indicated that correlation between items was sufficiently large for 
the PCA (see Table  4-9).  
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Table  4-8: Correlation Matrix 
Variables
Chall
enge
01
Chall
enge
02
Chall
enge
03
Chall
enge
04
Chall
enge
05
Chall
enge
06
Chall
enge
07
Chall
enge
08
Chall
enge
09
Chall
enge
11
Chall
enge
12
Chall
enge
13
Chall
enge
14
Chall
enge
16
Chall
enge
17
Chall
enge
18
Chall
enge
19
Chall
enge
20
Chall
enge
21
Chall
enge
23
Chall
enge
24
Chall
enge
25
Chall
enge
26
Chall
enge
27
Chall
enge
28
Chall
enge
29
Chall
enge
30
Chall
enge
31
Chall
enge
32
Chall
enge
33
Chall
enge
34
Chall
enge
35
Chall
enge
36
Chall
enge
37
Chall
enge
38
Chall
enge
39
Chall
enge
41
Challenge01 1.000
Challenge02 .628 1.000
Challenge03 .451 .616 1.000
Challenge04 .434 .354 .283 1.000
Challenge05 .462 .276 .387 .529 1.000
Challenge06 .459 .347 .375 .455 .585 1.000
Challenge07 .405 .432 .386 .203 .445 .542 1.000
Challenge08 .472 .403 .340 .415 .527 .614 .538 1.000
Challenge09 .356 .274 .201 .176 .369 .410 .430 .363 1.000
Challenge11 .197 .113 .124 .290 .349 .325 .167 .235 .196 1.000
Challenge12 .208 .331 .331 .262 .209 .131 .232 .082 .189 .430 1.000
Challenge13 -.024 .111 .114 .051 .046 -.015 .005 .036 -.130 .142 .258 1.000
Challenge14 .344 .317 .200 .461 .512 .421 .239 .261 .261 .372 .346 .051 1.000
Challenge16 .471 .333 .282 .417 .444 .442 .382 .345 .255 .364 .462 .207 .445 1.000
Challenge17 .405 .341 .322 .282 .339 .343 .435 .464 .306 .299 .332 .105 .312 .515 1.000
Challenge18 .111 .197 .067 .137 .074 .039 .205 .117 .051 .184 .325 .060 .234 .317 .556 1.000
Challenge19 .145 .136 .060 .119 .040 .072 .011 .090 .026 .160 .058 .411 .060 .099 .035 -.049 1.000
Challenge20 -.097 .040 .107 -.108 -.157 -.074 -.138 -.108 -.084 .037 .079 .524 -.056 -.070 -.163 -.089 .560 1.000
Challenge21 -.088 .072 .109 .020 -.035 -.021 .055 -.030 -.023 .052 .052 .441 .019 -.037 -.054 -.050 .538 .692 1.000
Challenge23 .170 .237 .159 .385 .185 .235 .188 .202 .157 .188 .347 .137 .269 .200 .221 .191 .192 .035 .022 1.000
Challenge24 .208 .283 .294 .190 .235 .105 .248 .215 .242 .087 .271 .036 .174 .163 .150 .055 .048 .114 .030 .308 1.000
Challenge25 .212 .218 .178 .200 .189 .110 .188 .222 .181 .093 .105 -.039 .104 .140 .321 .137 .134 -.013 -.063 .414 .492 1.000
Challenge26 .315 .323 .296 .331 .292 .452 .267 .407 .262 .162 .189 .052 .259 .279 .226 .165 .088 .079 -.002 .410 .340 .298 1.000
Challenge27 .260 .332 .230 .310 .277 .201 .372 .275 .338 .076 .342 .009 .281 .241 .228 .175 .033 .044 .087 .404 .481 .386 .457 1.000
Challenge28 .178 .273 .101 .158 .210 .237 .292 .065 .125 .188 .330 .039 .295 .246 .195 .142 -.052 .062 .138 .171 .235 .122 .153 .172 1.000
Challenge29 .178 .218 .225 .153 .148 .163 .254 .146 .095 .207 .440 .118 .275 .315 .260 .270 .123 .136 .129 .280 .310 .160 .278 .232 .618 1.000
Challenge30 .230 .287 .317 .195 .235 .244 .308 .190 .113 .163 .418 .138 .330 .330 .184 .201 .169 .233 .178 .197 .324 .088 .390 .377 .509 .717 1.000
Challenge31 .126 .268 .234 .206 .263 .266 .265 .173 .102 .103 .300 .078 .261 .194 .120 .183 -.065 .098 .113 .055 .221 .060 .250 .263 .609 .499 .508 1.000
Challenge32 .025 .184 .174 .157 .211 .282 .232 .145 .047 .118 .280 -.003 .256 .101 .080 .089 -.162 -.031 .011 .094 .201 .046 .194 .208 .611 .430 .460 .822 1.000
Challenge33 .105 .177 .237 .142 .248 .278 .282 .173 .190 .115 .246 .066 .187 .279 .243 .122 .102 .035 .149 .204 .171 .194 .293 .403 .278 .307 .342 .358 .314 1.000
Challenge34 .238 .249 .279 .265 .290 .234 .309 .275 .080 .172 .276 .038 .264 .290 .345 .249 .182 .024 .170 .362 .277 .273 .431 .400 .197 .394 .408 .241 .196 .623 1.000
Challenge35 .200 .261 .376 .152 .213 .149 .306 .177 .114 .112 .334 .137 .077 .348 .329 .302 .088 .043 .156 .244 .267 .121 .336 .392 .112 .281 .346 .256 .192 .546 .656 1.000
Challenge36 .304 .306 .264 .272 .300 .307 .404 .288 .147 .132 .197 -.051 .228 .341 .301 .201 .018 -.053 .077 .096 .226 .143 .293 .382 .261 .310 .285 .321 .261 .451 .555 .653 1.000
Challenge37 .207 .295 .254 .197 .216 .228 .333 .189 .100 .242 .262 .080 .263 .265 .332 .278 .105 .087 .238 .176 .224 .144 .286 .329 .380 .336 .333 .402 .353 .558 .569 .572 .596 1.000
Challenge38 .249 .395 .266 .342 .313 .296 .243 .296 .115 .137 .346 .113 .340 .470 .355 .276 .018 .110 .108 .263 .199 .160 .407 .399 .375 .351 .445 .354 .325 .313 .331 .413 .468 .384 1.000
Challenge39 .111 .285 .127 .169 .140 .085 .234 .233 .123 .182 .350 .073 .174 .304 .368 .277 .051 .094 .103 .179 .284 .247 .199 .393 .391 .401 .465 .380 .282 .232 .296 .288 .294 .288 .432 1.000
Challenge41 .161 .359 .232 .103 .138 .021 .174 .203 .141 .058 .387 .126 .208 .211 .240 .303 .070 .215 .102 .215 .267 .172 .331 .426 .252 .302 .434 .285 .260 .266 .336 .396 .328 .321 .603 .547 1.000
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Table  4-9: KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .821 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 2981.715 
df 666 
Sig. .000 
 
An initial analysis was run to obtain eigenvalues for each component in the data. 
Using the criterion of retaining components with eigenvalues of 1 or greater, nine 
components were retained for rotation. These component accounted for 27.37%, 8.84%, 
6.89%, 5.60%, 4.79%, 4.67%, 3.81%, 3.12%, and 2.89% of the total variance, 
respectively, for a total of 67.88% (see Table  4-11).The Scree plot (Figure  4-1), 
however, showed inflexions that would justify retaining both components 5 and 9.  
 
Figure  4-1: Scree Plot
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Table  4-10: Anti-image Matrix 
 
Variables
Chall
enge
01
Chall
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02
Chall
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03
Chall
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04
Chall
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05
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06
Chall
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07
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08
Chall
enge
09
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Chall
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12
Chall
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13
Chall
enge
14
Chall
enge
16
Chall
enge
17
Chall
enge
18
Chall
enge
19
Chall
enge
20
Chall
enge
21
Chall
enge
23
Chall
enge
24
Chall
enge
25
Chall
enge
26
Chall
enge
27
Chall
enge
28
Chall
enge
29
Chall
enge
30
Chall
enge
31
Chall
enge
32
Chall
enge
33
Chall
enge
34
Chall
enge
35
Chall
enge
36
Chall
enge
37
Chall
enge
38
Chall
enge
39
Chall
enge
41
Challenge01 .833a -.444 .015 -.099 -.149 -.042 .073 -.074 -.046 .019 .045 .144 .040 -.238 -.184 .156 -.118 -.045 .150 .062 .066 -.018 -.007 -.104 -.125 -.004 -.099 -.064 .159 .182 -.030 -.038 -.058 -.038 .179 .226 -.067
Challenge02 -.444 .780a -.525 -.046 .326 .040 -.135 -.121 -.085 .070 -.056 -.168 -.162 .115 .203 -.172 -.173 .144 .024 .005 -.051 .012 -.009 -.006 -.193 .150 .117 -.042 .036 .007 -.028 .092 -.006 -.028 -.198 -.155 -.039
Challenge03 .015 -.525 .738a -.047 -.280 -.129 -.060 .104 .152 .052 -.176 .144 .099 .057 -.256 .240 .253 -.194 -.099 .032 -.062 -.089 -.018 .139 .289 -.135 -.130 -.026 -.012 -.046 .102 -.225 .087 -.001 .109 .150 -.032
Challenge04 -.099 -.046 -.047 .868a -.208 -.094 .274 -.121 .091 -.021 -.066 .013 -.061 -.113 .038 -.047 -.064 .185 -.166 -.264 -.020 .028 -.005 -.105 .031 .090 -.026 -.097 .030 .084 -.021 .133 -.138 -.003 -.074 -.029 .115
Challenge05 -.149 .326 -.280 -.208 .833a -.128 -.111 -.165 -.130 -.158 .087 -.187 -.283 .018 .118 .011 -.067 .195 .026 .100 -.099 -.057 .119 -.011 -.138 .143 .008 -.149 .118 -.005 -.112 -.030 .040 .088 -.133 .034 -.063
Challenge06 -.042 .040 -.129 -.094 -.128 .840a -.262 -.267 -.135 -.097 .096 .121 -.122 -.146 -.009 .041 -.031 -.183 .094 -.135 .142 .108 -.300 .141 -.061 .116 -.015 .094 -.207 -.176 .079 .080 -.114 .061 -.049 -.007 .237
Challenge07 .073 -.135 -.060 .274 -.111 -.262 .854a -.222 -.139 .074 -.024 -.040 .163 -.128 -.061 -.086 .024 .206 -.183 -.086 -.017 .000 .144 -.194 -.122 .069 -.166 -.015 .040 .104 -.018 .058 -.176 -.071 .161 .075 -.007
Challenge08 -.074 -.121 .104 -.121 -.165 -.267 -.222 .862a -.008 -.086 .169 -.073 .149 .067 -.240 .111 .010 .048 -.028 .024 -.092 .045 -.099 .024 .284 -.139 .052 -.019 -.063 .034 -.059 .102 .011 .029 -.029 -.085 -.143
Challenge09 -.046 -.085 .152 .091 -.130 -.135 -.139 -.008 .790a -.044 -.098 .258 -.066 .005 -.205 .145 -.003 -.026 -.093 -.009 -.099 .038 -.098 -.135 .008 -.054 .070 -.072 .117 -.139 .237 -.092 .062 .078 .151 .071 -.130
Challenge11 .019 .070 .052 -.021 -.158 -.097 .074 -.086 -.044 .809a -.376 .024 -.113 -.037 .001 -.047 -.082 -.084 .035 .049 .056 -.042 -.066 .095 -.033 -.021 .063 .139 -.069 .069 .020 -.002 .011 -.194 .083 -.132 .116
Challenge12 .045 -.056 -.176 -.066 .087 .096 -.024 .169 -.098 -.376 .866a -.154 -.017 -.224 -.036 -.050 .041 .019 .064 -.164 -.057 .145 .127 -.152 -.016 -.115 -.017 -.009 -.076 -.005 -.028 -.030 .059 .079 .037 .018 -.168
Challenge13 .144 -.168 .144 .013 -.187 .121 -.040 -.073 .258 .024 -.154 .634a .019 -.209 -.207 .110 -.074 -.335 -.106 -.109 .022 .087 -.079 .041 .048 -.021 .036 -.030 -.021 -.054 .169 -.135 .092 .029 .115 .094 -.005
Challenge14 .040 -.162 .099 -.061 -.283 -.122 .163 .149 -.066 -.113 -.017 .019 .857a -.178 -.081 -.083 .040 .047 -.082 -.110 -.039 .101 .065 -.092 .060 .005 -.145 .013 -.067 .058 -.120 .291 -.082 -.095 .020 .130 -.089
Challenge16 -.238 .115 .057 -.113 .018 -.146 -.128 .067 .005 -.037 -.224 -.209 -.178 .876a -.070 -.052 -.047 .056 .111 .152 -.040 -.016 .002 .095 -.001 -.049 .002 -.017 .149 -.117 .061 -.149 .037 .070 -.298 -.138 .147
Challenge17 -.184 .203 -.256 .038 .118 -.009 -.061 -.240 -.205 .001 -.036 -.207 -.081 -.070 .794a -.502 -.047 .127 .039 .106 .083 -.211 .083 .060 -.098 -.018 .149 .163 -.051 -.002 -.116 -.006 .072 -.093 -.176 -.266 .131
Challenge18 .156 -.172 .240 -.047 .011 .041 -.086 .111 .145 -.047 -.050 .110 -.083 -.052 -.502 .706a .102 -.024 .000 -.054 .082 -.016 -.055 .007 .120 -.109 -.041 -.214 .153 .112 .053 -.152 .073 -.067 .085 .130 -.178
Challenge19 -.118 -.173 .253 -.064 -.067 -.031 .024 .010 -.003 -.082 .041 -.074 .040 -.047 -.047 .102 .691a -.277 -.273 -.145 .078 -.175 .063 .144 .222 -.087 -.158 .036 .032 -.070 -.021 -.003 -.020 -.010 .140 .027 -.026
Challenge20 -.045 .144 -.194 .185 .195 -.183 .206 .048 -.026 -.084 .019 -.335 .047 .056 .127 -.024 -.277 .619a -.485 -.003 -.173 -.028 -.024 -.015 -.018 .066 -.125 -.191 .190 .052 .040 .136 -.036 -.013 -.092 .034 -.210
Challenge21 .150 .024 -.099 -.166 .026 .094 -.183 -.028 -.093 .035 .064 -.106 -.082 .111 .039 .000 -.273 -.485 .655a .135 .103 .110 .099 -.120 -.198 .008 .109 .043 .014 .047 -.151 -.096 .084 -.105 -.094 -.059 .161
Challenge23 .062 .005 .032 -.264 .100 -.135 -.086 .024 -.009 .049 -.164 -.109 -.110 .152 .106 -.054 -.145 -.003 .135 .763a .022 -.237 -.133 -.175 -.117 -.192 .214 .181 -.051 .077 -.152 -.194 .280 .011 -.099 -.004 .029
Challenge24 .066 -.051 -.062 -.020 -.099 .142 -.017 -.092 -.099 .056 -.057 .022 -.039 -.040 .083 .082 .078 -.173 .103 .022 .846a -.362 -.078 -.199 -.076 -.087 -.025 .078 -.071 .154 -.003 -.130 .010 -.062 .119 -.030 .050
Challenge25 -.018 .012 -.089 .028 -.057 .108 .000 .045 .038 -.042 .145 .087 .101 -.016 -.211 -.016 -.175 -.028 .110 -.237 -.362 .770a -.079 -.139 -.045 .003 .146 .006 -.029 -.105 -.065 .182 -.038 .049 -.013 -.085 .020
Challenge26 -.007 -.009 -.018 -.005 .119 -.300 .144 -.099 -.098 -.066 .127 -.079 .065 .002 .083 -.055 .063 -.024 .099 -.133 -.078 -.079 .882a -.177 .040 .008 -.154 -.121 .108 .100 -.206 -.025 .065 -.042 -.121 .139 -.096
Challenge27 -.104 -.006 .139 -.105 -.011 .141 -.194 .024 -.135 .095 -.152 .041 -.092 .095 .060 .007 .144 -.015 -.120 -.175 -.199 -.139 -.177 .870a .187 .134 -.150 -.022 -.002 -.239 .088 .005 -.117 .016 -.067 -.155 -.023
Challenge28 -.125 -.193 .289 .031 -.138 -.061 -.122 .284 .008 -.033 -.016 .048 .060 -.001 -.098 .120 .222 -.018 -.198 -.117 -.076 -.045 .040 .187 .807a -.355 -.054 -.073 -.224 -.093 .096 .169 -.017 -.145 -.093 -.114 .006
Challenge29 -.004 .150 -.135 .090 .143 .116 .069 -.139 -.054 -.021 -.115 -.021 .005 -.049 -.018 -.109 -.087 .066 .008 -.192 -.087 .003 .008 .134 -.355 .834a -.490 -.151 .104 .004 -.118 .124 -.202 .071 .010 .031 .076
Challenge30 -.099 .117 -.130 -.026 .008 -.015 -.166 .052 .070 .063 -.017 .036 -.145 .002 .149 -.041 -.158 -.125 .109 .214 -.025 .146 -.154 -.150 -.054 -.490 .853a .072 -.150 -.007 -.096 -.105 .221 .051 -.116 -.221 -.022
Challenge31 -.064 -.042 -.026 -.097 -.149 .094 -.015 -.019 -.072 .139 -.009 -.030 .013 -.017 .163 -.214 .036 -.191 .043 .181 .078 .006 -.121 -.022 -.073 -.151 .072 .793a -.706 -.101 .056 -.027 -.008 -.061 .033 -.231 .160
Challenge32 .159 .036 -.012 .030 .118 -.207 .040 -.063 .117 -.069 -.076 -.021 -.067 .149 -.051 .153 .032 .190 .014 -.051 -.071 -.029 .108 -.002 -.224 .104 -.150 -.706 .757a .020 .022 -.040 .019 -.035 -.031 .174 -.155
Challenge33 .182 .007 -.046 .084 -.005 -.176 .104 .034 -.139 .069 -.005 -.054 .058 -.117 -.002 .112 -.070 .052 .047 .077 .154 -.105 .100 -.239 -.093 .004 -.007 -.101 .020 .857a -.367 -.127 .068 -.235 .010 .091 -.025
Challenge34 -.030 -.028 .102 -.021 -.112 .079 -.018 -.059 .237 .020 -.028 .169 -.120 .061 -.116 .053 -.021 .040 -.151 -.152 -.003 -.065 -.206 .088 .096 -.118 -.096 .056 .022 -.367 .875a -.271 -.130 -.096 .168 -.017 -.057
Challenge35 -.038 .092 -.225 .133 -.030 .080 .058 .102 -.092 -.002 -.030 -.135 .291 -.149 -.006 -.152 -.003 .136 -.096 -.194 -.130 .182 -.025 .005 .169 .124 -.105 -.027 -.040 -.127 -.271 .832a -.427 -.133 -.066 -.009 -.055
Challenge36 -.058 -.006 .087 -.138 .040 -.114 -.176 .011 .062 .011 .059 .092 -.082 .037 .072 .073 -.020 -.036 .084 .280 .010 -.038 .065 -.117 -.017 -.202 .221 -.008 .019 .068 -.130 -.427 .857a -.219 -.199 -.036 -.004
Challenge37 -.038 -.028 -.001 -.003 .088 .061 -.071 .029 .078 -.194 .079 .029 -.095 .070 -.093 -.067 -.010 -.013 -.105 .011 -.062 .049 -.042 .016 -.145 .071 .051 -.061 -.035 -.235 -.096 -.133 -.219 .928a -.009 .046 -.020
Challenge38 .179 -.198 .109 -.074 -.133 -.049 .161 -.029 .151 .083 .037 .115 .020 -.298 -.176 .085 .140 -.092 -.094 -.099 .119 -.013 -.121 -.067 -.093 .010 -.116 .033 -.031 .010 .168 -.066 -.199 -.009 .859a .074 -.392
Challenge39 .226 -.155 .150 -.029 .034 -.007 .075 -.085 .071 -.132 .018 .094 .130 -.138 -.266 .130 .027 .034 -.059 -.004 -.030 -.085 .139 -.155 -.114 .031 -.221 -.231 .174 .091 -.017 -.009 -.036 .046 .074 .821a -.353
Challenge41 -.067 -.039 -.032 .115 -.063 .237 -.007 -.143 -.130 .116 -.168 -.005 -.089 .147 .131 -.178 -.026 -.210 .161 .029 .050 .020 -.096 -.023 .006 .076 -.022 .160 -.155 -.025 -.057 -.055 -.004 -.020 -.392 -.353 .816a
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Table  4-11: Total variances 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadingsa 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
1 10.125 27.365 27.365 10.125 27.365 27.365 5.934 
2 3.269 8.836 36.201 3.269 8.836 36.201 4.308 
3 2.523 6.818 43.019 2.523 6.818 43.019 2.927 
4 2.073 5.602 48.621 2.073 5.602 48.621 5.014 
5 1.768 4.778 53.399 1.768 4.778 53.399 3.025 
6 1.727 4.668 58.067 1.727 4.668 58.067 3.474 
7 1.409 3.809 61.876 1.409 3.809 61.876 4.749 
8 1.156 3.123 64.999 1.156 3.123 64.999 3.550 
9 1.068 2.885 67.884 1.068 2.885 67.884 3.793 
10 .966 2.610 70.495         
11 .878 2.373 72.868         
12 .865 2.339 75.207         
13 .782 2.114 77.321         
14 .704 1.902 79.223         
15 .658 1.778 81.001         
16 .632 1.709 82.710         
17 .618 1.670 84.380         
18 .547 1.479 85.859         
19 .505 1.364 87.223         
20 .474 1.282 88.505         
21 .428 1.158 89.663         
22 .383 1.035 90.697         
23 .364 .984 91.681         
24 .343 .928 92.610         
25 .312 .842 93.452         
26 .305 .824 94.276         
27 .287 .776 95.052         
28 .279 .755 95.807         
29 .255 .689 96.496         
30 .235 .634 97.130         
31 .201 .543 97.673         
32 .190 .514 98.187         
33 .165 .446 98.633         
34 .155 .420 99.053         
35 .136 .367 99.420         
36 .113 .305 99.725         
37 .102 .275 100.000         
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
 
The pattern matrix (Table  4-12) and the summary of exploratory factor analysis 
(Table  4-13) present the nine components after direct oblimin rotation. The principal 
approach to determine what these components actually signify is to reflect on the item 
loadings of the nine components. According to Ho (2006, 232) it is in fact the grouping 
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of the items in each component and their descriptive wording that establishes the 
meaning of the respective components. 
An assessment of the item loadings of the nine factors shows that the majority of 
measures loaded on component 1 relate to the lack of a transparent reconstruction 
process and thus the component can best be labelled ‘Opaque Reconstruction Process’. 
Items which unite well together in this component are: ‘absence of a clear process for 
spending project money’, ‘misleading information’, ‘lack of adequate information about 
reconstruction plans and government regulations’, ‘misuse of project funding’, and 
‘participatory approach not supported firmly by policies and practices’. 
Component 2 contains five measures that clearly indicate the desire of sponsors 
for swift results from the reconstruction projects (i.e., ‘pressure from government on 
donors and local officials for quick results’, ‘hasty decisions made by government’, 
‘government agencies’ attitude that they are the single responsible body for 
reconstruction’ and ‘international donors' urgent completion of housing reconstruction 
projects’). Therefore this component was labelled ‘Sponsors’ Desire for Hasty 
Reconstruction’. 
Component 3 has four measures loaded on - ‘low literacy level and the lack of 
necessary knowledge and skills in the affected community’, ‘lack of 
incentive/encouragement for beneficiaries to participate’, ‘members of the affected 
community lack commitment to participate in reconstruction’ and ‘sponsor's lack of 
knowledge about local capacity’. These measures reflect the existing capacity and level 
of dedication in the community to participate in reconstruction. This component was 
tagged ‘Low Community Capacity and Commitment’.  
Items loaded on component 4 are: ‘socio-cultural and religious restrictions on 
women’s participation in social affairs’, ‘ignoring gender livelihood related issues’, ‘a 
culture of violation of women’s rights in society’, ‘general misconception that women 
are incapable of contributing to actual housing reconstruction’ and ‘weak representation 
of female headed families by the community representatives and their marginalisation 
from relief aid and reconstruction’. These items clearly reflect issues related to gender 
imbalance in the reconstruction process, therefore, this component was titled ‘Gender 
Issue’.  
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The measures that loaded particularly highly on component 5 seem to relate to 
‘Non-government organisations’ (NGOs) competency for instance corruption’, ‘lack of 
or low competency and their inadequate understanding of the principles of community 
participation’. Therefore component five was labelled ‘NGOs’ Lack of Competency’.  
Items in component 6 appear to reflect issues, which are likely to hinder effective 
community involvement in reconstruction. The items in this component are: ‘difficulty 
in mobilising affected people after a major disaster’, ‘affected community is under 
economic or other form of stress’, ‘loss of confidence in affected people’s personal 
competence’ and ‘weak collective capacity and a lack of strong community 
organisations to represent the needs of affected communities at local and central 
government level’. Component 6 was therefore titled ‘Community Inherent Issues and 
Weaknesses’.  
In component 7 there are three item loadings: ‘difficulty in land acquisition due 
to the government’s slow administrative process’, ‘lack of government support in the 
area to speedily restore and establish land ownership’ and ‘ignoring local councils when 
planning housing reconstruction’. These all perfectly reflect issues related to restoring 
land title and land acquisition. Therefore, this component was labelled ‘Slow Land 
Acquisition Process’.  
The three items that load highly on component 8 seem to reflect weakness in 
conduct of central government administration, such as ‘the exclusion of renters and low-
income families from government reconstruction programmes’, ‘government and 
professionals demonstrating no confidence in the capacity of affected populations’ and 
‘government obsession to control development programmes’, and thus this component 
was titled ‘Government Policies and Practices’. 
And finally, items loading on component 9 seem to address the regional security 
situation such as ‘weak central government and presence of illegal armed groups and 
warlords’, ‘difficulty organising a representative and accountable community group in 
the face of futility’, ‘hostility and distrust’, ‘regional military conflict’ and ‘the presence 
of landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs)’. Component 9 was titled ‘Lack of 
Adequate Security’. 
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Table  4-12: Pattern Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Challenge35 .825                 
Challenge34 .801                 
Challenge33 .770                 
Challenge37 .734                 
Challenge36 .727                 
Challenge04   -.737               
Challenge14   -.639               
Challenge05   -.551           .332   
Challenge06   -.507           .506   
Challenge26   -.340       .331       
Challenge20     .869             
Challenge21     .836             
Challenge19     .799             
Challenge13     .686             
Challenge32       .845           
Challenge28       .831           
Challenge31       .808           
Challenge29       .647           
Challenge30       .570           
Challenge18         .698         
Challenge17         .656     .355   
Challenge12         .479         
Challenge16   -.380     .448         
Challenge11   -.439     .442         
Challenge25           .764       
Challenge24           .683       
Challenge23   -.358       .647       
Challenge27           .488     .353 
Challenge03             -.857     
Challenge02             -.781     
Challenge01             -.643     
Challenge09               .664   
Challenge07               .617   
Challenge08               .611   
Challenge41                 .768 
Challenge38                 .674 
Challenge39                 .551 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 23 iterations. 
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Table  4-13: Summary of exploratory factor analysis results (N=147) 
Item 
Opaque 
Reconstruc
tion 
Process 
Sponsor’s 
Desire for 
Hasty 
Reconstruction 
Low 
Community 
Capacity and 
Commitment 
Gender 
Issue 
NGO's Lack 
of 
Competency 
Community 
Inherent 
Difficulties and 
Weaknesses 
Slow Land 
Acquisitio
n Process 
Government 
Policy and 
Practice 
Lack of 
Adequate 
Security 
Absence of a clear process for spending project money .825 .111 .016 -.116 .110 .005 -.182 -.139 .099 
Misleading information .801 -.085 .040 -.041 .041 .206 .019 -.069 -.026 
Lack of adequate information about  reconstruction plans and government regulations .770 -.009 .042 .146 -.050 .074 .117 .061 -.087 
Misuse of project funding .734 .029 .077 .182 .089 -.063 .005 .028 -.026 
Participatory approach is not supported firmly by policies and practices .727 -.027 -.098 .012 -.020 -.135 -.089 .089 .156 
Pressure from government on donors and local officials for quick results .024 -.737 -.039 -.040 -.051 .105 -.159 -.051 .085 
International donors' urgent completion of housing reconstruction projects -.041 -.639 -.018 .210 .151 .016 -.015 .018 .056 
Government agencies’ attitude that they are the single responsible body for reconstruction .093 -.551 -.050 .074 -.034 -.022 -.143 .332 -.042 
Hasty decisions made by government .094 -.507 .011 .125 -.123 -.103 -.124 .506 -.081 
Racial boundaries and discrimination towards minority groups .192 -.340 .017 -.020 -.220 .331 -.050 .084 .287 
Low literacy level and the lack of necessary knowledge and skills in the affected community -.095 .118 .869 .071 -.163 .018 -.014 -.052 .156 
Lack of incentive/encouragement for beneficiaries to participate .159 .106 .836 .062 -.121 -.112 .063 .101 .014 
Members of the affected community lack commitment to participate in reconstruction .051 -.087 .799 -.178 -.004 .120 .011 .102 -.086 
Sponsor's lack of knowledge about local capacity -.061 -.083 .686 -.022 .183 -.089 -.122 -.150 .024 
Socio-cultural and religious restrictions on women’s participation in social affairs .087 -.090 -.154 .845 -.176 -.071 .027 -.005 .044 
Ignoring gender livelihood related issues -.038 -.005 .000 .831 .086 .024 .019 .081 -.006 
A culture of violation of women’s rights in society .105 -.039 -.029 .808 -.132 -.102 -.044 .042 .098 
General misconception that women are incapable of contributing to actual housing 
reconstruction 
.090 .037 .094 .647 .220 .193 -.058 -.080 -.035 
Weak representation of female headed families by the community representatives and their 
marginalisation from relief aid and reconstruction 
.071 -.045 .170 .570 .020 .103 -.128 -.048 .201 
Corruption in Non-government organisation .142 .060 -.121 -.036 .698 -.008 .046 -.022 .236 
NGO's lack of or low competency .155 .004 -.061 -.112 .656 .024 -.127 .355 .092 
Inadequate understanding of the principles of community participation -.003 -.136 .054 .293 .479 .183 -.275 -.289 .005 
Disregard of local bodies’ (local council) involvement in reconstruction .110 -.380 .018 .001 .448 -.106 -.201 .089 .093 
Unnecessary large arrival of international aid into the affected area .022 -.439 .161 .131 .442 .037 .126 .094 -.246 
Difficulty in mobilising affected people after a major disaster .024 .076 -.049 -.068 .070 .764 .008 .173 -.010 
Affected community is under economic or other form of stress .002 .133 -.003 .199 -.098 .683 -.216 .048 .006 
Loss of confidence in affected people’s personal competence .078 -.358 .050 -.052 .070 .647 .037 -.172 .009 
Weak collective capacity and a Lack of strong community organisations to represent the needs 
of affected communities at local and central government level 
.219 -.066 -.024 .015 -.106 .488 -.001 .125 .353 
Difficulty in land acquisition due to the government’s slow administrative process .126 .046 .053 .045 -.066 .026 -.857 -.031 -.106 
Lack of government support in the area to speedily restore and establish land ownership -.061 .012 .038 .050 .021 .042 -.781 .071 .169 
Ignoring local councils when planning housing reconstruction -.030 -.207 -.056 -.085 .061 .019 -.643 .222 -.021 
The exclusion of renters and low-income families from government reconstruction programmes -.087 -.008 -.009 .030 .070 .212 -.042 .664 -.010 
Government and professionals demonstrate no confidence in the capacity of affected 
populations 
.195 .109 -.022 .149 .131 .009 -.250 .617 -.068 
Government obsession to control development programmes .022 -.266 .025 -.099 -.017 -.002 -.153 .611 .184 
Weak central government and presence of illegal armed groups and warlords .050 .063 .093 .068 .094 .068 -.077 -.050 .768 
Difficulty organising a representative and accountable community group in the face of futility, 
hostility and distrust 
.142 -.290 .025 .105 .046 -.106 -.067 -.045 .674 
Regional military conflict and presence of landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs) -.038 .126 .072 .276 .290 .131 .118 .176 .551 
Eigenvaluse 5.93 4.31 2.93 5.01 3.03 3.47 4.75 3.55 3.79 
% of variances 27.37 8.84 6.82 5.60 4.78 4.67 3.81 3.12 2.89 
α 0.87 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.74 0.73 0.77 0.70 0.77 
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The major components of the challenges for effective community participation in 
post-disaster reconstruction projects are shown in Table  4-14. 
Table  4-14: Nine components (groupings) of the challenges for community 
participation 
 
Components Measures 
Component 1 
Opaque Reconstruction Process 
 Absence of a clear process for spending project money 
 Misleading information 
 Lack of adequate information about  reconstruction plans and government regulations 
 Misuse of project funding 
 Participatory approach is not supported firmly by policies and practices 
Component 2 
Sponsors’ Desire for Hasty 
Reconstruction 
 Pressure from government on donors and local officials for quick results 
 International donors' urgent completion of housing reconstruction projects 
 Government agencies’ attitude that they are the single responsible body for 
reconstruction 
 Hasty decisions made by government 
 Racial boundaries and discrimination towards minority groups 
Component 3 
Low Community Capacity and 
Commitment 
 Low literacy level and the lack of necessary knowledge and skills in the affected 
community 
 Lack of incentive/encouragement for beneficiaries to participate 
 Members of the affected community lack commitment to participate in reconstruction 
 Sponsor's lack of knowledge about local capacity 
Component 4 
Gender Issue 
 Socio-cultural and religious restrictions on women’s participation in social affairs 
 Ignoring gender livelihood related issues 
 A culture of violation of women’s rights in society 
 General misconception that women are incapable of contributing to actual housing 
reconstruction 
 Weak representation of female headed families by the community representatives and 
their marginalisation from relief aid and reconstruction 
Component 5 
NGO's Lack of Competency 
 Corruption in Non-government organisation 
 NGO's lack of or low competency 
 Inadequate understanding of the principles of community participation 
 Disregard of local bodies’ (local council) involvement in reconstruction 
 Unnecessary large arrival of international aid into the affected area 
Component 6 
Community Inherent Difficulties 
and Weaknesses 
 Difficulty in mobilising affected people after a major disaster 
 Affected community is under economic or other form of stress 
 Loss of confidence in affected people’s personal competence 
 Weak collective capacity and a Lack of strong community organisations to represent the 
needs of affected communities at local and central government level 
Component 7 
Slow Land Acquisition Process 
 Difficulty in land acquisition due to the government’s slow administrative process 
 Lack of government support in the area to speedily restore and establish land ownership 
 Ignoring local councils when planning housing reconstruction 
Component 8 
Government Policy and Practice 
 The exclusion of renters and low-income families from government reconstruction 
programmes 
 Government and professionals demonstrate no confidence in the capacity of affected 
populations 
 Government obsession to control development programmes 
Component 9 
Lack of Adequate Security 
 Weak central government and presence of illegal armed groups and warlords 
 Difficulty organising a representative and accountable community group in the face of 
futility, hostility and distrust 
 Regional military conflict and presence of landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs) 
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4.4 SCALE RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
All nine components had a Cronbach’s Alpha exceeding the acceptable value of 
0.7 (see Table  4-15) that indicates high overall internal consistency among the items in 
their representative components. All items had the Corrected Item-Total Correlation 
above the 0.33 criterion (Ho 2006, 243), showing high correlation consistency between 
each item and the sum of the remaining items. The inter-items correlation is presented in 
Table  4-16. 
Table  4-15: Scale reliability 
Component Cronbach's Alpha 
Opaque Reconstruction Process 0.87 
Gender Issue 0.87 
Low Community Capacity and Commitment 0.81 
Sponsors’ Desire for Hasty Reconstruction 0.79 
Slow Land Acquisition Process 0.77 
Lack of Adequate Security 0.77 
NGO's Lack of Competency 0.74 
Community Inherent Difficulties and Weaknesses 0.73 
Government Policy and Practice 0.70 
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Table  4-16: Inter-item correlation 
Component Item 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Opaque 
Reconstruction 
Process 
Lack of adequate information about  reconstruction plans and government regulations 6.68 7.712 .650 .462 .857 
Misleading information 6.53 6.744 .727 .554 .836 
Absence of a clear process for spending project money 6.76 6.744 .744 .572 .832 
Participatory approach is not supported firmly by policies and practices 6.52 6.772 .685 .508 .847 
Misuse of project funding 6.73 6.717 .693 .488 .845 
Sponsors' Desire 
for Hasty 
Reconstruction 
Pressure from government on donors and local officials for quick results 8.59 9.613 .593 .362 .745 
Government agencies’ attitude that they are the single responsible body for reconstruction 8.72 9.778 .657 .473 .725 
Hasty decisions made by government 8.88 9.574 .640 .447 .729 
International donors' urgent completion of housing reconstruction projects 8.65 9.819 .547 .325 .761 
Racial boundaries and discrimination towards minority groups 9.14 11.557 .423 .226 .794 
Low Community 
Capacity and 
Commitment 
Sponsor's lack of knowledge about local capacity 7.02 8.883 .534 .301 .812 
Members of the affected community lack commitment to participate in reconstruction 6.66 8.089 .599 .369 .785 
Low literacy level and the lack of necessary knowledge and skills in the affected community 7.14 8.137 .737 .568 .721 
Lack of incentive/encouragement for beneficiaries to participate 7.07 8.124 .679 .516 .745 
Gender Issue Ignoring gender livelihood related issues 7.91 11.478 .715 .535 .840 
General misconception that women are incapable of contributing to actual housing reconstruction 7.87 11.264 .663 .606 .852 
Weak representation of female headed families by the community representatives and their marginalisation from relief aid 
and reconstruction 
8.03 12.225 .654 .547 .855 
A culture of violation of women’s rights in society 7.82 10.411 .757 .709 .829 
Socio-cultural and religious restrictions on women’s participation in social affairs 7.80 10.547 .713 .700 .841 
NGO's Lack of 
Competency 
Unnecessary large arrival of international aid into the affected area 7.88 8.642 .427 .230 .743 
Inadequate understanding of the principles of community participation 8.65 9.749 .542 .320 .685 
Disregard of local bodies’ (local council) involvement in reconstruction 8.63 9.029 .575 .374 .668 
Lack of or low competency 8.64 9.150 .578 .445 .668 
Corruption in Non-government organisation 9.03 10.397 .451 .333 .715 
Community 
Inherent 
Difficulties and 
Weaknesses 
Loss of confidence in affected people’s personal competence 5.42 3.944 .469 .242 .712 
Affected community is under economic or other form of stress 5.86 4.159 .538 .343 .662 
Difficulty in mobilising affected people after a major disaster 5.67 4.100 .560 .327 .649 
Weak collective capacity and a Lack of strong community organisations to represent the needs of affected communities at 
local and central government level 
5.88 4.500 .545 .312 .665 
Slow Land 
Acquisition 
Process 
Ignoring local councils when planning housing reconstruction 3.67 2.388 .605 .401 .760 
Lack of government support in the area to speedily restore and establish land ownership 4.11 3.139 .725 .533 .584 
Difficulty in land acquisition due to the government’s slow administrative process 4.20 3.803 .575 .386 .747 
Government 
Policy and 
Practice 
Government and professionals demonstrate no confidence in the capacity of affected populations 4.04 2.985 .586 .353 .532 
Government obsession to control development programmes 4.15 2.923 .529 .311 .600 
The exclusion of renters and low-income families from government reconstruction programmes 4.19 3.142 .450 .209 .699 
Lack of Adequate 
Security 
Difficulty organising a representative and accountable community group in the face of futility, hostility and distrust 3.01 1.733 .582 .378 .703 
Regional military conflict and presence of landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs) 3.05 1.799 .542 .316 .748 
Weak central government and presence of illegal armed groups and warlords 3.27 1.826 .680 .465 .603 
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4.5 TEST OF NORMALITY  
The results of the exploratory analysis indicate that the distribution of data for all 
groups, Gender, Age, Survey language, Participants’ Role in Reconstruction and Level 
of Education appears to be non-normal p<0.05, and thus a non-parametric test should be 
used (Table  4-17, Table  4-18, Table  4-19, Table  4-20, Table  4-21). 
Table  4-17: Test of normality – Gender group 
  
Gender 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Opaque Reconstruction 
Process 
Male .273 120 .000 .701 120 .000 
Female .372 27 .000 .693 27 .000 
Sponsors Desire for 
Hasty Reconstruction 
Male .287 120 .000 .865 120 .000 
Female .297 27 .000 .761 27 .000 
Low Community 
Capacity and 
Commitment 
Male .356 120 .000 .787 120 .000 
Female .339 27 .000 .756 27 .000 
Gender Issue 
Male .319 120 .000 .801 120 .000 
Female .305 27 .000 .681 27 .000 
NGOs Lack of 
Competency 
Male .337 120 .000 .805 120 .000 
Female .264 27 .000 .780 27 .000 
Community Inherent 
Difficulties and 
Weaknesses 
Male .295 120 .000 .737 120 .000 
Female .258 27 .000 .751 27 .000 
Slow Land Acquisition 
Process 
Male .325 120 .000 .784 120 .000 
Female .386 27 .000 .685 27 .000 
Government Policy and 
Practice 
Male .299 120 .000 .825 120 .000 
Female .343 27 .000 .733 27 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
Table  4-18: Test of normality – Survey language group 
  
Survey 
language 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Opaque Reconstruction 
Process 
English .278 65 .000 .746 65 .000 
Dari .308 82 .000 .646 82 .000 
Sponsors Desire for 
Hasty Reconstruction 
English .308 65 .000 .839 65 .000 
Dari .275 82 .000 .859 82 .000 
Low Community 
Capacity and 
Commitment 
English .386 65 .000 .698 65 .000 
Dari .303 82 .000 .831 82 .000 
Gender Issue English .317 65 .000 .814 65 .000 
Dari .286 82 .000 .760 82 .000 
NGOs Lack of 
Competency 
English .333 65 .000 .808 65 .000 
Dari .320 82 .000 .798 82 .000 
Community Inherent 
Difficulties and 
Weaknesses 
English .349 65 .000 .714 65 .000 
Dari .274 82 .000 .711 82 .000 
Slow Land Acquisition 
Process 
English .300 65 .000 .816 65 .000 
Dari .299 82 .000 .743 82 .000 
Government Policy and 
Practice 
English .238 65 .000 .863 65 .000 
Dari .315 82 .000 .731 82 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Table  4-19: Test of normality – Age group 
  
Age 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Opaque Reconstruction 
Process 
  
  
  
21-30 .281 39 .000 .722 39 .000 
31-40 .266 58 .000 .679 58 .000 
41-50 .313 41 .000 .675 41 .000 
51-Over .325 9 .007 .846 9 .068 
Sponsors Desire for 
Hasty Reconstruction 
  
  
  
21-30 .268 39 .000 .864 39 .000 
31-40 .311 58 .000 .846 58 .000 
41-50 .303 41 .000 .794 41 .000 
51-Over .278 9 .044 .766 9 .008 
Low Community  
Capacity and 
Commitment  
  
  
21-30 .343 39 .000 .772 39 .000 
31-40 .378 58 .000 .736 58 .000 
41-50 .342 41 .000 .814 41 .000 
51-Over .272 9 .054 .805 9 .024 
Gender Issue 
  
  
  
21-30 .273 39 .000 .816 39 .000 
31-40 .324 58 .000 .788 58 .000 
41-50 .375 41 .000 .691 41 .000 
51-Over .278 9 .044 .833 9 .049 
NGOs Lack of 
Competency 
  
  
  
21-30 .303 39 .000 .825 39 .000 
31-40 .338 58 .000 .785 58 .000 
41-50 .311 41 .000 .751 41 .000 
51-Over .274 9 .050 .827 9 .041 
Community Inherent  
 Difficulties and 
Weaknesses 
  
  
21-30 .296 39 .000 .754 39 .000 
31-40 .359 58 .000 .683 58 .000 
41-50 .285 41 .000 .754 41 .000 
51-Over .396 9 .000 .684 9 .001 
Slow Land Acquisition 
Process 
  
  
  
21-30 .254 39 .000 .840 39 .000 
31-40 .343 58 .000 .710 58 .000 
41-50 .265 41 .000 .777 41 .000 
51-Over .351 9 .002 .781 9 .012 
Government Policy and 
Practice 
  
  
  
21-30 .295 39 .000 .827 39 .000 
31-40 .253 58 .000 .828 58 .000 
41-50 .311 41 .000 .766 41 .000 
51-Over .257 9 .088 .903 9 .273 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Table  4-20: Test of normality – Participants’ role in reconstruction group 
  Participant's 
role in 
reconstruction  
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Opaque Reconstruction 
Process 
Beneficiary .326 65 .000 .665 65 .000 
Project Staff .268 54 .000 .715 54 .000 
Other .482 28 .000 .508 28 .000 
Sponsors Desire for 
Hasty Reconstruction 
Beneficiary .275 65 .000 .841 65 .000 
Project Staff .276 54 .000 .861 54 .000 
Other .364 28 .000 .765 28 .000 
Low Community 
Capacity and 
Commitment 
Beneficiary .305 65 .000 .849 65 .000 
Project Staff .370 54 .000 .753 54 .000 
Other .429 28 .000 .591 28 .000 
Gender Issue Beneficiary .281 65 .000 .805 65 .000 
Project Staff .325 54 .000 .785 54 .000 
Other .323 28 .000 .723 28 .000 
NGOs Lack of 
Competency 
Beneficiary .267 65 .000 .774 65 .000 
Project Staff .359 54 .000 .800 54 .000 
Other .397 28 .000 .706 28 .000 
Community Inherent 
Difficulties and 
Weaknesses 
Beneficiary .265 65 .000 .735 65 .000 
Project Staff .331 54 .000 .734 54 .000 
Other .272 28 .000 .692 28 .000 
Slow Land Acquisition 
Process 
Beneficiary .260 65 .000 .760 65 .000 
Project Staff .311 54 .000 .827 54 .000 
Other .429 28 .000 .591 28 .000 
Government Policy and 
Practice 
Beneficiary .282 65 .000 .764 65 .000 
Project Staff .273 54 .000 .872 54 .000 
Other .382 28 .000 .656 28 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Table  4-21: Test of normality – Level of education group 
  
Level of 
education 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Opaque Reconstruction 
Process 
2 .433 10 .000 .594 10 .000 
3 .328 30 .000 .718 30 .000 
4 .278 77 .000 .718 77 .000 
5 .385 27 .000 .626 27 .000 
Sponsors Desire for 
Hasty Reconstruction 
2 .297 10 .013 .868 10 .095 
3 .342 30 .000 .793 30 .000 
4 .280 77 .000 .860 77 .000 
5 .250 27 .000 .805 27 .000 
Low Community 
Capacity and 
Commitment 
2 .477 10 .000 .549 10 .000 
3 .367 30 .000 .767 30 .000 
4 .323 77 .000 .833 77 .000 
5 .385 27 .000 .734 27 .000 
Gender Issue 2 .377 10 .000 .764 10 .005 
3 .288 30 .000 .777 30 .000 
4 .311 77 .000 .800 77 .000 
5 .332 27 .000 .680 27 .000 
NGOs Lack of 
Competency 
2 .400 10 .000 .658 10 .000 
3 .321 30 .000 .675 30 .000 
4 .311 77 .000 .843 77 .000 
5 .306 27 .000 .764 27 .000 
Community Inherent 
Difficulties and 
Weaknesses 
2 .381 10 .000 .640 10 .000 
3 .291 30 .000 .752 30 .000 
4 .276 77 .000 .764 77 .000 
5 .372 27 .000 .706 27 .000 
Slow Land Acquistion 
Process 
2 .314 10 .006 .750 10 .004 
3 .327 30 .000 .748 30 .000 
4 .305 77 .000 .802 77 .000 
5 .256 27 .000 .780 27 .000 
Government Policy 
and Practice 
2 .224 10 .168 .911 10 .287 
3 .355 30 .000 .690 30 .000 
4 .299 77 .000 .823 77 .000 
5 .331 27 .000 .745 27 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
2 = High School Diploma 
      3 = College Diploma 
       4 = Bachelor Degree 
       5 = Master's Degree 
       6 = Doctoral Degree 
        
4.6 MANN-WHITNEY U TEST 
A Mann-Whitney test was carried out to determine whether there was a 
significant difference between males and females in the mean ranking of their responses 
to the nine constructs (refer to Table  4-14). The Mann-Whitney test is a nonparametric 
test which is appropriate for data at ordinal level, and which appears to be non-normally 
distributed. It tests the hypothesis that the median of the two groups are equal (Ho 2006, 
372). 
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 Table  4-22 suggests that there is no significant difference in the mean ranking of 
male and female participants rating (C1, C3and C6), ns, however, female respondents 
expressed stronger agreement to items (C2, C4, C5, C7, C8, and C9) all having p < 0.05. 
Table  4-23 shows summary of the data after having been ranked. 
Table  4-22: Test statistics 
Component 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
Opaque 
Reconstr
uction 
Process 
Sponsors 
Desire for 
Hasty 
Reconstru
ction 
Low 
Community 
Capacity and 
Commitment 
Gender 
Issue 
NGOs 
Lack of 
Competen
cy 
Community 
Inherent 
Difficulties 
and 
Weaknesses 
Slow 
Land 
Acquisitio
n Process 
Governm
ent Policy 
and 
Practice 
Lack of 
Adequat
e 
Security 
Mann-
Whitney U 
1355.000 978.000 1357.500 1137.000 1225.500 1546.500 1030.000 1101.000 1212.500 
Wilcoxon 
W 
1733.000 1356.000 1735.500 1515.000 1603.500 1924.500 1408.000 1479.000 1590.500 
Z -1.493 -3.453 -1.455 -2.650 -2.172 -.412 -3.230 -2.798 -2.332 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.135 .001 .146 .008 .030 .680 .001 .005 .020 
a. Grouping Variable: Gender 
 
Table  4-23: Ranks 
  Gender N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Opaque 
Reconstruction Process 
Male 120 76.21 9145.00 
Female 27 64.19 1733.00 
Total 147     
Sponsors Desire for 
Hasty Reconstruction 
Male 120 79.35 9522.00 
Female 27 50.22 1356.00 
Total 147     
Low Community 
Capacity and 
Commitment 
Male 120 76.19 9142.50 
Female 27 64.28 1735.50 
Total 147     
Gender Issue Male 120 78.03 9363.00 
Female 27 56.11 1515.00 
Total 147     
NGOs Lack of 
Competency 
Male 120 77.29 9274.50 
Female 27 59.39 1603.50 
Total 147     
Community Inherent 
Difficulties and 
Weaknesses 
Male 120 74.61 8953.50 
Female 27 71.28 1924.50 
Total 147     
Slow Land Acquisition 
Process 
Male 120 78.92 9470.00 
Female 27 52.15 1408.00 
Total 147     
Government Policy 
and Practice 
Male 120 78.33 9399.00 
Female 27 54.78 1479.00 
Total 147     
Lack of Adequate 
Security 
Male 120 77.40 9287.50 
Female 27 58.91 1590.50 
Total 147     
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Figures: (Figure  4-2, Figure  4-3, Figure  4-4, Figure  4-5, Figure  4-6, Figure  4-7, 
Figure  4-8, Figure  4-9 and Figure  4-10) show percentages of responses within 
Gender group to the nine variables. 
 
 Figure  4-2: Percentages of responses on “Opaque Reconstruction Process” 
 
 
 Figure  4-3: Percentages of responses on “Sponsors Desire for Hasty 
 Reconstruction” 
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 Figure  4-4: Percentages of responses on “Low Community Capacity and 
 Commitment” 
 
 
 Figure  4-5: Percentages of responses on “Gender Issues” 
 
 
Figure  4-6: Percentages of responses on “NGOs Lack of Competency” 
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Figure  4-7: Percentages of responses on “Community Inherent Difficulties and 
Weaknesses” 
 
 
 Figure  4-8: Percentages of responses on “Slow Land Acquisition Process” 
 
 
Figure  4-9: Percentages of responses on “Government Policies and Practices”  
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Figure  4-10: Percentages of responses on “Lack of Adequate Security” 
The Mann-Whitney test was also run to determine if there was a significant 
difference in the mean ranking between the two Survey Languages. Table  4-24suggests 
that there is no significant difference in C2, C3, C4, C5 and C7. However, findings 
suggest that the two mean ranking in items (C1, C6, C8, and C9) p < 0.05 are 
significantly different. Respondents using Dari appear to have expressed stronger 
agreement to these items. Table  4-25 provides a summary of the data after having been 
ranked. 
Table  4-24: Test statistics 
Component 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
Opaque 
Reconstru
ction 
Process 
Sponsors 
Desire for 
Hasty 
Reconstru
ction 
Low 
Communit
y Capacity 
and 
Commitm
ent 
Gender 
Issue 
NGOs 
Lack of 
Compete
ncy 
Community 
Inherent 
Difficulties 
and 
Weaknesses 
Slow 
Land 
Acquisiti
on 
Process 
Governm
ent 
Policy 
and 
Practice 
Lack of 
Adequate 
Security 
Mann-
Whitney U 
2191.000 2482.000 2477.500 2230.500 2477.500 2020.000 2267.000 2116.000 2186.500 
Wilcoxon 
W 
5594.000 5885.000 4622.500 5633.500 5880.500 5423.000 5670.000 5519.000 5589.500 
Z -2.082 -.767 -.810 -1.858 -.805 -2.821 -1.699 -2.308 -2.135 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.037 .443 .418 .063 .421 .005 .089 .021 .033 
a. Grouping Variable: Survey language 
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Table  4-25: Ranks 
  Survey language N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Opaque 
Reconstruction Process 
English 65 81.29 5284.00 
Dari 82 68.22 5594.00 
Total 147     
Sponsors Desire for 
Hasty Reconstruction 
English 65 76.82 4993.00 
Dari 82 71.77 5885.00 
Total 147     
Low Community 
Capacity and 
Commitment 
English 65 71.12 4622.50 
Dari 82 76.29 6255.50 
Total 147     
Gender Issue English 65 80.68 5244.50 
Dari 82 68.70 5633.50 
Total 147     
NGOs Lack of 
Competency 
English 65 76.88 4997.50 
Dari 82 71.71 5880.50 
Total 147     
Community Inherent 
Difficulties and 
Weaknesses 
English 65 83.92 5455.00 
Dari 82 66.13 5423.00 
Total 147     
Slow Land Acquistion 
Process 
English 65 80.12 5208.00 
Dari 82 69.15 5670.00 
Total 147     
Government Policy 
and Practice 
English 65 82.45 5359.00 
Dari 82 67.30 5519.00 
Total 147     
Lack of Adequate 
Security 
English 65 81.36 5288.50 
Dari 82 68.16 5589.50 
Total 147     
 
Figures: (Figure  4-11, Figure  4-12, Figure  4-13, Figure  4-14, Figure  4-15, Figure 
 4-16, Figure  4-17, Figure  4-18 and Figure  4-19) show response percentages within 
the survey language group on the nine variables.  
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Figure  4-12: Percentages of responses on “Opaque Reconstruction Process” 
 
 
Figure  4-13: Percentages of responses on “Low Community Capacity and 
Commitment” 
 
 
Figure  4-14: Percentages of responses on “Gender Issues” 
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Figure  4-15: Percentages of responses on “NGOs Lack of Competency” 
 
 
Figure  4-16: Percentages of responses on “Community Inherent Difficulties and 
Weaknesses” 
 
 
Figure  4-17: Percentages of responses on “Slow Land Acquisition Process” 
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Figure  4-18: Percentages of responses on “Government Policies and Practices” 
 
 
Figure  4-19: Percentages of responses on “Lack of Adequate Security” 
4.7 KRUSKAL–WALLIS TEST 
A Kruskal-Wallis test was carried out to determine if the mean ranks of the 
Participants’ Role in Reconstruction category significantly differed. The Kruskal-Wallis 
test is a nonparametric test which is appropriate for data at ordinal level. As well as being 
a non-parametric test, it is also referred to as distribution-free test and is used to compare 
scores in more than two groups (Bryman and Cramer 2009, 169). 
Table  4-26 suggests that there was a significant difference in the mean ranking of 
the rating (C1, C3, C5 and C8) p < 0.05. Findings did not suggest any statistically 
significant difference in the mean ranking of the other five components. 
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Table  4-26: Test statistics 
 
Component 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
Opaque 
Reconstruct
ion Process 
Sponsors 
Desire for 
Hasty 
Reconstru
ction 
Low 
Community 
Capacity and 
Commitment 
Gender 
Issue 
NGOs 
Lack of 
Compete
ncy 
Community 
Inherent 
Difficulties 
and 
Weaknesses 
Slow 
Land 
Acquisiti
on 
Process 
Govern
ment 
Policy 
and 
Practice 
Lack of 
Adequate 
Security 
Chi-Square 6.810 3.722 9.305 .267 10.807 3.138 5.271 13.537 2.603 
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
.033 .155 .010 .875 .004 .208 .072 .001 .272 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Participant's role in reconstruction 
 
4.8 POST HOC TEST 
Mann-Whitney tests were run to follow up the findings in Kruskal-Wallis test. A 
Bonferroni correction was applied and all effects are reported at a 0.0167 level of 
significance. Table  4-27 suggests that there is a significant difference in the mean 
ranking between Beneficiary and Project Staff rating items (C5 and C8) p < 0.0167. A 
greater percentage of project beneficiaries appear to have strongly agreed with both 
constructs representing challenges for effective community participation in post disaster 
reconstruction projects. Table  4-28 provides a ranking summary of the data.  
Table  4-27: Test statistics (Beneficiary vs. Project Staff)  
Componen
t 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
Opaque 
Reconstru
ction 
Process 
Sponsors 
Desire for 
Hasty 
Reconstruct
ion 
Low 
Communit
y Capacity 
and 
Commitm
ent 
Gender 
Issue 
NGOs 
Lack of 
Competen
cy 
Communit
y Inherent 
Difficulties 
and 
Weaknesse
s 
Slow 
Land 
Acquisitio
n Process 
Governm
ent Policy 
and 
Practice 
Lack of 
Adequate 
Security 
Mann-
Whitney U 
1570.000 1455.500 1577.000 1687.500 1214.500 1520.500 1403.500 1140.000 1505.000 
Wilcoxon 
W 
3715.000 3600.500 3062.000 3832.500 3359.500 3665.500 3548.500 3285.000 3650.000 
Z -1.112 -1.694 -1.036 -.391 -3.124 -1.399 -2.022 -3.488 -1.520 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.266 .090 .300 .696 .002 .162 .043 .000 .128 
a. Grouping Variable: Participant's role in reconstruction  
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Table  4-28: Ranks 
  
Participant's 
role in 
reconstruction  N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Opaque 
Reconstruction Process 
Beneficiary 65 57.15 3715.00 
Project Staff 54 63.43 3425.00 
Total 119     
Sponsors Desire for 
Hasty Reconstruction 
Beneficiary 65 55.39 3600.50 
Project Staff 54 65.55 3539.50 
Total 119     
Low Community 
Capacity and 
Commitment 
Beneficiary 65 62.74 4078.00 
Project Staff 54 56.70 3062.00 
Total 119     
Gender Issue Beneficiary 65 58.96 3832.50 
Project Staff 54 61.25 3307.50 
Total 119     
NGOs Lack of 
Competency 
Beneficiary 65 51.68 3359.50 
Project Staff 54 70.01 3780.50 
Total 119     
Community Inherent 
Difficulties and 
Weaknesses 
Beneficiary 65 56.39 3665.50 
Project Staff 54 64.34 3474.50 
Total 119     
Slow Land Acquisition 
Process 
Beneficiary 65 54.59 3548.50 
Project Staff 54 66.51 3591.50 
Total 119     
Government Policy 
and Practice 
Beneficiary 65 50.54 3285.00 
Project Staff 54 71.39 3855.00 
Total 119     
Lack of Adequate 
Security 
Beneficiary 65 56.15 3650.00 
Project Staff 54 64.63 3490.00 
Total 119     
 
Table  4-29 suggests that there is no significant difference in the mean ranking 
between Project Staff and Other, p >0 .0167.  
Table  4-29: Test Statistics (Project Staff vs. Other) 
Componen
t 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
Opaque 
Reconstr
uction 
Process 
Sponsors 
Desire for 
Hasty 
Reconstr
uction 
Low 
Communit
y Capacity 
and 
Commitm
ent 
Gender 
Issue 
NGOs 
Lack of 
Compete
ncy 
Communit
y Inherent 
Difficulties 
and 
Weakness
es 
Slow 
Land 
Acquisiti
on 
Process 
Governm
ent 
Policy 
and 
Practice 
Lack of 
Adequat
e 
Security 
Mann-
Whitney U 
612.000 609.500 548.500 711.000 656.000 609.500 585.500 600.000 656.000 
Wilcoxon 
W 
2097.000 1015.500 954.500 1117.000 1062.000 1015.500 991.500 1006.000 1062.000 
Z -1.618 -1.584 -2.371 -.496 -1.137 -1.664 -1.863 -1.681 -1.110 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.106 .113 .018 .620 .256 .096 .062 .093 .267 
a. Grouping Variable: Participant's role in reconstruction  
 
  
Chapter 4 – Survey Results  
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 102 
The Mann-Whitney Test statistics shown in Table  4-30 revealed that there was a 
significant difference in the mean ranking between Beneficiary and Other rating (C1, 
and C3) p < 0.0167. In an interesting contrast, the findings indicated that while a higher 
percentage of project beneficiaries agreed strongly with C1 representing a challenge for 
effective community participation in reconstruction, the percentage of Beneficiaries 
strongly agreeing to C3 was lower.  The ranking summary of the data can be found in 
the Table  4-31. 
Other had a higher percentage strongly agreeing with C3 while this percentage 
was lower in relation to C1. Findings did not suggest any statistically significant 
difference in the mean ranking of the other seven components.  
Table  4-30: Test Statistics (Beneficiaries vs. Other) 
Compone
nt 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
Opaque 
Reconstructi
on Process 
Sponsors 
Desire for 
Hasty 
Reconstructi
on 
Low 
Communit
y Capacity 
and 
Commitme
nt 
Gender 
Issue 
NGOs 
Lack of 
Competen
cy 
Communit
y Inherent 
Difficultie
s and 
Weakness
es 
Slow 
Land 
Acquisiti
on 
Process 
Governme
nt Policy 
and 
Practice 
Lack of 
Adequat
e 
Security 
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
631.000 880.000 590.500 896.000 717.000 868.500 905.500 716.000 896.000 
Wilcoxon 
W 
2776.000 3025.000 996.500 1302.00
0 
2862.000 1274.500 3050.500 2861.000 3041.00
0 
Z -2.645 -.271 -2.922 -.128 -1.771 -.385 -.042 -1.786 -.137 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.008 .786 .003 .898 .077 .700 .967 .074 .891 
a. Grouping Variable: Participant's role in reconstruction  
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Table  4-31: Ranks 
  
Participant's 
role in 
reconstruction  N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Opaque 
Reconstruction Process 
Beneficiary 65 42.71 2776.00 
Other 28 56.96 1595.00 
Total 93     
Sponsors Desire for 
Hasty Reconstruction 
Beneficiary 65 46.54 3025.00 
Other 28 48.07 1346.00 
Total 93     
Low Community 
Capacity and 
Commitment 
Beneficiary 65 51.92 3374.50 
Other 28 35.59 996.50 
Total 93     
Gender Issue Beneficiary 65 47.22 3069.00 
Other 28 46.50 1302.00 
Total 93     
NGOs Lack of 
Competency 
Beneficiary 65 44.03 2862.00 
Other 28 53.89 1509.00 
Total 93     
Community Inherent 
Difficulties and 
Weaknesses 
Beneficiary 65 47.64 3096.50 
Other 28 45.52 1274.50 
Total 93     
Slow Land Acquisition 
Process 
Beneficiary 65 46.93 3050.50 
Other 28 47.16 1320.50 
Total 93     
Government Policy 
and Practice 
Beneficiary 65 44.02 2861.00 
Other 28 53.93 1510.00 
Total 93     
Lack of Adequate 
Security 
Beneficiary 65 46.78 3041.00 
Other 28 47.50 1330.00 
Total 93     
 
Figures: (Figure  4-20, Figure  4-21, Figure  4-22, Figure  4-23, Figure  4-24, Figure 
 4-25, Figure  4-26, Figure  4-27 and Figure  4-28) show response percentages within the 
Participants Role in Reconstruction group on the nine variables.  
 
Figure  4-20: Percentages of responses on “Opaque Reconstruction Process” 
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Figure  4-21: Percentages of responses on “Sponsors Desire for Hasty 
Reconstruction” 
 
 
Figure  4-22: Percentages of responses on “Low Community Capacity and 
Commitment” 
 
 
Figure  4-23: Percentages of responses on “Gender Issues” 
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Figure  4-24: Percentages of responses on “NGOs Lack of Competency” 
 
 
Figure  4-25: Percentages of responses on “Community Inherent Difficulties and 
Weaknesses” 
 
 
Figure  4-26: Percentages of responses on “Slow Land Acquisition Process” 
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Figure  4-27: Percentages of responses on “Government Policies and Practices”  
 
 
Figure  4-28: Percentages of responses on “Lack of Adequate Security” 
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Statistics in Table  4-32 suggest that there was no significant difference in the 
mean ranking of the Age group rating at p < 0.01.  
Table  4-32: Test statistics 
Component 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
Opaque 
Reconstr
uction 
Process 
Sponsors 
Desire for 
Hasty 
Reconstructi
on 
Low 
Communit
y Capacity 
and 
Commitme
nt 
Gender 
Issue 
NGOs 
Lack of 
Competen
cy 
Communit
y Inherent 
Difficultie
s and 
Weakness
es 
Slow 
Land 
Acquisiti
on 
Process 
Governme
nt Policy 
and 
Practice 
Lack of 
Adequat
e 
Security 
Chi-Square 3.992 10.403 3.682 3.525 8.344 10.794 1.493 1.472 4.655 
df 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Asymp. Sig. .262 .015 .298 .318 .039 .013 .684 .689 .199 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Age 
Figures: (Figure  4-29, Figure  4-30, Figure  4-31, Figure  4-32, Figure  4-33, Figure 
 4-34, Figure  4-35, Figure  4-36 and Figure  4-37) show response percentages within the 
Age group on the nine variables. 
 
Figure  4-29: Percentages of responses on “Opaque Reconstruction Process” 
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Figure  4-30: Percentages of responses on “Sponsors Desire for Hasty 
Reconstruction” 
 
 
Figure  4-31: Percentages of responses on “Low Community Capacity and 
Commitment” 
 
 
Figure  4-32: Percentages of responses on “Gender Issues” 
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Figure  4-33: Percentages of responses on “NGOs' Lack of Competency” 
 
 
Figure  4-34: Percentages of responses on “Community Inherent Difficulties and 
Weaknesses” 
 
 
Figure  4-35: Percentages of responses on “Slow Land Acquisition Process” 
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Figure  4-36: Percentages of responses on “Government Policies and Practices” 
 
 
Figure  4-37: Percentages of responses on “Lack of Adequate Security” 
Table 4.33 suggests that there was no significant difference in the mean ranking 
of the Level of Education group rating at p < .01.  
Table  4-33: Test statistics 
Component 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
Opaque 
Reconstr
uction 
Process 
Sponsors 
Desire for 
Hasty 
Reconstructi
on 
Low 
Communit
y Capacity 
and 
Commitme
nt 
Gender 
Issue 
NGOs 
Lack of 
Competen
cy 
Communit
y Inherent 
Difficultie
s and 
Weakness
es 
Slow 
Land 
Acquisiti
on 
Process 
Governme
nt Policy 
and 
Practice 
Lack of 
Adequat
e 
Security 
Chi-Square 7.291 11.442 5.509 7.806 11.398 7.345 7.004 6.858 6.015 
df 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Asymp. Sig. .295 .076 .480 .253 .077 .290 .320 .334 .421 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Level of education 
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Figures: (Figure  4-38, Figure  4-39, Figure  4-40, Figure  4-41, Figure  4-42, Figure 
 4-43, Figure  4-44, Figure  4-45 and Figure  4-46) show response percentages within the 
Level of Education group on the nine variables.  
 
Figure  4-38: Percentages of responses on “Opaque Reconstruction Process” 
 
 
Figure  4-39: Percentages of responses on “Sponsors Desire for Hasty 
Reconstruction” 
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Figure  4-40: Percentages of responses on “Low Community Capacity and 
Commitment” 
 
 
Figure  4-41: Percentages of responses on “Gender Issue” 
 
 
Figure  4-42: Percentages of responses on “NGOs Lack of Competency” 
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Figure  4-43: Percentages of responses on “Community Inherent Difficulties and 
Weaknesses” 
 
 
Figure  4-44: Percentages of responses on “Slow Land Acquisition Process” 
 
 
Figure  4-45: Percentages of responses on “Government Policies and Practices” 
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Figure  4-46: Percentages of responses on “Government Policies and Practices” 
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 Security problems can be solved with participation of the community. 
 
  ریگ روز مدرم و یلحم یاه نادنموق تیدوجوم دوشیم یزاس زاب رد یلاها کارتشا یار دس هکیلماع هناگب
دشابیم. 
 The only reason for the lack of community involvement in reconstruction is the presence 
of local commanders (“commander” is a widely used term in Afghanistan referring to 
the head of armed militia or illegal armed groups) and people with dominant power. 
 
 One of the challenges faced in projects designed with community participation is 
sustainability. In post-disaster communities the need for continuous support (and 
income) might last longer than the commitment of international community. Thus, the 
project must be clearly introduced to the community and the input from this community 
must be measurable. 
 
  هظحلره .تسا نآ ماود و تموکح هب ناشدامتعا مدع انامه یزاسزاب هسورپ رد مدرم کارتشا مدع هدمع لماع
 نایم رد نانمطا نیا ات تسا رورض ًاانب .دشاب هتشادن دوجو تموکح یدعب لاس دیاش هک دنتسا نیا رکف رد مدرم
اه هژورپ یلصا کلام و تسا ناشدوخ زا تموکح هک دیایب دوجو هب مدرم  قیرط زا فرص نیا و تسا مدرم دوخ
دیآ یم دوجو هب تیفافش و دهعت.                   
 The principle reason for the lack of community involvement in reconstruction is that they 
[people] do not believe in the current government and its continuity. People think that 
the current government may not exist next year. Therefore, it is necessary to earn 
people’s trust by giving them the assurance that the government truly is people’s 
government, which can only be achieved through commitments and transparency. 
 
  تینما دوبن تینما ندز مه رب ثع اب هک رگید لماوع یضعب و هقطنم رد یزاسزاب یاهپورگ زا تظافا و یوقطنم
دوشیم یزاسزاب قطانم رد. 
 The lack of regional security and protection of the reconstruction teams and other 
factors that contribute to the lack of adequate security in areas where reconstruction 
projects are implemented. 
 
 هرادا کی رد نادنمراک یاهیررقم رد طباوظ هب تبن طباور تیدوج وم.          
 Preferential treatment in employees’ recruitment and selection. 
 
 ییارگبیلم و ییارگتمس  روشک فلتخم راشقا نیب یمیظنت ینمشد یلب           
 Yes, hostility among different militia groups, oppression and nationalism. 
 
 Commitment of people can reduce security threats if the projects are honest in 
implementation. 
 
  هسسوم هب و ببترت ار هژورپ لزوپورپامش رگا لاثم روطب دنهد دنف یاهناگرا رد یرادا داسف  دیهدب داهنشپ
 زا هدافتسااب  دنراد ییانشآ هدننک لیومت تاسسوم نادنمراک اب هک تاسسوم و صخش هب لزوپورپ نآامش تامحز
دنهدیمن ماجنا زین ار رثوم راک دنراد هدننک لیومت تاسسوم رد ینابیتشپ نوچ و هدربارنآ دافم اهنآ و هدش هدرپس.  
 Corruption in funding organisations, for example after a lot of hard work you prepare a 
project proposal and submit it to the funding agency for funding. Instead of funding 
your proposed project, the funding agencies use your proposal to fund the agencies of 
their friends and those they favour. 
 
  رد یزاساب یاه هرورپ مامت لماش مه هیاپ دنلب نیکارا نانجمه و لوسم ریغ یماظن یاهورگ رثکا تلاخاد
دناوخیم ار دوخ قح اه نیا هزورپ ره رد و هدش ناتسناغفا.             
 Illegal and irresponsible armed groups and also the high-ranking government officials 
interfere in reconstruction project to embezzle project findings. 
Table  4-34: Additional comments from the questionnaire respondents 
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4.9 SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY RESULTS 
The qualitative findings from the available literature pertaining to post-disaster 
reconstruction projects and specifically the challenges for effective community 
participation, were validated by means of administering an online questionnaire survey. 
The primary aim of the survey was to collect participants’ opinion on the 41 measures 
expressed in the form of individual statements outlined in the questionnaire. A survey 
link was made available to a wider affected population, project staff of the project-
implementing agencies and the United Nations in Afghanistan. Due to the scarcity of IT 
equipment and the lack of a widely available access to the internet in Afghanistan, the 
survey rule was set up such that responses from many participants could be obtained 
using the same computer multiple times.  
An initial examination of the survey data showed the wide-ranging demographic 
characteristics of the respondents (see Table  4-1 and Appendix B for the graphical 
display of demographic details).  The outcome of the initial frequency analysis of the 
survey data reveals that an overwhelming majority of survey participants either ‘agree’ 
or ‘strongly agree’ with the 41 measures as being serious challenges for effective 
community participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects.  
A Principal Component Analysis (CPA) was conducted using Statistical 
Packaged for Social Sciences (SPSS) and as result a nine-factor solution was suggested. 
Non-parametric Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests were run to explore and 
examine the resultant nine components. The results of both tests revealed that regardless 
of the demographic characteristics, a significantly higher percentage of respondents 
either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the 41 items as presenting real challenges for 
community participation in reconstruction, and there was no significant difference in the 
mean ranking of their rating. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, community participation is the key 
requirement for successful delivery of post-disaster reconstruction projects. International 
funding authorities, governments, non-governmental organisations, contractors and the 
affected communities all agree that reconstruction projects that are planned and executed 
without a meaningful participation of the affected communities increasingly jeopardise 
successful implementation. This chapter explored the fundamental barriers for effective 
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community participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects. The next chapter will 
first examine the effects of these challenges on community participation and then explain 
how best they can be addressed to allow for more effective community participation in 
rebuilding after a disaster. 
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Chapter 5 
Interview Results - Challenges for 
Community Participation 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter 4 outlined the major barriers for community participation, responding to 
the first question. One of the major aims of this research is to develop a Logical 
Framework to enable effective community participation in post-disaster reconstruction 
projects. In order to develop a workable Logical Framework for community participation 
three research questions need to be addressed: first, what the major challenges are for 
community participation; second, how these barriers impact community participation; 
and third, how can the impact of these challenges be eliminated or reduced. This chapter 
(Chapter 5) and the next chapter (Chapter 6) will attempt to answer the second and third 
research questions. Guided by the Problem three structure, chapter 5 will explain how 
these barriers impact community participation, and the next chapter (Chapter 6), 
adopting the Logical Framework Matrix, will explain what NGOs need to do to 
eliminate or reduce the impact of these challenges in order to allow for greater and more 
effective community involvement in housing reconstruction.  
Whilst the intent of the questionnaire survey, as reported in chapter 4, was to 
identify and broadly investigate the underlying barriers for community participation, 
semi-structured interviews (Qu and Dumay 2011) were conducted to explore and explain 
the impact of these barriers in more depth. This and the subsequent chapter will report on 
the results of the interviews. 
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5.2 METHOD 
As explained in Chapter 3 “Research Design”, semi-structured interviews were 
used as the main method for collecting qualitative data. This section outlines and 
explains the interview design, transcription and coding processes and how the interview 
data was analysed. 
5.2.1 Participants Profile and the Interview Design 
A range of participants, all of them having more than 15 years experience in 
post-disaster recovery and reconstruction were interviewed. The interviews were 
conducted during the period from 14th April to 9th of August 2012 using Skype and 
iFree Skype Recorder to audio record the interviews for documentation (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009, 178). Participants were selected from Afghan National Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs), International Non-Government Organisations 
(INGOs) and the United Nations (UN) operating in Afghanistan and in other developing 
countries around the world (Table 5.1). The participants each had greater than 15 years 
of working experience in developing and implementing reconstruction projects and 
working directly with communities in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Pakistan, the 
Balkans, Latin America and the African continent offering first hand data and rich 
insight and explanation of the current situation on the ground. Interviews were 
conducted in three different languages: Pashto, Dari and English each lasting for 90-120 
minutes. Prior to the interviews the QUT form “Participant Information for QUT 
Research Project” containing the QUT ethics approval number, researcher’s contact 
details as well as the contact details of researcher’s principal supervisor were sent to the 
participants by e-mail. The interview brief, which included short background 
information about the research and its significance, and the interview questions, were 
sent to the participants. The interviewees were identified and selected from within the 
survey respondents, using the researcher’s professional network based on his previous 
association with various NGOs and the United Nations (UN), as well as using the 
snowball sampling technique (Morgan 2008, 816-817).  
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Table 5.1 
Participant Gender Years of 
Experience 
Nationality Current Position 
P1 Male >15 Afghan Head of Operations 
P2 Male >15 Afghan Operations Project Manager (INGO) 
P3 Male >15 Afghan Regional Manager Afghanistan (UN) 
P4 Male >15 Afghan Operation Manager (National NGO) 
P5 Male >15 Afghan Head of Operations/ Director Afghanistan 
(UN) 
P6 Male >15 Afghan Manager, Central Zone (NPO) 
P7 Male >15 Afghan Planning Manager (National NGO) 
P8 Male >15 Afghan Regional Area Manager Afghanistan (UN) 
P9 Male >15 Afghan Senior Programme Officer (INGO) /Head 
of  Provincial Council 
P10 Female >15 Albanian Programme Officer ( UN) 
P11 Female >15 British Director (INGO) 
P12 Male >15 British Director (Development and Emergency 
Practice) 
P13 Female >15 British Programme Officer (INGO) 
P14 Female >15 British Head of Mission (INGO) 
P15 Female >15 German Team Leader (Donor Organisation) 
  
5.2.2 Transcribing the Recorded Interviews 
As mentioned in section 5.2, interviews were conducted in three different 
languages. The interviews were voice recorded using iFree Skype Recorder, which 
provided high acoustic quality and a recording capacity of many hours without 
interruption. The interviews were transcribed using both verbatim and written styles. 
Verbatim style was used for transcribing interviews that were in English, whereas 
interviews that were conducted in Pashto and Dari were translated and transcribed 
simultaneously into English text using the written style. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, 
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180) indicate that there are no standard rules to follow when transcribing a voice 
recorded interview into text, but that the person transcribing has discretion as to whether 
verbatim or written style is used.  
5.2.3 Data Analysis and the Coding Process  
Qualitative interviews are conducted with an aim of developing an in-depth 
understanding about a phenomenon through identifying patterns of association and 
explaining their interaction. This is achieved by knowing the participants’ perception 
founded on their knowledge and experience of the issue under study (Flick 2008, 2). 
There are different approaches to qualitative data analysis and they are known as 
inductive and deductive. In the deductive approach to data analysis, coding is usually 
done with an emphasis on the themes derived from the literature, however using the 
inductive approach the researcher puts aside theory-driven tools and turns the focus on 
exploring what has actually been discovered by the study (Thomas 2006; Altinay and 
Paraskevas 2008, 168). In order to explain the pattern of relationship and interaction 
between variables, and at the same time to avoid introducing bias by limiting findings 
(ibid 2008, 168), both deductive and inductive approaches were applied in this study. 
The general categories of the emerging themes were first identified, and then more 
detailed coding was conducted by revisiting the general coded categories, and re-reading 
the interview transcripts.  
The qualitative analysis software, QSR International NVivo 9, was used to 
support the coding and manage the process of data analysis (Bazeley 2007, 67). Nodes 
containing codes that held conceptually similar meaning were merged at parent and at 
children levels. Figure  5-1illustrates the relationships between a Parent node and Child 
nodes 
 
Figure  5-1: Parent Nodes and Child Nodes Relationships 
 
Parent Node 
Child Nodes 
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5.3 RESULTS 
As explained, the interview transcripts were read and coded using ‘mixed style’, 
meaning that both deductive and inductive approaches were employed. Unlike in 
quantitative research, findings from the qualitative data can be presented in a variety of 
different ways depending on the format that best fit the purpose of the investigation 
(Sandelowski 1998; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, 279). Even though there are no set 
forms of presenting qualitative findings, qualitative research interviews can be reported 
in a structure of questions followed by interviewees’ comments, descriptive summary 
followed by quotes, or by quotes and interpretation and quotes presented using text and 
tables. In this study, the interview analysis will be presented along with some important 
selected quotes. Other illustrative quotes and their condensed meaning can be found in 
Appendix D and E. Adib Hagbaghery, Salsali and Ahmadi (2004) used this option to 
present the results of their qualitative interviews when they investigated the relationship 
between knowledge and experiences, and professional power in a workplace. (Hayles 
2010) used a similar style in her research of examining decision making in post-disaster 
housing reconstruction. The problem tree structure (cause and effect diagram) shown in 
Figure  5-2 represents themes that emerged from the interview analysis.  
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Effect 
Figure  5-2: Problem Three Structure (cause and effect diagram) Cause 
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5.3.1 Lack of Community Capacity 
Generally, lack of community capacity was regarded as a major barrier to 
community participation in reconstruction. The interviewees stated that one of the 
reasons that the affected communities did not participate effectively in reconstruction 
projects was due to the loss or lack of required capacity in the community. Lack of 
community capacity was generally perceived as the product of one or more of the 
following measures:  
- Culture of dependency 
- Lack of livelihood opportunities 
- Lack or loss of personal assets  
- Loss of community cohesion 
Participants asserted that the lack of adequate capacity in the affected 
communities contributed to decreased participation, eventually causing detachment 
between the implementing partners (NGOs) and the wider affected beneficiary 
communities. Lack of community capacity was also considered as a major barrier to 
community contribution. An overwhelming majority of participants mentioned that, in 
general, the lack of community contribution affected transparency in project processes, 
damaged trust and was perceived to be a threat for project sustainability.  
Culture of Dependency  
One of the frequently mentioned measures that the interviewees perceived as 
playing a prominent contributory role in weakening community capacity, or hindering it 
from developing was the culture of dependency often created by an ill-designed aid 
delivery approach. The interview participants highlighted that the culture of dependency 
was created in different ways. In some cases the long term aid projects that were poorly 
designed and implemented in the past had actually turned the affected communities from 
being an active actor in reconstruction into a passive receiver of humanitarian assistance. 
According to one participant:  
 “In flood prone areas, where communities may organise themselves to get 
their flood walling organised and just do that of their own volition, don’t do 
it anymore. It is a really, really hard one and it’s one of the classic cases 
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where aid, as I said, has done more harm than good in the creating of 
dependency culture” (P12). 
In other projects, for example where incentives were introduced, people who 
would previously have gathered together and done their own work would no longer do it 
without an incentive.  
Also, because of the prevailing culture in the community, the affected 
beneficiaries were voiceless to challenge [the] “incompetent engineers and builders with 
poor integrity” (P11), meaning that they had little or no control over reconstruction. 
Participants stated that the cultural mindset of the NGOs is one of the greatest influences 
in creating a culture of dependency in the affected communities. NGOs often consider 
the affected people as being the powerless victims of the disaster and not being capable 
of “moving a finger even” (P15) for their betterment. Another participant, who had 
particular experience in working with such communities, expressed deeper concern 
about NGOs’ practice of doing everything for the affected people rather than with them. 
“It is this culture of being the victim and receiving, and having the right to 
be assisted and someone does everything for you. We have really damped 
people down and we have really disabled people in looking after 
themselves” (P15). 
Participants stated that NGOs with such practices have actually almost 
completely destroyed the self-confidence and zeal of the affected communities. They 
have criticised or belittled people and their abilities, resulting in reduced confidence, and 
have disabled them in looking after themselves.  
Lack of Livelihood Opportunities 
The availability of, and access to, sources of livelihood is paramount for 
successful housing reconstruction in-situ as well as for the re-integration and 
resettlement of affected people when relocated elsewhere. The respondents reported that 
affected people were often more concerned about the availability of necessary services, 
such as clinic, schools, clean water and access to employment than the rebuilding of their 
houses. One of the respondents described her experience of a situation in which the 
project for her community faced enormous difficulty:  
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“One of the challenges we had in our project was that people wouldn't go 
back to their communities because there was nothing in the communities. So 
it wasn't just the challenge of rebuilding houses, it was actually there weren't 
any boreholes, there weren't proper schools. The teachers didn't want to live 
there. And I guess, you know, they had to start their livelihood again 
whereas before when they are in the camps they are much closer to a town 
so they had access to more livelihood and more resources” (P14).  
Respondents stated that community capacity as a whole was important for the 
affected people and so in many cases they would put it forward up as a condition when 
the possibilities of returning to their original place were discussed. Participants also 
stated that rebuilding housing was actually not the first and most important priority for 
the affected people and that there were other important priorities that they had to contend 
with. For example, in rural communities the affected people did not consider rebuilding 
housing as important as collecting their harvest. The affected population in such a time 
would not participate in reconstruction at the cost of losing their harvest. Almost all 
respondents revealed that the lack of livelihood opportunities negatively impacted 
community capacity in the long term and that the affected communities would not be 
able to re-establish their life if this issue was not addressed adequately. 
“People consider their life in the long term. Afghan life and the social 
structure of Afghan people are mainly tribal and a vast majority of them are 
farmers. During the harvest season people often leave their houses, they 
move to the field and erect their tents there. They even take their families 
with them during the harvest period and remain there until the harvest is 
collected. At this time people leave aside all other work including rebuilding 
their houses because they understand that rebuilding a room or two can be 
done later, but if they miss out on the harvest this year, they will have to wait 
for a whole year until the next harvest season” (P6).  
Participants noted that the absence of livelihood in post-disaster settings was 
often disregarded when reconstruction projects were planned, even though that the lack 
of income had an adverse impact on project outcomes. 
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Lack or Loss of Personal Resources and Skills  
Data revealed that the lack of skills and low level of education in the affected 
community had a direct negative effect on community capacity. Many respondents 
stated that communities that lacked the basic understanding and skills of reconstruction 
had enormous difficulties checking that the project implementing agencies/contractors 
had respected the agreed quality standard for reconstruction. Respondents added that in 
large-scale reconstruction projects, NGOs were not always adequately staffed and thus it 
was essential to have the right capacity in the community so that members of the 
affected families could monitor the reconstruction process of individual houses. It was 
also acknowledged that forced relocation and mass migration were the prime causes for 
the loss of community skills, particularly when those skills could not be passed on to the 
new generation in the refugee camps or other temporary locations. Below is a quote from 
a respondent, who has spent many years working with the Afghan refugees in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan: 
“It is a bit like all the Afghan refugees are still stuck in Pakistan, so it means 
a lot of the younger people have never worked in a field, so how can they go 
back to become farmers in the midst of Helmand. They have grown up in the 
refugee camp, they cannot, you know, they haven't got the skills they need to 
actually go back to farming. So, a lot of these people return to the big cities 
and hope to find some work and there is only a limited number of 
chawkidars (doormen) that the world can utilise, and it makes the situation 
pretty dreadful” (P15). 
Another major issue that the participants pointed out was the loss of confidence 
and motivation in the affected community due to the extensive damage caused by the 
disaster to the community life. Participants stated that following major disasters affected 
people found it hard to remain in their communities due to the complete destruction of 
their houses, loss of family assets and severe disruption to the community’s everyday 
operations. A respondent, also one of the top managers of a large donor organisation 
stated that “If a community is totally destroyed, then it is hard where you start and I think 
part of the problem that we “NGOs” also have with projects is that our reconstruction 
projects are very focused on one thing or the other” (P15). Respondents argued that in 
such a situation affected people were unable to participate in reconstruction, firstly 
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because they had lost everything to the disaster, meaning they did not have much left to 
offer to reconstruction, and secondly the NGOs responding to the disaster most often 
lacked a wide-ranging strategy for rebuilding the entire community life. 
Participants were also asked to comment if low levels of literacy in the affected 
community had a negative impact on community involvement in rebuilding. 
Interestingly, although all participants acknowledged that the lack of required skills was 
a major problem in rebuilding housing, there were mixed views as to whether poor 
literacy in the community was a contributory factor for low community capacity. While 
some respondents stated that low literacy did not affect community contribution at all, 
other stated it actually led to misinterpretation of the project objectives, which in some 
cases damaged the community’s relationship with the NGOs. Participants who stated 
that illiteracy was not a major issue in reconstruction also mentioned that people with a 
lower level of literacy showed much stronger enthusiasm and readiness for participation 
than the others and they had better ideas about rebuilding their own houses.  
Loss of Community Cohesion 
Besides the destruction that large-scale disasters often inflict on community 
economy and functionality, they also damage or completely destroy community 
cohesion. Respondents noted that community structure was weakened or has become 
completely dysfunctional when affected communities have been displaced or have 
chosen to displace themselves. The interview participants reported that one particular 
problem that they faced while planning their reconstruction projects was the lack of an 
actual community structure that was no longer in place due to relocation. In some cases, 
affected people had been relocated to other cities or places far from the area of the 
disaster to live with their relatives, which meant that the community council, an 
important immediate contact point and a decision making body, was no longer there. 
Almost all respondents were of the opinion that unless a large number of the affected 
families returned to their original place, reconstructing housing for the few families 
returning back would not have lasting results. A participant, also a member of a large 
international organisation who had a significant role in rebuilding housing after the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami both in Sri Lanka and in Aceh, Indonesia stated:  
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“I think quite often you need to take people back to the location; you almost 
need a critical mass because there isn't much point if you just get a handful 
of families coming back because they’re not going to be happy” (P11).     
The loss of immediate relatives, particularly the male members of the family, due 
to a disaster was another issue that the respondents acknowledged had a negative impact 
on community capacity and morale. A member of the United Nations (UN) who is the 
head of a regional office in Afghanistan expressed his view in relation to this challenge 
as follows: 
“The problem is that they have nothing left to start rebuilding their houses 
with. Men in the family have been killed, and that is why they cannot 
participate in rebuilding housing. They might somehow come out of the 
situation but it will take them longer and they might not be able to fully 
recover without the help from external sources” (P4). 
Respondents noted that in male dominated societies, such as exists in 
Afghanistan, male members of the family have an exceptionally important contributory 
role both in terms of providing physical labour and influencing planning for 
reconstruction. 
5.3.2 Gender Issues 
The concept of women’s participation in reconstruction and its associated gender 
issues were argued to be very context specific, differing significantly from one location 
to another. For example, as described by one participant “There are different problems in 
different cultures. I think it is interesting to see that in some cultures women do the 
building work, whereas in other women will not necessarily get involved” (P11).  
Participants (P1, P9, P11, P14) provided evidence that in some locations women 
were deprived of their basic rights, such as access to education and employment, whilst 
in other locations they were overly-exploited, doing heavy manual construction work. 
The respondents indicated that these differences were evident whether viewed at the 
global level, or at the level of continents, countries, provinces within a country, and 
sometimes even within the different districts of the same province. At the global level, 
for example, women in Africa were more vocal in contrast with women in some other 
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countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some participants said that they had fewer 
problems getting in touch with women in the northern provinces of Afghanistan 
compared with the central provinces. 
“In the Northern region we didn't have much problem with talking directly to 
women, however, in the central region like in the remote villages of Parwan 
or Logar the situation is very different. People there are more sensitive to 
gender related issues” (P2). 
Responding to whether women’s participation in post-disaster housing 
reconstruction was important, all participants categorically confirmed that involving 
women in reconstruction was an important feature of any successful project. Focusing on 
the significance of women’s participation, the respondents said that women’s input was 
crucial when planning reconstruction because they actually spent most of their time in 
the house and had an absolute understanding of their own needs. Women were able to 
express their needs much more clearly and had better ideas about the design of their own 
houses. The respondents confirmed that despite having a crucial role, in the majority of 
the reconstruction projects already implemented, women had minimal participation in 
rebuilding their houses. This can be seen in the following remark: 
“Afghanistan, as a minimally developed country has huge problems with 
gender inequity. I can tell that women have as little as 5% involvement in the 
design of many projects and that is why these projects are less successful 
and often held up as incomplete” (P1). 
The interview participants highlighted that the current socio-cultural and 
religious settings in some affected communities have created a general misconception of 
women’s ability. Gender inequity coupled with women’s lack of education, or them 
having lower education levels than the men in many communities continue to pose a 
major barrier to women’s participation in reconstruction. 
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Socio-Cultural Barriers  
Regardless of the significant importance that women’s participation has in terms 
of project viability and suitability, this important aspect of a successful reconstruction 
continues to be ignored because of the many socio-cultural restrictions on women. The 
respondents stated that in some communities, women’s interests and needs are largely 
overlooked “because people don’t believe that men should be talking to women” (P5). In 
some projects even the locally recruited male members of the aid organisations felt that it 
was culturally inappropriate to talk with community women.  
“I remember during the evaluation of our project where women's needs were 
ignored because the assessment teams were men, and men were too 
embarrassed to ask questions of women... and I have had a man who was too 
embarrassed to ask anybody else, so women's hygiene needs were ignored 
and that was the problem after the earthquake... and so you hear all these 
kind of stories all the time and that is not ok. That is not acceptable” (P12). 
The participants acknowledged that since some International NGOs were using 
the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to 
guide them in disaster relief operations, they often adhered quite strictly to respecting the 
local culture as being one of the principles of the code, despite some cultures actually 
impeding women’s participation in reconstruction.  
The respondents also admitted that although they strongly felt the need for 
conducting their operations in ways that could encourage and accommodate more 
participation from the affected women, they were hesitant to introduce any approach that 
had the potential to change the family dynamic (P4, P5, P6, P8).  
International NGOs were not prepared to risk or take the blame for any 
undesirable long-term negative effect of a change in the community dynamic on the life 
of affected women if it occurred because of the NGOs’ influence. One respondent stated 
that International NGOs were simply not in favour of changing what the affected people 
really considered a normal community practice, if it ran the risk of creating tension in the 
affected families, even if such change would result in greater involvement or the 
empowering of the community women.  
Chapter 5 – Interview Results – Challenges for Community Participation  
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 133 
“If women become more empowered, that will change family dynamics and 
possibly because women would want to be out working, the men feel at risk, 
they feel undermined because they have got vocal wives” (P13). 
The above statement was supported by another female participant who 
acknowledged that empowering women might also trigger gender based violence in the 
family, if the male members of the affected family were completely disregarded.   
“The downside of this is that there is a risk if you increase the power 
dynamics towards the women it can increase gender based violence so you 
need to be really careful that if you are going to work with a woman you 
need to work with the man as well” (P11). 
The interview analysis revealed that under the current socio-cultural norms many 
Afghan families did not allow their females to have any form of participation in 
reconstruction. Many commented that women’s participation needs only be considered 
or planned if it agrees with the cultural norms of the affected people and that members of 
the NGOs should refrain from introducing or forcing their own cultures on the affected 
communities. 
“It is not right to do anything that is not in line with the community culture 
or clashes with the community cultural norms, like men going and knocking 
on women's doors and meeting with them”. (P5) 
Inequity 
Besides the existing socio-cultural barriers that made women’s participation 
difficult in some places, women globally faced the challenge of being perceived as 
secondary to men in terms of having equal opportunities and equal voice in the 
community life. One respondent (a university professor from the UK) endorsed this view 
stating that: 
“One of the big issues and problems in our plants is that women are second 
class in all societies, in the UK you know they are paid less than the man 
and that should change because that is inherently unfair” (P12).  
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Participants stated that in some places where women actually were invited to 
participate in discussions, they only had a token representation rather than true 
participation in the traditional all male panel. This was acknowledged by an Afghan 
national respondent who stated, “We may have women's participation but at the end of 
the day, men's decisions will have more weight over the decisions made by women” 
(P6). The respondents stated that in the majority of cases, particularly in the 
predominantly male governed societies, reconstruction projects were designed with 
much greater attention towards meeting the needs of the male members of the affected 
communities than those of the women. According to at least one respondent, women’s 
involvement as a whole was drastically curtailed in certain locations in Afghanistan 
because of the deep-seated prejudice against them. Sometimes this occurred even when 
only very basic health education activities and literacy courses were planned for the 
affected communities. The evidence suggests that women’s participation was 
particularly ineffective in some places because they had enormous difficulty expressing 
their opinions about anything beyond the simplest everyday family matters. The head of 
an international donor organisation reported that it “wasn't always easy to gauge their 
opinion, because they [women] not being used to being asked their opinion was 
sometimes quite challenging” (P14). 
Respondents revealed that women were often under pressure from their male 
family members to use whatever has been provided to them in terms of the kitchen and 
latrine facilities even if they did not suit the women’s physical build or preferences. 
Misconception 
“Gender issues of course have a negative impact on women's participation 
and unfortunately there is this perception that women are not capable of 
contributing in reconstruction, but in reality it is not so.” (P2). 
There is a general misconception among most Afghans about the ability of 
women to participate in reconstruction. According to at least one participant, people in 
Afghanistan often say, “Zan Naqes-ul-Aql ast,” meaning that women are “mentally 
handicapped” (P6). Respondents (P2, P3, P5, P6, P9, and P15) stated that in the majority 
of their projects, community level decisions were customarily made by the male 
members of the affected communities and the male staff from the NGOs without asking 
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the affected women to share their opinions. The respondents argued that the false 
impression about women had significantly limited their possibilities to discuss and 
communicate their needs in project meetings. The participants further argued that 
women’s needs were not given adequate consideration because the representing male 
participants were either not fully aware of the women’s need or had considered them 
unimportant (P5). One of the participants who had investigated the impact of the 
traditional kitchen design on the health of women in the South of Afghanistan reported 
that many women had developed lung problems due to their constant exposure to the 
smoke that fed back into the kitchen area. The investigation also revealed that although 
this significant design defect was having a direct impact on women’s health, it was 
largely ignored because women were just not consulted.  
“A lot of houses in the South for example, from the medical perspective we 
have seen a lot of women with lung damage because of the traditional way of 
building the kitchen. The problem is that the way it was constructed... they 
had such a big back draft that the women were inhaling smoke all the time 
and therefore had severe lung damage”(P15). 
The participants however highlighted that in many places it was not only the men 
who thought that women were not capable of contributing in reconstruction projects, but 
women in some affected communities expressed doubt that they really were able to play 
a meaningful role. 
Level of Education  
The participants noted that women in Afghanistan generally had a lower level of 
education than men and this level was even lower in villages because traditionally, in 
most villages in Afghanistan people either do not allow their girls to go to school. 
(P7), or they just do not have access to a school for girls. Participants stated that the low 
level of education coupled with the lack of opportunities for self-development have had 
a major impact on the ability of the community women to understand the importance of 
their participation and the long term benefits of the project in their life.  
“We rarely had women's participation because their families wouldn’t let 
them and also because of their low level of education” (P3). 
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Participants argued that the existing situations had also made it difficult for 
women to clearly express their opinions and to relate them to their needs. The 
respondents stated that generally the prolonged war and the prevailing cultural and 
religious restrictions on women’s participation in the society had a direct impact on their 
low level of education. The following observation provides supporting evidence to this: 
Women’s involvement in reconstruction projects is indeed very weak 
because of the socio-cultural and religious reasons (P6). 
5.3.3 Lack of Professional Competence in NGOs 
The lack of adequate operational capacity and integrity in NGOs was addressed 
by the respondents as being one of the common causes for the failure of many 
reconstruction projects. Participants stated that pursuant to major disasters the response 
from the governments as well as the international community in terms of funding 
allocation for emergency recovery and reconstruction could sometimes be 
unprecedented (P2, P14 and P15). The respondents reported that in some of the post-
disaster settings in which they previously operated, the availability of large grants for 
reconstruction and sponsors’ desire for hasty implementation of reconstruction projects, 
provided funding opportunities for the existing NGOs and also prompted the creation of 
new ones. It was reported that: 
“After the collapse of the Taliban when NGOs flooded to Afghanistan and 
many more were created locally, funds were given to them without first 
checking their capacities, and as result billions of dollars of aid money were 
wasted. Many reconstruction projects [implemented by these NGOs] didn't 
respond to the specific needs of the affected communities” (P2). 
It was acknowledged that in situations where NGOs had poured into the affected 
areas, the race for securing funding and a place in reconstruction efforts intensified, and 
as a result participation from the affected people in the whole process of planning and 
rebuilding diminished. Participants admitted that this was in fact a major issue in 
reconstruction after a disaster and there they were working “to establish minimum 
standards for the NGO because there are a lot of NGOs. Everybody gets involved in 
the big game because there is money” (P15).  
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The participants added that community participation was often ignored by NGOs 
when reconstruction projects were planned, as they had to rush to secure funding for 
their projects. Many respondents mentioned that donor organisations did not always 
check the credentials and background of the partner NGOs, when responding to the need 
for quick reconstruction after large-scale disasters. Many participants also noted that in 
many such cases when funding was given to NGOs with no previous experience in 
reconstruction, or where the NGO lacked adequate operational capacity, there was lesser 
effective community participation. Lack of transparency and accountability, corruption 
in NGOs, lack of technical knowledge as well as the lack of awareness of the local 
culture, were generally perceived as factors affecting NGOs’ capacity to work 
successfully alongside the affected communities when delivering reconstruction projects. 
 Lack of Transparency 
The respondents viewed transparency as an important aspect of delivering 
successful post-disaster reconstruction projects. Participants believed that reconstruction 
projects with transparent processes were more sustainable because they had greater 
support from the affected population. The respondents however emphasised that the lack 
of transparency in reconstruction projects damaged trust between the NGO and the 
affected communities, added to confusion about the project objectives and led to a 
declined sense of project ownership by the community. 
Trust  
“I think people sort of say, “Well someone has given some money to help me. What 
is happening with that money? How much of that money is coming my way? What is 
the motivation of people behind it? Why are they coming and wanting to help us?” I 
think there is a lot of mistrust, unless you are really, really transparent” (P15). 
The participants pointed out that the lack of transparency in reconstruction had 
led many affected communities to gradually distance themselves from the NGOs 
operating in Afghanistan. As one respondent stated “Lack of transparency impacts 
negatively on the effectiveness of community participation and it damages trust. 
People do not participate in projects that they do not trust would really benefit 
them” (P1).  
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According to (P1, P4, P6 and P8) lack of transparency and accountability in 
some NGOs has severely damaged the trust the Afghan population once had in NGOs, 
earning the NGOs increased unpopularity. The respondents stated that the majority of 
Afghan beneficiaries did not want to work with NGOs anymore because they were very 
upset and annoyed by the fact that many NGOs had already been in their area, had 
numerous meetings with people, collected the information they wanted and then 
suddenly disappeared without a trace. The following statement provides evidence 
supporting this. 
“We have seen, and we have the experience, many NGOs have surveyed 
exactly the same location, done needs assessment but none has ever given 
positive or negative feedback or a response to the affected population, 
disappointing a large proportion of the affected people” (P6). 
Participants argued that reconstruction projects that were designed and 
implemented without the involvement of the large mass of community members were 
not only poorly looked after but in some cases the affected communities deliberately 
damaged or even completely destroyed them. 
Unrealistic promises  
“NGOs implementing reconstruction projects must have a very transparent 
policy; unrealistic promises should never be made. They should not tell 
people that the project will take only 2 to 3 months when they are in the 
initial design phase and haven’t even got their budget approved”(P3) . 
Another critical issue that emerged from the interviews was pertaining to the 
unrealistic promises that the NGOs often made during their initial contacts with the 
affected people. Such promises were often made by NGOs to attract community support 
in order to show to the donor agency that there was a well-established and legitimate 
need for the project to be funded.  
The respondents noted that when NGOs first met with the affected communities, 
they often overstated their abilities in terms of how much aid they would give and in 
what timeframe the aid would be delivered within, while the fate of their project 
proposal was still being determined by the donor organisation. The participants added 
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that many NGOs have failed to deliver what they had initially promised and this has in 
fact led the affected people to become more suspicious about the NGOs’ moral 
principles, integrity and accountability. This can be seen in the following two remarks: 
“The thing that I have heard time and time again from beneficiaries and 
communities is that they are fed up with NGOs coming in, doing their 
surveys, promising this and that, and then go and not delivering anything” 
(P13). 
 “Affected people have increasingly become suspicious about the aim of 
reconstruction projects, and this has created a huge distance between NGOs 
and the affected people in Afghanistan. The lack of transparency is the major 
cause for the failure of most reconstruction projects” (P5). 
It was reported that this practice has significantly hampered building positive 
relationships between the NGOs and the affected communities, resulting in a general 
decline in people’s cooperation with aid organisations. 
Confusion  
“I am not aware that there is regulating body who can be responsible to 
hold NGOs to account if they are not providing the community with what 
they should be getting” (P14). 
The respondents also acknowledged that NGOs were not always prepared to 
explain the actual reconstruction process to the affected people or to allow them access 
to the important information about the project funding. Many respondents revealed that 
when delivering their reconstruction projects, either as a direct response or through their 
partners, they did not always provide a fully comprehensive information package that 
included critical and useful information about the project itself, the implementing NGO 
and the donors and other interested parties, as well as the beneficiaries’ rights and 
entitlements. Participants admitted that it was not a normal practice to provide the 
contact details of other influential stakeholders such as the project donor (s) and the 
government authorities to the affected people, which made it absolutely impossible for 
them to bring up any concern to the donor related to the project or to the performance of 
the implementing NGO. Four participants (P11, P13, P14, P15) who had decades of 
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international experience in post-disaster reconstruction shared the same view, concluding 
that it was unfortunate to see so many affected communities struggle because they were 
not clearly told what they were entitled to and how the whole reconstruction process 
worked. The respondents were generally of the view that people do want help, and they 
will take what is given to them, but in the meantime they are very well aware that “not 
all NGOs really are as altruistic as they sound” (P15). Unless the objectives of the 
project are clearly explained to the affected people, and there is a well-established direct 
line of communication between the people and all stakeholders particularly the donor, 
affected people will always find it difficult to make informed decisions and support 
NGOs.  As one participant (P4) stated when people are not well informed of the 
objectives of the project they do not only refuse to support such projects, they also create 
more problems for the project and try to stop it. “First of all, affected people do not 
participate, second they do not cooperate and third they create problems and when you 
have all these elements they can create huge barriers for the project” (P4).  
Project ownership  
“When there is no transparency, there is much less ownership by the 
community, because if they don’t know that they can have a voice and they 
cannot influence what is going on, they are likely to just sit back and feel 
completely disempowered” (P11). 
Lack of transparency was also perceived by many respondents to have had a 
significant effect on people’s spirit of project ownership. Generally, all respondents 
stated that those projects without sufficient transparency did not only fail to attract 
people’s support, they also had a shorter life because the beneficiaries did not want to 
maintain them. As stated by (P10) such projects do not develop the very sense of 
ownership in the affected people and as result they are often abandoned, 
“The project doesn’t belong to them. It doesn't belong to them, and they have no 
sense of belonging, no sense of ownership. It won't have long life. It could be ruined. 
It could be destroyed. It could be left on its own and the community not necessarily 
protect it” (P10). 
Many respondents remarked that opaqueness in reconstruction projects increased 
the risk of project failure because they were not always designed well enough to meet 
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the needs of the affected communities due to the lack of community input, leaving a 
disempowered community with no sense of owning the project. One respondent also 
stated that projects with no transparency run the risk of going absolutely wrong (P12), 
failing to get the greatest possible impact and not being used by the affected 
communities, eventually leading to a total loss of project funding. This participant (P12) 
further stated that the level of community engagement in the design and implementation 
of reconstruction projects was significantly influenced by who the provider was and 
where the power actually lay. It was admitted that in humanitarian response relief and 
recovery the power remains with the responder organisations such as the NGOs, 
government, the UN or other aid entities from within the affected country or external to 
it. Too often the responders assumed that those affected were completely powerless, 
resulting in the creation of a power imbalance. This issue was affirmed by other 
respondents who also stated that the sponsors of humanitarian projects and the providers 
of humanitarian assistance very often did not think that the affected beneficiaries should 
also actually be included in decisions that affected them the most. The respondents 
acknowledged that this has been a practice for decades and that NGOs were still very 
disinclined to include affected people, showing no particular interest in changing their 
mindset. All respondents admitted that NGOs working with such a mindset had really 
disempowered the affected communities, leading them to doubt their power and position 
as the foremost and most critical stakeholders in the reconstruction. Participants 
concluded that NGOs often lost the opportunity to build the sense of ownership by the 
affected communities, and also to encourage inclusivity and the connectedness with 
those seeking to own the project, when they did the needs assessment without seeking to 
involve the wider affected population.  
“Any good assessment starts to build a sense of ownership by the affected 
communities of the eventual product, but too often that is done poorly or not 
at all, but it is absolutely essential for empowerment of local people” (P12).  
Corruption 
Generally, all respondents stated that many NGOs did not respect the basic 
principles of being “non-for-profit” and “humanitarian” (P1). The respondents 
stated that in Afghanistan many NGOs, although titled as non-governmental and 
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non-for-profit were actually established for profit that largely violated the basic 
principles on which NGOs are required to operate.  
“The problem is that many national NGOs are run by members of the same 
family. They have established a kind of kingdom type of NGO regime. They 
are surrounded and protected by their relatives and whatever they do is 
kept in secret” (P4). 
Five interviewees (P1, P2, P4, P12 and P15) asserted that non-transparent NGOs 
were more likely to have corrupt procedures and a governance structure heavily founded 
on nepotism, and they were only interested in making a profit out of foreign aid. The 
participants acknowledged that unless the funding body actually really required 
community process, NGOs almost always avoided or performed extremely poorly in 
terms of community participation. The participants stressed that in many places, as a 
direct result of such poor performances, the word “NGO” now means everything 
negative and it is a word merely seen by many as a corrupt entity that has no passion and 
commitment to rebuilding affected communities. The following remark provides 
evidence to support this; 
“We have countless NGOs operating right now in Afghanistan. Not all of 
them are there to help people or are concerned about them, and they are 
there for their profit from project funding for their own personal agendas 
(P2). 
“I can tell you this, in Afghanistan there are many NGOs that have really 
low capacity and competency and their work has had little or no positive 
impact. Many NGOs have been established for their own benefit, not really 
for the sake of people. They are called Not for profit organisations but their 
main aim is to fill their own pockets” (P1). 
The evidence suggests that corruption was not limited to local and international 
NGOs; it was endemic in Afghanistan and had also contaminated many major donor 
organisations as well as the government departments.  
“The other unfortunate issue is that those having political power and 
influence are actually the ones who own the NGOs, and they also have link 
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with the corrupt employees in donor organisations who have the power of 
approving project proposals” (P2). 
It was reported that due to the lack of adequate competency in some donor 
organisations quite often projects that never got off the ground in the first place were 
given full funding for the entire lifecycle. In some cases certain projects that only existed 
on paper having received funding from multiple donors for many years without 
interruption.  
“There was an NGO that only existed on paper in charge of Nuristan [a 
province of Afghanistan]. Nothing had happened in Nuristan in three years 
and it took basically until the end of the contract - just about two months till 
the closing of the contract - someone figured out something was wrong” 
(P15). 
Participants argued that some donor organisations operating in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere lack the needed proficiency to effectively monitor and evaluate their partners’ 
performance in the field or talk with the beneficiaries, and thus allowing every 
opportunity for the corrupt NGOs to embezzle project funding. The respondent indicated 
that corrupt NGOs did not promote community participation giving greater priority to 
their own needs.   
Lack of Technical Knowledge  
Participants stated that NGOs lacking specific knowledge and technical expertise 
of reconstruction had actually done more damage than good in the context of 
post-disaster reconstruction.  
“Is it the role of the NGOs to do construction? Or this is where money 
should be given to the private sector to do construction” (P13). 
One respondent revealed that there was a general opinion even among the very 
good NGOs and some large forums of NGOs around the world that housing 
reconstruction was a simple matter that anyone could do.  
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“There is a real danger, I think even with good NGOs, the thing we have 
found with our shelter forum is the understanding that everybody thinks they 
can build a house” (P11). 
Participants becoming desperate to manage their projects stated “the 
misconception about the simplicity of housing reconstruction caused NGOs having low 
competency to struggle” (P13). Other participants noted that in a post-disaster context, 
so many NGOs rushed to the disaster area creating a massive crowd of NGOs those with 
good competency and technical knowledge being mixed with those with poor or no 
technical knowledge and capacity at all. At least three participants (P2, P4 and P13) 
commented that NGOs who were not experienced and did not have sufficient technical 
knowledge caused more fatigue and suffering in the communities already devastated by 
the disaster, when they failed to the deliver the project as expected.  
“A bad NGO will do bad work and a good NGO will produce good results. If 
funding for a reconstruction project is given to a bad NGO, at the end the 
affected people will be the ones who will suffer” (P4). 
It was also revealed that the bidding process for humanitarian projects has 
increasingly become cost-focused, meaning that regardless of the quality, previous 
experience and level of expertise, NGOs with lowest price won most of the bids for 
reconstruction projects (P15). It was argued that most of the times good NGOs with 
years of experience in reconstruction and proven ability were underbid by inexperienced 
NGOs who had no intention of putting into practice their reconstruction strategy. Three 
respondents (P4, P15, and P7) viewed donors’ performance as ineffectual in terms of 
assessing funding proposals. They stressed that some donor organisations did not 
conduct a thorough check of the NGOs’ background and technical capabilities when 
appraising their project proposals and as a result funding was given to NGOs that, apart 
from on paper, did not exist in the real world. Another participant (P2) stated that many 
newly established NGOs had such poor conduct that their registration had to be 
cancelled when major incidences of poor performance, attempts to bribe locals and 
corruption were reported by the affected communities. Participants informed that in 
some places community people have become more vigilant about NGOs’ conduct, and 
the incidents of people actually stopping the projects or expelling the incompetent NGOs 
from their communities, are increasing.  
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Haste in Reconstruction 
“When we look back at the tsunami in particular, lots of projects that 
happened, people aren’t living there. There were a number of ghost towns 
because people have hasted to build these new communities.” (P11). 
Haste in reconstruction was generally acknowledged to have had negative 
impacts on the outcomes of reconstruction projects mainly because such an approach to 
planning and implementation of such projects often avoided community consultation. 
The respondents, however, stressed that in certain environmental conditions such as in a 
harsh climate, it was appropriate to consider hasty implementation. The analysis of the 
interviews revealed that haste in reconstruction was a controversial approach to housing 
reconstruction perceived as having positive as well as negative features. It was argued 
that hasty implementation of housing reconstruction although a good strategy for the 
immediate recovery may not always support the long term rebuilding of the affected 
communities mainly due to the absence of adequate community inputs. Many 
respondents stated that large-scale housing reconstruction projects need to be in line with 
the strategic development plan and should allow for expansion.  
The respondents acknowledged that in the majority of cases NGOs adopted this 
approach as a response either to certain climatic constraints or to meet donors’ 
requirements for a quick disbursement of project funding.   
The need for hasty implementation 
“After the Kashmir earthquake, the winter was coming in. It was October, and 
so a lot of agencies stormed very quickly to build some temporary housing and 
moved very quickly with that, so time was of the essence before the winter set 
[in].” (P12). 
The severity and magnitude of disasters and the circumstances in which NGOs 
operate, as well as the geological conditions in disaster areas, sometimes necessitate 
addressing the enormous need for housing reconstruction more hastily. Interviewees (P1, 
P8, P9, P12, P13 and P14) were of the same view that in such severe and disruptive 
situations, affected people want to speedily reconstruct their damaged or destroyed 
houses. The respondents acknowledged that although community participation does 
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increase the chances of project success, under certain conditions when there is an urgent 
need for housing, an all-embracing community consultation should be avoided because it 
might slow down reconstruction. Some respondents, however, argued that the urgency 
for reconstruction and the desperate desire of the affected people to get back to their 
houses is not a justification for ignoring community involvement and that NGOs need to 
make every attempt to make sure affected people do have their input in the process. For 
example, one respondent stated, “There may be a good reason to build quickly. That 
said, of course you can build quickly and involve communities. There is no reason 
why that can't be the case” (P12). 
Participant (P10) who had extensive experience in providing housing solutions 
for refugees reported that a housing project that was intended to permanently 
accommodate a large number of Afghan returnees failed shortly after its completion. The 
project was a joint initiative of the Afghan government and the UN to provide 
emergency housing for over 300 refugee families who had already arrived in 
Afghanistan. The respondent stated that the project failed for many reasons: firstly 
because of the urgency for housing created by the sudden arrival of the refugee families 
and the shortly approaching winter, secondly it was near a military barracks which was 
regularly attacked by the insurgents, thirdly there was no effective coordination between 
the local government and the UN, and fourthly other communities in the locality were 
not consulted. The respondent also said that the plot of land on which the houses were 
constructed did not actually belong to the government as initially claimed but was the 
property of the adjacent community, fuelling racial tension among in the communities.  
Ignoring the needs of affected communities 
 “NGOs are often under quite a tight time frame for spending donor's money, so 
often government funds or funds from other donors stipulate that it has to be 
spent within a year or possibly two” (P13). 
A fundamental tension inherent in delivering post-disaster reconstruction 
projects arises when project objectives, particularly project schedules set by funding 
bodies do not agree with what the NGOs consider more realistic.  
“Now one of the problems that makes aid agencies feel they have to spend 
the money very quickly is [their] accountability to donors and that is one of 
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the great tensions in humanitarian aid - the pressure to spend quickly” 
(P12). 
The respondents stated that in post-disaster settings project targets are often 
set by the sponsors, but, based on their own analysis of the situation without looking 
into the enormity of the tasks required to achieve desirable project outcomes. The 
respondents indicated that tension in NGOs is particularly high when they are 
required to spend large sums of project funding very quickly because of the 
contractual obligations and accountabilities to donors, and the pressure from the local 
government for quick results. It was also noted that the pressure to build quickly on 
the one hand, and the belief that community participation slows reconstruction on the 
other, drove NGOs  to make tough trade-offs, often favouring donors’ priorities at 
the expense of ignoring the basic needs of the affected communities. The following 
two statements provide compelling evidence to support this. 
“NGOs don't want to lose that money. They don’t want to have it paid back 
to the donor, they just need to spend, spend, spend and I think, at that point, 
beneficiary consultation goes out the window” (P13). 
“Well you haven't got time for it, as simple as that. If you have six months to 
build houses, then it is very, very hard to involve the right people” (P15). 
The respondents highlighted that, in situations when reconstruction projects 
were implemented in haste, they actually took more time to complete because of the 
many problems that were encountered along the path. The NGOs had to spend more 
time consulting with the affected community to deal with the many issues that were 
initially ignored because of the hasty implementation. In other situations, as one of 
the participants reported, rushing to rebuild housing without first establishing the 
land tenure, resulted in a total failure of the reconstruction project, as well as 
plunging the once peaceful neighbourhood into chaos and lasting community feud.  
Overall, the majority of participants agreed that hasty implementation of 
reconstruction projects was a real challenge for effective community participation. 
Four participants (P12, P13, P14, and P15) admitted that in emergency situations 
NGOs were very eager to complete the needs assessment as fast as possible “and get 
the proposal out to the donors” (P14). It was also noted that NGOs did so because 
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they perceived there was “not enough time for community consultation” (P15), 
particularly if they wanted to make sure all members of the affected community had 
the opportunity to share their opinion, communicate on it and to really understand 
what was going on. All respondents stated that when reconstruction projects were 
designed and implemented in haste, community participation, although 
acknowledged by many as being the most important element in reconstruction “was 
the first thing to get cut” (P14). In situations when community needs were largely 
ignored and consultation was carried out only with a handful of community 
representatives, the majority of the affected people felt aggravated because it was not 
communicated with them. Two participants (P11 and P13) concluded that it was a 
much better practice to take the time and involve affected communities in planning 
and reconstruction than risking failure by making quick decisions without 
community involvement.  
5.3.4 Government Policies and Practices 
“Government is often the problem not the solution and of course that is why so 
many NGOs [have] probably grown in prominence, in response, because the 
government is often overwhelmed and under resourced” (P12). 
The interview analysis revealed that participants had mixed views about the 
role of government and the appropriateness of its policies and practices when 
responding to a disaster. While some respondents agreed that “government policies 
were necessary at times to get some control over the rebuilding” (P14, P8), another 
stated that “not all the decisions by the government were good for people” (P10) 
because they were not always fully oriented towards helping the affected 
communities. One respondent (P13) stated that policies issued by some governments 
in the wake of a major disaster actually resulted in forced relocation of the affected 
people, with negative consequences, particularly on the life of those relocated far 
away from their only sources of livelihood such as the farming land or the sea. This 
was indorsed by (P11) who stated, “I think there are a lot of government policies that 
kind of force [relocation]. I know in a lot of places there was a policy to clear the 
coast line”. At least three interviewees (P11, P14, P8) asserted that, in principle 
government policies should be a positive thing, however in reality, in many 
countries, the government itself was often more of “a hindrance than a help” (P12).  
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It was also revealed that in some countries the government actually made it 
harder for the INGOs to operate, by delaying their registration or refusing them entry 
visas. As one participant stated government policies and political agendas had 
adverse impacts on the INGOs ability to swiftly deliver their aid to the affected 
population. 
 “It [government] has not been overly supportive, particularly of INGOs. 
Certainly [in] last year's [2011] flood situation the government for a long 
time refused to issue NOCs [No objection certificates] to INGOs to allow 
them implement projects and to allow the INGOs staff to travel”(P13).  
According to respondents in some cases when INGOs were implementing 
their projects they were absolutely bound by, and had to strictly adhere to, the 
policies the government had already formulated without necessarily having had input 
from the affected people. Many participants reported that very often the governments 
imposed heavy restrictions in terms of building, which were not in the best interest of 
the affected people. The housing design that the governments imposed, did not 
respond to the needs of the wider affected population, because of the unique 
requirements of the individual locations. One participant commented, “In 
Afghanistan the biggest problem is that everything is done through the central 
government” (P9).  
 Participants stated that the centralised approach, obsolete construction 
policies and a high level of bureaucracy and corruption in government departments, 
had all had negative impact on post-disaster reconstruction in Afghanistan. “One of 
the major factors for project failure is that the central government designs the 
projects and imposes them on people, meaning that the needs are completely 
different from the project objectives” (P8). On other occasions, as reported by the 
same respondent, the government had a list of building criteria including the number 
of rooms and storeys the affected family must be able to build in order to qualify for 
a plot of government land. “The government often imposed certain restrictions on 
how the house should be built to meet the criteria for a piece of land” (P8). The 
respondents revealed that in the majority of post-disaster reconstruction projects, the 
government-designed post-disaster housing models did not actually meet the needs 
of all financially disadvantaged communities “because the designs were not suitable 
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for remote and high altitude places because of the associated transportation cost” 
(P14). Respondents reported that the current polices of the Afghan government have 
totally disempowered the local authorities and the affected communities for 
contributing in the design and the subsequent phase of project implementation and 
“as a result people have lost interest in cooperating with the government” (P9).  
In relation to government policies and practices, the analysis of the interview 
revealed four major subthemes: land issues, weak governance, control and 
coordination and relocation, each constituting a barrier for community participation.  
Land Issues 
“Shelter is quite one of the most intractable problems in recovery, and often 
that does relate to land ownership and land tenure, and in urban area of 
course that is really, really, really complicated where people lease hold renting 
squats” (P12). 
Issues related to land ownership and land tenure were perceived to be the 
most intractable problems in the whole process of post-disaster recovery and the 
reconstruction of permanent houses. Evidence suggests that issues related to land 
ownership caused long delays in project completion, sometimes they even resulted in 
total project failure when they were not resolved appropriately ahead of project 
implementation.  
One respondent reported that a shelter project in the East part of Afghanistan 
was doomed to complete failure “when private owners came to the scene and they 
claimed to be the owners of that [land] so not having the path through the 
government they started harassing the returnees” (P10). The respondents, 
particularly those from Afghanistan, strongly indicated that owing to the prolonged 
war, and as a direct result of the endemic corruption in the government departments, 
extremely poor governance “the lack of viable land acquisition and land distribution 
policy” (P2) and the seizure of vast government land resources by the warlords, the 
whole land business has become a huge and most intractably difficult issue for the 
Afghan people (P2, P3, P4, P5, P9).  
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 Respondents explained that in some cases after a large scale disaster, when 
the land records were destroyed (P13), affected families were unable to participate in 
the NGOs’ supported initiative for housing reconstruction because the government 
was either too slow or refused altogether to re-establish their entitlement to land that 
they already legally owned. One participant who had extensive experience working 
with many NGOs in developing countries stated that, “A lot of development 
programs die basically [because of] the lack of cooperation from the government to 
their [refers to the affected people] paper work without bribes (P15). Participants 
admitted that issues related to land acquisition and land distribution were very 
complex and difficult extending a long way beyond the NGOs’ and the affected 
people’s ability to solve without the cooperation of the government. The lack of land 
created by the illegal seizure of government-owned land by powerful warlords and 
wealthy individuals had made even difficult for the grassroots to find a plot for 
reconstruction. 
Land acquisition process 
“It definitely slows down the whole process because you are dependent on the 
government to issue their directives as to where they are going to allow 
construction to take place” (P13). 
Participants noted that land acquisition was generally perceived to be an 
extremely slow and cumbersome process in all places, creating a huge barrier to the 
progress of reconstruction efforts. In some developing countries, particularly those 
hit by a disaster, the government took a much longer time to plan and issue land for 
reconstruction.  
The participants described the long wait and slow land acquisition process as: 
“long waiting time in getting lands for building is the anti-tank mine [the project 
killer]” (P10), “the key problem in shelter” (P11) and “a huge minefield” (P13), 
impacting severely negatively on people’s ability to participate in rebuilding their 
houses as they had to wait often indefinitely to be issued a piece of government land.  
Many participants stated that the government policies in relation to land 
acquisition as well as the long waiting time had created huge problems. This was the 
case particularly for the most vulnerable and needy people without land rights to 
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actually qualify for NGOs’ assistance because they did not have access to land. The 
respondents pointed out that the government polices had also slowed down the whole 
reconstruction process because NGOs had to implement their projects in line with the 
directives from the government, which were slow being issued.  
One participant (P14) reported that on a number of occasions their 
implementing partners, NGOs and the recipient beneficiaries had to purchase the 
land themselves because the government had no particular interest in providing land 
for reconstruction. Respondents (P10, P11, P13, P14, and P8) provided evidence 
suggesting that the slow land acquisition process significantly reduced community 
participation, caused affected people to be/remain displaced from their original 
locations and even halt the whole reconstruction effort.  
Land scarcity  
“The problem is that all government lands have been looted by land mafia. Even 
in the remote desert you won’t find a piece of land There is no place left even for 
a clinic to be built on” (P3). 
The shortage in government land stock created by illegal land gifting to 
senior government officials and former militia commanders, land grabbing by 
returnees and local villagers, and long standing unresolved land disputes, was 
considered a huge issue and a major weakness in the Afghan government, halting 
many reconstruction projects. At least two participants stated the shortage of land 
and the many regulatory barriers (P12) constituted “a huge problem nowadays with 
millions of square meters of land taken by a few powerful persons leaving millions of 
others landless” (P9). This statement was affirmed by a respondent (P2), who said 
that land scarcity was “a very huge issue and a great point of concern for all Afghans 
now, before it was an issue of concern for men but today both men and women worry 
about this issue”. The respondent further highlighted that high level of corruption 
and the use of power have resulted in a completely unfair distribution of government 
land, with some individuals having multiple houses while the remaining majority of 
people in the community having no access to a piece of land to build a house.  
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Weak Governance 
“The government lacks committed personnel. It affects community participation 
and community morale. It creates mistrust and a distance between people and 
the government” (P4).  
Weak governance coupled with the existing gap in the capacity of some 
governments, particularly those suffering from decades of war and internal conflicts 
such as Afghanistan, was a major issue of concern for the NGOs operating in the 
felid of post-disaster reconstruction as well as for the affected beneficiaries. 
   According to participants, state governments that lacked the ability to 
enforce good policies did little to support reconstruction efforts, leaving the affected 
people “to deal with the problem themselves” (P11). These populations then had to 
instigate any measures in a desperate attempt to do whatever they could to provide 
for their housing needs. Two respondents (P3, P4) commented that the absence of a 
strong governance structure in Afghanistan often created problems for the NGOs to 
effectively implement reconstruction projects when the government employees 
intentionally delayed the issuance of building permits in order to force the affected 
people to resort to bribery.  
“The policies and procedures are so difficult for people to deal with. For 
example if you want to rebuild your house you will have to pass through 
many [Afghan]government departments and keep giving them bribes to get 
permission for rebuilding your own house” (P3).  
Respondent (P1) revealed that “delays in the release of construction materials 
due to the high corruption in large government departments, such as the customs 
office, negatively impacted on reconstruction efforts”. Many respondents argued that 
the weak governance structure and high level of corruption in the Afghan 
government had also opened up ways for the establishment of many corrupt NGOs 
and private contractors. Their only aim was to make a profit out of international aid 
rather than providing humanitarian assistance. Highlighting further the negative 
impact of weak governance on the process of reconstruction in Afghanistan, one 
respondent in particular blamed the Afghan government for failing to support good 
standards:  
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 “The present [Afghan] government and the government like the present one 
are not only unable to tackle corruption but are contributing to its 
growth”(P9).  
Respondents (P1, P3, P4, P7, and P8) concluded that weak governance 
structure, resulting from the huge capacity gap and the endemic corruption in the 
current Afghan government, has cut off a large proportion of the Afghan population 
from the government, and has severely damaged people’s trust and community 
morale.  
Control and Coordination 
“I think sometimes government can be a bit heavy handed. They can say this is 
how it is going to be, and I think that is not really based on a community. They 
can be very top-down. There is no community process in it. There is no 
community involvement. They have not asked their opinion” (P14). 
Evidence from the data gathered in the research suggests that governments, 
which overly obsessed with controlling and coordinating reconstruction projects, 
often come up with strategies that are incompatible with the real situation and thus 
fail to address the needs of a larger mass of affected people. Although governments 
might sometimes have legitimate reasons (P14, P11, P3) for dictating what they 
believe to be a better and safer housing solution, the issues with constructability, 
maintainability and whether or not the affected people can really afford to build the 
government-imposed blue print for housing, are rarely given appropriate 
consideration. As one participant stated, in Pakistan after the Kashmir earthquake 
“The government wanted to stipulate the design because they wanted to make sure 
that the designs were earthquake resistant and therefore people wouldn't be affected 
by earthquakes again” (P14). The design, however, was not thought through, 
because it was unrealistically expensive for many communities who lived in remote 
and inaccessible places.  
Interviewees argued that having the right and meaningful coordination is an 
essential enabler of successful reconstruction, but when it is done badly and the 
government just wants control, it blocks humanitarian assistance from reaching 
affected people. “I remember, even in Afghanistan, I remember the number of times 
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the Mayor shut down our projects” (P11). Respondents expressed concerns that the 
current “excessively centralised and bureaucratic” (P3) government mechanism in 
Afghanistan was actually the main reason for the many problems that currently 
existed in many reconstruction projects. The respondents stated that in the majority 
of cases, decisions were made by the central government, giving no opportunity to 
the provincial authorities to have their feedback. One of the biggest challenges in 
Afghanistan as described by (P8) was that “everything had to be done through the 
central government” leaving the local authority without sufficient power to influence 
reconstruction. This statement was confirmed by (P9) who also stated, “Local 
governors do not have the authority to let out even a little piece of land to an NGO 
without the permission from the central government”. Respondent (P8) reported that 
in the event of local authorities being asked for approval for reconstruction projects, 
it took many months before a response was given to the applicants.  
Relocation 
“Because of the lack of land, quite often [Affected communities] get allocated a 
piece of land way away from where the community originally lived and then you 
are completely destroying the whole social network” (P11).  
Relocation, whether for a good cause or “an excuse to clear poor 
communities” (P11) was generally perceived by the respondents to have immediate 
as well as long term negative impacts on the affected communities. In the aftermath 
of major disasters “because of the lack of land” (P11) affected communities were 
very often relocated miles away from their original places, to plots of land with 
limited or no access to sources of livelihood, education and health services.  In the 
majority of cases after a disaster, people were just so desperate and traumatised 
(P13) that they had to accept whatever was given to them by the government. 
Participants explained that in such situations, the government did not always attempt 
to explain “why it [relocation] was important and what alternative sources of 
livelihood were provided” (P14). In other cases as stated by (P10), the Afghan 
government allowed NGOs and the affected people to build houses on privately 
owned land plots, causing enormous tension in the community. This was affirmed by 
(P12) who described a similar situation: 
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“People build houses on land and that land is owned by somebody else and 
so at the end of that rebuilding process the local land owner says, “Well,  I 
want half of your houses now because I owned that land and I wasn't going 
to tell you that” (P12).  
Interestingly enough, in one particular location in Afghanistan, as reported by 
(P10), the Afghan government in cooperation with the UN built houses near a 
military base that was occasionally attacked by the insurgents: “It was positioned 
very badly in relation to the barracks. We knew that the situation was not stable and 
the military barracks were hit from time to time”. Respondents generally agreed that 
relocation creates more problems because very often the basic needs of the affected 
communities are not fully incorporated when relocation is planned.  
5.3.5 Lack of Adequate Security 
Generally all respondents stated that having adequate security was vital for 
the immediate reconstruction as well as the long-term strategic development of the 
affected communities, and that the lack of it actually threatened reconstruction 
projects at all levels. Data revealed that war in the country, regional conflicts 
between rival groups, the presence of illegal armed militia and warlords, threats to 
NGO personnel and assets and the presence of land mines were all considered to be 
elements of insecurity that negatively affected reconstruction efforts (P1, P3, P5). 
 Although the majority of respondents said that lack of adequate security 
negatively affected community participation, interestingly enough, one participant 
(P13) stated that the lack of security actually provided an opportunity for the affected 
people to have greater participation in rebuilding their houses because the NGOs 
were unable to access the affected area. “I think in some ways it [lack of security] 
could have a positive impact and that the local community have to participate 
because it is harder for external people to gain access to those communities” (P13).   
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Uncertain Security Situation or Fragile Peace 
According to some respondents, in security situations of great uncertainty 
neither the NGOs nor the affected people could function effectively because they did 
not know whether it was safe to return and work in the affected area and if the houses 
they were going to rebuild would “be taken over or destroyed again” (P11).  
It was reported that NGOs faced immense difficulties when delivering aid to 
the affected returnees in areas with poor security. Reporting on one particular 
situation in Afghanistan, participant (P10) said: 
  “Lack of security does make a difference - a huge difference. In 2004 where 
we had returnees entering the red zone, nobody could get in, nobody could 
get out and that is where they had their houses”.  
Six respondents (P14, P11, P15, P2, P8, and P9) stated that the protracted 
crises found in some places had made it particularly difficult for many affected 
communities to return to their homes after being displaced for so many years. The 
respondents further explained that when affected communities were asked if they 
wanted to return to their original locations, the first thing they demanded was the 
reassurance that the area was safe. The participants also stated that in a situation of 
unreliable security, not only the affected communities but the NGOs also, felt 
discouraged to undertake any reconstruction project that involved a potential risk to 
the safety of their staff and assets. As one participant stated: “NGOs also don't want 
to go and do construction in a community area where it is insecure “(P14) because 
very often reconstruction projects took a long time to complete and thus they faced 
many security challenges in the less secure areas, particularly when large quantities 
of construction materials were constantly being moved around in big trucks and also 
the project personnel were visiting the project site on a daily basis. The respondents 
indicated that the issue of “confidence for the community” (P14, P11, P15, P9, and 
P2) was a significant decisive factor in terms of the community return to their 
original places, their participation in rebuilding and determining project success in 
the long term. The following two statements relate to this matter: 
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 “I think it [the lack of confidence in security] has a big impact, if people 
don’t believe that it is going to be secured and it is going to last, they will 
not waste their time doing it” (P11).  
“I think it is very, very hard for people to have hope and it is a bit like 
coming back to Kabul after the Taliban were ousted. For the first few years 
nothing much had changed in Kabul, and then suddenly people started 
painting their walls and almost like hope had come, the war is over after 30 
years of having their houses constantly destroyed and finally we [they] think 
we [they] are here now to stay and nothing will happen. In the last few years 
people have stopped looking after their properties again, because they are 
not quite sure what will happen after the foreign forces leave” (P15). 
Risk of Kidnap or Violence against NGOs 
“It has to be an acceptable risk or risk that has been mitigated and if it is not 
acceptable then those people can't work there [be]cause who would they help, 
there is no benefit being a martyr in those situations and that actually can make 
things worse” (P12). 
The risk of being kidnapped or killed was a major concern for those NGOs 
operating in dangerous places. Participants stated that violence against NGO staff 
often resulted in discontinuation of reconstruction projects. Recalling an incident, 
one participant recalled one terrible instance when their team members were 
kidnapped and then killed by the insurgents, permanently stopping the entire activity 
in the affected province.  
“We had a project in Helmand and it was going very well. We also had 
people from the local community working in the project, and when the 
security situation deteriorated; the insurgent kidnapped our teams, and later 
killed three members of our teams. The project was stopped and it never 
started again” (P2).  
Another participant (P10) reported a similar incident in which an INGO lost 
two members of their project team in 2004 and as result the entire project was 
suspended for an indefinite period. Kidnapping and killing of NGO personnel has 
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always had a significant negative impact on NGOs’ performance and morale leading 
to a drastic reduction of project activities or a mass withdrawal of NGOs from the 
affected area. Lately, in another incident “in Dadaab refugee camp, a whole lot of 
people pulled out because of the threats” (P12). According to participants, the risk of 
kidnap on the one hand, and the no-ransom policy (a basis on which many INGOs 
operate) on the other, had made it extremely difficult for NGOs to deliver aid to 
insecure places. One participant stated that because of such threats “NGOs were 
unable to deliver any assistance to places like Kohestanat in Faryab [a province] in 
the north of Afghanistan, when the communities were hit by the disaster” (P3).  
Presence of Land Mines and UXO 
“Often it is not a big problem or difficulty, but it slows down reconstruction 
efforts significantly, because mine clearance cannot be done in a matter of a day 
or two” (P6). 
Land mines and the presence of unexploded ordinance (UXO) were major 
concerns for the affected people in the post-war settings. Many reconstruction 
projects had to wait for mine clearance before they could commence. Participants 
noted that mines and UXO were present all over Afghanistan. They could be found 
near residential areas, in the agricultural fields, irrigation channels and in the 
mountains. 
 One participant (P3) stated that anti personal mines and UXOs threatened the 
life of many communities in the north of Afghanistan and thus people were unable to 
access the vast fertile mountain area that once provided a major livelihood 
opportunity for the affected population. Participants (P1, P2, P3, P5, P6 and P12) 
acknowledged that mines and UXO were some of the major risks with a particular 
impact on project performance and personnel safety.  
5.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a comprehensive analysis of the barriers for 
community participation in reconstruction, explaining the nature of these challenges 
and the ways in which they negatively impacted community participation. Data 
collected in the quantitative phase as reported in Chapter 4 was integrated with the 
data collected and analysed in the qualitative phase (reported in this chapter) and as a 
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result five major factors and their associated constructs that posed real threat for 
community participation were derived.  
The major barriers for community participation being known, and an 
understanding of how these barriers impact community involvements in 
reconstruction projects having been established, the chapter that follows informs the 
ways in which the impact of these barriers can be eliminated or reduced. 
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Chapter 6 
Interview Results – A Logical 
Framework for Community 
Participation 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the previous chapter, interview analyses will be reported on in 
two separate chapters. In Chapter 5 the interview analysis, guided by the problem 
tree structure, confirmed and explained in depth the factors (outlined in Chapter 4) 
hindering community participation. Chapter 5 responded to the second research 
question: How these barriers impact community participation? In this chapter the 
interview analysis will be extended to address the third research question: How can 
the impact of these challenges be eliminated or reduced? Whilst in Chapter 5 the 
Problem Tree Structure (Figure  5-2) was used to organise the root challenges in a 
structure and logically present the “cause and effect” relationship between them, in 
this chapter the Objective Tree Structure (Figure  6-2) will be used to present the 
“means-ends” relationship between objectives.  
The findings from the interview analysis (as reported in Chapter 5) will be 
used as a foundation for developing the Objective Tree, which will subsequently be 
used for developing the “Activity narrative description” in the Logical Framework 
Matrix (LFM). The logical framework matrix is shown in Table  6-1. Figure  6-1 
presents the sequential steps leading to the logical framework matrix development.  
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Figure  6-1: The sequential process of developing Logical Framework Matrix 
To develop the logical framework matrix (Table  6-1), firstly a summary 
description of the activities will be provided in column 1, and then specific 
assumptions will be informed in column 4. These assumptions can relate to external 
or internal factors over which NGOs have no direct control, or may not be able to 
influence at the time when implementing their project. 
Problem tree  
(Casue and effect relationship) 
Objective tree  
(Means - ends relationship) 
Logical Framework Matrix (LFM)  
(Activity narrative) 
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Component 
objectives/intermediate 
results 
End 
Means 
Goal/Impact 
Purpose 
Outputs 
To effectively involve affected community in 
reconstruction 
To enable affected people to participate in 
reconstruction 
To provide livelihood 
opportunities 
 
 The existing skills in 
the community 
identified 
 
 Skill building 
trainings provided 
 
 Local people hired 
 
 Sources of income 
generation restored 
 
To provide Disaster 
Recovery support 
 Level and nature of 
disaster recovery 
support  determined 
  
 Psychological 
support provided 
 
 Immediate financial 
support provided 
 
To encourage project 
ownership in the 
community  
 Reconstruction 
strategy explained 
clearly to the 
affected people 
 
 Community 
contribution 
determined 
 
 NGO’s contribution 
determined 
 
To re-establish 
community structure 
 Affected IDPs 
located 
 
 Meetings with the 
affected people held 
 
 Community level 
needs identified 
 
 Basic infrastructure 
restored 
 
 Figure  6-2: Objective Tree (means-end diagram) 
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Table  6-1: Logical Framework Matrix 
 Activity Description 
 
(1) 
Measurable 
Indicators 
(2) 
Means of 
Verification 
(3) 
Important 
Assumptions 
(4) 
Goal 
Effective community 
participation 
Community is 
involved in all 
phases of 
reconstruction 
“Generic” 
Project documents, 
survey, interviews 
with the affected 
people 
“Generic” 
 
 NGO has 
sufficient 
capacity to 
deliver 
participatory 
reconstruction 
project 
 
 Government 
supports 
reconstruction 
 
 Community 
council allows 
broader 
community 
participation 
 
 There is 
adequate 
security in the 
affected area 
 
Purpose 
Increased community 
capacity to participate 
in reconstruction 
 
Community 
increasingly 
participates in 
reconstruction 
“Generic” 
Project documents 
showing the number 
of affected 
beneficiaries 
participating in 
reconstruction 
“Generic” 
Objective – 1 
Objective – 2 
 
Objective – 3 
Objective – 4 
 Cohesive community 
established 
 
 Sense of project 
ownership in the 
community 
encouraged 
 
 Disaster recovery 
support provided 
 
 Livelihood 
opportunities 
created 
 
Functional 
community council 
exists, community 
has stronger sense 
of project 
ownership,  
community receive 
disaster recovery 
support, community 
has access to 
employment  
“Generic”  
Community meetings, 
project progress 
report, community 
survey, interviews 
with the affected 
members of the 
community  
“Generic” 
Outputs (1.1 - 1.3) 
(Related to objective – 1) 
 
 Affected IDPs 
located 
 Meetings with the 
affected people held 
 Basic infrastructure 
restored 
Community has 
access to basic 
services, community 
has a functional 
community council 
“Generic” 
Videos, pictures and 
surveys showing 
number of community 
members accessing 
basic services, 
minutes of joint 
meetings with 
community council 
“Generic” 
Output (2.1 – 2.3)  
(Related to objective – 2) 
 
 Reconstruction 
strategy explained 
clearly to the 
affected people 
 Community 
contribution 
determined 
 NGO’s contribution 
determined 
 
Community is able 
to make an informed 
decision, community 
is happy to 
participate in 
rebuilding 
(commitment) 
“Generic” 
Contracts between 
sponsor, 
implementing partner 
and the affected 
community 
“Generic” 
Outputs (3.1 – 3.3) 
(Related to objective – 3) 
 
 Level and duration 
of disaster recovery 
support  determined  
 Psychological 
support provided 
 Emergency financial 
support provided 
 
Availability of 
disaster recovery 
support (Value in 
$), affected 
community has high 
morale  
“Generic” 
List of project 
beneficiary and 
distribution 
documents (payslips, 
vouchers etc.) 
“Generic” 
Outputs (4.1 – 4.4) 
(Related to objective – 4) 
 The existing skills in 
the community 
identified 
 Skill building 
training provided 
 Local people hired 
 Sources of income 
generation restored 
 
Availability of 
livelihood 
opportunities 
“Generic” 
Statistics from the 
community 
“Generic” 
Tasks 
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6.2 ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION 
This section will provide a detailed description of the activities to be 
undertaken in order to eliminate, or reduce, the impact of challenges (outlined in 
Chapter 4 and explained in Chapter 5) for community participation in post-disaster 
reconstruction projects (see column 1 Table  6-1).  
6.2.1 Re-establish Community Structure (Objective – 1) 
Locate Affected People (Output – 1.1) 
To initiate and successfully complete any reconstruction project, the 
interview participants stated that the project needs to begin with finding the affected 
people (P11, P4, and P5). The respondents also argued that to be successful in 
finding out where the affected people have been displaced to, it was important for the 
NGOs to have an “ongoing relationship with the affected communities” (P11, P12) 
and be in contact “with the UN agencies such as the UNHCR” (P5) who often keep a 
good record of the IDPs. According to respondents, NGOs implementing 
reconstruction projects need to be able to repatriate a whole mass of the affected 
population back to their original ‘home’ location rather than just moving a handful of 
families. The respondents stated that, normally, the affected people would set up 
their temporary accommodation in locations where the actual reconstruction is 
planned to happen, or is happening or at least in close proximity to their destroyed 
communities. One respondent stated that the first thing they actually did in their 
project was: 
 “To find out where the community people had gone. We were able to easily 
find out where they had been relocated. Most of them had relocated in the 
nearest villages around Lashkargah [the provincial capital of Helmand 
province, Afghanistan]” (P5).  
Participant (P11) stated that based on her experience in Haiti as well as in the 
Balkans the affected population had chosen to live on site in tents to stay close to 
their original home locations. In many cases affected people lived close to their 
original places to be able to access their only source of livelihood such as the land or 
sea. The statement made by (P11) was also confirmed by (P13) who reported: “The 
ones I have been working with wanted to go back to their home earlier. Yes they had 
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a very traumatic experience, but that is their livelihood.” Generally, all participants 
agreed that any meaningful reconstruction process must always attempt to locate the 
affected people and involve a greater mass of them in community needs assessment. 
Many respondents reported that, when it was possible to return, affected people 
almost always wanted to come back to their communities and rebuild their houses.  
Meet with the Affected People (Output – 1.2) 
“I want to say again that people are very committed if you sit with them, talk with 
them and propose a way out to the problem. Together you can find a solution, 
provided you let them participate” (P6). 
Respondents acknowledged that, for planning successful reconstruction 
projects, it was of utmost importance when meeting with the affected people and 
listening to them to “assume that those worst affected are the true holders of 
knowledge and wisdom” (P12). Respondents remarked that, regardless of the scale of 
a disaster, affected people are definitely the first who respond to the impact of the 
disaster, and the role of aid agencies is to support what the communities have already 
initiated. The respondents stressed that the NGOs should not consider the affected 
people just as being ‘hopeless victims’ but work together with them, support and 
empower them, because ultimately they are the ones who determine their future and 
the success of reconstruction efforts (P1, P6. P12, P14). The majority of the 
respondents stated that meeting with the affected people is crucial and it is an 
opportunity for the implementing organisation to explain their objectives to the 
affected people and, together with them, identify their immediate and long term 
strategic needs (P1, P2, P3, P5, P6, P12, P14, and P15). As commented by one 
respondent: “Any good assessment starts to build a sense of ownership by 
communities and also inclusivity and the connectedness with those seeking to own 
the programmes” (P12). 
As described by (P2), in order to understand the core challenges that affected 
people faced while attempting to return to their home place in the Helmand province 
of Afghanistan, the UN in coordination with the implementing NGOs and the 
provincial government, had to find and meet with the community. Respondent (P7) 
stated that meeting with the affected people in Hesarak district of Afghanistan 
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provided them with an important opportunity to gather vital information from the 
affected people based on which they actually prioritised their project activities. The 
same participant stated that after meeting with the local people, it was determined 
that a de-mining project (removal of existing unexploded mines) needed to be 
implemented before the actual reconstruction work could begin (P7). Although 
meeting with the affected people was essential for planning reconstruction projects, 
the respondents stated that NGOs must refrain from making unrealistic promises 
when they meet with the affected people. As stated by (P8), NGOs should try to 
espouse a communication strategy that can encourage participation from the wider 
affected community and support project success in each phase of the reconstruction 
lifecycle. One respondent who had served as the chief of a district, a member of the 
provincial council and the director of an INGO, firmly stated that:  
“Affected people are humans as we are and if we can show them kindness as 
well as our support and use appropriate language, I strongly believe that 
they’d diffidently listen to you and participate in reconstruction” (P9).   
Restore Basic Infrastructure and Services (Output – 1.3) 
“A reconstruction project is never complete and successful if equal consideration is 
not given to the restoration of other social elements” (P4). 
Reconstruction of basic infrastructure such as access roads, water supply and 
sanitation, and restoration of fundamental services such as medical services and 
medical supplies as well as access to education were acknowledged by a large 
number of respondents as being the critical success factors for rebuilding of 
sustainable permanent housing (P1, P2. P3, P4, P5, P7, P9, P10, P11, P15). The 
respondents stated that housing reconstruction must always be done alongside 
restoration of basic infrastructure and essential services. Shelter projects that are 
planned and implemented alongside other community development programs are: 
“more likely to be successful because if you provide somebody a means for 
living and somewhere for their kids to go to school and health, they are more 
likely to want to either go back or wherever you want to locate them” (P11). 
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The statement above was supported by another participant who argued that, 
“The infrastructure needs to be there. You are talking about relocating families, so 
children have to have access to school” (P13). Both participants further suggested 
that reconstruction was not just about building houses but it was about rebuilding the 
affected community.  
“I think we’d be very cautious about doing shelter only projects unless we 
are aware there were other NGOs meeting the other needs of the community 
as well”(P13). 
 (P13) reported that in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, 
their reconstruction projects also included rebuilding community halls which were 
used for different purposes by the communities.  
Data from the interviews strongly suggests that in almost all locations, 
housing reconstruction projects need to be supplemented by the rebuilding of basic 
infrastructure and the provision of other services in order to be successful. One 
respondent who had many years of experience working with the refugees stated that, 
in an African country, “affected refugees did not want to go back to their original 
places mainly due to the lack of basic services such as access to potable water and 
education for their children” (P14). The respondent reported that one particular 
approach that the NGOs adopted to encourage the affected refugees return to their 
villages was to attempt to restore some services in order to make the situation more 
suitable for a long-lasting return. The interview analysis revealed that in situations 
where affected people were displaced, bringing them back to their original location 
was all about negotiating and agreeing to acceptable terms and conditions around the 
return. In such situations, as described by (P14):  
“It is almost a negotiation, that if you are willing to consider going back, 
then we are willing to consider investing resources in rebuilding a school, 
rebuilding... you know, supporting you in rebuilding houses, putting in water 
systems and that sort of thing”.  
It was further revealed that in the majority of cases, the affected people did 
not choose to return their original locations unless certain services were available in 
the community. All participants concluded that NGOs must be cautious because 
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merely rebuilding housing whether in situ or in a different location will not 
necessarily lead to project success if other essential elements that are required to 
address functional difficulties in the affected community are neglected. (Table 31) 
6.2.2 Encourage Sense of Project Ownership (Objective – 2) 
Clearly Explain Reconstruction Plan (Output – 2.1) 
“Any meaningful reconstruction project will need to have both the reconstruction 
elements as well as the community awareness programme” (P6). 
Holistically communicating project specific objectives and the reconstruction 
strategy in a clear and easily understandable way enables affected people to make an 
informed decision when agreeing what can affect their future life. It was imperative 
for the NGOs to clearly explain the scope of the project to the affected beneficiaries 
and to inform them of the essential safety features so that they didn’t compromise 
these features when extending their properties (P13).  
The interview analysis revealed that in fact it was the morale duty of the 
NGOs to clearly inform the affected people about the reconstruction plan and explain 
how the project would benefit them in the immediate as well as the longer term (P3, 
P4, P6, P7, P8, and P9). As stated by (P6), “Any meaningful reconstruction project 
will need to have both the reconstruction elements as well as the community 
awareness programme”. At least three respondents (P5, P6 and P7) provided 
evidence that reconstruction projects required greater support from the affected 
communities to be successful, and that such support was only offered by community 
people when they had a clear understanding of the project objectives, and there was a 
sense of project ownership in the community. One respondent (P7) gave an 
interesting example of a situation in which their agency was able to turn a rather 
demoralised affected community into a staunch supporter of their project. The 
respondent reported that the affected beneficiaries offered them transport and 
security support when they understood the project deliverables and realised the long 
term benefits of the project for the affected community. The respondent described:  
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“When people understood the importance of the project and that every 
member of the community would equally benefit, they showed great 
enthusiasm and readiness to support the project in all possible ways” (P7).  
Determine Community Contribution (Output – 2.2) 
“NGOs should never attempt to provide any assistance that the affected community 
can provide for themselves” (P9). 
Project ownership and a sense of responsibility in the affected communities 
are strong determining success factors in any reconstruction project. The interview 
analysis provided strong evidence that reconstruction projects could only be 
delivered successfully if they are implemented with the participation of a significant 
proportion of the affected people: “Projects that have people's contribution last 
longer because people don’t take the aid for granted and they take great care of the 
houses even long after the houses have been handed over them”.  
Six respondents (P4, P6, P9, P10, P11 and P12) argued that reconstruction 
projects implemented for, or on behalf of, the affected population, without their 
involvement, do not always stand a good chance of success. All participants 
collectively agreed that NGOs should never do any reconstruction work without 
some form of community participation. The interview participants argued that, in the 
light of the severity of the disaster (P4) and based on the damage inflicted on the 
community, the implementing agencies must make sure that an appropriate level of 
contribution from the affected population is determined and agreed on before the 
project can go ahead. According to the respondents, in the worst case scenario the 
majority of affected people can at least contribute with their time and man-power 
(P15, P6) and thus NGOs should never attempt to deliver an absolutely free aid (P9). 
Participant (P15) stated that:  
“If people have nothing else to contribute they always have got time to 
contribute and man-power. We can provide training, that is easy... but I 
think their contribution at the minimum has to be time and people”.  
Furthermore, it was declared that affected people should be involved in order 
to apply their own unique building techniques when rebuilding their houses. This 
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provides them with the opportunity to improve their techniques through acquiring 
new knowledge about contemporary building methods from the implementing 
partner organisation. One respondent noted that involving affected people in 
reconstruction was “also an important skill building exercise that enabled them to 
replicate their houses” (P14), and pass on the acquired knowledge and skills to their 
children.  
Determine NGO’s Role and Contribution in the Reconstruction (Output 
2.3) 
 “It was such an experience! When we involved people in clearing their own 
community of land mines, they worked with great enthusiasm. We didn't only achieve 
the objectives of the project, but also left behind a greatly empowered community” 
(P2). 
Findings suggested that affected communities themselves are always the first 
to respond to the impact of the disaster and they can emerge from the disaster even 
without the external assistance. The interview participants repeatedly stated that 
NGOs and other aid organisations come along later to provide, where they can, 
additional support to expedite recovery and reconstruction. One respondent observed 
that: 
“People were up and running pretty quickly in terms of opening markets and 
something to produce, because people need to earn money and people need 
to eat, and that was even on day two [after the Haiti earthquake in 2012], 
and so people are getting on with their life and recovering and doing the 
best they can in a really terrible situation” (P12).  
Interviewees asserted that NGOs should really be open, and clearly tell the 
affected people “the level of their organisational and technical capacity” (P13, P6, 
P13) and how much they can help them with rebuilding their houses. As stated by 
(P12), “The role of good agency is to support and empower, not to provide and to 
take away participation,” and they should never attempt to assume the roles and 
responsibilities of the affected communities when implementing reconstruction 
projects. One of the interview participants (P4) explained that the houses built with 
the support of an INGO in Tezin, Afghanistan, in 1998 were fully occupied even 
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now [2012], mainly because the project was designed with an intention to support the 
strong sense of project ownership and commitment for participation that already 
existed in the affected community. The role of the implementing NGO was limited to 
providing construction materials and giving specialist housing engineering advice 
(when required), while the affected beneficiaries implemented and managed the 
actual rebuilding process. The participants reported, “It was a participatory project. 
The construction materials were given by the NGO and the beneficiaries’ 
contribution was to rebuild their houses. It was a successful project.”(P4).  
6.2.3 Provide Disaster Recovery Support (Objective – 3) 
Level and Duration of Recovery Support (Output – 3.1) 
The analysis of the interviews revealed that provision of welfare assistance 
and a counselling service was an important initial step for encouraging affected 
people, particularly those who had been displaced for quite a long time, to return to 
their home communities. At least three respondents (P6, P8 and P10) stated that a 
successful post-disaster reconstruction project needs to consider and determine the 
kind, and level of, initial pre-reconstruction aid required to support a successful 
return of the affected people.   
Psychological Support (Output – 3.2) 
Respondents stated that when disasters happen, social and physiological 
consequences follow, that often damages people’s ability to continue with their 
normal life.  The analysis revealed that critical events such as loss of family 
members, loss of community cohesion and loss of self-confidence, severely 
undermined the ability of people to participate in rebuilding their communities (P1, 
P3, P4, P6, P7, P13) and thus, besides the actual housing reconstruction, a post-
disaster reconstruction project must also include psychological support elements to 
boost community morale. This can be seen from the following remarks:   
“A reconstruction project should firstly aim at providing mental support, 
counselling to the affected people to bring them out of the shock of the 
disaster, and then aim at rebuilding the community not just the houses”(P1). 
Chapter 6 – Interview Results – A Logical Framework for Community Participation 
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 173 
“It is clear that it [disaster] does impact participation in reconstruction. 
From the point of view of psychology, there is a need for consoling first of 
all. The project needs to encourage affected people to participate in 
reconstruction” (P3).  
In an interesting statement, one respondent (P2) said that community was like 
a large family and when it is devastated by an event, the senior of the family would 
do everything to mentally support other members to overcome the situation. The 
respondent stated, “Such a situation has a huge negative impact on community 
morale. There is definitely a need for encouragement, be it external aid or local 
government. Community is like a large family and when a problem occurs in a 
family, the father or the elder of the family will try to give mental support to other 
members and it has a huge positive impact on the family morale” (P2). The role of 
religious leaders and community elders was perceived to be crucial in helping 
affected people cope with the shock of a disaster. The role and significance of 
involving elders and religious people was acknowledged in the statement made by 
(P7):  
“Disasters affect community morale and their [people] ability. I think, in 
such a situation, beside the urgent assistance that is needed for the 
community, the role of religious people can also be significant, to encourage 
people and to boost their morale” (P7).  
Immediate Financial Support (Output – 3.3) 
Data revealed that psychological support can be most effective when it is 
supplemented with a suitable cash grant and aid package (tents, kitchen sets, sleeping 
mats, mosquito nets and blankets) and if needed, to cover the cost  of moving people 
back to their original home places. At least one participant stated that often people 
did not return to their original locations because they did not have adequate resources 
to continue a normal life. This is evident in the statement provided below: 
“The only reason why people leave their home place and their community is 
the lack of adequate resources to return their life to the basic standard they 
had before the disaster” (P6). 
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The above statement was confirmed by (P10) who stated that affected people 
needed emergency assistance to be able to survive through the reconstruction period:  
“The community needs these [Small grants] and, at the end of the day, it is about 
survival”. A similar statement from another respondent provided evidence that 
emergency aid did play a significant role in helping affected people participate in 
rebuilding their houses. The participant asserted that, “NGOs need to initiate some 
sort of emergency aid to the community to bring them back to their location” (P8). 
Respondents concluded that NGOs need to conduct a thorough study of the 
prevailing situation in the affected area, identify factors affecting community 
participation and, in line with that, propose necessary support measures when 
designing their project proposals.    
“It is important to have a survey of the affected area to determine the 
challenges. Based on the situation on the ground, NGOs need to decide 
whether to hire people from the local community or give them an incentive in 
other forms such as food for work” (P7).  
6.2.4 Provide Livelihood Opportunities (Objective – 4) 
“People need more than just a house” (P15). 
The interview analysis strongly suggested that the approach of “building only 
housing” (P4, P7), was not always a successful permanent solution and response 
neither to successful in situ housing reconstruction nor to resettlement elsewhere. 
Respondents argued that, in addition to a place to live in, people also needed a 
regular income and access to a reliable source of livelihood to continue with their 
life. As stated by (P3), “People don't always need just a house; they also need 
regular income to feed their families.” This statement was then verified by (P7) who 
argued that people will not be encouraged by, “just rebuilding only the houses”.  
The interview analysis also revealed the following steps need to be taken to 
provide a solution for the livelihood needs of the affected people: 
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Identify the Existing Skills in the Community (Output – 4.1) 
I think it is really important for NGOs to identify what skills and abilities are already 
there in the communities, because there are a lot of communities where people have 
built their own houses, and know perfectly how to do it, and they’ve got indigenous 
knowledge about what is appropriate for their situation (P11). 
Analysis of interviews provided a strong indication that acquiring project 
staff from the local area was much more cost effective than bringing labourers from 
outside. Respondents indicated that in the aftermath of a large-scale disaster, “due to 
the enormity of reconstruction” (P13), there is often a huge demand for skilled 
labourers, who may not always be available in the affected area. As one participant 
stated, “It is not always possible to find all the needed skills in the affected 
community” (P1), but there are definitely some skills that need to be identified (P15, 
P11). Data suggested that identifying the existing capacity in the affected community 
should actually be an integral part of the project design and planning process. This is 
evident in the statement given by (P10):   
“Knowing what capacity exists in the community is part of the analysis in 
the way they design their project. If they design a project, and if they have 
not assessed the capacities of the community then maybe they are in 
trouble.” 
Evidence suggests that identifying skilled members in the community and 
engaging them in reconstruction can serve two primary purposes: firstly, it provides a 
livelihood and income generation opportunity for the skilled members encouraging 
them to remain in the affected community and, secondly, most importantly, skilled 
members can help in mentoring, thus building the skills and capacity of other 
community members.  
One respondent, who worked for a large-scale housing reconstruction project 
after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, reported that many members of the fishing 
communities did not want to continue with fishing due to the fear created by the 
tsunami and instead wanted to learn new skills in housing construction (P13). As 
quoted by the same respondent, one member of the affected fishing community 
stated: “We don't want to go back to fishing. We feel scared, and we want to find a 
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new way to earn our living”. The participant further explained that, in cases when 
the demand for skilled labourers could not be met locally, external contractors were 
contracted through a tender process, and part of the subsequent contractual 
agreement was that they hire and train a certain number of local people.  
Another respondent reported that in the aftermath of the Kashmir earthquake 
in 2005, most of the required training was provided by local craftsmen who would 
train local community members how to build individual sections of a house.  The 
respondent described: “We did most of that [training] through kind of master 
builders, so we used craftsmen in that area” (P14). 
Generally all respondents agreed that employing local craftsmen is in fact cost 
effective and an appropriate approach to transferring indigenous knowledge and 
skills to other members of the community.  
Skill Building Training (Output – 4.2) 
“If you really want to bring people back then you have to give them the whole 
package. You have to do skills training. You have to help them build more resistant 
houses. You have to give them proper water and food... and, in fact, you have to 
build that with them and you have to give people different skills” (P15).  
The interview analysis revealed that, once the skills needed have been 
identified, the next step was to formulate a strategy for providing skill building 
training to members of the wider affected community to rebuild their own houses. As 
described by (P1), one such strategy could be that, “The NGO provide a short 
vocational training program to meet the immediate demand.” Many respondents 
stated that giving training to the affected people was essential for many reasons. 
Firstly, it empowers the affected people to effectively participate in rebuilding their 
houses; secondly, it enhances people’s ability to obtain new employment and finally, 
it strengthens the existing capacity in the affected community. Data indicated that in 
the aftermath of a major disaster, monitoring and controlling large-scale 
reconstruction projects are often very problematic due to the shortage of project staff. 
Many respondents argued that in such cases, it was crucial to train members of the 
affected community in the basics of reconstruction and essentials of effective 
monitoring of the rebuilding process. This is evident in the statement below:  
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“In Aceh where it [reconstruction] was done through a direct response, it 
was a case of helping the house owners know what the contractor should be 
doing... to have an eye on key elements, because you [project staff] cannot 
be everywhere monitoring all the time” (P11).  
The above statement was confirmed by (P9) who stated that, “The 
government cannot visit the project every day, so you [affected people] need to learn 
and acquire the skill to enable you to monitor the process of rebuilding your own 
house”. The important role that affected people can play in monitoring of 
reconstruction processes was also confirmed by another respondent, “It is very 
important that the householders observe the reconstruction process, even if they are 
not directly involved (P13)”. Respondents (P1, P9, P8, and P15) acknowledged that 
providing skill building training was crucial for achieving the immediate, as well as 
the long term, objectives of any well planned reconstruction project. Data revealed 
that members of the affected communities often needed access to training and 
education to improve their potential for employment in other sectors when their only 
means of livelihood was destroyed by the disaster. Many participants stated that 
skill-building initiatives should be planned in a way that can serve as an alternative 
means of income generation, and support community resilience and the ability to 
withstand future disasters. 
“Anything that we build can be broken, especially in the war situation... but 
any knowledge that we put in someone's head can't be taken away really” 
(P15 quoting a colleague). 
There was general consensus among the respondents that training is an 
integral part of the reconstruction and should be designed in line with the needs of 
the affected communities.  
Hire Local People (Output – 4.3) 
The data from interviews indicates that maintaining a minimum standard of 
living during the implementation of a reconstruction project is important for the 
affected community to effectively participate in rebuilding their houses. That data 
also revealed that the affected beneficiaries will need to have access to a source of 
regular income to provide for their families while rebuilding their houses. 
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Respondents argued that NGOs should give priority to hiring skilled labourers from 
the affected community and thus boost the local economy. Data showed that 
although any form of incentive “Cash or food for work” (P15), must generally be 
discouraged in rebuilding private dwellings, ‘special consideration’ on a case by case 
basis, needs to be given to the  most disadvantaged members of the affected 
community, such as widows with children, people with a disability and aged 
members. For example, (P10) reported that they paid daily wages to those families 
within the affected community who had absolutely no other means of survival. A 
similar approach was adopted by another NGO: 
 “We have had projects where we would provide 60% percent of the 
assistance and pay the daily wages to the disadvantaged affected families for 
rebuilding their houses” (P3). 
 Even though several respondents viewed incentives or hardship allowances 
as being a positive supporting measure (P10, P4, P8, P13), at least two respondents 
stated that such assistance did not ensure project success in the longer run (P9 and 
P15).  
Restore Sources of Income Generation (Output 4.4) 
The interview data strongly indicates that reconstruction projects focusing on 
the rebuilding of housing only, without putting in effort to restore or provide 
alternative sources of sustainable income for the affected communities, could run the 
risk of failure. Respondents stated that reconstruction projects are often more 
successful when they are implemented alongside a livelihood programme. One 
respondent stated, “One of the key things is the availability of a livelihood option” 
(P11). The participant added, “I think... where you work... where you do shelter 
projects, and you do it alongside a livelihood program, is much more likely to be 
successful, because you provide somebody a means for living” (P11). Another 
participant reported that, in the aftermath of the Port Au Prince earthquake in 2010, 
people were more concerned about restoring their sources of livelihood than the 
houses, because they needed money and food to eat. He states: 
Chapter 6 – Interview Results – A Logical Framework for Community Participation 
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 179 
 “After the earthquake, people were up and running pretty quickly in terms of 
opening markets and something to produce, because people need to earn 
money and people need to eat” (P12).  
Two respondents (P3 and P7) also confirmed that the livelihood issue was 
particularly important and must be seriously considered when planning 
reconstruction projects.  
“a difficult economic situation, the livelihood issue is of utmost importance 
and I think reconstruction projects have to respond to the community need 
for housing as well as livelihood” (P3). 
This was further confirmed by (P7) who asserted that: 
 “Rebuilding houses only, is not the only reason for people's encouragement. 
We have witnessed that people often return to places where there are other 
services, such as health, water, school and some sort of livelihood there”.  
On the whole, many respondents acknowledged that rebuilding the entire life 
of any community is an enormous task that often requires a coordinated response by 
multiple NGOs. Data revealed that NGOs working in isolation, with the focus on 
rebuilding housing, may not produce desirable outcomes if the livelihood needs of 
the affected communities are not met.  
6.3  IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS (CONDITIONS) 
This section will identify and provide the analysis of the internal (NGO’s 
input) and external conditions and assumptions based on the various stakeholders 
involved in the reconstruction process (see column 4 Table  6-1). These (both internal 
and external) assumptions need to be satisfied in order to allow progress to the next 
level in the work description column in logical framework matrix. The relationship 
between assumptions and the hierarchy of objectives are demonstrated in Figure  6-3.  
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The (+) sign indicates that these assumptions need to be met in order to 
progress to the next higher level of objectives.   
6.3.1 NGO Has Sufficient Capacity to Deliver Reconstruction Project 
(Assumption – 1) 
Major disasters cause widespread destruction of properties, requiring a rapid 
and well-coordinated response by various actors to bring the affected community 
back to normality. Data suggests that major disasters often attract a wide range of 
NGOs seeking to engage in delivering various emergency services to the affected 
population. As one respondent reported: “After the collapse of the Taliban, NGOs 
flooded to Afghanistan and many more were created locally” (P2). NGOs 
responding to the emergency can be international or local, long established with 
many years progressive experience in reconstruction or newly created because the 
funding bodies are seeking to speedily disburse the, often huge, amount of funding 
allocated for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction.  
“We would only form new partnerships with organisations if, with the major 
disasters, we had quite a lot of funding and we didn't have enough partners” 
(P14). 
Goal 
Assumptions Purpose 
Assumptions Objectives 
Outputs Assumptions 
Figure  6-3: Relationships between objectives and assumptions - the vertical logic 
(Adopted from AusAid 2003) 
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NGOs vary both in their technical capacity and organisational competence. 
Whilst NGOs with sufficient capacity can play a crucial role in post-disaster 
reconstruction (P9), NGOs without the required capacity are likely to produce 
undesirable outcomes for the simple reason that, “They don't know what to do or they 
might not care if they are a corrupt organisation” (P12).  
Generally, when asked  whether NGOs without adequate operational capacity 
and managerial competence could do anything to develop their capacity, respondents 
said that it was extremely difficult for such NGOs to develop their capacity at the 
same time that they are implementing, or setting up a project to implement (P2, P4, 
P10, P12, P14). 
 The respondents stated that NGOs with insufficient capacity are less likely to 
satisfy the requirements of a large scale reconstruction project, therefore donors 
should work closely with them to ensure proper management of project funding and, 
“encourage them to network and recognise their strengths and their experience and 
not try do projects that they have never experienced or lack technical knowledge of” 
(P13). Seven respondents (P1, P3, P4, P5, P7, P10, and P13), suggested that project 
proposals submitted by NGOs with no proven capability should not be considered for 
funding. One respondent specifically stated that international donor organisations 
who are already working in the area need to consider building local partnerships 
ahead of major disasters and building the capacity of those local NGOs they choose 
to partner with (P13). This statement was confirmed by another respondent who 
stated: “We have ongoing partners, so in that countries in which we work we have 
partnerships that [are] kind of long term, which means that we already know our 
partners, so when a disaster happens then they would be the first people that we talk 
to” (P14). 
Donors’ Role  
“We wouldn’t really work with organisations that weren’t interested in community 
participation because obviously it is something we just feel is absolutely fundamental 
for what we are doing.” (P14). 
The role of donors in reconstruction projects is fundamental to successful 
implementation (P1, P3, P4, P9, and P10). Analysis of interviews revealed that 
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donors can play a crucial role in reconstruction by making sure that the NGO’s 
capacity was critically appraised and funding was given only to those NGOs who had 
the required technical knowledge, resources and experience in working with 
communities. Data indicated that, due to widespread corruption in some 
governments, NGOs can bypass government systems when obtaining registration 
(P13) and so it is up to the donors to ensure that the NGOs they consider partnering 
with do have the required capacity (P3). At least one respondent stated that many 
NGOs were able to gain registration with the government of Afghanistan due to the 
prevailing corruption in the government offices.  
Unfortunately, due to the lack of a rigorous accreditation and registration 
process in Afghanistan, many incompetent NGOs have been listed as active 
organisations in the government register (P4).  
Data also revealed that, in some cases, due to their lack of adequate 
operational capacity, donors solely relied on the information presented to them by the 
NGOs when considering their project proposal for funding. Respondent (P4) further 
explained that “donor agencies should not rely only on what NGOs write in their 
proposal. It is crucial to determine whether the NGO actually has the required 
technical capacity by visiting them in the field”.  
Two participants (P1 and P7) reported that donor organisations were not 
particularly immune from corruption and that some of their employees, particularly 
at the regional level, were definitely corrupt. Here is what one of the respondents 
said: 
“Donors must also have the required capacity to effectively and rigorously 
supervise and monitor reconstruction projects. There is also a degree of 
corruption in some donor agencies and they, too, have low competency” 
(P1).  
6.3.2 Government Supports Community Participation (Assumption – 2) 
“I think government policies should be a positive thing, if they get it right. But it can 
be a real blockage, and I think it is usually above and beyond the control of 
communities themselves” (P11). 
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The interviews brought to light that governments varied in terms of their 
support and commitment for reconstruction. While good and well-organised 
governments had fundamental interests in promoting strong community involvement 
in rebuilding communities, those having no real interest in the plight of their people 
obstructed reconstruction. The following remark illustrates this: 
“I think they [People of Myanmar] have a huge level of mistrust of the 
government and that probably the NGOs were seen as being more on their 
side than the government. So it is a difficult line for the NGOs to trade 
because obviously they need the government permission in order to 
implement their projects. In other areas, it has not been so much of an issue. 
The governments have generally been quite supportive and they have come 
with reasonable policies” (P13).  
Some respondents commented that regardless of the government position, “It 
is really important that people can interact with the local government as positively 
and constructively as possible” (P11). Evidence supports the fact that government 
policies are considered important because they provide a structured approach and 
guidance for reconstruction. Governments also play a crucial role in coordinating 
reconstruction efforts among implementing agencies and donors because NGOs 
rarely coordinate among themselves, particularly when they compete for a place in 
the reconstruction or race to obtain resources. This is evident in the following 
statement: 
“I think a lot of the NGOs are arrogant enough to ignore government 
policies. I am not saying that I think that is right, I am just saying I have 
seen lots of people who just do their own thing” (P11).     
However, NGOs may find it difficult to implement their projects if the host 
government is not overly supportive of reconstruction. For example, in Myanmar, as 
reported by at least two respondents, the government often created a blockage rather 
than assisting certain affected communities with reconstruction, “In some contexts it 
has been said that the government didn't particularly like a particular group so 
therefore didn't particularly want to see aid going to that group” (P13).  
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According to respondents, it was imperative to make sure the host 
government agreed to support reconstruction throughout its entire lifecycle before 
the actual work can begin. Most respondents stated that NGOs needed to understand 
the government policies and align their practices accordingly. This assumption can 
only be realised through working and cooperating closely with the host government. 
Any attempt to ignore the government authorities, whether on central or local level, 
can damage the delicate relationship between the government and the implementing 
NGO. The head of one of the UN offices in Afghanistan commented: “NGOs that do 
not communicate with the government can bring about serious harm to their 
projects” (P5). This statement was affirmed by another respondent who stated that: 
 “You are not going to get anywhere if you don’t try and work with and 
influence people [government officials], the key thing is about building 
relationships” (P 9).  
Work within the Government Structure 
“It is about facilitating the voice of the communities so make sure there are 
structures through which the community voice can be heard” (P14) 
NGOs must have a good idea and understanding of the government’s current 
polices, to be able to operate successfully in the disaster area. As has been revealed 
earlier, NGOs need to work within a structure or operational framework agreed by 
the host government, to be able to function effectively and produce lasting outcomes 
(P8). At least one participant (P12) asserted that “adopting government structures” 
was imperative. Supporting this statement, another participant (P8) acknowledged 
that “NGOs will not be able to work independently of the government or ignore its 
policies” (P8). 
Large reconstruction projects require a well equipped control and 
coordination government authority in the affected host country, which might be 
lacking or obliterated by the disaster. At least four respondents (P12, P14, P5, and 
P8) indicated that NGOs perform better if they work through the government 
structure. Respondent (P14) stated that a functional government structure was 
necessary, because it provided a means of communication between the affected 
population and government. NGOs can be more successful in their role to facilitate 
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“the voice of the affected communities” (P14) through a proper government structure 
that may already be in place, or is urgently developed in the wake of a disaster. In the 
aftermath of a major disaster NGOs can play an important role in helping local 
governments strengthen their existing mechanisms and organise for a massive 
reconstruction response to the resultant emergency (P14, P5).  
Cooperate With the Government 
“I remember even in Afghanistan, the number of times the Mayor shut down our 
projects, and every time we had to go to the office and had to discuss with him. The 
best is when you actually influence and help them to govern better. The worst is at 
least getting them to agree not to block what you doing” (P11).  
Analysis of the interviews strongly indicates that NGOs need to work in 
tandem with the host governments, in order to achieve desirable project outcomes. 
Respondents stated that, regardless of the governments’ existing capacity, NGOs are 
required to cooperate with the host governments because they are ultimately 
responsible for the planning and coordination of post-disaster reconstruction, which 
can largely influence NGOs operations. In addition, governments hold the power to 
approve or refuse entry to humanitarian aid to the affected area or halt NGOs’ 
operations. 
“Government can influence whether the community can be part of it or not. 
They can influence projects. I mean the government has a real good stake in 
projects because, that is how it works. All the international community, be it 
the donor, be it the NGO implementing the project, has to have a close link 
with the government or the local authorities” (P10).  
Data indicated that cooperation with the host government was particularly 
important when the host government needed to restore and develop its capacity 
following a major disaster. NGOs can perform better when they have the support of a 
“better, stronger government that is more representative and accountable to its 
people and is able to act accordingly” (P12). This statement was confirmed by 
another respondent (P11), who acknowledged that NGOs needed a good functioning 
government to be able to operate successfully in the host country. The respondent 
(P11) added that the success of reconstruction projects rests very much upon 
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government cooperation, therefore, NGOs wherever possible, need to make 
necessary efforts to support the host government develop its capacity.    
“You need good functioning government and local government. Wherever 
possible, you need to encourage good behaviour there and to support them 
in it, even though you know that in many of these situations it is fairly 
corrupt or doesn’t work. You still need to go through the effort of trying to 
do it and even getting their rubber stamp to at least allow you to do the right 
things” (P11). 
On the whole, cooperation with the host government was perceived to be a 
positive strategy and should be encouraged throughout the whole reconstruction: 
“The Government, NGO and the UN polices need to support each other to work 
together more effectively. NGOs’ work may not contribute to achieving the eventual 
development goal if it is not aligned with the government development plan” (P8).  
Land Acquisition and Land Ownership 
One of the most pervasive problems that NGOs often encounter when 
implementing post-disaster housing reconstruction projects, is the establishment of 
legal rights to land. Respondents admitted that land tenure was one the most complex 
issues to be faced in almost any reconstruction, necessitating a great deal of 
cooperation from the host government. Data revealed that major disasters not only 
cause major losses of human lives, but also severely damages people’s access to their 
land and security of land possession. This means that people are often unable to 
access their land for housing purpose before the land ownership can be restored.  
At least two respondents (P10, P11) reported that NGOs rushing to build 
houses before the land title is actually established can run the usual risk of wasting 
project recourses as well as causing tension in the affected communities. 
Respondents acknowledged that NGOs can sometimes play a role in encouraging or 
indirectly putting pressure on the host government to speedily resolve matters related 
to land allocation and establishing people’s legal rights to their lands. For example, 
during the post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan, the implementing NGOs required 
the affected beneficiary to have their land title established before they can be eligible 
for the NGOs donated construction materials. In an attempt to secure the assistance 
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from NGOs, which was generally regarded as a short-lived opportunity, the affected 
beneficiaries had to put pressure on the local government to act more speedily. This 
is evident in the following statement: 
“When we were rebuilding our house an NGO called CARE helped us but I 
had to go myself to the different government offices to get permission to 
rebuild my house. With the help of the NGO I was able to get all the paper 
sorted quite fast because the NGO was ready to help and I could argue my 
case with the local government that I needed the house and didn’t want to 
lose the opportunity” (P8). 
At least six respondents (P2, P4, P6, P12, P13, and P15) pointed out that 
NGOs may formulate their own strategies, refer back to their past experience or unite 
their voice to deal with matters related to land. However, despite this the final 
decision is always in the hand of the formal land administration authority of the host 
country that holds the ultimate power. A good government can address this matter 
more effectively.   
Respondents admitted that land issues were inherently difficult to solve and 
the level of their complexity varied significantly from one location to another 
depending on the land tenure system.  Generally all respondents agreed that land 
tenure must first be established before permanent housing can be built. Data revealed 
that issues related to land needed the affected beneficiaries to directly communicate 
their needs with the host government. One participant strongly asserted that all 
matters related to land need to be solved by the affected people and the host 
government because “there is no way an NGO can work out ways” (P10).  
Even though NGOs cannot always influence government decisions on matter 
related to land, they are able to play an important role in providing specific education 
or legal advice to the affected beneficiaries, on issues related to land and land rights. 
NGOs operating in post-disaster settings can facilitate meetings between the affected 
communities and the local government.  
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Help People Understand Their Rights to Land 
“NGOs cannot just decide whether someone owns some land or not. The only thing 
they can really do is to facilitate the community negotiation with the government, so 
that the community can be helped to know what rights they have” (P14).  
Participants emphasised that NGOs have a really big part to play in terms of 
having the opportunity to work with the affected communities and help them to 
understand how to tackle local government when trying to access their rights. 
Respondents stated that communities do not always understand their entitlements, or 
just feel that they lack enough educational background to access their rights. 
Therefore, the role of NGOs in terms of empowering the affected communities to 
access what they are entitled to, can be crucial. In a situation where land regulations 
are not governed by the formal legal system, NGOs can work closely with the 
community elders to facilitate issues related to land tenure. At least five respondents 
(P4, P6, P8, P9, P14) stated that the best outcomes can be achieved when NGOs are 
able to effectively facilitate the process that is primarily undertaken and led by the 
affected people and is in compliance with the land regulations of the host country.  
6.3.3 Community Council Allows Women’s Participation (Assumption – 3) 
“All members of the community, including the affected women, must be given the 
opportunity to participate in reconstruction. If women' are deprived of such 
opportunity, the houses they build are going to be ineffectual” (P9). 
A successful completion of post-disaster reconstruction projects requires the 
knowledge and involvement of the wider community population. Generally, 
respondents acknowledged that a needs assessment can only be considered 
meaningful and effective if it embodies the basic housing and livelihood 
requirements of the larger mass of affected people. Respondents agreed that a well-
planned reconstruction project should encourage community participation at all 
levels and must consider the important role that the most vulnerable community 
people, particularly women, can play in reconstruction.  
According to the interview data, women are often severely impacted by 
disasters. They lose their livelihood and are traditionally required to care for 
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children, elderly, wounded and disabled members (P13). Following a major disaster, 
women’s potential to effectively participate in reconstruction, or voice their concerns 
about their needs, is often significantly decreased. The assumption that a community 
council will actually allow women’s participation is important. It needs to be 
fulfilled, to allow women to represent themselves in reconstruction, rather than being 
represented.  
“I definitely think that is really important. I think, again, it is quite 
challenging. I think you often, very much get the men who often speak about 
the women's need. It is quite difficult sometimes to ask, and get, an 
independent opinion from the women in some cultures. That is certainly the 
challenge I found in Pakistan” (P14).  
Evidence from the interviews confirms that women’s participation was 
particularly important because they had a much better understanding of their needs 
and the knowledge of their house design. Women are the main users of houses, 
spending more time in their homes compared to the male members of the family.    
The Importance of Women’s Participation 
“Women ABSOLUTELY need to be involved in the design of that property. They are 
the ones that spend the majority of the time at home. They are the ones that cook for 
the family. They are the ones that care for the family So they definitely need to be 
consulted” (P14).  
Women make up approximately one half of any society and should be 
recognised as members of the community with equal rights to participate in 
reconstruction. “I think your society is half male, half female, whether your religion 
likes it or not. Women have an important role to play” (P15). 
Respondents confirmed that a community participation process can only be 
considered effectual and complete if it ensures the inclusion of all members of the 
community, particularly women. Almost all respondents (P2, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, 
P10, P12, P13, P14, and P15), stated that women’s involvement was absolutely vital 
for successful completion of housing reconstruction projects. One respondent (P10) 
emphasised that when we talk about community and community participation we 
Chapter 6 – Interview Results – A Logical Framework for Community Participation 
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 190 
should be talking about involving everybody, “the community as a whole” (P10), not 
just a particular group of people. Participants acknowledged that women did not only 
play a vital role in looking after their family, they also had the best understanding of 
their own needs. Furthermore, women are able to express their needs “much better 
than anybody else” (P10), and they are also able to offer practicable solutions to 
solving them. The following remarks provide evidence supporting this:  
“Women need to be consulted. They need to be able to say what is important 
to them; they need to be able to say that the latrine doesn’t work for them 
and all of these things. So, I think they have a lot of ideas, because they are 
there every day. Women are human, and they then can be quite creative” 
(P15). 
Respondents argued that women needed to be involved in all phases of 
reconstruction to have their input. It was particularly vital for women to have their 
input during the housing design, because ultimately they were the ones who spent 
most of their time at home cooking for the family and taking care of them (P10, P13, 
P14, P15) . The director of an NGO stated: 
“Women spend more time at home. They have more interest in the design of 
their house. They know what size of house they need or what the colour 
should be”. (P7) 
The programme officer of a large INGO reported that women often 
challenged the property design proposed by NGOs: 
 “There are instances where NGOs come up with the design and then the 
women say, ‘Where are we going to cook? You haven’t thought about where 
we are going to cook.’ So, definitely, women need to involve in the design” 
(P13).  
This was confirmed by (P8) who stated, “It is important to consider gender 
issues when a project is designed”.  
The interviews provided evidence that owing to the complex nature of post-
disaster reconstruction projects, the socio-cultural and religious sensitivities, and 
more importantly the general misconception about women’s capability, women’s 
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participation can be severely undermined in some areas. Results indicated that, 
despite the many challenges, NGOs having an established positive relationship with 
the affected community can encourage community leaders to agree to women’s 
participation. Many respondents stated that NGOs only operate effectively and have 
community support, if their policies and practices agree with the community culture.  
Explain the Need for Women's Participation 
The interview analysis suggests that identifying the specific need for 
women’s participation in reconstruction was a very important first step towards 
formulating an acceptable strategy for their participation. The need for women’s 
involvement in reconstruction, and its immediate as well as long term strategic 
benefits, must then be clearly explained to the representatives of the affected 
community, to seek their agreement (P1, P6, P9, P13). The discussion should also 
seek to identify the specific cultural and religious requirements for women’s 
participation. At least one participant (P14) stated that, given the very sensitive 
nature of the whole issue of gender in some societies, reconstruction projects should 
attempt to maintain a balance between the benefits of women’s participation and the 
community culture.  
“It was sometimes quite challenging to get them to understand why it was 
important to get the women's kind of input into reconstruction. In a context 
like that, it is getting the balance between seeing it [as] really important that 
we get that kind of participation, but also balancing that with the fact that, 
actually, we need to be sensitive, to some extent, to the situation, and not to 
obviously aggravate the community” (P14). 
According to at least two respondents (P11 and P13), although women’s 
participation was vital in reconstruction, it also had its downsides. Reconstruction 
projects with greater involvement of women can increase the power dynamic towards 
women that may lead to gender-based violence in some cultures. One respondent 
emphasised that the “the knock-on effect of the empowerment of women is greater 
violence within the family” (P11). This respondent recommended that NGOs need to 
be really careful if they are going to work with women. They need to work with men 
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as well. According to (P13), if the family dynamics change towards women, the men 
will feel undermined and at risk.  
Most respondents agreed that NGOs should be aware that such changes may 
destabilise family cohesion and cause other problems, if they are not undertaken, 
based on an absolute understanding of the community culture and social norms. Here 
is what one respondent had to say:  
“NGOs need to pay attention, and give meaningful consideration to, the 
prevailing culture in the community. They need to have a good study of the 
community culture and make their decisions in compliance with that” (P2).  
Understand Community Culture and Religion 
“It is easy for us to say, ‘Yes, it is a good thing that women are involved.’ But I think 
it is the practicals of getting through many layers of cultural challenges, to getting 
that” (P14). 
Understanding the prevailing culture and religion in the community, and 
acting in accordance with the principles, and being guided by them, was perceived to 
be the keystone for formulating a strategy acceptable to all members of the affected 
community (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P8, P11, P15). Respondents stated that the 
assumption that involving women in reconstruction is a simple process does not 
always hold true.  
Generally, respondents asserted that, in some cultures, women’s participation 
often entails working through many level of cultural barriers and understanding what 
the participation of women looks like within that cultural context. Respondents 
admitted that women’s participation was in fact a process that the NGOs needed to 
go through carefully, to help the affected communities prepare and agree to women 
being involved in reconstruction. One respondent commented:  
“It is a process; you cannot just go there and say, ‘Look we come here and 
we want to talk to your wife. It doesn’t work like that” (P10).  
Almost all respondents agreed that NGOs, who respected people’s culture and 
religious beliefs, were more successful at maintaining a desirable level of operations 
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in a culturally and religiously sensitive environment. One respondent (P15) who has 
many years of experience working in developing countries reported that:    
“In Afghanistan, under the Taliban, you know... our program was one of the 
few that weren’t shut down ever, because we were trying to work within the 
rules. So, sometimes it is just to find [a way] around it... follow the rules 
without disadvantaging any side” (P15). 
Data from the interviews on women’s participation provided strong evidence 
that gender issues are context specific and their level of significance varies in 
different cultures. The interview analysis indicated that one commonly adopted 
approach to reach women in a culturally sensitive environment was to have women 
working with women (P10). Respondents stated that NGOs having female staff were 
far more successful in working with the affected female population, than those 
largely dominated by men. NGOs with female staff were able to reach affected 
Afghan women, in almost all places in Afghanistan, to have their opinions collected.  
Employ Female Project Staff 
“Based on my experience, the only effective way to reach affected women is to have 
teams of female employees. Women can meet freely with the affected women and it 
doesn’t conflict the community culture” (P7). 
In a predominantly conservative society, involving community women in 
post-disaster reconstruction projects could really be challenging. In such societies, 
women without male relatives are particularly disadvantaged by the many socio-
cultural restrictions they face every day. In a country like Afghanistan, women are 
often forbidden to talk with males who are not members of their immediate family. 
Almost all respondents (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P7, P8, P9, P10, P12, P13, P14, 
and P15) acknowledged that, in such situations, the best strategy, and a more 
practical way to reach the affected women, would be employing female staff and 
working through them with the affected female population. Participants reported that, 
in many locations in Afghanistan, women were required to be accompanied by male 
members of their family when going out. Four respondents (P1, P3, P5, P15) 
suggested that, in such situations, it was more appropriate to employ a couple 
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(husband and wife, sister and brother or father and daughter), than women alone. 
This was felt to ensure that female employees are always accompanied by a male 
member of their immediate family when working with the affected beneficiaries.  
“If you allow female staff, as we have quite successfully demonstrated in a 
lot of our projects for example... employ a couple. You know... get a man and 
his wife as a team, and they go out together, and the woman talks to the 
women, and the man talks to the men, and when they come home they 
compare notes” (P15).  
6.3.4 There Is Adequate Security in the Affected Area (Assumption – 4) 
Tricky - challenging environment-never as simple as people think it is (P14). 
Lack of adequate security can be a major obstacle to implementing 
reconstruction projects. Data revealed that operating in insecure conditions may be 
challenging for both the implementing NGO and the affected people. When asked if 
reconstruction projects can be implemented in insecure environments, participants 
responded that, depending on the level of insecurity, it may or may not be possible to 
successfully implement such projects. At least two respondents (P6 and P8) 
remarked that NGOs cannot operate in areas under the control of the Taliban because 
of the Afghan government’s failure to provide enough security to the NGO staff and 
project beneficiaries in those areas.  
“In areas where the Taliban are, it is impossible to work or implement any 
project, because the government cannot provide adequate security or protect 
you there” (P6). 
Participants expressed a common belief that, depending on the level of 
insecurity in an affected area, NGOs can determine the most appropriate and 
effective approach to delivering reconstruction projects. Respondents concluded that 
establishing a well-substantiated relationship with the affected communities was 
essential, in terms of providing security for project personnel and assets. Data 
indicated that if NGOs cannot access the affected area, due to major insecurity, 
reconstruction projects still may be implemented by the community people, while 
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technically supported and remotely monitored by the implementing NGOs. This is 
evident in the statement below:  
“Look, if there is no possibility to work in or access the affected area 
because of security concerns, NGOs can still implement and manage their 
project remotely” (P9). 
Involve Community 
“Building a strong relationship with the community is important. NGOs with positive 
relationship with the community people can have strong community support in terms 
of project delivery and ensuring staff security” (P8).  
Repeated statements by the respondents indicated that gaining support from 
local communities, not only by providing aid, but also by acting responsibly, is a 
crucial criterion for project success. Respondents stated that tribal societies in 
Afghanistan have always had a significant contribution towards providing a safe 
working environment for the NGOs. They have always offered protection to NGO 
personnel and assets from the insurgents (P2). Data revealed that NGOs operating in 
Afghanistan often had more support from the tribal societies than from the local 
government, when implementing their projects in remote and relatively insecure 
areas in Afghanistan. At least four (P1, P2, P8, P10) respondents reported that they 
had to seek security assistance from the tribal communities, when they were tasked 
to undertake recovery and community development projects in remote areas in 
southern provinces in Afghanistan.  Many respondents asserted that NGOs must 
really have the heart, and a genuine desire for helping the affected people, to gain 
their support. A relationship built on the basis of having an appreciation for 
community culture and religion, is necessary in order to make the interaction with 
the affected people more productive. Having a strong relationship with the 
community is essential. NGOs cannot implement their projects in remote and 
insecure places without community support. Communities can provide security to the 
NGOs personnel and properties (P5).  
Many participants reported that seeking security assistance from the affected 
communities in Afghanistan was effective and worked well. At least two participants 
(P1 and P9) suggested that matters related to security need to be discussed with, and 
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agreed on, by a body representing the entire community, before reconstruction 
projects can be planned.  
Remotely Managed Projects 
“I would like to think it would have a positive impact, in terms of people's feelings, 
that they participated in the whole process” (P13). 
In insecure situations, where accessing the affected area is difficult or 
presents a real threat to the life of NGO personnel and assets, a strategy to implement 
a reconstruction project remotely could be an alternative approach. Analysis of the 
interview data revealed that there was a major conflict of opinions among the 
respondents on the practicality of such an approach. Although all participants agreed 
that remotely managed projects provided greater opportunity for the affected 
communities to participate in rebuilding their houses, not all participants agreed that 
such projects would definitely yield positive results. Even though a large number of 
respondents (P3, P9, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14, and P15) supported the notion of a 
remote management approach to reconstruction, they too expressed concerns that 
ensuring housing quality and monitoring the progress of such projects could be 
challenging.  
“I mean... we actually worked in a number of places in a remote 
management model. In fact Kandahar [a province of Afghanistan] is one 
area where we work in a remote management model. I definitely think that it 
can happen. I think quite a lot of it comes down to... you need to have the 
right people in that community” (P14).  
At least two participants (P4 and P7) stated that implementing any project 
remotely, without the presence of project staff in the area, would be hard to produce 
the intended outcomes. These participants argued that, since a remote management 
method does not operate on the basis of direct observation by professional staff, there 
is every possibility that the basic principles of project management can be neglected. 
Reconstruction projects managed and monitored remotely are highly likely to face 
technical difficulties and can also be fraud-prone.  Two respondents concluded that: 
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“I think such projects are not very successful. It is correct that there is 
maximum community involvement in remotely managed projects, but they 
can face enormous technical difficulties and also their management is 
difficult. There are issues with managing funding and also other technical 
requirements that need managerial skills, which may not be available in the 
effected community” (P4).   
“Remotely managed projects whether technically results in a good outcome I 
don’t know, that would be an interesting assessment to make” (P13). 
6.4 SUMMARY 
As explained previously, chapters 5 and 6 were dedicated to reporting the 
findings from the qualitative interviews.  Both chapters explained in detail the major 
challenges (as outlined initially in chapter 4) for community participation in post-
disaster reconstruction. Guided by the Problem tree structure (Figure  5-2), Chapter 5 
explained the nature of these challenges and the ways in which they negatively 
impacted community participation. Using the Logical framework matrix (Table  6-1) 
this chapter has provided a detailed explanation of the activities needed to be 
undertaken at a strategic level to eliminate, or at least minimise, the impact of these 
challenges. This chapter further explains the major assumptions that are needed to be 
fulfilled to allow progress to the subsequent levels in the Logical framework matrix. 
This and the preceding chapters responded to the three research questions posed 
initially in Chapter 1 and reiterated at the beginning of Chapter 5. The next chapter 
will discuss and produce an assessment of the obtained results. 
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Chapter 7 
 Discussion  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research has utilised a mixed methods sequential explanatory design, which 
enabled the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data. A quantitative 
questionnaire and qualitative interviews were used to investigate the nature of post-
disaster reconstruction projects, and to identify factors that often determine the outcomes 
of these projects.   
As described in Chapter 1, and later reiterated in Chapter 5, the focus and major 
objective of this research is to develop a logical framework for facilitating greater 
community participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects. To achieve this, the 
following three research questions need to be addressed:  
1- What are the major challenges for community participation? 
2- How do these barriers impact on community participation? 
3- How can the impact of these challenges be eliminated, or reduced.  
Founded on the analysed results of an orderly and rigorous investigation, the framework 
is anticipated to provide useful guidance for effective community participation 
specifically in post-disaster reconstruction projects. 
An internet-based questionnaire (details provided in Chapter 4) was used to 
answer the first research question. The analysis of qualitative interviews as presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6 provided answers to the second and third research questions 
respectively.  
Guided by the key elements of the logical framework approach (problem tree 
structure, objective tree structure and logical framework matrix), this chapter will now 
discuss the main findings of the research, presenting an assessment of the answers 
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provided to the three research questions that in turn will enable the reader and other 
researchers to draw some firm conclusions.  
7.2 CHALLENGES FOR COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
The results from the statistical analysis of the opinion survey strongly suggest 
that post-disaster reconstruction projects are complex and that their outcomes may be 
affected by a lack of community participation. With almost all respondents either 
agreeing, or strongly agreeing, with all 41 measures in the questionnaire survey (posed 
as challenges for community participation in reconstruction), it can be seen that these 
challenges present real threats for effective community participation.  
Following the analysis of data from the survey questionnaire and the analysis of 
qualitative interviews, the 41 measures were subsequently reduced to five derived factors 
renamed as: ‘Lack of community capacity’, ‘Gender issues’, ‘Lack of professional 
competence in NGOs’, ‘Government policies and practices’, and ‘Lack of adequate 
security’.  This section outlines these factors and discusses how they impact on 
community participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects.   
7.2.1 Lack of Community Capacity 
As depicted in the problem tree structure (Figure  5-2) factors contributing to lack 
of community capacity are: dependency on external aid, lack of livelihood opportunities, 
lack, or loss, of personal resources and skills, and loss of community cohesion.  
Disasters destroy productive family assets and human capital, leading affected 
communities towards socio-economic crises and an overall decreased community 
capacity (WMO and UNISDR 2009). Data from both the questionnaire survey and the 
interviews confirm that lack of community capacity is indeed a major barrier for 
community participation in reconstruction.  
Analysis of the data indicates that the lack of livelihood opportunities, and the 
provision of long-term humanitarian aid as a substitute for income, may adversely 
impact community zeal and self-confidence creating a culture of dependency on external 
assistance. Becoming heavily dependent on external aid and letting NGOs implement 
reconstruction projects without community involvement may also prevent affected 
people from developing their own sense of responsibility and accountability. In both of 
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these cases, affected people are often considered mere victims of the disaster rather than 
key stakeholders in reconstruction. Immediate relief aid efforts, if not linked to the long 
term development of the affected communities, may discourage community participation 
(Paul 2006).  
Davidson et al (2007) in their study of participatory reconstruction in post-
earthquake El Salvador found that people lacking construction skills and those who were 
socially and economically disadvantaged had minimal input in the project design. Their 
participation was strictly limited to doing heavy manual work of 150 hours each month 
for which they received food rations. The same authors (ibid 2007) argue that the lack of 
cohesion in the community was another major obstacle for community participation. The 
community was being formed from people who had previously lived in different 
locations. Since there was no effective representation of the affected people, almost all 
decisions were made by the management that adhered strictly to a top-down approach, 
leaving limited or no place for community involvement.  
The findings from this research suggest that in developing countries like 
Afghanistan, male members of a family play an important role in reconstruction, and 
they are generally expected to make a greater contribution to reconstruction than the 
females. Therefore, the loss of immediate relatives, particularly male members of the 
family, can significantly reduce a community’s capacity to take an effective part in 
rebuilding after a disaster. Evidence from the literature suggests that the proposition that 
the point of view of male members plays a more significant role than that of females in 
reconstruction, is also found in many other parts of the world. A study of the impact of 
gender roles in the reconstruction in post-hurricane Mitch, by Bradshaw (2002), revealed 
that women generally perceived themselves as being highly dependent on their male 
members of the family. Women without a male partner, who would normally perceive 
themselves as the person making the greatest contribution in the family, also had a shift 
in their perception. In post-Mitch reconstruction efforts, a high number of these women 
acknowledged that the male members of their family actually had the most important 
contribution in reconstruction.  
Communities without adequate capacity have reduced chances of being invited 
by sponsors and implementers of reconstruction projects to participate in reconstruction. 
In some cases, even if they are actually invited, their participation may be limited to 
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doing labouring only, or providing just a token representation, which means in either 
case, that their input is not fully included in the project design. 
7.2.2 Gender Issues  
Based on the assumption that women make up almost half of the entire human 
society (UNFPA 2012) and they have a vital role in reconstruction, the research data 
reveals that despite having such a high significance, women’s participation remains 
alarmingly invisible in reconstruction projects being implemented in Afghanistan. In the 
context of several developing countries, including Afghanistan, women’s participation is 
considered unimportant and as result of such prejudice, they are not always invited to 
participate in discussions when reconstruction projects are being instigated. Kandiyoti 
(2007) argues that community participation by women is hardly visible in the public 
arena in Afghanistan. Customarily, women in Afghanistan do not participate in decision-
making, and generally their male family members would represent them when important 
decisions about their future are being made.      
The interview analysis revealed that participation by women in reconstruction is 
largely influenced by the prevailing socio-cultural barriers in the community, inequity 
(not being able to exercise their basic human rights) and their relatively low level of their 
education compared to men. Women are also perceived as being incapable both 
physically and intellectually to participate effectively in matters of strategic importance.  
Rahmani (2012) found that an overwhelming majority of women in Afghanistan 
live in poverty due to the extended war and the many socio-cultural restrictions. The 
author (ibid 2012) argues that Afghan women, particularly those without adult male 
members in their family, are largely excluded from participating in any forms of 
reconstruction. These women live in extreme poverty and are not paid any attention even 
by the humanitarian aid organisations.  
The findings from the questionnaire show that the majority of respondents (89%) 
agree with the statement that most women face many gender and inequality related 
challenges. Data from the interviews provides sufficient evidence to suggest that women 
in Afghanistan do not only suffer from gender and inequality based discrimination, but 
they also face enormous socio-cultural challenges in the society, as well as within their 
family. Women’s participation in housing reconstruction is generally considered 
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culturally inappropriate in the larger Afghan society. Women are strictly prohibited from 
involving themselves in the actual rebuilding, particularly when reconstruction is carried 
out by male labourers who are not members of the family.  
Women with male members in the family are almost always represented by their 
male members, and those without a male relative neither have their own representation 
nor are adequately represented by their home community. In both such cases women are 
deprived of the opportunity to have even indirect input into reconstruction. The research 
findings reveal that cultural settings and community life in Afghanistan have also had 
their impact on the way sponsors and implementers of reconstruction projects operate in 
Afghanistan. Due to cultural sensitivities, NGOs generally do not engage community 
women in reconstruction activities. Women’s participation is in fact a highly sensitive 
socio-cultural issue in Afghanistan, which could be a potential project ‘show stopper’ if 
dealt with carelessly. Women’s participation, if planned without due respect to the 
community culture may also trigger, or intensify, tension (if it already exists) in the 
affected families. Although, in many areas of Afghanistan, women are widely restricted 
from participating in reconstruction projects and they do not provide physical labour, 
these restrictions are relatively relaxed in the municipalities of some major cities and 
certainly in the capital city, Kabul.  
Another fundamental barrier for women’s participation in reconstruction is the 
issues of fairness and equal rights. According to data analysis, women all over the world 
face some level of discrimination and they are often considered second class citizens. 
The interview analysis indicates that in Afghanistan, women do not have the same power 
and authority as men in relation to decision-making. As pointed out earlier, when women 
are invited to participate in discussion, it is purely to accommodate donors’ demand, and 
such token representation may not guarantee the inclusion of women’s needs in the 
planning. Afghan families and Afghan society as a whole are dominated and governed 
predominantly by males. According to Yodanis (2004), in such societies, men’s power is 
considered to be a right and it can be used to silence the voices of women in that society. 
The interview analysis provides evidence that in Afghanistan, the decision as to whether 
or not a female can participate in reconstruction mostly rests with the family males.  
In Afghan society, women have always been considered to have lesser 
intellectual capability than men and as such their inclusion in reconstruction is 
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considered unimportant. One respondent said that, unfortunately many Afghans see 
women as “mentally handicapped humans” being unable to make the right decisions. As 
mentioned before, this deep-rooted misconception and the prevailing prejudice has led 
many Afghans, including the government officials, to believe that women are not needed 
to participate in reconstruction, and that they can be adequately represented by any male 
member of their family. Unfortunately, this mindset of the wider community has also 
influenced women’s self-perception. Many Afghan women think, and in fact they have 
already accepted in their subconscious mind, that they are not as effective as their men. 
The interview analysis highlights that there is widespread discrimination against women 
in Afghanistan, making them heavily dependent on their male members for survival.  
Another major issue, that impedes women from participating in reconstruction, is 
their level of education. According to the literature (European Union 2008) and based on 
the findings of this research the percentage of educated females in Afghanistan was 
substantially lower than that of males (the percentage of literate female population in 
Afghanistan is three times lower than that of the literate male population). Currently, in 
many places in Afghanistan, women are either not allowed to receive, or do not have 
access to, any form of formal education. Women in Afghanistan clearly understand what 
their basic needs are, however, most of them lack the sense of individuality and 
confidence to inform and argue for their needs in community meetings.  Mukhopadhyay 
(2008) found that in India, women who have a lower level of education than men often 
suffer discrimination within their families and in society. They are also subject to 
domestic violence and have a weak standing in society with no effective voice in issues 
important for their future. Based on the findings of this research and the evidence from 
the current literature, it can be argued that gender discrimination against women is not an 
issue confined to Afghanistan, but that unfair treatment of women exists in many parts of 
the world. 
7.2.3 Lack of Professional Competence in NGOs 
Lack of professional competence in NGOs is usually attributed to their lack of 
transparency, perceived high levels of corruption, lack of adequate technical knowledge 
as well as the limited understanding of the cultural environments in which they operate.  
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Data from the questionnaire survey and the interviews indicate that NGOs 
working in the field of reconstruction often face serious administrative and operational 
challenges when responding to major disasters. While some humanitarian NGOs, 
particularly those operating in developing countries, have well-established working 
procedures and integrity standards, many others seriously lack organisational 
competence and are ‘not’ actually as non-profit as they declare. Donini (2007) indicates 
that NGOs, as a whole, once greatly admired for their work in Afghanistan, are now 
largely viewed as criminal organisations by many Afghan people. The author finds that 
the existing negative view in the wider Afghan community, about the effectiveness of 
aid organisations, has mainly resulted from the growing disengagement of affected 
communities in reconstruction, their disempowerment, and the disbelief in the integrity 
of the aid organisations. The interview analysis suggests that NGOs without adequate 
professional competence are not particularly interested in working with the affected 
communities, because they either do not have a genuine interest in promoting a 
participatory approach, or they seriously lack the knowledge and skills necessary for 
facilitating community participation.  
The interview analysis also reveals that affected communities are significantly 
detached from the NGOs. People are suspicious about the performance of NGOs, 
because they have failed to demonstrate adequate transparency in their administrative 
and operating processes when undertaking reconstruction projects. It is generally 
believed that many NGOs are corrupt and they are there to pursue their economic and/or 
political ambitions, and thus, working with such NGOs can only mean wasting of 
people’s time and effort. The advancement in information technology, and greater and 
more widespread access to the internet have enabled people to discover information 
about NGOs and make an evaluation of their effectiveness for themselves. People are 
more informed than ever and when it comes to participating in reconstruction projects, 
they no longer trust just any NGO as they would do in the past. Findings from the data 
revealed that many NGOs have failed in the past to deliver desirable project outcomes 
causing great disappointment among the affected people. There is general frustration in 
many communities, based on a perception that aid assistance has done little in terms of 
restoring community life, and also the increasing damage that the NGOs have inflicted 
on themselves in terms of their credibility, has led many Afghans to believe that NGOs 
are nothing but a group of “thieves” with the only objective being to steal project 
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funding. As one respondent said, “NGOs have a bad reputation and they are often seen 
as a corrupt entity” (P12). Corruption is also evident in large international organisations 
and in donor communities (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012). This research also reveals that 
NGOs that lack transparent processes are actually highly likely to be corrupt.  
Transparency is essential for creating and maintaining trust in the affected 
communities. It is vital to plan and implement reconstruction projects on the basis of 
mutual trust between the project implementing organisation and the affected people. The 
interview analysis strongly suggests that affected people do not participate effectively in 
projects that they do not believe are beneficial for them in the long term. Another critical 
issue that was identified relates to the promises that NGOs often make, but they do not 
deliver on, to entice community support. Donors have increasingly become aware of the 
importance of community participation in reconstruction projects, and so they demand 
that implementing agencies have their project designed with the agreement and 
considerable input from the target community. However, planning a reconstruction 
project, even together with the affected communities giving substantial input into the 
design, does not always guarantee that the donors will fund the project. Unfortunately, 
luring people into believing that the NGO already has funding and that what they 
promise will definitely be delivered has become normal practice among NGOs. The 
truth is that the NGOs cannot know what they will, or will not, be delivering until their 
proposal for funding is actually approved by the donor. 
Analysis if the data provides sufficient evidence to suggest that the work of some 
NGOs is generally appreciated by the wider Afghan community, however, the work of 
many others is perceived to be profit-driven, largely representing the interests of the top 
executives rather than those of the affected community. Since these NGOs are hardly 
ever audited by any independent external body, or by those who provide funds for them, 
there is no evidence to substantiate that their financial reports are, or are not, presented 
without corruption or graft. Data strongly indicates that the popularity of NGOs is 
dramatically decreasing and so is the interest among affected people to cooperate with 
them.   
Reconstruction projects that are designed and implemented without adequate 
input from affected communities neither respond to the immediate needs of the affected 
community for shelter, nor do they contribute to the creation of a stronger, cohesive and 
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more resilient community in the long term. Affected communities do not want to be 
involved in, or look after, projects that are not owned by them from the very inception.  
7.2.4 Government Policies and Practices 
As explained in section (5.3.4), government policies and the current 
reconstruction practices, as well as those specifically established in the aftermath of a 
disaster, can either support or hamper reconstruction efforts. Depending on how 
effective the host government is, and whether it has a genuine desire for helping its own 
people, its role in reconstruction can seriously influence the outcomes of reconstruction 
projects. Data indicates that governments with policies established based on thorough 
analyses of people’s needs, can encourage and enable citizens to take an active part in 
reconstruction. However, administratively weak and corrupt governments often have 
policies that do not support transparent and fair distribution of aid assistance. These 
policies do not always consider the needs and the existing capacities of the most 
disadvantaged affected people such as women, elderly people, children, and people with 
a disability. The data analyses provide sufficient evidence to suggest that such policies 
delay reconstruction, lead to confusion among the affected people, and intensify the 
tensions created by the disaster. The inherent bureaucratic and difficult structures of 
some governments, coupled with their ill-designed policies established in the wake of a 
disaster, all increase the already existing distance between the government and the 
people. In extreme cases, such as in Afghanistan, the lack of a well-established and 
responsive government can cause detachment from its citizens, eventually leading to 
long term conflict and regional instability. Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein (2008) argue 
that government’s failure to provide basic services to its citizens can lead to public 
distrust and then to political chaos in the country. Vendrell (2008) (Former European 
Union Special Representative for Afghanistan) in his article on the current conflict in 
Afghanistan, informs of the growing distance between the government of Afghanistan 
and the people. The author (ibid 2008) argues that this gap has caused a large percentage 
of the Afghan population to discontinue their relationships with the current government, 
or to incline towards the Taliban and be against the government.  
One of the major issues in post-disaster reconstruction relates to the long time it 
generally takes to resolve issues around land and land tenure. This difficult issue is then 
exacerbated when land records are destroyed by a disaster. Affected communities cannot 
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participate in, or benefit from, reconstruction programmes if they do not already own a 
plot of land, or have their original land title restored. The issue of land is even more 
difficult to solve in a country like Afghanistan where a comprehensive land policy does 
not even exist. Land scarcity resulting from the ineffective and corrupt land 
administration, land gifting to influential figures for political reasons, land grabbing by 
powerful warlords (on some occasions by desperate returnees as well), is a significantly 
challenging issue in the current effort for reconstruction in Afghanistan. This issue is 
currently having a major impact on the United Nations’ supported strategy for 
repatriation and reintegration of affected Afghan refugees in their home communities.  
Findings from this research suggest that government policies can provide a 
useful framework for reconstruction, if such is formulated with consultation of the 
affected people. If aimed at providing workable guidance and a structure for 
reconstruction, government control and coordination can play an important role in 
rebuilding. However, if the government is seeking to just control a reconstruction project 
out of obsession for power and influence, but is not interested in the plight of the people, 
it can be more of a problem than a solution.  
7.2.5 Lack of Adequate Security  
Afghanistan is progressing very slowly both in the political and economic arenas 
due to the continuing conflict in the country (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012). This research 
indicates that the lack of adequate security has always proven to be a major obstacle to 
the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The impact of the prolonged war, coupled with the 
surge in attacks targeting aid workers and community leaders, has significantly slowed 
down reconstruction efforts in most parts of the country. According to the UNHCR 
(2013) there are 2.7 million Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries (Iran and 
Pakistan), and around 425,000 internally displaced people who cannot return to their 
home communities, mainly because of the deteriorating security situation. In such poor 
security situations, donor organisations are often reluctant to provide funding for 
humanitarian projects, fearing that such projects can potentially endanger the lives of 
NGO personnel operating in the field, and those of the participating affected 
beneficiaries. The current situation in Afghanistan continues to threaten aid workers, 
forcing NGOs to limit their operations within a handful of relatively secure areas. Many 
reconstruction projects that were being implemented in remote areas in Afghanistan, had 
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to be stopped due to the occurrence of rising violence against NGO staff. According to  
Humanitarian Outcomes (2011), Afghanistan had the highest number of attacks on aid 
workers in 2009-2010, as compared to other countries, where major attacks on aid 
workers were reported. The analysis of research data reveals that of the different factors 
contributing to the current insecurity in Afghanistan, politicisation of attacks was what 
mostly concerned the NGOs. The findings indicate that NGOs currently operating in 
Afghanistan suffered greater loss of their personnel and assets as result of the attacks by 
the Taliban for political reasons, than from attacks of a more general criminal nature by 
non-Taliban elements.  
Another factor that can impact reconstruction projects is the presence of land 
mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Land mines and UXO create extremely 
hazardous situations as their accidental detonation can indiscriminately injure or kill 
people, and can cause major delays in project completion. Data reveals that working in 
areas contaminated by landmines can be life threatening both for the NGO personnel and 
the affected people from communities participating in projects. Landmines are still being 
found in or around many communities in Afghanistan, making reconstruction 
programmes difficult to implement. Affected people cannot return to areas contaminated 
by mines and thus reconstruction projects cannot be implemented without first 
thoroughly clearing the affected areas. Although this factor is a major impediment to 
community reconstruction and development in post-war settings, currently there is little 
knowledge available to indicate how this factor impacts project delivery in terms of 
schedule and cost. 
7.3 IMPROVING COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN POST-DISASTER 
RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS  
In section 6.2, this research developed fundamental knowledge about some of the 
major factors that negatively impact community participation in post-disaster 
reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. In addressing these challenges, this section will 
first discuss community capacity development activities, and will follow on to discuss 
some of the important assumptions that need to be made into a reality so that community 
development initiative is supported. While the requirement for developing community 
capacity differs between disasters, and disaster affected communities, this research found 
that successful community capacity development activities, in the context of post-
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disaster recovery and reconstruction, should generally lead to achieving the following 
objectives:  
 To re-establish community structure 
 To encourage sense of project ownership 
 To provide disaster recovery support 
 To provide livelihood opportunities 
7.3.1 Develop Community Capacity 
 Re-establish community structure 
In a post-disaster situation, it is important to help the affected communities to 
organise themselves within a cohesive and functional community structure, so that they 
can effectively articulate their needs and concerns to the relevant organisations involved 
in reconstruction. Major disasters destroy, or severely damage houses, sources of 
livelihood and vital infrastructure, often causing mass displacement of community 
people. According to the WHO (2005), in 2004 the Indian Ocean tsunami left as many 
as 280 000 dead and more than a million displaced people in Indonesia. This research 
shows that in a situation in which people have been displaced from their original places 
and the community structure that existed prior to the disaster has been destroyed, the 
very first step towards re-establishing community structure is to relocate the affected 
people. Affected people are often relocated to IDP camps, or they choose to relocate 
themselves to live with their relatives elsewhere. In some cases in Afghanistan, when 
people are forced out of their homes en masse by a conflict or natural disaster, they often 
set up their own camps around relatively secure places in large cities. Generally, affected 
people do not want to be relocated away from their original home areas, they have a 
strong desire to remain in the affected area, or at least somewhere nearby. Once the 
majority of affected families have been located, it is then possible to identify their 
representative councils and work with them within their existing community structures. 
In situations where the affected community does not have a representative body, a new 
community development council representing the entire affected community, needs to be 
established.  
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NGOs should always bear in mind that the affected people are in fact the most 
important stakeholders in reconstruction, holding knowledge and wisdom critical to the 
project. NGOs should also realise that affected people have the power to determine 
project success. Therefore, it is vital for the NGOs to treat the affected people as 
important stakeholders in reconstruction, rather than completely inactive recipients of 
humanitarian assistance. NGOs must exhibit a high level of integrity and professionalism 
when meeting with members of the affected community. The first contact with the 
affected community could be an important opportunity for the NGO to give the affected 
people crucial information about the NGO and its mandate. NGOs should also avail 
themselves of this opportunity to build trust by being open and truthful about their 
existing capacity and the level of participation they need from the affected community.   
When talking about reconstruction projects, one should not assume that 
reconstruction is just about building or restoring residential dwellings; it is, in fact, about 
rebuilding an entire community life to a higher, or at least the, same standard that existed 
before the disaster. Besides rebuilding houses, sponsors and implementing partners must 
also consider the provision of essential services such as water supply and sanitation, 
schools, medical facilities and medical supplies. The findings from this research are 
consistent with the minimum standards introduced by The Sphere Project (2011). The 
Sphere Project handbook states that, among others, factors such as the availability of 
water and access to schools and health clinics, enables a displaced population to return 
and successfully resettle in their home communities. Therefore, it can be argued that 
housing reconstruction projects are more likely to be unsustainable and unsuccessful in 
the long term if they do not include the reconstruction or development of at least a basic 
infrastructure.  
 Encourage sense of project ownership 
Another important aspect of community capacity development in the post-
disaster context is enabling affected people to make informed decisions about matters 
that are important for them. People are able to make important decisions rightly when 
they are adequately informed about the objectives, the intended results and the strategy 
for delivering reconstruction projects. Furthermore, professionally informed people have 
increased confidence and are able to participate more meaningfully in reconstruction. 
Davidson et al.(2007) found that community participation in decision-making leads to 
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more successful implementation of reconstruction projects. Participation of beneficiaries 
(not token representation) encourages project ownership by the community, and the lack 
of it, as argued by Oliver-Smith (1991), creates a culture of dependency on external aid. 
Lawther (2009) in his study of community participation in reconstruction conducted in 
the Maldives, found that affected people who were significantly involved in the process 
of reconstruction had a greater sense of project ownership. Therefore, it can be strongly 
argued that transparency in the entire process of reconstruction is central to encouraging 
and developing a sense of project ownership amongst the affected community. 
Reconstruction projects must be owned and implemented by the affected communities in 
all project phases, with the support of aid organisations, to produce sustainable 
outcomes. Projects largely owned and governed by NGOs are less likely to produce a 
sense of project ownership amongst affected people, and thus, may not receive the 
required support from them. 
As discussed, project ownership and the sense of responsibility of the beneficiary 
community are the key factors for effective community participation and for delivering 
successful reconstruction projects. Analysis of the data showed that successful 
reconstruction projects require input from a large proportion of the affected beneficiaries. 
This means that reconstruction efforts should aim at bringing back a significant mass of 
the affected population to their home place, and should support rebuilding ‘life’ at the 
community level. To do so, it is vital to determine and agree on the level, and kind, of 
contribution the project needs to have from the affected people. Data analysis strongly 
indicates that the community must be involved in rebuilding their houses. Consideration, 
however, must be given to the existing capability of the affected people in terms of their 
resources. Many respondents strongly argued that projects without community 
participation should never be sanctioned. 
NGOs must explicitly state and discuss their role in reconstruction with the 
beneficiaries. It is important for the beneficiaries to know the kind and level of assistance 
they can expect from the NGO when they are making their decision whether to return to 
their original place, or stay in the new location. Agencies involved in reconstruction 
projects must determine what role they can play in the reconstruction, and subsequently 
design their projects in a way that can boost community morale, strengthen project 
ownership and eventually lead to more meaningful community involvement in the 
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reconstruction. A well-designed reconstruction project should always ideally leave 
behind an empowered and much stronger community.   
 Provide disaster recovery support 
Following a disaster, people often suffer severe negative economic as well as 
psychological effects, which can drastically weaken their capacity to uphold minimum 
living conditions. The psychological wellbeing of communities is largely influenced by 
the severity of any disaster, loss of relatives and property. In the context of Afghanistan, 
loss of relatives, particularly the loss of male members, can severely reduce family 
strength. NGOs need to be mindful that, in such situations, affected people might need 
psychological support including counselling and basic welfare assistance to reduce their 
vulnerability and improve their resilience. To address post-disaster recovery and 
reconstruction more effectively, an integrated approach that expand beyond merely 
providing housing needs to be adopted.   
Another important point that needs to be considered in the effort to assist the 
affected people to overcome any physiological impacts of a disaster, is to encourage the 
involvement of religious leaders in the project. Religion and religious leaders have 
always played an important role in shaping and strengthening people’s lives. In 
Afghanistan, the way of life of people and their perception of the causes for the events 
that occur around them, have always been guided by their religious beliefs. In the 
aftermath of catastrophic events, religious leaders lead the burial of those killed and offer 
prayers to the survivors. Religious leaders also play an important role in calling for 
people’s unity and companionship to help each other in the task of rebuilding. A study of 
post-traumatic factors and resilience conducted by Pérez-Sales et al. (2005) revealed that 
disasters are often perceived by people as a “punishment from God” for what the 
affected people believe to be inappropriate and immoral conduct by them, and 
disobedience to their God. The same authors (ibid 2005) argue that the majority of the 
affected people involved in the study stated that religion was fundamental to their coping 
with the impact of the disaster. The findings of this research and the evidence from the 
current literature provide compelling evidence to argue that religious leaders play a 
crucial role in leading, inspiring and guiding affected people. They have the ability to 
persuade and bring together the affected dispersed population in the lead-up to 
reconstruction.  
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As discussed earlier, major disasters severely damage people’s ability to cope 
with the loss of their relatives, homes and personal belongings. Therefore, it is vital to 
consider providing the affected people with an emergency, unconditional cash grant, or 
vouchers that can be redeemed for food items, besides the much-needed psychological 
support, to enable them to maintain basic living conditions during reconstruction. 
Affected people often cope with the effects of a disaster in their own unique way. The 
Sphere Project (2011) asserts that people’s coping ability is increased when it is 
supported by financial and psychological assistance. 
 Provide livelihood opportunities 
Shaw (2006), argues that disasters impact most on those whose lives are largely 
dependent on natural resources. Therefore, restoring sources of livelihood in affected 
areas is vital for people’s security and the permanence of reconstruction projects. This 
research indicates that reconstruction projects that do not adequately consider the issues 
surrounding re-establishment of the livelihoods of affected people in communities often 
fail to produce lasting results. The findings from the interviews strongly suggest that an 
approach of building only housing should not be encouraged. As stated by one 
participant, “People don't always need just a house; they also need regular income to 
feed their families” (P3). The livelihood requirements of the affected people could be 
very context specific and they can vary substantially from one location to the other. 
Affected people may also have diverse living needs based on the environment they live 
in. Regardless of the context, a workable strategy for providing livelihood will need to 
include: identifying the existing skills in the community, providing skill building training 
to the affected people, creating job opportunities, and supporting the restoration of 
sources of income generation.  
Large scale disasters are often followed by enormous reconstruction work and 
the labour force needed for the reconstruction may not always be available in the local 
area. Bringing skilled labourers from outside the affected area is expensive, may disrupt 
stretched infrastructure and resources, and as an asset, they do not remain in the 
community after reconstruction. Therefore, it is advisable to address the issue of labour 
shortages by providing training to generate the needed skills within the affected 
community. An important first step towards providing meaningful skill-building training 
is to identify the skills and wisdom that are already inherent in the community. Providing 
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training is an integral part of any post-disaster reconstruction project. Community 
education increases people’s awareness about building-safety measures both during and 
after reconstruction. Skill-building training needs to be primarily directed at improving 
the community capacity to participate in reconstruction, and also support the affected 
community in becoming more resilient. The new knowledge and skills that the affected 
people acquire during the training will remain in the community and can possibly 
provide an alternative means of generating income after the community is re-established. 
When planning reconstruction, NGOs should make every effort to staff their projects 
from within the affected community. As discussed earlier, recruiting project staff from 
the local area is more cost-effective than bringing in labourers from outside. More 
importantly, it is an effective way of helping affected people move faster from the 
emergency phase to more sustainable, long-term development.   
Another important point that needs to be considered is restoring or creating any 
sources of income generation. As mentioned earlier, besides rebuilding their houses, 
affected people also need to maintain a minimum living standard to be able to survive 
during and after the project. NGOs can restore local economies by using locally 
available construction materials and contracting local suppliers and firms. On a case-by-
case basis, NGOs may consider supporting the most disadvantaged families with a 
hardship allowance during the project. NGOs may also consider providing financial 
services such as microcredit to the affected disadvantaged women-lead families to 
support them establish a new source of income generation, or reinstate their existing one 
that may have been affected negatively by the disaster. Such assistance will alleviate 
poverty as well as enabling women to effectively contribute to the redevelopment of 
their affected community. 
7.3.2 Important Assumptions 
As described at the beginning of section 6.3, this section discusses community 
capacity development activities and the important assumptions that need to be fulfilled in 
order to allow successful implementation of these activities. In 6.3.1, activities for 
community capacity development were discussed, and this sub-section will provide a 
discussion of the important assumptions.  
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 NGO has sufficient capacity to deliver reconstruction project 
The level of maturity of particular NGOs and their operational capacities can 
largely influence the provision of assistance to communities affected by a disaster. In the 
wake of a major disaster, it is common to witness a surge of NGOs moving towards, or 
into, the affected areas. Funding opportunities, created by the huge sums of often easily 
accessible aid money for reconstruction, pull many national and international 
humanitarian NGOs towards the disaster-affected areas. According to the Ministry of 
Economy Afghanistan (2012) currently, there are more than 1,537 NGOs (387 
international & 1,430 local) registered and operational in Afghanistan. These NGOs are 
involved in delivering all sorts of projects – from food distribution, agriculture, health, 
and housing reconstruction, to supporting military operations conducted by the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In Aceh province, Indonesia, there were 
only two NGOs with permanent bases before the area was devastated by the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami. In less than a month, after the Indonesian government called for 
international assistance, more than 500 international humanitarian NGOs and foreign 
military forces rushed to be involved in recovery and reconstruction (Gaillard, Clavé and 
Kelman 2008). Unfortunately not all of these NGOs are competent enough to carry out 
reconstruction projects in complex, culturally diverse and usually highly chaotic post-
disaster environments. There are ample examples of bad performance by NGOs, local as 
well as international, currently operating in Afghanistan. While most local NGOs are 
established to make profit out of international aid, many large donor organisations 
pursue their own specific, often non-humanitarian objectives, set by their representative 
governments. Findings from this research indicate that funding organisations need to 
have adequate technical and personnel capacity to differentiate well established and 
credible NGOs from those with a history of bad performance. Data suggests that donors 
should examine and verify the technical and operational capacity of NGOs, as well as 
their organisational maturity levels, before granting them funding. In the aftermath of 
most large scale disasters, there is often a demand for a high number of NGOs to carry 
out humanitarian projects. There is also a great desire in donor communities to get 
reconstruction projects off the ground as soon and as speedily as possible. In a situation 
of high demand for expedited reconstruction, donor organisations will sometimes jump 
to fund NGOs with insufficient past experience, thus they need to also consider a more 
robust monitoring and evaluation strategy to make sure project resources are utilised 
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well within any agreed governance frameworks. Barakat (2003) suggests that NGOs that 
are not prepared to be monitored closely, or fail to demonstrate minimum standards, 
should  be denied funding. 
NGOs are more likely to fail rather than to succeed in achieving project 
objectives, if they do not have the required operational and managerial capacity. NGOs 
may also not be able to develop their capacity at the same time as implementing or 
setting up their projects. In disaster-prone areas, one possible way to overcome this 
problem could be by establishing a strategic partnership with, and providing capacity 
building training to, the existing local NGOs. Research indicates that it is in the best 
interests of both the affected community, and their donors, to have well-established, 
long-term partnerships with local NGOs, who can be readily available to partner with 
them, in the event of a disaster.  
Donors have a critical role in selecting the appropriate implementing partners for 
their projects. It should be considered a prerequisite for the NGOs to have the required 
capacity when planning reconstruction projects. Donors must ensure that NGOs have the 
ability to satisfy this important condition (assumption) before the proposed project is 
funded. Unless this condition is met, attempts to promote community participation in 
reconstruction may yield little success.  
 Government supports community participation in reconstruction 
Governments are important stakeholders in that they have the ultimate power to 
authorise reconstruction. They also hold the power to halt any, or all, reconstruction 
projects and under some circumstances, expel foreign NGOs and aid workers from their 
countries. A former Minister of Economy of the republic of Afghanistan, Bashar Dost, 
accused NGOs of being corrupt and threatened to expel 1, 935 registered NGOs from 
Afghanistan if successful in the presidential elections (Maxwell et al. (2012). In 1998, 
the Taliban expelled scores of international NGOs from Afghanistan accusing them of 
spying for western governments (Rahmani 2012). 
Governments are different in terms of their interest in the plight of the affected 
people. The important point for aid organisations to seriously consider, is the level of 
cooperation they can expect to have from a host government. A critical evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the host government in terms of its policies and practices for 
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reconstruction is crucial in planning any reconstruction projects. The level of cooperation 
the aid organisations can have from the host government will affect the allocation of 
necessary resources. In Sri Lanka, for example, a significant amount of NGO resources 
in terms of their time and project funding were wastefully spent on restoring and 
managing relationships with the government (Shaw and Ahmed 2010). In 2008, cyclone 
Nargis hit the southern coastal areas of Burma affecting over 2.5 million people. Despite 
the acute need for emergency relief assistance, scores of international aid personnel had 
to wait for over a month for permission from the Burmese government to deliver 
humanitarian assistance to the affected people (Stover and Vinck 2008).  
Data shows that working with governments, which have no particular interest in 
helping their citizens, can be difficult both for the aid organisations and the affected 
people. It is important for aid organisations to determine the kind, and level, of 
cooperation they need and can obtain from the host government, in order to plan and 
implement their projects successfully. Reconstruction projects without a responsible 
contribution from the host government can face coordination chaos that can easily lead 
to wasteful spending of project resources due to duplication of activities and also by 
fraud. NGOs having minimal cooperation of the host government may still be able to 
produce good outcomes. However, failing to include the host government in project 
planning will render the good intentions and efforts of NGOs impossible to succeed. As 
discussed earlier, governments hold the ultimate decision-making power in 
reconstruction, and community participation in NGO-supported projects is only possible 
when reconstruction projects are authorised and supported by the host government. 
Therefore, in the best interests of the affected people, NGOs should make every attempt 
to align their humanitarian responses with the policies of the host government. Major 
disasters do not only affect people, they also weaken, or even completely destroy, 
government mechanisms at a local level (Lyons 2009). In the aftermath of major 
disasters, local governments may not be able to effectively contribute to reconstruction 
efforts, or provide a structure to guide and coordinate reconstruction efforts. This 
research indicates that supporting and working together with the host government to re-
establish and strengthen its capacity could, in fact, be an opportunity for the NGOs to 
build a professional relationship with the government. The research findings agree with 
those of Binder-Aviles (2012) who states that NGOs need to cooperate with the host 
government if they are to achieve their vision for a better community. Building trust 
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through listening, cooperating and giving realistic feedback is crucial to developing a 
successful relationship with government.  
NGOs are required to establish a professional and workable relationship with the 
host authorities and plan their operation in cooperation with them. Effective post-disaster 
housing reconstruction projects can only be planned and developed alongside goodwill 
and assistance from a government that is well equipped, has sufficient controlling and 
coordination power and is representative of, and accountable to, the affected 
beneficiaries.   
 Community council allows women’s participation 
There is no question that women play an important role in the community. 
However, whether the role of women should be recognised, and whether or not they 
should be allowed to proactively participate in the community life outside their family 
circle, remains an unsolved critical issue in many cultures. According to this research, 
women in many countries around the world have little or no effectual power in decision-
making and their basic human rights are continuously abused. According to the poll 
carried out by Thomson Reuters Foundation (2011), Afghanistan has been ranked the 
most (not one of the most) dangerous place for women. Women in Afghanistan 
increasingly suffer from issues related to non-sexual violence, poor health conditions, 
and widespread socio-economic inequality. This means that women in Afghanistan are 
unable to exercise their rights to participate in, and discuss matters that are important for 
them. Housing reconstruction is one such matter that requires full participation from the 
affected women. Women’s lack of participation often results in reconstruction projects 
being inadequately designed, subsequently leading to other serious problems. As stated 
by one of the interviewees (P15), in the Helmand province of Afghanistan, an 
inappropriate kitchen design resulted from the lack of inclusion of the opinions of 
affected women in the community, caused many women to develop pulmonary related 
medical conditions due to their constant exposure to smoke. According to the results, of 
this research, reconstruction projects that do not embody the opinions of all members of 
the affected community, fail to achieve their intended objectives. Houses produced based 
on a poor design are either uninhabitable, or lead to other major problems in the longer 
term. We now know that on the one hand, female participation is crucial because women 
are ultimately the ones who spend most of their time in the homes, and on the other hand 
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the participation of women in reconstruction, is a highly controversial and culturally 
sensitive issue in many cultures. So what can be done to make sure both sides of the 
issue are attended to successfully? Women’s participation in reconstruction is indeed a 
difficult issue to address, but having said that, there are certain approaches that, if 
considered carefully, could make women’s inclusion possible, even in the most 
restrictive societies. In Afghanistan, many communities are having a hard time 
understanding why women need to be involved in reconstruction and how their 
involvement would lead to better project outcomes. Therefore NGOs need to:  
 Clearly explain the need for women’s participation in the project. Justify the 
potential benefits of their involvement, and how the affected community 
would benefit from it. NGOs must also be able to tell the affected people the 
likely negative consequences of not having women’s involvement in 
reconstruction. An important point for NGOs to note is that they need to be 
aware of the risks associated with the participation of women because 
although their involvement is undeniably crucial, however, it may also lead to 
gender violence in the family if it changes the relationship dynamics more 
holistically. 
 Understand the culture of the affected community. The mechanisms guiding 
women’s participation need to be aligned with the dominant principles and 
cultural norms of the community. This research clearly indicates that 
respecting community culture and religious values is critical to sustainable 
implementation of reconstruction projects. Women are allowed to participate 
in reconstruction projects if the approach to their participation doesn’t 
conflict with the community culture. 
 Employ female project staff. In some locations in Afghanistan, women are not 
allowed to talk with men because it is considered immoral and against the 
cultural and religious norms of the community. NGOs can ensure female 
participation in reconstruction by having women employees on board to 
access the women in the community. While, culturally, it is not always 
appropriate for male members of the project to be talking to women, there are 
no restrictions at all on female staff, whether from the same or different 
religious and cultural backgrounds, talking to the women in the community.  
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In spite of the many challenges women often face in relation to their involvement 
in reconstruction, NGOs must make sure that the important role of women, as active 
members of the community, are accommodated by the project.  
 There is adequate security in the affected area 
Generally, security is necessary to protect project staff and the affected 
beneficiaries during and after reconstruction. In situations of poor security, project staff 
and beneficiaries can be subjected to direct attacks, threats and intimidation (Jelinek 
2009). The same author (ibid 2009) reports that in 2008, in Afghanistan alone, there 
were 47 attacks on convoys delivering aid assistance. In addition, 112 aid workers were 
kidnapped, five of whom were ultimately killed. Lack of security also adversely affects 
project implementation in terms of budget and schedule.  
Although the lack of security is generally perceived to seriously impede recovery 
and reconstruction, this research suggests that insecurity can sometimes provide an 
opportunity for the affected communities to have greater involvement in reconstruction. 
When NGO staff cannot maintain their physical presence in the affected area, and/or if 
visiting project sites on a regular basis (particularly travelling by road) is dangerous, 
reconstruction projects may be implemented by the affected communities themselves 
with donors’ assistance. In situations when there is not enough security and a direct 
response by the aid communities is not feasible, adopting remote management approach 
to project delivery may be considered. According to Norman (2012) remote 
management, previously perceived as a “temporary approach” to project 
implementation, is gaining increased popularity among aid communities operating in 
insecure locations. The remote management approach is now being used in many 
countries including Afghanistan. This research indicates that remote management could 
be an alternative approach to on-site project development and delivery; however, it has 
its own intrinsic drawbacks. Remotely managed projects are difficult to monitor and the 
quality of housing cannot always be assured. 
In the context of Afghanistan, since the government does not yet have total 
control over the entire country and cannot provide adequate security to the NGOs 
operating in remote areas, security assistance can only be provided by the affected tribal 
communities. As stated by Schmeidl and Karokhail (2009), tribal people in Afghanistan 
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often have their own Lashkar (meaning tribal army/militia) operating within a specific 
traditional enforcement structure, designed to serve the interests of their tribal 
communities. Tribal communities have also had major roles in providing security for 
reconstruction projects. For example, according to these authors (ibid 2009), members of 
the tribal communities provided security for road reconstruction in Sayed Karam district 
of Paktia province.    
As discussed, implementing recovery and reconstruction projects in insecure 
areas can be a risky business. NGOs need to have the agreement and protection of the 
tribal communities before delivering their projects in areas lacking adequate security. 
Such an arrangement could provide a more secure working environment for the NGOs 
and would also allow for a lasting community contribution in reconstruction projects.  
 
7.4 SUMMARY  
The focus of this research was to develop a logical framework for effective 
community participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects. This chapter discussed 
the two main aspects of planning community participation. Firstly, the chapter discussed 
the Objectives that needed to be planned and successfully achieved to improve 
community capacity and then a discussion of the Important Assumptions (conditions) 
was presented. The next chapter presents a summary of the main findings, research 
contribution and limitations. The chapter will conclude this study by providing 
recommendations for further research in the area of post-disaster project management, 
and also for how the developed logical framework can be more widely introduced and 
used. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research has explored and explained the context of current factors that 
challenge and are affecting the outcomes of post-disaster reconstruction projects. The 
research provides an explanation of how these challenges have affected, and are 
affecting community participation, and it has sought the ways in which the immediate 
impacts of such challenges on community participation in post-disaster reconstruction 
projects, and in the long term on project outcomes and sustainability, can be reduced. 
Chapter 2 explored the extant and current literatures on post-disaster reconstruction 
projects. The thematic analysis of the literature revealed 41 constructs that posed 
potential challenges for community participation in reconstruction. The revelation of 
such a large number of potential challenges, and the lack of a workable mechanism for 
proposing and designing realistic solutions to these challenges, clearly indicated the 
critical need for improvements in all of these areas. A mixed methods approach was 
adopted to examine the complex nature of these challenges from more than one 
perspective. The overall philosophy and methodology for this research, along with the 
research questions was presented in Chapter 3. The nature of these questions and their 
specific requirements for employing appropriate research methods to answer them led to 
the selection of a mixed methods sequential explanatory model. Chapter 4 reported on 
the results of the questionnaire survey and explained the data analysis process that was 
undertaken. Chapters 5 and 6 presented the findings from the analysis of the qualitative 
interviews, and Chapter 7 provided a general discussion based on these findings. In 
Chapter 6 the logical framework matrix, as the final product developed from this 
particular research was proposed and presented. This last chapter presents a summary of 
the main findings, the overall research contribution and the limitations faced. The 
chapter will conclude this research study by providing recommendations for further 
research in the area of post-disaster reconstruction project management, and suggesting 
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how this research can be beneficially introduced to the reconstruction project stakeholder 
based for future improvements in community-based and driven reconstruction projects. 
8.2 KEY FINDINGS 
Post-disaster housing reconstruction projects are complex and they can exist in 
diverse environmental and political conditions. These projects have their own unique 
socio-cultural, religious and economic requirements, meaning that two instances of 
similar, or different, post-disaster reconstruction projects can rarely be the same. 
Therefore, each post-disaster reconstruction project needs to be dealt with in its own 
unique way to suit the context within which it operates. The contextual differences of 
these projects also mean that policy makers and practitioners of reconstruction projects 
should adapt their existing reconstruction policies to respond better to the needs of 
individual projects. A one-size-fits-all approach to reconstruction has a reduced chance 
of delivering successful projects.  
Housing reconstruction policies are effective if they are formulated based on the 
needs of the affected people. Housing reconstruction projects are owned by the affected 
people, and thus they need to have adequate participation in decision-making, and in the 
subsequent rebuilding process of their houses. Adequate participation of the affected 
population means the introduction of an adequate knowledge input from them in the 
decisions, and in the project designs, that in turn influence their future life. Post-disaster 
housing reconstruction projects planned and executed without adequate community 
participation seriously jeopardise sustainable outcomes. 
Findings in Chapter 4, 5 and 6, and discussion in Chapter 7 suggest that 
community participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects faces many challenges. 
Depending on the specific context within which post-disaster reconstruction projects are 
implemented, these challenges may originate from a range of different sources. In the 
context of Afghanistan, some government policies and the lack of a robust government 
administration system for reconstruction, the lack of adequate capacity demonstrated by 
many local as well as international aid organisations, issues related to gender inequality 
and the lack of adequate security currently pose serious challenges for community 
participation in reconstruction. Results from this research also indicate that community 
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capacity plays a crucial role in establishing the level of community engagement in 
decision making and in different phases of the actual reconstruction.  
Community cohesion is important for the success of reconstruction projects. 
Housing reconstruction projects need to be planned and their objectives agreed on, 
together with participation from the wider affected community. Rebuilding houses for a 
handful of families may not serve the fundamental purpose of rebuilding the life of a 
whole community. Housing reconstruction projects implemented, whether in situ or 
elsewhere, that adequately respond to the multifaceted challenges associated with 
rebuilding domestic dwellings, encourage affected people to return to their home 
communities after the disaster. Post-disaster reconstruction projects that are considerate 
of community needs and implemented carefully in each phase of their lifecycle can be 
more successful in addressing the identified needs of the entire community. A systematic 
review of completed reconstruction projects, along with necessary post-occupation 
assistance, is needed to ensure project sustainability.  
As discussed in previous chapters, reconstruction projects are never as 
straightforward as normal construction projects. These projects have inherent complexity 
and associated uncertainties that cannot be managed proactively without the involvement 
of the affected people. Affected communities have the answers to key questions that 
often concern experienced planners and those humanitarian organisations implementing 
projects, when developing their funding proposals for post-disaster reconstruction 
efforts. The eventual success of reconstruction projects is certainly in the hands of the 
project recipients. Agencies with demonstrable experience and knowledge of a 
participatory approach, along with proven professional integrity and ethical behaviour, 
are more likely to work effectively within the affected Afghan communities, produce 
lasting project outcomes, and leave behind a more resilient community.  
8.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
This research contributes to the current body of knowledge in two distinct ways. 
Firstly, it identifies the major challenges for community participation in post-disaster 
reconstruction projects in Afghanistan and explains their impact on project outcomes. 
Secondly, the research develops and proposes a logical framework as a pragmatic 
approach to delivering sustainable post-disaster reconstruction projects in the most 
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multifaceted and often uncertain environments. The study is unique in the context of 
Afghanistan. So far, a scientific study on such a scale, focused on exploring and 
explaining the many reasons for failure of reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, has not 
been conducted.  
This research makes a significant contribution in enhancing the awareness of the 
important relationship that exists between community participation and project success. 
It argues that project success is directly proportional to the level of community 
engagement in reconstruction, which means that the more effective the participation of 
the affected community, the higher the chance of project success. The research brings to 
light the important role that the affected communities play in the development of 
reconstruction projects and the provision of human resources, materials and equipment 
for the project. This research calls for a change in the current often-held perspective that 
affected people are powerless victims and passive receivers of humanitarian aid, to one 
of accepting and promoting the fact that they are the prime stakeholders and the actual 
owners of reconstruction projects, and that without them reconstruction projects simply 
cannot exist.  
This research develops a logical framework to support the planning and 
development of a participatory approach to post-disaster reconstruction projects in 
Afghanistan. The logical framework, although prepared specifically for community 
participation in post-disaster reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, can be adapted for 
implementation in similar contexts elsewhere in the world. The findings of this research 
provide useful insight into the many issues that may adversely affect relocation of 
affected communities, and suggests possible ways in which they can be managed more 
effectively. These findings may also be used for designing and developing population 
resettlement projects under normal circumstances.   
8.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The findings of the research are based on the data primarily collected in 
Afghanistan. The data is limited to project beneficiaries, humanitarian implementing 
organisations and donor agencies due to their continued role in reconstruction projects. 
At present, almost all reconstruction activities are funded by foreign donor organisations 
with the majority of funding for reconstruction projects expended by non-governmental 
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local and international organisations operating in Afghanistan. No data for this research 
was collected from the government agencies or private contractors in Afghanistan.  
The main focus of this research was to identify the challenges for community 
participation in reconstruction projects in Afghanistan and propose possible solutions to 
these challenges to facilitate planning and decision making at a strategic level. Therefore, 
the findings of this research are limited to activities described in column 1 and important 
assumptions in column 4 of the logframe matrix. This research does not specify how 
achievement of project objectives is measured and what means of verification needs to 
be used. Information provided in columns 3 and 4 of the logframe matrix is generic and 
does not apply to any specific situation. The choice of how achievement of project 
objectives is measured, and what means of verification are used, can be influenced by a 
number of factors such as the level of complexity involved in the project, the availability 
of recourse and knowledge of the chosen method for data collection and analysis. 
Although this research investigated a number of fundamental factors affecting 
community participation in reconstruction, it also acknowledges that there could be other 
barriers posing real threats to community participation that this study did not identify or 
cover. 
8.5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As described in this thesis, post-disaster reconstruction projects are context 
specific and a one-size-fits-all approach to project delivery does not respond adequately 
to the diverse needs of these projects in all situations. This research developed an 
understanding of the current problems for community participation and offered an 
inclusive framework for effective community involvement specific to Afghanistan, 
which could be adapted to fit the situation in other countries. The research model could 
be used for research in other disaster-prone countries and replicated with a diverse range 
of project stakeholders. This research offers a comprehensive analysis of the current 
situation in reconstruction which could be used as a foundation for further research in 
this area. The immediate recommendation this research puts forward for further research 
is to develop a set of qualitative and quantitative key performance indicators (KPIs) to 
evaluate success and appropriateness (in terms of design and impact) of community 
participation in individual phases of the project lifecycle.  
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Although this research offered some helpful insights into the current situation in 
reconstruction in Afghanistan, the research calls for further investigation to develop a 
holistic understanding of the complex nature of  reconstruction projects. As stated by 
Bradshaw (2013) any literature that adds to the limited current knowledge relating to 
reconstruction is a welcome addition.  
Other recommendations for research, and specific questions in this area of post-
disaster reconstruction project operations, include: 
In relation to the non-governmental humanitarian aid organisations: 
 How does the level of maturity of aid organisations influence donors’ 
decisions about the size of the project and the level of funding they approve 
for aid organisation? 
 How does the organisational culture of donor organisations influence 
community involvement in reconstruction?   
 Should humanitarian non-for-profit aid organisations (faith-based or secular) 
be involved in delivering the actual reconstruction activities? 
In relation to the Afghan government: 
 What are the current practices of the Afghan government in relation to 
responding to natural disasters? 
 How effective are the current practices in relation to meeting the housing 
needs of the affected people?  
 What mechanism is in place for controlling and coordinating post-disaster 
recovery and reconstruction activities, and how effective is it? 
 How can a more robust government mechanism for responding to post-
disaster recovery and reconstruction be established?  
8.6 POSSIBLE WAYS IN WHICH THE FINDINGS FROM THE 
RESEARCH MAYBE INTRODUCED INTO THE FIELD 
The findings from the research will be introduced into the field in two ways: 
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1-  Copies of the thesis will be distributed to the representatives of organisations 
who have participated in this research. The participants interviewed all 
viewed this research as making an important contribution to improving the 
current practices operating in reconstruction. Members of many large 
organisations who contributed in this research have expressed great interest 
in receiving a copy of the completed thesis. 
2- The findings from this research will be posted on the QUT e-Prints with a 
free access to anyone interested and involved in post-disaster reconstruction 
projects, academics as well as general public.  
8.7 EPILOGUE 
The UNHABITAT (2013) website notes that, “since 1992 UN-Habitat has been 
working with communities across Afghanistan placing people at the centre of decision-
making and action”. On another website (World Press 2009) it is stated that, “This 
approach, the People’s Process, makes the people more responsive and self-reliant, 
promotes their dignity, pride and sense of ownership”  
From this, it can be seen that much has been written about the resilience of the 
Afghan people. The findings of this research, in order to be meaningful and go beyond 
extending the pool of knowledge, attempt to supplement the current efforts of 
government and NGOs. The research attempts to provide a deeper understanding, 
backed by a tangible framework tool to assist those offering aid to better harness that 
resilience of people facing the aftermaths of disasters, and assure that they value-add to 
the ways in which the people can take an even greater role in planning and developing 
the habitats in which they will build their futures. 
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Appendix A 
Questionnaire Survey 
Part – 1 
1- Have you been involved in a post-disaster housing reconstruction project in the past 10 
years? 
           
 Yes  No 
 
2- If yes, what has been your role in post-disaster reconstruction?   
 
Beneficiary    Project staff    other, please specify  
 
3- In which country was the project undertaken? Name of the country   
 
4- What is your gender group?     Male    Female 
 
5- What age group do you fall in?  Under 20    21 – 30   31– 40      
            41 - 50    51 - over 
What is your highest level of education?  
  
Some high school education    High school diploma   College diploma 
Bachelor degree       Master's Degree    Doctoral Degree 
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Part – 2 
How much do you agree with the challenges for effective community participation in 
relation to the following categories? Please rate on a scale of 1- Strongly agree, 2- Agree, 3- 
Neutral, 4- Disagree and 5- Strongly disagree.  
 
 
2- Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 1 2 3 4 5 
 Unnecessary large arrival of international aid into the affected area □  □  □  □  □  
 Inadequate understanding of the principles of community participation □  □  □  □  □  
 Sponsor lack the knowledge about local capacity □  □  □  □  □  
 International donors urgent completion of housing reconstruction 
projects 
□  □  □  □  □  
 Inappropriate behaviour of local and international employees towards 
the affected beneficiaries 
□  □  □  □  □  
 Disregard of local bodies’ (local council) involvement in reconstruction □  □  □  □  □  
 Lack of or low competency □  □  □  □  □  
 Corruption □  □  □  □  □  
 
  
1- Government 1 2 3 4 5 
 Ignoring local councils when planning housing reconstruction □  □  □  □  □  
 Lack of government support in the area to speedily restore and establish 
land ownership 
□  □  □  □  □  
 Difficulty in land acquisition due to the government’s slow 
administrative process 
□  □  □  □  □  
 Pressure from government on donors and local officials for quick results □  □  □  □  □  
 Government agencies’ attitude that they are the single responsible body 
for reconstruction 
□  □  □  □  □  
 Hasty decisions made by government  □  □  □  □  □  
 Government and professionals demonstrate no confidence in the 
capacity of affected populations 
□  □  □  □  □  
 Government obsession to control development programmes □  □  □  □  □  
 The exclusion of renters and low-income families from government 
reconstruction programmes 
□  □  □  □  □  
 Corruption □  □  □  □  □  
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3- Affected people (affected beneficiaries) 1 2 3 4 5 
 Members of the affected community lack commitment to participate in 
reconstruction □  □  □  □  □  
 Low literacy level and the lack of necessary knowledge and skills in the 
affected community 
□  □  □  □  □  
 Lack of incentive/encouragement for beneficiaries to participate □  □  □  □  □  
 Unfamiliar technology and construction materials □  □  □  □  □  
 Loss of confidence in affected people’s personal competence □  □  □  □  □  
 Affected community is under economic or other form of stress □  □  □  □  □  
 Difficulty in mobilising affected people after a major disaster □  □  □  □  □  
 Racial boundaries and discrimination towards minority groups □  □  □  □  □  
 Weak collective capacity and a Lack of strong community organisations 
to represent the needs of affected communities at local and central 
government level 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
4- Gender related 1 2 3 4 5 
 Ignoring gender livelihood related issues □  □  □  □  □  
 General misconception about women as being incapable of contributing 
to actual housing reconstruction 
□  □  □  □  □  
 Weak representation of female headed families by the community 
representatives and their marginalisation from relief aid and 
reconstruction 
□  □  □  □  □  
 A culture of violation of women’s rights in society □  □  □  □  □  
 Socio-cultural and religious restrictions on women’s participation in 
social affairs 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
5- Transparency 1 2 3 4 5 
 Lack of adequate information about  reconstruction plans and government 
regulations □  □  □  □  □  
 Misleading information  □  □  □  □  □  
 Absence of a clear process for spending project money □  □  □  □  □  
 Participatory approach is not supported firmly by policies and practices □  □  □  □  □  
 Misuse of project funding □  □  □  □  □  
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6- Security 1 2 3 4 5 
 Difficulty organising a representative and accountable community 
group in the face of futility, hostility and distrust 
□  □  □  □  □  
 Regional military conflict and presence of landmines and 
unexploded ordnances (UXOs) 
□  □  □  □  □  
 Militarisation of humanitarian aid by foreign military forces □  □  □  □  □  
 Weak central government and presence of illegal armed groups 
and warlords 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
Are there other challenges for community participation you are aware of?   
Yes  
No 
If “yes” please state using the box below. 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time!
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Appendix B 
Questionnaire Results 
Demographic Details 
 
 
 
 
82% 
18% 
Demographic Details - Respondents' Gender 
Male
Female
44% 
56% 
Demographic Details - Respondents' Language 
English
Dari
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44% 
37% 
19% 
Demographic Details - Respondents' Role in 
Reconstruction 
Beneficiary
Project
Staff
Other
27% 
39% 
28% 
6% 
Demographic Details - Respondents' Age (Year) 
21 - 30
31 - 40
41 - 50
50 - over
1% 
7% 
20% 
52% 
18% 
1% 1% 
Demographic Details - Respondents' Level of Education 
Some High
School
education
High School
Diploma
College
Diploma
Bachelor
Degree
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Appendix C 
Interview Brief 
Interview Brief 
The purpose of this study is to develop a Logical Framework to help Non-
governmental Organisations (NGOs) and members of the communities stricken by a 
disaster to effectively participate in post-disaster housing reconstruction projects.  
The review and analysis of the contemporary literature on the nature and outcomes of 
post-disaster reconstruction projects (conducted in 2010-2011) revealed that in the 
majority of cases, reconstruction projects have failed due to the lack of a meaningful 
involvement of the affected communities in the process of reconstruction. Policy-
makers, International funding bodies, NGOs and all other stakeholders in general 
appreciate the value of community participation. They also understand that involving 
the affected populations in reconstruction is an integral requirement for delivering 
successful project outcomes. However, the question of “how” to involve members of 
the affected communities more effectively in housing rebuilding remains uncertain. 
To identify the specific factors that to date have often adversely impacted community 
participation and to determine their relevant measures, a comprehensive review of 
the current literature was conducted. The findings from the literature review were 
then incorporated into an online opinion survey which was launched in November 
2011. The qualitative findings from the literature and quantitative analysis of the data 
from the survey revealed 37 measures which posed major challenges for community 
participation. Factor analysis was conducted on the 37 measures and as a result, this 
large number of measures was reduced to a final set of nine factors. These nine 
factors and their associated contributory components are shown in the table below. 
 
Factors Measures contributing to this Factor include but are not limited to: 
Transparency of 
Reconstruction Process 
 
 
1. Absence of a clear process for spending project money 
2. Misleading information 
3. Lack of adequate information about  reconstruction plans and government regulations 
4. Misuse of project funding 
5. Participatory approach is not supported firmly by policies and practices 
 
Speed of Reconstruction 
 
6. Pressure from government on donors and local officials for quick results 
7. International donors' urgent completion of housing reconstruction projects 
8. Government agencies’ attitude that they are the single responsible body for 
reconstruction 
9. Hasty decisions made by government 
10. Racial boundaries and discrimination towards minority groups 
 
Community Capacity and 
Commitment 
11. Low literacy level and the lack of necessary knowledge and skills in the affected 
community 
12. Lack of incentive/encouragement for beneficiaries to participate 
13. Members of the affected community lack commitment to participate in reconstruction 
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Interview Questions: 
1. How does lack of transparency in funding affect 
community participation in housing reconstruction? 
2. How does haste in reconstruction affect community 
participation? 
3. Do you think that community education is an 
important part of the rebuilding process? 
4. Do you think women’s participation is important in 
reconstruction and should it be encouraged? 
5. How important is for the NGOs to have an 
understanding of the community when implementing 
their project? How does this encourage community 
participation? 
6. How does a long waiting time or delay in getting 
land for rebuilding housing impact on the 
effectiveness community participation? 
7. Does security or lack of security make a difference 
to a reconstruction project? 
14. Sponsor's lack of knowledge about local capacity 
 
 
Gender Issues 
 
 
15. Socio-cultural and religious restrictions on women’s participation in social affairs 
16. Ignoring gender livelihood related issues 
17. A culture of violation of women’s rights in society 
18. General misconception that women are incapable of contributing to actual housing 
reconstruction 
19. Weak representation of female headed families by the community representatives and 
their marginalisation from relief aid and reconstruction 
 
 
NGO's Level of Competency 
 
20. Corruption in Non-government organisation 
21. NGO's lack of or low competency 
22. Inadequate understanding of the principles of community participation 
23. Disregard of local bodies’ (local council) involvement in reconstruction 
24. Unnecessary large arrival of international aid into the affected area 
 
Community Inherent 
Challenges 
 
 
25. Difficulty in mobilising affected people after a major disaster 
26. Affected community is under economic or other form of stress 
27. Loss of confidence in affected people’s personal competence 
28. Weak collective capacity and a Lack of strong community organisations to represent the 
needs of affected communities at local and central government level 
 
Land Acquisition Process 
 
29. Difficulty in land acquisition due to the government’s slow administrative process 
30. Lack of government support in the area to speedily restore and establish land 
ownership 
31. Ignoring local councils when planning housing reconstruction 
 
Government Policies and 
Practices 
 
32. The exclusion of renters and low-income families from government reconstruction 
programmes 
33. Government and professionals demonstrate no confidence in the capacity of affected 
populations 
34. Government obsession to control development programmes 
 
Adequacy of Security  
35. Weak central government and presence of illegal armed groups and warlords 
36. Difficulty organising a representative and accountable community group in the face of 
futility, hostility and distrust 
37. Regional military conflict and presence of landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs) 
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8. Do you think that government policies can challenge 
community participation in rebuilding projects? 
9. Can you tell me about a time the community got 
involved in one of your projects? 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT RESEARCH PROJECT 
Interview 
Strategic Guidelines for Effective Stakeholder Participation in Post-disaster Reconstruction Projects 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1100001200 
RESEARCH TEAM  
Principal Researcher: Zabihullah Sadiqi, PhD student, QUT 
Associate Researchers: Dr William (Vaughan) Coffey, Lecturer, QUT 
Associate Professor Bambang Trigunarsyah, , QUT 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of PhD for Zabihullah Sadiqi.  
The purpose of this project is to develop a Logical Framework for effective stakeholder participation in post-disaster 
reconstruction projects that can help all major stakeholders, including people affected by disaster, to participate effectively in 
all stages of the post-disaster reconstruction project planning and development. 
You are invited to participate in this project because you have experienced the effect of recent disaster in your area and have 
been involved in the reconstruction of your house. Your participation is important for this study, because through the 
experiences and deeper understanding you have acquired as a participant/implementation agent of a post-disaster 
reconstruction project you can greatly assist this study to answer the critical research questions now posed. 
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you can withdraw from the project 
without comment or penalty. Your decision to participate, or not participate, will in no way impact upon your current or 
future relationship with QUT. 
 
Your participation will involve a telephone interview at a time convenient for you that will take approximately 60 minutes of 
your time. Interview questions will include: 
  Please refer to the attached interview brief  containing nine interview questions 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
It is expected that this project will benefit you by making a framework available to help you and other agencies participate 
effectively in rebuilding your own house and the houses of other people after a disaster. There is no cost associated with your 
participation. The researcher will approach you for the interview when it is most convenient for you. 
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your participation in this project. 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially.  You will have the opportunity to verify your comments and 
responses prior to the final inclusion. Please note that non-identifiable data collected in this project may be used as comparative 
data in future projects 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
Due to the nature of the project a verbal consent mechanism will be used. 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If have any questions or require any further information please contact one of the research team members below. 
Zabihullah Sadiqi – Student Dr Vaughan Coffey –Supervisor   
Built Environment and Engineering – School of Urban 
Development 
Built Environment and Engineering – School of Urban 
Development 
  
Phone:  +61( 0) 434 523 777 Phone :   + 61 7 3138 1002   
Email :  zabihullah.sadiqi@qut.edu.au  Email: v.coffey@qut.edu.au    
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  However, if you do have any concerns or 
complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the QUT Research Ethics Unit on +61 7 3138 5123 or 
email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the research project and can facilitate a 
resolution to your concern in an impartial manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your information. 
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Appendix D 
Participants Quotes (Chapter 5) 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on culture of dependency) 
Condensed meaning 
I mean it is the creation of dependency culture and that is a huge 
problem in South Sudan. I don't know in Afghanistan, but in other 
parts of the world that is real problem and that is one of the damages 
that long term aid has done, created the dependency culture. Where 
people who would have done things now don't do things. For 
example, in Bangladesh, where communities may organise to 
organise their flood walling and just do that of their own volition, 
don’t do it anymore. it is really, really hard one and it’s one of the 
classic cases where aid, as I said, has done more harm than good in 
the creating of dependency culture so that is an incredibly hard bit. 
(P12) 
I remember I asked members of a community why they were not 
cleaning their water canal, “Well, we are waiting for an NGO to 
clean if for us,” they replied. And there were around 20 men sitting 
around doing nothing. (P7) 
In our project there was a real problem about builders with integrity. 
You know they didn’t do a good job. The engineers didn't necessarily 
have the right skill set to make sure it is all going well and then there 
is the culture that doesn’t allow you to challenge somebody else; you 
know the whole thing about losing face. We also had a problem with 
people not feeling that they could challenge the respected building 
contractor because who were you to say you were not doing a good 
job. (P11) 
Aid agencies or government or the UN or well meaning people from 
within the country affected or externally and they have the power and 
too often the responders assume that those affected don't have the 
power and of course those people who want to survive and have the 
power within them and want to keep the power and certainly it is a 
power imbalance and that is one of the huge problems. (P12) 
Unfortunately in the past 30 years and as result of prolonged war we 
have lost this value. People have become increasingly reliant on the 
aid from NGOs. It has become a normal practice to mention with such 
pride that other countries are helping us. In other part of the world 
people say, "We don’t want aid, we want to trade".   In the past 
people would volunteer to clean up their water canals and take part in 
other sorts of public work but now people do not even want to 
participate in the rebuilding of their own house. Unfortunately 
because of the long war and the presence of so many NGOs and the 
aid, people have lost such values, they no longer have the devotion. 
(P3) 
But on the other hand I know there are also places where people 
expect the NGO to do everything. (P13) 
Long term aid projects create 
culture of dependency. 
Affected people have no 
voice to challenge the 
contractor leading to 
ineffective participation. 
Long term aid projects create 
culture of dependency. 
Perceiving affected 
communities as victim of a 
disaster and doing the work 
for them rather than with 
them making them 
dependent on external aid. 
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It is this culture of being the victim and receiving, and having the 
right someone does everything for you. We have really damped people 
down and we have really disabled people in looking after themselves. 
There are a lot of communities out there, who wouldn't just move a 
finger even for their own betterment even if they could something in 
the situation, just because there is that NGO. And that is part of the 
problem we seen in Kashmir where people have, since the earthquake, 
really lost all self-respect and all self-drive to change the situation, 
which is really appalling because people have come and done 
everything for them. (P15) 
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Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Lack of livelihood opportunities) 
Condensed meaning 
One of the challenges we had in our project was that people wouldn't 
go back to their communities because there was nothing in the 
communities. So it wasn't just the challenge of rebuilding houses, it 
was actually there wasn't any boreholes, there weren't proper schools. 
The teachers didn't want to live there. And I guess, you know, they 
had to start their livelihood again whereas before when they are in 
the camps they are much closer to a town so they had access to more 
livelihood and more resources. You know, it is certainly everything is 
so much farther, nothing is there and that was definitely really a 
challenge. (P14) 
This is a multifaceted issue, there is the security factor that people 
don't want to go to their original place and then there are factors 
such economic and social. For the displaced population to return to 
their original place, first of all they should have access to 
employment, adequate education and health services. Once these 
basic needs are provided for, affected people would return to their 
places. (P9) 
If you are the only one helping them now then how about later when 
the reconstruction is done? Who is going to build the school and who 
is going to give them help with the agricultural tools etc? 
Reconstruction is not just about taking only that first step, I mean 
rebuilding houses. It is the entire process where you are considering a 
community. (P10) 
You need to recognise especially in a post-disaster situation, that 
people are trying to get back on their feet with livelihood and they 
have other things to contend with. They can’t just drop everything and 
just focus on the housing project. (P11) 
Livelihood issues and security really play a vital role. People will 
return to their original places if they are given some sort of livelihood 
opportunity and it is safe for them. They will not return to their 
original location if there is no livelihood opportunity and if there is no 
security. No- they will not return. (P3) 
Well no, life has not returned exactly to what it was before the 
disaster, but there has been significant improvement. We have 
pictures of our project team members taken when they first arrived in 
the affected area. In the pictures, they can be seen having lunch and 
the only thing [food] they have is bread that they had brought with 
them. There was nothing in the area; they couldn’t find any food 
because there was no market there. But now there is a market and 
there are people living there. Having said that, however, more is 
needed to be done to return the community to what it was before the 
disaster. (P2) 
Look, rebuilding just the houses does not always encourage affected 
people to return to their original places. We have witnessed that 
people often returned to places where there were other services such 
as health, water, school and some sort of livelihood there. People 
won’t simply return because you’re building them two or three rooms. 
(P7) 
I felt it myself when I met with the people of Nawzad district in their 
current location. It seemed that the majority of them didn't want to 
return to Nawzad because they had already built houses “here”. They 
had jobs so they didn’t want to return to their original places. (P7) 
The availability of livelihood 
opportunity and access to 
services has greater priority 
for the affected people than 
rebuilding their houses. 
Livelihood issues are equally 
important to be considered 
when reconstruction projects 
are designed. 
Affected population need to 
have access to sources of 
livelihood to be able to 
continue with their life and 
participate in rebuilding and 
developing a sustainable 
community. 
People have greater concern 
about their livelihood 
opportunities than rebuilding 
their house. 
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People consider their life in the long term. Afghan life and the social 
structure of Afghan people is mainly tribal and a vast majority of 
them are farmers. During the harvest season people often leave their 
houses, go the field and erect their tents there. The even take their 
families with them during the harvest period and remain there until 
the harvest is collected. At this time people leave aside all other work 
including rebuilding their houses because they understand that 
rebuilding a room or two can be done later, but if they miss out on the 
harvest this year, they will have to wait for a whole year until the next 
harvest season. They prioritise their activities based on their 
importance. Harvest and crops has the meaning of life for the village 
people. They work hard all year round in the field and wait for the 
harvest period to arrive. This is a critical time for them and in fact 
their entire life depends on it. (P6) 
I found in our project, that although there were low literacy levels, 
people really wanted to be involved in the reconstruction process 
themselves. As I said in other areas I have heard people say, “If you 
can help us get our livelihood back on track we can build our own 
houses.” (P13) 
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Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Lack or loss of personal resources and 
skills) 
Condensed meaning 
If they have lost their house and their land, it is a bit like all the 
Afghan refugees still stuck in Pakistan, so it means a lot of the 
younger people have never worked in a field, so how can they go back 
being farmers in the midst of Helmand. They have grown up in the 
refugee camp, they cannot, you know, they haven't got the skills they 
need to actually go back to farming. So, a lot of these people return to 
the big cities and hope to find some work and there is only a limited 
number of chawkidars (doormen’s) that the world can utilise, and it 
makes the situation pretty dreadful. (P15) 
If a community is totally destroyed, then it is hard where you start and 
I think part of the problem that we “NGOs” also have with projects is 
that our reconstruction projects are very focused on one thing or the 
other. (P15) 
It is very true, when a disaster happens people lose confidence, 
because the disaster takes everything away from them, all their 
belongings and the house that they have worked for years to build. 
(P6) 
Indeed after a disaster people lose their belongings, their economy is 
shuttered and they really need a hand to hold. In such a situation they 
need urgent assistance and also help to be able to rebuild their 
houses. (P4) 
The longer the affected people remain in other places the more 
difficult it becomes for them to return to their original places. (P6) 
The longer the affected 
people remain in temporary 
locations the harder for them 
to re-integrate in their 
original home communities 
due to the regular loss of 
their inherent skills. Affected 
communities are unable to 
rebuild their houses due to 
the total destruction of their 
houses and loss of family 
assets.    
Mixed opinions whether 
literacy or lack of it plays an 
important role in 
reconstruction. 
A low level of literacy alone is not always a huge issue for 
reconstruction. I understand that people in villages and in remote 
areas are mostly illiterate but they have some excellent ideas for 
developing their country and community. They also know how to 
rebuild their houses. I often travel to remote villages in Afghanistan. I 
have much stronger trust in those so called “illiterate villagers” than 
in the literate city people. I agree that literacy plays a vital role in 
communication, but it doesn't mean illiteracy is an impediment to 
implementing reconstruction projects. (P9) 
I found in our project, that although there were low literacy levels, 
people really wanted to be involved in the reconstruction process 
themselves. (P13) 
A low level of literacy does affect community participation and does 
affect also the relationship with the NGO’s representative and the 
community per se, because if they would not understand what is 
written on that paper or what your projects are and how that project 
would impact their life after 3 months, 6 months or whenever, the 
project is over. (P10) 
This is a huge issue, often communities with a low level of education 
or skills find it hard to understand the objectives of the reconstruction 
projects. (P8) 
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Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Loss of community cohesion) 
Condensed meaning 
When a community has been displaced or they chose to displace 
themselves then all community cohesion often will go unless they 
move en mass. But often, you know, people might relocate to live with 
relatives and be very, very scattered so while is community in those 
situation. hmm, So all of the structure that was previously there in 
terms of decision making at community level they have is gone, 
because the community isn't there anymore .(P13) 
When something was hit indiscriminately where maybe 50% of the 
housing got damaged and 50% stayed, if you move half of the 
community they will also have lost that social cohesion and their 
extended families.(P10) 
In the tsunami many of the governments issued no-construction zones 
and people who previously lived on the seashores, particularly the 
fishing communities, would have to relocate onto other areas that the 
government dictated, that they have no say over it.(P13) 
The problem is that they have nothing left to start rebuilding their 
houses with. Men in the family have been killed, and that is why they 
cannot participate in rebuilding housing. They might somehow come 
out of the situation but it will take them longer and they might not be 
able to fully recover without the help from external sources.(P4) 
I think on the basic level, unless if you have sort of killed all the adult 
men in the society, which obviously is a possibility, people have got 
certain skills, otherwise they wouldn't live in the area.(P15) 
They will have lost their relatives (father, brother, sister) and I think 
taking the survivors of the disaster immediately back to their original 
place will affect their mental status because that will remind them of 
their dead relatives.(P1)  
In some cases just this community would be so desperate, also 
traumatised by the disaster experience and are just so grateful for any 
assistance that they can have.(P13) 
When I met with the people of Nawzad district, the majority of them 
didn't want to return to Nawzad. Because some people had already 
built houses there. They had jobs so they didn’t want to return.(P5) 
It is very true when a disaster happens people lose confidence, 
because the disaster takes everything away from them, all their 
belongings and all their many years of hard work to build a house are 
all gone. There is a clear example of this problem now in Kabul. 
People who have been displaced by war have all come to Kabul or 
gone to other cities because the community they used to live in doesn’t 
exist anymore. Perhaps that is one of the many reasons why the 
population of Kabul has jumped from half a million to more than 5 
million in almost a decade.(P6) 
If you counted on 50 families and 50 houses to be rebuilt because 
there were 50 families over there, but the land issue was not solved 
until March when you already got the funds and you wanted to 
implement that project and in March you don’t have 50 families 
anymore and you can hardly find 20, right, so by all means you are in 
big trouble because it is not only about the 50 houses it is about what 
you are going to do with 20 families Is that a sufficient investment? Is 
that good for the community participation per se? Because they are 
going to be isolated. (P10) 
Disasters force people to 
relocate or be relocated and 
as result community 
cohesion is destroyed. 
Community social life is 
destabilised and its normal 
operations are disrupted by 
the significant losses that 
disasters inflict both on 
community social structure 
and human capital.  
Once settled in their new 
locations affected people do 
not always want to return to 
their original communities 
meaning that the community 
structure they were once part 
of is no longer there. 
Community cohesion and the 
existence of a strong 
community structure and 
decision making body is vital 
for planning reconstruction 
projects. A cohesive and 
well structured community 
has greater capacity to 
participate in reconstruction. 
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I think quite often you need to take people back to the location you 
almost need a critical mass because there isn't much point if you just 
get a handful of families coming back cause they not going to be 
happy.(P11) 
In Afghanistan, communities and their social structure is formed on 
the solid foundation of ethnicity, language and socio-cultural 
background. Therefore, implementing a project in such places is more 
successful because these communities have one united voice and they 
would normally allow projects that are agreed upon by all people in 
the community.(P8) 
In such a situation we need to find out where the affected people have 
gone and bring them back.(P6) 
 
Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Gender issues) 
Condensed meaning 
So again, like in Afghanistan, you have quite a lot of challenges about 
involvement of women in terms of being publicly present in the 
community, so it was quite difficult to get them into community 
meetings.(P14) 
We had the designs based on all the good science or the good 
engineering and we would discuss it with the communities but many 
times it was just the men that were present but we were really aware 
that often the women are the primary users of the project.(P14) 
Yes, this is a real problem in Afghanistan; we have educated women 
who can go out and we have less educated women who live in villages 
and usually work at home or in the field.(P9)  
Afghanistan, as a minimally developed country has huge problems 
with gender inequity. I can tell that women have as little as 5% 
involvement in the design of many projects and that is why these 
projects are less successful and often held up as incomplete.(P1) 
I think there are different problems in different cultures. I think it is 
interesting in some cultures women do the building work.(P11)  
The thing is it is so different in different cultures. Quite often in some 
of the parts in Africa the women are quite vocal especially when it 
comes to the household things whereas in the other culture where 
people... where women will not necessarily get involved.(P11) 
Gender issues and their related problems are different from one 
region to the other. For example, in the Northern region we didn't 
have much problem with talking directly to women, however, in the 
central region like in the remote villages of Parwan or Logar the 
situation is very different. People there are more sensitive to gender 
related issues. 
Every culture and every situation is specific and is distinct, but I don’t 
think a project would be good enough if there is no women’s voice 
.(P2) 
Women’s participation in 
reconstruction is largely 
uninvited in Afghanistan. 
The severity of gender 
problems vary widely from 
one location to another. They 
are very specific to their 
locations. 
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Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes Socio-cultural barriers) 
Condensed meaning 
I don’t think a project would be good enough if there is no women’s 
voice.(P10) 
I think, quite generally, it is really important for women being 
involved, particularly in the design because it tends to be women that 
are the main users.(P11) 
These issues badly impact on women’s participation, not only in 
reconstruction, but in all spheres of life. Women must be involved 
effectively in reconstruction.(P3) 
Talking about post-disaster projects and women's participation, here 
comes the culture issues: first, whether male members of the family 
really want to sit home and let their women go out and work with the 
male builders outside. Of course males will not allow that.(P8) 
On many construction sites I visited, women were working as paid 
labourers and they were definitely a part of the whole reconstruction 
process. In other areas that won’t be so appropriate and in some it 
would be much harder for the women to be involved overtly in the 
construction process.(P13) 
There are different problems in different cultures. In some cultures 
women do the building, in others they don’t. I mean... I am thinking 
about Afghanistan. I think it might be hard for women to challenge if 
they see something in the building process go wrong.(P11) 
It is a challenge because people don’t believe that men should be 
talking to women.(P5) 
We have come across situations in our project when the affected 
community was not happy to have women's participation in decision 
making and during the needs assessment to collect their opinions and 
needs for inclusion in the project planning. In some cases we had 
women's participation but in others it was not feasible.(P6) 
If women become more empowered that will change family dynamics 
and possibly because women would want perhaps to be out working, 
the men feel at risk, they feel undermined because they have got vocal 
wives or mothers or whatever. Yes, it will change the whole dynamics 
at the family level, at the community level and we have to be aware of 
that and prepare for that consequence.(P13) 
I remember during the evaluation of our project where women's needs 
were ignored because the assessment teams were men, and men were 
too embarrassed to ask questions of women... and I have had a man 
who was too embarrassed to ask anybody else, so women's hygiene 
needs were ignored and that was the problem after the earthquake... 
and so you hear all these kind of stories all the time and that is not ok. 
That is not acceptable.(P12) 
Unfortunately, women's role in reconstruction is not as visible as it 
should be therefore these projects do not meet their intended 
objectives because they do not fully cater for the basic needs of the 
wider female population.(P6) 
I don’t think I have been rejected in any way because you do not or 
over step your limits. So, in many ways, if an NGO is aware of the 
Women’s participation is 
important for the success of 
reconstruction projects. 
Due to cultural restrictions in 
some locations, there are 
fewer opportunities for 
women to participate in 
community activities than 
for men. 
The lack of women’s 
participation in 
reconstruction results in their 
basic needs being ignored. 
Reconstruction projects can 
be affected if they are not 
considerate of the 
community culture. 
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cultural sensitivity, yes, they can find ways around it and have that 
women's participation.(P10) 
There are issues of culture, tradition and religion that need to be 
considered very carefully.(P4) 
It is not right to do anything that is not in line with the community 
culture or clashes with the community cultural norms, like men going 
and knocking on women's doors and meeting with them.(P5) 
There are some projects where women do better than men, but I think 
your society is half male, half female. Whether your religion likes it or 
not, women have an important role to play. I think our projects need 
to recognise that. It is not always easy to do that within the confines 
of the religion.(P11) 
 
Natural Unit 
 (Participants’ quotes on inequity) 
Condensed meaning 
One of the big issues and problems in our planet is that women are 
second class in all societies, in the UK you know they are paid less 
than the man and that should change because that is inherently 
unfair.(P12)  
Again communities are different in their thinking and perception of 
the women's role. We may have women's participation but at the end 
of the day, men's decisions will have more weight than the decisions 
made by women.(P6) 
No, they weren't asked. The design was obviously as usual in 
Afghanistan, you have the meetings with the elders and the men of the 
village. The women weren't part of it because the engineers who came 
around to do these discussions were men. So no one actually talked to 
women about the design because, you know. Of course if you were 
somewhere in Helmand or whatever, you [men] would not be invited 
to [talk] to the women.(P15) 
You could definitely get a lot of good things in terms of where should 
we locate taps, where is it convenient, that sort of thing, but some of 
the more complex sort of issues... perhaps about pipes passing 
through people's land and you know water being available for more 
than one community, wasn't always as easy to kind of gauge their 
opinion, because I think... not just because of lack of education but 
[women] not being used to being asked their opinion was sometimes 
quite challenging.(P14) 
Women make up more than half of the society. It is very important to 
let women participate in reconstruction projects and their opinion 
and ideas about the housing reconstruction must be sought.(P4) 
We talk about half of the society and their rights – indeed, statistically 
women make half of the population. We must consider their rights as 
the right of a human. Very often, widow’s opinions are not embedded 
in the projects, no one asks them what they actually need: How can 
we help you? Or what can we do together to help you? Often 
decisions are made for them not with them.(P6) 
A simple example would be the literacy training project for the 
affected communities. The training needs to target both men and 
women. The project should not be only for men. Men can go to 
school, women cannot. So training opportunities should be given to 
Although women make up 
more than half of the entire 
human society, they are often 
unfairly discriminated 
against and their role in 
reconstruction is largely 
ignored. In communities that 
are strongly male dominated, 
women are represented 
weakly, holding no power in 
decision making. They only 
have a token presence rather 
than true participation in 
discussions.  
Appendix D 
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 268 
the women and training should be given at their place, in accordance 
with their culture and social norms.(P1) 
 
Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Misconception) 
Condensed meaning 
Afghan people have always argued that women do not think logically 
(naqes el aqal) and this argument in itself is an illogical argument. 
(P6) 
Gender issues of course have negative impact on women's 
participation and unfortunately there is this perception that women 
are not capable of contributing in reconstruction but in reality it is 
not so.(P2) 
No, they weren't asked. The design was obviously... as usual in 
Afghanistan you have the meetings with the elders and the men of the 
village. The women weren't part of it because the engineers who came 
around to do these discussions were men. So no one actually talked to 
women about the design.(P15) 
A lot of houses in the South for example, from a medical perspective 
we have seen a lot of women with lung damage. Why? Because of the 
traditional way of building the kitchen. The problem is that the way it 
was constructed they had such a big back draft that the women were 
inhaling smoke all the time and therefore had severe lung damage. 
(P15) 
The needs of women are not always known to men and that is why no 
attention is paid to them, but women know their needs because they 
are significantly important for them.(P5) 
If you build the house, it is, the women who are always there. The 
men are in the field most of the time so in the Afghan society women 
don't get out very much.(15) 
Women must be involved effectively in reconstruction, but their 
participation is not given real importance.(P3) 
Afghanistan is not progressing because half of its population, the 
women, are not involved in reconstruction, they are sitting home and 
nobody is asking them for their opinion.(P9) 
I think the other challenge we had really was that although we hired 
women, as I said, specifically to do community liaison with the 
community women, they themselves were... you know... had some sort 
of gender perception about what women should and shouldn't be 
involved in.(P14) 
There is a general 
misconception that women 
are not capable of being 
effective actors in 
reconstruction. 
Although women are the 
main users and they spend 
most of their time at their 
homes, they are not always 
consulted when important 
decisions are made about 
housing design. 
In some places women may 
themselves think they need 
not be involved in 
reconstruction. 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix D 
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 269 
Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Lack of professional competence in NGOs) 
Condensed meaning 
Lack of capacity does have its impact on the level of community 
participation. People often do not want to cooperate with such NGOs. 
Well, there are always some people who would cooperate regardless 
of the quality of the NGO, maybe for their own personal gains and 
aims but the wider population will not. (P2) 
I don’t think anyone of us would like anyone from outside to come 
into our house, break in and build something that most probably 
would not be needed. (P10) 
I mean Indonesia was really, I would say a bit crazy, because actually 
there was a lot of money for that disaster, so I think in a way it was a 
good thing because the communities knew there were a lot of 
resources available. (P14) 
We are doing something at the moment in terms our programme 
where we want to establish minimum standards and not just for the 
NGO but for the public sector because there are a lot of NGOs. 
Everybody gets involved in the big game because there is money. 
(P15) 
After the collapse of the Taliban when NGOs flooded to Afghanistan 
and many more were created locally, funds were given to them 
without first checking their capacities, and as result billions of dollars 
of aid money were wasted. Reconstruction projects didn't respond to 
the specific needs of the affected communities.(P2) 
NGOs that lack operational 
capacity fail to encourage 
participation from the wider 
community. 
Availability of large sums of 
money after a disaster. 
Lack of good standards in 
NGOs. 
Reconstruction projects can 
fail if they are implemented 
by incompetent NGOs.  
 
Natural Unit 
 (Participants’ quotes on Lack of transparency) 
Condensed meaning 
We have seen, and we have the experience, many NGOs have 
surveyed exactly the same location, done needs assessment but none 
has ever given positive or negative feedback or a response to the 
affected population, disappointing a large proportion of the affected 
people. (P6) 
Lack of transparency impacts negatively on the effectiveness of 
community participation and it damages trust. People do not 
participate in projects that they do not trust would really benefit them. 
(P1)  
To answer your question, the first impact of lack of transparency on 
community participation is that it damages trust. People stop trusting 
the NGO and the project. (P8) 
NGOs often come to a community, hold several meetings, take 
people's time, and once they leave, they never return to implement 
their projects. (P6)  
When we first started our project, the community had a negative 
impression about us. They were telling us that we were thieves, and 
we were there just to fill our pockets but not to help the affected 
people. (P4) 
If you simply go and use the knowledge of the community and their 
information and their goodness and will, but at the end of the day you 
do not come back with the project, but you divert your project to 
Affected people do not trust 
responding humanitarian aid 
organisations that have 
opaque reconstruction 
processes.  Aid organisations 
with inadequate capacity 
have severely damaged the 
trust people once had in 
them.  
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something doing something then you are not building a bridge, you 
are not going to the community, you are opening spaces [creating a 
divide] which would mean a long time to be brought together. (P10) 
Of course transparency is important for improving trust relating to 
people. (P12) 
 
Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Unrealistic promises) 
Condensed meaning 
Fulfilling what a project promises is of the utmost importance and is 
fundamental to building trust between the NGO and the affected 
people. (P4)  
Affected people have increasingly become suspicious about the aim of 
such projects, and unfortunately in Afghanistan that is the main 
problem, a huge distance has been created between NGOs and the 
affected people because of the lack of transparency and it is the cause 
of most failed projects. (P5) 
NGOs implementing reconstruction projects must have a very 
transparent policy; unrealistic promises should never be made. They 
should not tell people that the project will take only 2 to 3 months 
when they are in the initial design phase and haven’t even got their 
budget approved. (P3) 
My strong belief is that if the community gets to know that someone is 
working for them from the very beginning, and there is a commitment 
that what they are assessing, what they are evaluating, and that the 
project they are doing for them would work to a certain extent, and 
not be a complete lie, and not be a statistic, and will not be left on 
papers, then yes, you already have half of the community ready to 
help you to have a successful project. (P10) 
I definitely think if NGOs can be clear on their objectives, and refrain 
from making unrealistic promises, and listen to the affected people 
and not ignore them, the community will definitely support them. (P5) 
In our case we are talking about rebuilding housing and we are 
talking about provision of permanent shelter. I am not sure how an 
NGO can tell people how much money they have got for their project 
if they haven’t even completed their needs assessment yet. They 
haven’t even got their funding proposal submitted because they are in 
the planning phase. (P6) 
Reconstruction projects that 
are not transparent enough 
damage NGOs’ relationships 
with the affected 
communities. NGOs very 
often make unrealistic 
promises to win people’s 
support so that their project 
proposal can be 
substantiated.  
 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Confusion) 
Condensed meaning 
No they [people] don’t, I mean I personally wouldn't want to 
[participate] either because it is natural you want to understand what 
is going on there... and I think people are quite aware nowadays, 
probably even more than the past, that there are some really good 
NGOs and there are some bad NGOs... and I think people sort of say, 
“Well someone has given some money to help me. What is happening 
with that money? How much of that money is coming my way? What 
is the motivation of people behind it? Why are they coming and 
Affected people need to 
know the process to be able 
to effectively participate in 
reconstruction. 
NGOs that lack the required 
competency are less 
transparent when 
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wanting to help us? I think there is a lot of mistrust, unless you are 
really, really transparent. (P15) 
In Afghanistan, the biggest issue is that due to the low competency of 
NGOs, entire reconstruction projects are often subcontracted, 
sometimes even multiple times, and as a result transparency is 
substantially reduced. So often, projects are not implemented by the 
NGOs who were initially awarded them; they are “sold” or 
subcontracted to others, sometimes up to four times. (P9) 
When it is clear for the affected people what the project will deliver 
and that the outcome will benefit them, then yes, they will participate 
and it is the responsibility of the NGO to provide a detailed 
explanation of the project to people and try to work with them and 
make sure they understand the objectives of the projects. (P5) 
Affected people need to know the process otherwise they will think, 
“Well, you have been here for such a long time now. What has 
happened? We still haven't got a house.” I think people need to know 
exactly what the process is: Where do I register? What happens then 
when I am registered/ When will I get any instructions? Will someone 
come and look at my land on how to reconstruct what I need? Will 
they only build a standard house or is there some flexibility to make it 
really individual? (P15) 
People will participate in the project if the objectives of the project 
are explained clearly for them and if they know how the project is 
going to benefit them in the short and long term. (P9) 
In the area where I live, a reconstruction project is currently 
underway. The project is sponsored and implemented by the 
government of Japan. The community people in the area are very 
cooperative with the project and there is such a high community 
involvement because the project is highly transparent and people 
know exactly what the project objectives are and they don’t lie to 
people either. (P2) 
implementing their projects 
and thus they are not 
supported by the affected 
communities.   
 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes Project ownership) 
Condensed meaning 
Well, I think when there is no transparency, there is much less 
ownership by the community, because if they don’t know that they can 
have a voice, and they cannot influence what is going on, they are 
likely to just sit back and feel completely disempowered. (P11) 
The project doesn’t belong to them. It doesn't belong to them. They 
have no sense of belonging, and that is when I said we wouldn't like 
anyone to come and in invest in something that we might not really 
want. It won't have long life. It could be ruined. It could be destroyed. 
It could be left on its own and the community will not necessarily 
protect it. (P10) 
In humanitarian response relief and recovery, the power lies with the 
responders, then maybe aid agencies or government or UN or well 
meaning people and too often they assume that those affected don't 
have the power. (P12) 
Any good assessment starts to build a sense of ownership by the 
affected communities of the eventual product, but too often that is 
done poorly or not at all, but it is absolutely essential for 
Lack of transparency in the 
project processes leads to 
decreased ownership by the 
community, leaving a 
disempowered community. 
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empowerment of local people. (P12) 
 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Corruption) 
Condensed meaning 
I can tell you this, in Afghanistan there are many NGOs that have 
really low capacity and competency and their work has had little or 
no positive impact. Many NGOs have been established for their own 
benefit, not really for the sake of people. They are called Not for 
profit organisations but their main aim is to fill their own pockets. 
(P1) 
NGOs with low competency and corruption are sources of great 
worry for people. I don't think if people would want to cooperate with 
such NGOs. There could be some small groups who would work with 
such NGOs for their personal interest, however a community as a 
whole will not participate in such a project and will not support a 
corrupt NGO. Projects implemented by NGOs with low competency 
are often abandoned before completion or unsuccessful in meeting 
their objectives particularly when it comes to the quality of the end 
product. (P4) 
I am aware that in most commercial bidding there is corruption and a 
project is often granted to commercial NGOs based on the percentage 
they pay to the donor. Often, and in fact right now, there are large 
international companies operating in Afghanistan. When they win the 
bid and get the contract they then subcontract the project to other 
smaller international companies and finally the project gets 
subcontracted to local NGOs and by then up to 40% of the project 
funding is lost before the project begins. (P7)  
If they are a bad NGO they will do their trade very badly and without 
question they will almost do participation very badly , because it is an 
art not a science and, as you would know, participation is very easy 
to get wrong, assessments are very easy to get wrong. There are lots 
and lots of bad NGOs, I mean, NGO has a bad reputation. NGO very 
often, it is often seen as a word as a corrupt entity set up by former 
politicians who will often set up an NGO. So by no means the word 
"NGO” means something good, so often they cover for very bad 
things .(P12) 
There is such a free-for-all at the moment and there is... I mean, like 
in Afghanistan, the NGO that had the cheapest price won the bid and 
[whoever] [had] the cheapest price were the people who weren't even 
trying to do anything. (P15) 
In the majority of cases, NGOs have taken money for themselves 
while doing little or nothing at all for the affected communities. And 
the reason for this is that NGOs’ work has never been rigorously 
controlled and monitored. We have countless NGOs operating right 
now in Afghanistan. Not all of them are there to help people or are 
concerned about them, and they are there for their profit from project 
funding for their own personal agendas. The other unfortunate issue 
is that those having political power and influence are actually the 
ones who own the NGOs, and they also have link with the corrupt 
employees in donor organisations who have the power of approving 
project proposals. (P2) 
There was an NGO that only existed on paper in charge of Nuristan. 
Corruption in NGOs reduces 
their capacity to deliver 
desirable project outcomes.  
Corrupt NGOs do not 
encourage positive 
community participation and 
as a result their credibility is 
declining. 
Corruption in and the lack of 
adequate managerial 
competency in the NGOs 
coupled with the lack of 
adequate capacity in their 
funding organisations leads 
to project failure. Projects 
implemented by corrupt 
NGOs have minimal 
community support. Such 
projects are neither supported 
during their implementation 
nor taken care of by the 
affected people after they are 
handed over.  
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Nothing had happened in Nooristan in three years and it took 
basically until the end of the contract - just about two months till the 
closing of the contract - someone figured out something was wrong. 
(P15) 
We went out to the central highlands since it is a building project, 
someone from one of the NGOs has asked us to have a look at the 
school building  project which was in the area where we were 
travelling and said, “Could you stop and look and have some pictures 
of school that has been completed? Just so that we can do our final 
report.” When we got to that point, it was a long sort of trip and 
walking and whatever and we got to the school building. It basically 
had the walls, the roof... the initial bit of roof was on there, it just has 
been covered but it didn’t actually have a proper roof on and there 
was nothing in there. It was already water damaged, people kept their 
animals in the school building and when we asked around, “What 
happened to you? This school was supposed to have finished two 
years ago and all we see is the shell,” and they say, "Oh well, you 
know that house down in the valley that you passed when you came 
up the main road? That belongs to the person who was in charge of 
the building project." It was this fortress like palace, so it was quite 
clear the school was never completed, money went somewhere else. 
The community didn't know who to contact. It wouldn't have been 
much sense to contact the NGO who was suppose to build it because, 
the NGO, you know the leader of the NGO, had obviously built 
himself a house from the money. (P15) 
They were [underbid] by a newly created Afghan NGO which in 
(home site) probably only existed of two people and a desk so they 
had no intention of actually implementing anything but because they 
didn't have any running costs, because they weren't doing anything 
they offered the project for a third less than the  already operating 
NGO did, and therefore they got the bid, and as long as you got 
people who undermine a common policy or a common minimum 
standards, it is hard to actually play hardline with the donor. (P15) 
 
  
Appendix D 
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 274 
Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes Lack of technical knowledge) 
Condensed meaning 
One of our partners really, really struggled to manage the 
construction projects. They were building dwellings, I can't remember 
how many houses [were] made but I think, if we say about building 
houses, permanent houses, they struggled big time to manage that 
because they were used to doing community development, the soft side 
in communities. (P13) 
There is a real danger, I think even really good NGOs... I think the 
one other thing we have found with our shelter forum is the 
understanding that everybody thinks they can build a house. (P11) 
I have heard time and time again from beneficiaries and communities 
is that they are fed up with NGOs coming in, doing their surveys, 
promising this, this and this and then go and not delivering anything. 
So, there is definitely this fatigue in communities in post-disaster 
contexts which does lead to mistrust of NGOs, definitely. (P13)  
These newly established mine action NGOs did not have the desirable 
capacity to conduct large scale projects. They failed to meet the 
project objectives. People in the community started to complain about 
their work and conduct. (P2) 
This is a very huge problem, the technical knowledge of NGO 
employees definitely has a huge impact on project outcomes, but even 
the biggest problem is the NGOs are often not audited. There is not 
enough information about their background and their work is often 
not monitored as it should be. Donor agencies should not rely only on 
what NGOs write in their proposal, it is crucial to determine whether 
the NGO has adequate technical capacity, by visiting them in the 
field. (P4) 
I mean like in Afghanistan, the NGO that had the cheapest price won 
the bid and who has got the cheapest price were the people who 
weren't even trying to do anything. (P15) 
The biggest problem with the NGOs doing reconstruction in 
Afghanistan is that when donor organisations approve their projects 
and give the funding to these so called “implementing NGOs” the 
NGOs then subcontract the projects to other smaller NGOs and the 
smaller NGOs then subcontract it to other smaller NGOs meaning 
that the project is sold multiple times leaving absolutely no room for 
transparency. (P7) 
A bad NGO will do bad work and a good NGO will produce good 
results. If funding for a reconstruction project is given to a bad NGO, 
at the end the affected people will be the ones who will suffer. (P4) 
NGOs often misconceive 
reconstruction as being a less 
complex endeavour with no 
requirements for specific 
knowledge and experience.  
Incompetent and less 
experienced NGOs damages 
NGOs’ relations with the 
affected communities by 
making false promises. 
Funding bodies do not 
always conduct a thorough 
screening of NGOs’ 
background and technical 
competence and, as a result, 
when assessing their project 
proposal, funding is given to 
less competent NGOs who 
do not produce acceptable 
outcomes.  
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Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on The need for hasty implementation) 
Condensed meaning 
After a disaster people want a speedy reconstruction of their houses, 
because they live in tents or temporary accommodation and they want 
to return to their houses. (P1) 
Well, I think often the community wants to get back into [their] 
house[s] quickly, particularly if they are going [in] to the monsoon 
season. They want protection. If there is a very temporary structure, 
they want to get back into their houses quickly. Or if they are coming 
back to the hot weather they want the shade the permanent can give. 
(and) I think it is actually the communities also want to be back in 
their houses very quickly. (P13) 
It is important to know when the disaster has actually happened and 
how much time is available. We must make our plan with 
consideration given to the weather condition of the affected area. We 
had such a problem when the earthquake hit Badakhshaan in Wardak. 
It happened in the winter and we had to act quickly to do whatever we 
could. (P6) 
 I think it is difficult, because in some situations obviously people 
need something straight away. (P14) 
 There are two parts. One is in terms of responding to a disaster and 
the resultant emergency. Affected people are in need of urgent aids 
including shelter and therefore the response needs to be swift. (P8) 
There might be good reasons for it and I remind you after the 
Kashmir earthquake, the winter was coming in. It was October, and 
so a lot of agencies stormed very quickly to built some temporary 
housing and moved very quickly with that, so time was of the essence 
before the winter set [in]. So there may be a good reason to build 
quickly. That said, of course you can build quickly and involve 
communities. There is no reason why that can't be the case. (P12) 
I recall a situation such as returnees from Pakistan coming to 
Afghanistan. The returnees arrived in the reception point and they 
claimed that they had nowhere to go, they had no houses and they had 
sold their land when they left the country. So there was nowhere they 
could leave the reception centre to [go to] and the UN had to find a 
rapid solution for 311 families on the spot and the government 
claimed to have the solution. So, in principle, you have the UN and 
the government cooperating and everything sounded successful. 
However the situation deteriorated after 3, 4 months and people came 
claiming the land, the returnees claimed not to be in peace and the 
hostility between the communities increased. The only benefit was that 
the families had one winter under a roof - that was it. (P10) 
Affected people have the 
desire to return to their 
houses as quickly as 
possible. 
Even though the prevalent 
emergency may require swift 
action to address the housing 
crisis, and that consultation 
may take a long time, it is 
still essential to have 
community participation to 
ensure project sustainability. 
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Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Ignoring the needs of affected 
communities) 
Condensed meaning 
Now one of the problems that makes aid agencies feel they have to, 
well have to, often spend the money very quickly because of 
accountability to donors and that is one of the great tensions in 
humanitarian aid pressure: to spend quickly. So there is that tension 
in relief and recovery to have to build quickly and, at the same time, 
the knowledge to developmentally rebuild takes time and consultation 
is a slow process. (P12) 
NGOs are often under quite a tight time frame for spending donors’ 
money, so often government funds or funds from other donors 
stipulate that it has to be spent within a year or possibly two. 
Therefore NGOs don't want to lose that money. They don’t want to 
have it paid back to the donor. They just need to spend, spend, spend 
and I think, at that point, beneficiary consultation goes out the 
window. (P13)  
I think one of the challenges is that NGOs are so keen to complete the 
needs assessment and get the proposal out the door quickly in order 
to start implementing the project. Then I think one of the challenges is 
that community process can really take a while, particularly if you 
are really making sure that every sort of member of the community 
has had the opportunity to feed in, or at least representation from the 
community had been given the chance to feed it in. (P14) 
Well you haven't got time for it, as simple as that. If you have six 
months to build houses, then it is very, very hard to involve the right 
people. It would probably take you a month to sort of establish 
yourself and get everything sorted and then you probably already 
have ordered the building materials because it will take time to get 
them delivered depending how remote your place is. It is hard to 
consult. Consultation takes time. (P15) 
I think that the whole process can take quite some time and so I think 
haste is one of the biggest challenges and I really think that when you 
are trying to do things quickly, in order to get on, I definitely think 
that the community participation process is one of the first things that 
sort of gets cut.  (P14) 
If we make decisions quickly we may get to regret them as well. So in 
terms of relocation, sites, in terms of design, sometimes actually 
taking time over the decision will pay dividends at the end. So maybe 
it is about taking no time or making sure the transitional temporary 
shelters are of a better construction that would last longer. (P13) 
Because the community did not want this block to be where it was 
settled, many people claimed to be the owners of that land. So it was 
not government land as it was claimed initially. Private owners came 
to the scene and they claimed to be the owners of that. So not having 
the path through the government, they started harassing the local 
community -  the returnees. (P10) 
I think there is a real problem when we do things too quickly: you 
maybe not have the right design, you cannot have taken into 
consideration the cultural norms or the social norms and I think you 
probably get a worse product if you act in haste and [I] also think 
that you can come across quite a lot of issues if you go too quickly. 
(P11) 
NGOs are often required to 
spend donors’ money 
quickly leaving no time for 
community participation. 
NGOs believe that 
community participation 
requires time and NGOs do 
not always have the luxury 
of time when implementing 
reconstruction projects. 
Housing reconstruction is a 
risky business and if done in 
haste without community 
involvement can face many 
issues or even risk a total 
failure. 
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Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Government policies and practices) 
Condensed meaning 
Oh, not all the decisions by the government are good for people. 
There are certain disasters which are caused by the government per 
se, so I wouldn't be 100% confident that a government would help 
100% or be devoted 100% to the reconstruction projects. (P10) 
I mean government can be more of a hindrance than a help too often, 
and that is said also that the government capacity might be lacking or 
may be destroyed after a disaster. (P12) 
So the government themselves imposed quite heavy restrictions in 
terms of the building so you could argue to some extent that you know 
they weren't based on communities desires. (P14) 
Other[Government] policies and procedures are so complex and 
made hard for people. For example when you want to rebuild your 
house you will have to go to many government departments and pay 
bribes to get permission for rebuilding your own house. (P3) 
I think government policies are necessary at times because that is how 
you get a bit of control and a bit of structure to sort of rebuilding or 
whatever, particularly when technical expertise is needed. But where 
it is a challenge, is when it is done without consultation. (P14) 
Government policies should be a positive thing if they get it right, but 
it can be a real blockage and I think it is usually above and beyond 
the control of communities themselves. (P11) 
The government kind of wanted to stipulate the design because they 
wanted to make sure that the designs were earthquake resistant and 
therefore people wouldn't be affected by earthquakes again. (P14) 
Government has some good policies and practices but there is such 
high corruption and these policies cannot be enforced. (P3) 
People are being relocated away from where they were previously, 
like in the tsunami many of the governments issued no-construction 
zones and people who previously lived on the sea shores, particularly 
the fishing communities, would have to relocate onto other areas that 
the government dictated. (P13)  
I think there are a lot of government policies that kind of force 
[relocation], I know in a lot of places there was a policy to clear the 
coast line. (P11) 
Government policies and 
practices do not always 
support reconstruction 
efforts. Some government 
policies slow down 
reconstruction progress and 
could at times be an 
impediment rather than a 
support. 
Government policies can 
provide a useful framework 
for reconstruction if they are 
formulated with consultation 
of the affected people.   
Government policies that are 
not responsive of the basic 
needs of the affected people 
can cause more harm than 
good. 
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Natural Unit 
 (Participants’ quotes on Land issues) 
Condensed meaning 
Definitely, the long waiting time in getting lands for building is the 
anti-tank mine. (P10) 
The whole land tenure business is one of the key problems in shelter. I 
think it is so essential that if takes a long time it maybe that people 
have no choice but to do some alternative to come up with some 
alternative arrangement. (P11) 
It definitely slows down the whole process because you are dependent 
on the government to either issue their directives as to where they are 
going to allow construction to take place. (P13) 
In a number of cases I know our partners and the community have 
just gone and purchased the land themselves so that they could get on 
and do the construction because the government, you know, will never 
be able to plan the land. (P14) 
Due to such weakness in the government this [land issue] is taking a 
long time. The government’s process is causing huge disappointment 
among people. Land acquisition and land distribution is one of the 
weakest areas in the [the respondent refers to the Afghan 
Government] government mechanism.(P8) 
A lot of the ones I have seen are just unresolved, so people [are] just 
living without being allowed to build permanent structures, without 
being allowed to own the land, but they just lived there for like 20 
years and I think that is a real challenge. (P14)  
As a matter mainly related to 
governments, land 
acquisition and land tenure is 
a major problem in post-
disaster reconstruction taking 
a long time to resolve. 
Affected communities 
cannot participate in or 
benefit from reconstruction 
programmes if they do not 
already own a plot of land.  
 
Natural Unit 
 (Participants’ quotes on Land scarcity) 
Condensed meaning 
The problem is that all government lands have been looted by land 
mafia. Even in the remote desert you won’t find a piece of land. There 
isn’t any place left even for a clinic to be built on.” (P3) 
A high level of corruption and the use of power have resulted in an 
absolutely unfair distribution of government land. You can see that 
some individuals have multiple houses, while a large majority of 
people in the community have no house or a piece of land. (P2) 
This is a huge problem nowadays with millions of square meters of 
land taken by a few powerful persons leaving millions of others 
landless” (P9). 
This is a very huge issue and a great point of concern for all Afghans 
now. Before it was an issue of concern for men, but today both men 
and women worry about this issue. (P2) 
Land scarcity is a huge 
concern for affected people 
and an impediment for 
reconstruction. Affected 
people do not always have 
access to a plot of land and 
thus are unable to participate 
in reconstruction projects.  
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Natural Unit 
 (Participants’ quotes on Weak governance) 
Condensed meaning 
I have seen lots of people who would just do their own things. I think 
it is quite hard, especially when it [Government] is not particularly 
strong, to be able to enforce some of these things. (P11) 
First of all, the government doesn’t have the required technical 
capacity. The government lacks committed personnel. It affects 
community participation and community morale, creates mistrust and 
a distance between people and the government. (P4)  
The policies and procedures are so difficult for people to deal with. 
For example, if you want to rebuild your house, you will have to pass 
through many [Afghan] government departments and keep giving 
them bribes to get permission for rebuilding your own house”. (P3) 
The present [Afghan] government and the government like the present 
one are not only unable to tackle corruption but are contributing to 
its growth. (P9) 
In Afghanistan, the insufficient supply of needed construction 
materials due to bad security, and delays in the release of 
construction materials due to the high corruption in large government 
departments, such as the customs office, negatively impact on 
reconstruction efforts. (P1)  
Weak governance and the 
widespread corruption in the 
government result in 
reconstruction projects being 
delayed. Long government 
procedures and processes 
and the lack of an effective 
and people-friendly 
governance structure cause 
already affected people to 
suffer more.   
 
Natural Unit 
 (Participants’ quotes on Control and coordination) 
Condensed meaning 
I think at some point there has to be some control in order to ensure 
that you can rebuild in a safe way, so I could understand and I would 
support the government in that. (P14) 
 This is an important issue in Afghanistan since I have lived here. 
Unfortunately, when people get to higher government positions they 
start thinking that they are the leaders and whatever they say must be 
accepted and whatever decisions they make must be implemented. 
(P5) 
To do so [initiate a project], the local government office needs to 
contact the relevant sector in Kabul and get their permission which 
often takes months before it can be done. (P8)  
In Afghanistan the biggest problem is that everything is done through 
the central government. Provincial or district level government has 
limited authority to sign off a project. (P9) 
Often one of the biggest factors for project failure is that the central 
government throws the projects at communities or imposes them on 
people. (P8) 
It has a bad effect my friend. At present the government acts as a boss 
and considers people as their servants. At the present, the government 
says that they are the project owners. They are holding the money. 
When the boss, the high ranking government official, is in the right 
mood, he sanctions the project, but when he is not, no project can be 
implemented. Or when the boss is in another country for any reason, 
the project is stopped until he is back. (P9) 
If aimed to provide workable 
guidance and a structure for 
reconstruction government 
controlling and coordination 
can play an important role in 
rebuilding. However, if the 
government is seeking to just 
control reconstruction project 
out of obsession but is not 
interested in the plight of 
people, it can be more of a 
problem than a solution.   
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Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Relocation) 
Condensed meaning 
I think it is your responsibility as a government to impose that 
restriction in order to maintain the safety of the community, but you 
have to explain to the community why [relocation] is important so 
that they can understand, but you have to actually provide something 
as an alternative to them. (P14) 
Because of the lack of land, quite often [Affected communities] often 
get allocated a piece of land way away from where the community 
originally lived, and then you are completely destroying the whole 
social network. (P11) 
 I think there has been a lot of a problem where people have moved 
people away from the coast and then they have found a plot of land 
but its miles away from anywhere and there is a kind of isolation. 
(P11) 
People build houses on land and that land is owned by somebody else 
and so at the end of that rebuilding process the local land owner says, 
“Well, I want half of your houses now because I owned that land and 
I wasn't going to tell you that.” (P12) 
It was positioned very badly in relation to the barracks. We knew that 
the situation was not stable and the military barracks were hit from 
time to time, so if the military barrack were targeted, the civilians 
were in the line of fire. P(10) 
After a disaster, the 
government often relocates 
people for a good cause or to 
pursue their political agenda. 
In the majority of cases, 
relocation turns into a 
problem rather than a 
solution because 
governments do not always 
consult with the affected 
people.  
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Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Uncertain security situation or fragile 
peace) 
Condensed meaning 
I think security is a huge issue. I don’t think you can function, you 
certainly can't work with the community, where there is such huge 
insecurity that people don’t know whether they are going to be safe, 
or whether you are whatever  you are doing is going to last. (P11) 
Lack of security does make a difference - a huge difference. In 2004, 
where we had returnees entering the red zone, nobody could get in, 
nobody could get out and that is where they had their houses. (P10) 
Security is the most important factor in any project and needs to be 
considered before a project is planned. People will not be interested 
to move into a place or remain in a place that is insecure for them 
and for their families; they will just not participate in rebuilding their 
houses as they would normally be required. I have several examples 
from our projects. In some instances, when we first planned our 
project, the situation didn't seem to present a serious security 
challenge, but later during the implementation of the project, when 
the area became less secure, a number of our projects could not 
continue and we had to stop them. (P2) 
If your house is too nice then a warlord will come and take it away 
from you or I spend all this time and energy to make it nice and 
someone bombs it. I think it is hard to motivate people who have lost 
all hope and the longer the conflict lasts the harder it is because - 
quite rightly so -  people have been disappointed so many times. (P15) 
I think the issue of confidence for a community is a big one. Hmm, 
you know: Why would someone want to build a permanent structure if 
the area is insecure? Because they won't want to invest their money in 
building a permanent structure if maybe they end up displaced. (P14) 
I think it is very, very hard for people to have hope and it is a bit like 
coming back to Kabul after the Taliban were hosted and for the first 
few years nothing much has changed in Kabul and then suddenly 
people started painting their walls and almost like, you know, hope 
had come. The war is over, you know, after 30 years of constantly 
having their houses destroyed, finally we think we here now to stay 
and nothing will happen. And in the few last years people have 
stopped looking after their properties again, because they are not 
quite sure what happens after the foreign forces leave. (P15)  
People lose motivation, they lose confidence in such a situation and 
they don't participate with interest in reconstruction. (P9) 
Affected people can only 
participate in reconstruction 
if they are given a firm 
security assurance and that 
they are protected if returned 
to their places. People will 
not invest their time and 
resources in rebuilding their 
houses if they are unsure 
they can permanently remain 
in the area.   
 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Risk of Kidnap or Violence against NGOs) 
Condensed meaning 
We had a project in Helmand, the project was going very well. We 
also had people from the local community working in the project, and 
when the security situation got bad, our teams were kidnapped and 
also they killed three staff members. The project was stopped and 
never started again.  (P2) 
Look we had [NGO name]. They were working and doing a very, very 
good job in the south-eastern region. They had an accident in 2004 
Kidnapping constitutes a 
major barrier for NGO work 
and is widespread in places 
where they work. 
Kidnapping of NGO 
personnel results in major 
interruptions in aid 
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and they had 2 of their people killed. They suspended the activities. 
(P10) 
If it is to deal with the risk of kidnap or violence against aid 
workers... that is, you will be knowing that Zabi way better than I, 
that is a huge challenge. In the "Daab" refugee camp, a whole lot of 
people pulled out because of threats and even only last week [NGO’s 
name] vehicle was attacked and someone was killed. (P12) 
There are other places where NGO personnel have been kidnapped 
and no NGO wants to work there. There are many such places where 
no assistance has been delivered to those people because of the lack 
of security. (P3) 
“It has to be an acceptable risk or risk that has been mitigated and if 
it is not acceptable then those people can't work there, because who 
would they help? There is no benefit in being a martyr in those 
situations and that actually can make things worse”. (P12) 
 
operations, often leading to 
premature closure or 
indefinite suspension of 
reconstruction projects.   
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Appendix E 
Participants’ Quotes (Chapter 6) 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on re-establish community structure) 
Condensed meaning 
It is all about relationship with people you need to find where the 
people are and you need to talk with them. (P11) 
If they are NGOs that have been working pre-disaster in a place, of 
course then they have a good standing and reputation and trust builds 
up, and that, of course, will be helpful. (P12) 
First of all, the NGO needs to find the IDPs and talk with them about 
their project. It is crucial to have an integrated approach to 
rebuilding. (P4) 
The first thing we did was to find out where the community people had 
gone. We were able to very easily find out where they had been 
relocated. Most of them had relocated in the nearest villages around 
Lashkargah.(P5) 
As you remember many villages have been bombarded/destroyed in 
the recent war, but people didn't leave their communities forever, they 
came back and if there was nobody (aid organisation) to help them, 
they built their houses themselves. People never forget their land and 
the land they inherited from their father. People always want to keep 
their land and build on it. And because of the culture they will not 
want to leave a land that belonged to their father and to themselves. 
They will do anything to build their houses to keep their father’s and 
ancestors' names alive.(P3) 
But I think often people, the ones I have been working with, do want 
to go back to their homes earlier. Yes, they had a very traumatic 
experience, but that is their livelihood. After the tsunami, the fishing 
people, that is all they knew - they needed to go back to the sea early 
and needed to fish again. In Pakistan they work as agricultural 
labourers on the fields, they know nothing else, so they want to go 
back. (P13) 
Any meaningful 
reconstruction project needs 
to start with locating the 
affected people. Affected 
people have a strong desire 
to return to their home 
communities. NGOs with a 
previous positive working 
relationship in the affected 
communities are more 
successful in working with 
the affected people.  
 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on re-establish community structure) 
Condensed meaning 
Listening to people, assuming those worst affected are the true 
holders of knowledge and wisdom of what to do... and how to unlock 
that becomes the challenge of any thoughtful agency. (P12) 
The NGO needs to meet with the affected people, talk with the local 
council. The NGO needs to explain the reconstruction project really 
clearly. (P3) 
Meeting with the affected 
beneficiaries is crucial for 
planning and developing 
reconstruction projects. 
Affected people have the 
knowledge about their 
specific needs and priorities. 
Appendix E 
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 284 
In order to understand what the biggest issues were, the UN, the local 
government and other NGOs had coordination meetings to identify 
and prioritise the problems. (P2) 
We also used the information collected by our Mine Awareness Teams 
in the area so we were successful in identifying the exact locations of 
IDPs. Then we called for a meeting and we also had government 
officials involved and the meeting was held in the Governor’s office of 
Nimroz province [in Afghanistan]. We had the Governor and his 
deputy in the meeting. (P5) 
People organise themselves, of course not in a formal, scientific or 
official way, but spontaneously, naturally, instinctively. They get 
themselves organised in such a way that they can help each other in a 
difficult and hard time following a disaster. (P6) 
NGOs should have an effective communication strategy which can 
encourage and enable participation from the wider affected 
community.(P8) 
In such [post-disaster] situations the donor and the government 
agencies should meet with a wider affected population, listen to 
everyone's opinion, not just to a warlord or a wealthy person. (P9) 
Any good assessment starts to build a sense of ownership by 
communities and also inclusivity and the connectedness with those 
seeking to own the programmes.(P12 
NGOs can be more 
successful in achieving their 
reconstruction objective if 
their communication 
strategies can encourage 
participation from a wide 
range of community people.   
 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on re-establish community structure) 
Condensed meaning 
The project should aim at rebuilding housing and also provide 
medical support and help them [affected people] restore their 
livelihood. People need medical treatment and houses after a disaster, 
therefore, aid assistance should not be limited to just building houses. 
(P1) 
In order to mobilise and bring back the affected people to their 
original location, a coordinated approach is of utmost importance. 
Reconstruction should not only focus on responding to the affected 
community’s housing needs, but should also provide other services 
such as medical, education and access to clean water. (P2) 
When the UN did their survey and helped with rebuilding local 
schools and NGOs agreed to rebuild health clinics the affected IDPs 
returned to their communities. (P3) 
 Building housing alone is not enough if there is no drinking water or 
health facility in the area. For the affected people to live in the 
affected area and be able to return to a normal life, other services and 
infrastructure such as the health clinics, school and more importantly 
the livelihood issue are equally important as the rebuilding of their 
house. (P4)  
When a clinic is built, the district office returns to its functional state 
and schools operate, people will slowly return because trust can be 
built gradually. (P5) 
If you just try and build a few rooms for people but ignore other 
needs, they will not come and will tell you that besides a house they 
also need to have access to a clinic and that their kids need to go to 
 Affected people will not be 
encouraged to return to the 
affected area to participate in 
rebuilding their houses if 
they do not have access to 
basic services such as 
education and health, and if 
basic infrastructure needed 
to support normal 
community life is not 
restored. 
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school. (P7) 
For the IDPs to reintegrate into their home communities there need to 
be adequate education and health facilities. Once these basic needs 
are provided for, affected people would return to their places. (P9) 
If you are the only one helping them now, once the reconstruction is 
done then who is going to build them the school? (P10) 
If you provide somebody a means for living and somewhere for their 
kids to go to school and health, they are more likely to want to either 
go back or wherever you want to locate them. (P11) 
The infrastructure needs to be there. You are talking about relocating 
families, so children have to have access to school. I think we need to 
be very cautious about doing shelter-only projects unless we were 
aware there were other NGOs meeting the other needs of the 
community as well. (P13) 
Who would want to move to a village first and then find... you know... 
maybe or maybe not some NGOs are going to help with the services 
provision.(P14) 
There has to be all, you know they have to start together and someone 
has to actually work sanitation while other build the houses, and 
someone has to work water and skills training at the same time so that 
it all really comes together. (P15) 
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Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Encourage sense of project ownership) 
Condensed meaning 
But many people were extending at the back of their properties and 
we didn’t want the safety features that were integrated in to this 
design to be compromised, so it was absolutely essential that people 
understood the particular features, safety features of the property so 
they didn't then compromise these features when they extended their 
property... and it is about care and maintenance of the property too. 
(P13) 
I think when NGOs are trying to implement a project in an area they 
need to explain the aims of the project so that people's support can be 
had. (P6) 
The NGO needs to meet with the affected people, talk with the local 
council. The NGO needs to explain the reconstruction project really 
clearly.(P3) 
It is also crucial to talk with the affected people and explain clearly 
the objectives of the project. (P4) 
If people already know about the project and its importance they will 
participate anyway, and if they are not aware about the project it is 
the responsibility of the NGO to explain to them and try to work with 
them to help them understand the objectives of the projects. I think the 
effect of this challenge will be reduced, once people realise the 
importance of the project and how the project will benefit them, I am 
sure they will participate. (P5) 
When we are implementing post-disaster reconstruction projects, we 
shouldn't merely think that our job is to build houses and nothing 
more. No it is not like this; an NGO responsible for rebuilding 
housing is also responsible to explain to the affected people why 
rebuilding is necessary and why they should take an active part in 
reconstruction. People's awareness of the whole project must be 
raised and their decision making ability is directly linked to their 
level of understanding and knowledge about the goal and objectives 
of the project. (P6) 
It is of utmost importance to talk with the affected community about 
the objectives of the project before its implementation. In fact, it is an 
important part of any reconstruction project to encourage 
communities to participate. If you can explain the significance of the 
project on a community level not on individual level, people will 
accept the project and participate. (P7) 
When people understood the importance of the project and that every 
member of the community will equally benefit, they showed great 
enthusiasm and readiness to support the project in all ways possible. 
(P7) 
NGOs must explain the particulars of the project to all stakeholders 
(NGO, government and the effected community) in their meetings. 
The type of project and its objective must be clearly explained to the 
stakeholders. (P8) 
I think the social side of the project such as involving affected people 
in the project, providing training to them, helping them understand 
the significance of the project for their community and themselves, is 
more important and thus it is necessary that a project be implemented 
with great patience to make sure these important and vital elements of 
the project are not excluded. (P9) 
 Explaining to the recipient 
beneficiaries the aims and 
objectives of reconstruction, 
expected outcomes, project 
limitations and requirements 
is important: 1) It helps with 
building trust, 2) discourages 
unrealistic promises, 3) 
develops project ownership 
in the community and finally 
4) encourages effective 
participation.   
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Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Encourage sense of project ownership) 
Condensed meaning 
When it came to rebuilding houses or participating in whatever way, 
it was one of the things that we required... meaning that the NGO will 
go to the field and have a contract signed with the beneficiary. (P10) 
Most projects that we would support wherever possible you would 
expect some kind of contribution whether you get somebody to be part 
of the labour force or whatever. (P11)  
NGOs will get together to have one united stand, which might be: We 
don't do for them. (P12) 
I think, you know, many of those houses are built by the families 
themselves, so if you don’t also involve people in the way you build a 
house, then how are they going to be able to replicate. (P14) 
If people have nothing else to contribute, they always have got time to 
contribute and man-power. We can provide training, that is easy, but 
I think their contribution at the minimum has to be time and people. 
(P15) 
The NGO requirement was that the house ownership must first be 
established. And, yes, our contribution was to build the roof. (P3) 
Affected people must be involved somehow in reconstruction, to 
acquire sense of project ownership. Depending on the type of project 
and the level of damage inflected on people's economy, the level of 
aid and level of participation must be determined. This will revive the 
zealousness in the affected population; free aid without community 
contribution will not last long and is not effective in the long-term. 
(P4) 
For example, one might be committed to rebuilding his house, but 
may not have the needed skills. In our shelter projects, people's 
contribution was in the form of paying for the labour cost, people do 
work as unskilled labourers and they are committed to providing such 
a contribution. (P6) 
NGOs should not attempt to provide, for any reason, any assistance 
that the affected community is able to provide for themselves. (P9)   
Community contribution is 
crucial for long-lasting 
projects. It helps build 
project ownership. 
Community contribution 
must be determined and 
agreed on with the affected 
people before the project can 
actually be implemented. 
Regardless of the magnitude 
of their contribution, people 
always take pride in what 
they achieve. People’s 
contribution is essential for 
project sustainability. 
 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Encourage sense of project ownership) 
Condensed meaning 
The role of good agency is to support and empower, not to provide 
and to take away participation. (P12) 
We would encourage our partners to network and recognise their 
strengths and their experience, and not try and to do projects that 
they have never experienced or do not have technical knowledge of. 
(P13) 
I think greater attention needs to be paid when selecting 
beneficiaries. What is the NGO capacity and how many families can 
we help and who should we help?(P6) 
It is important to realise that a single NGO on its own cannot actually 
reconstruct the entire village. And that is when you need to explain to 
the affected beneficiaries what capacity you have, and the 
 Agencies involved in 
reconstruction must 
determine what role they can 
play in reconstruction and 
design their projects in a way 
that can boost community 
morale, strengthen project 
ownership and eventually 
lead to more meaningful 
community involvement in 
reconstruction. A well 
designed reconstruction 
project shall always leave 
behind an empowered and 
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beneficiaries are going to use whatever resources and, together with 
you, in a more effective way, leading to the establishment of trust, 
there will be a higher contribution from the affected people and 
increased participation. (P6) 
We told them that we are here to clear the area of mines and UXOs, 
so that water supply could be restored and the local market could be 
re-established. At the beginning, people were doubtful and yet 
expressed their readiness to cooperate. It was such an experience. 
When we involved people in clearing their own community of land 
mines, they worked with great enthusiasm. We didn't only achieve the 
objectives of the project but also left behind a greatly empowered 
community. Following the clearance operation, rebuilding of 
destroyed houses started and more and more people returned to the 
area.(P2) 
much stronger community. 
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Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Providing post-disaster recovery support) 
Condensed meaning 
A reconstruction project should firstly aim at providing mental 
support, counselling to the affected people to bring them out of the 
shock of the disaster, and then aim at rebuilding the community not 
just the houses. (P1) 
It is clear that it [disaster] does impact participation in 
reconstruction. From the point of view of psychology, there is a need 
for consoling first of all. The project needs to encourage affected 
people to participate in reconstruction. (P3)  
Such a situation has a huge negative impact on community morale. 
There is definitely a need for encouragement, be it external aid or 
local government.(P2) 
Disasters affect community morale and their [people] ability. I think, 
in such a situation, beside the urgent assistance that is needed for the 
community, the role of religious people can also be significant, to 
encourage people and to boost their morale. (P7) 
 Major disasters severely 
damage people’s ability to 
cope with the loss of their 
relatives, homes and 
personal belongings. In the 
aftermath of such devastating 
events, housing 
reconstruction projects 
should also include a pre-
reconstruction aid package 
including counselling 
services to uplift their 
confidence.  
 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Providing post-disaster recovery support) 
Condensed meaning 
People have got certain skills, otherwise they wouldn't live in the 
area. (P15) 
Knowing what capacity exists in the community is part of the analysis 
in the way they design their project. If they design a project, and if 
they have not assessed the capacities of the community, then maybe 
they are in trouble.(P10) 
I think it is really important for NGOs to identify what skills and 
abilities are already there in the communities, because there are a lot 
of communities where people have built their own houses and know  
perfectly how to do it, and they’ve got indigenous knowledge about 
what is appropriate for their situation. (P11) 
Well, I think they need to get involved and need to work alongside. I 
think it is great when you get people working alongside... you know... 
skills... I think you need to pull out who is a skilled labourer within 
the community... but also to use it to really build the skills of 
beneficiaries. (P11) 
We also found that we could hire local labourers in the communities 
to be involved in the construction process. Often the construction 
process was led by the contractors, external contractors who were 
contracted through a tender process... but part of the tender process 
could be that they agreed to hire as much local labourer as possible, 
so that they are also training local people in new skills. (P13) 
We did most of that [ training] through... hmm... kind of master 
builders, so we used craftsmen in that area, and we run workshops 
where the craftsmen actually build sections of a house, and we would 
invite community members long to come in and kind of see and 
participate in the rebuilding of a house. (P14) 
Firstly, the demining operation started which included training locals 
to participate in demining and clearance of their area. It was 
 Large scale disasters are 
often followed by enormous 
reconstruction works and the 
labour force needed for the 
reconstruction may not 
always be available in the 
local area. NGOs must make 
every attempt to identify the 
existing scale in the affected 
area, and use them in support 
of the project. Employing 
skilled people from the local 
area is more cost effective 
than bringing them from the 
external market.  
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logistically difficult to bring a large number of teams from other 
provinces to Nawzad. (P2) 
Lack of adequate skilled labourers is what costs us a lot when we 
implement reconstruction projects. Training community members is 
cost effective, compared to bring in skilled labours from outside. 
NGOs that bring skilled labour also pay for their accommodation, 
transportation and meals as well. (P6) 
 
 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Providing post-disaster recovery support) 
Condensed meaning 
The NGO can provide a short vocational training program - enough 
to meet the immediate demand. (P1) 
They would teach, in cases where they did not know, and they would 
guide them throughout the project, not only as supervisors... you 
know...“Put the brick here. Put the mud there.” But also, “Build 
along the path.” (P10) 
I do think it is really important. I mean... I am really in favour of 
doing community education. In Ache, where it [reconstruction] was 
done through a direct response, it was a case of helping the house 
owners know what the contractor should be doing... to have an eye on 
key elements because you [project staff] cannot be everywhere 
monitoring all the time. (P11) 
The government cannot visit the project every day, so you [affected 
people] need to learn and acquire the skill to enable you monitor the 
process of rebuilding your own house and participate in enhancing 
and maintaining the quality of work. (P9) 
I think this lack of skills or knowledge, this is where it becomes very 
important for the NGO to take time to explain the design of the house, 
built full scale... or a smaller scale model of the design can be really 
helpful. It is very important that the householders observe the 
reconstruction process even if they are not directly involved. (P13) 
We used craftsmen in that area and we ran workshops where the 
craftsmen actually built sections of a house, and we would invite 
community members to come in and see and participate in the 
rebuilding of a house, and then would go and kind of replicate that 
building in their own houses. So it was all done by... kind of... visual 
aids, and... you know... craftsmen kind of aiding them. So they didn't 
actually needed to be literate for that process.(P14) 
Since everybody has been hit by the disaster, there must be enough 
people around there who need a job... well, don’t just make them 
make bricks, but teach them all about making bricks and all about 
construction and make them your construction force. So use local 
labour and give them the skills to be the people who then do it. 
Hmm... again, it gives them power and ownership so... and the skills 
will remain in the area after the project is completed.(P15) 
NGOs need to have a training and skill building program beside 
housing reconstruction. These skills will not only be needed for 
rebuilding their houses, but will also provide a means for livelihood 
in the future. They can also use these skills to maintain and repair 
their houses after the NGO is gone.(P3) 
 Providing training is an 
integral part of any post-
disaster reconstruction 
project. Community 
education increases people’s 
awareness about building 
safety measures during and 
after reconstruction. Skill 
building training needs to 
primarily aim at improving 
people’s capacity to 
participate in reconstruction, 
and also support the affected 
community become more 
resilient. The new knowledge 
and skills that the affected 
people acquire during the 
training will remain in the 
community and can provide 
an alternative means of 
generating income. 
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NGOs can train people within the community, give them the skills that 
are needed for reconstruction. The skills brought in to help rebuild 
housing will not remain in the community after the completion of the 
project and will not be there  if needed again.(P6) 
NGOs need to provide the necessary training for the affected people. 
(P7) 
Give them [affected people] the necessary training in each phase of 
the project lifecycle, so that by the end of the project, people would 
not have received just a house but the necessary skills as well. (P8) 
In the remote villages, there is a need for training to be given to the 
affected people and there is also a need for the acquired skills to 
remain in the community. Building people's skills will not only serve 
the immediate purpose, which is to participate in the reconstruction, 
but will also prepare the affected community for future disasters and 
will enhance their resilience. It will also help people look after their 
houses once the project has been completed. (P9) 
 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Providing post-disaster recovery support) 
Condensed meaning 
We required that the NGO will go to the field and have a contract 
signed with the beneficiary, whereas the beneficiary would work on 
the house and the NGO would give [money] for the days they actually 
worked on the house because the community needs these and at the 
end of the day it is about survival. (P10) 
There may be other ways to build, and benefits for communities, or 
you hire some people. (P12) 
We also found that we could hire local labourers in the communities 
to be involved in the construction process. (P13) 
We have had projects where the NGO provided 60% percent of the 
assistance, plus they also paid daily wages to the affected people 
when reconstructing their own houses. (P3)  
I think it is more effective to consider some sort of incentive or food-
for-work strategy. Affected people must be involved somehow in 
reconstruction to acquire sense of ownership. (P4) 
I think it is important to have a survey of the affected area, first of all, 
to determine what factors or challenges are there. Based on the 
situation on the ground, NGOs can decide whether to hire people 
from the local community, or give them an incentive in other forms, 
such as food for work. (P7) 
For example, using local materials and hiring people locally rather 
than bringing them from outside the affected area. These are some of 
the examples that would show people how the project will 
immediately support them. (P8) 
Presently, there are programmes that help people, for example food- 
for- work or cash-for-work programmes which are not effective. (P9) 
I will get away from incentives for starters; people have to give their 
time. (P15) 
Besides rebuilding their 
houses, the affected people 
also need to maintain a 
minimum living standard to 
be able to survive during the 
project. NGOs can improve 
local economy using locally 
available construction 
materials and hiring skilled 
labourers within the affected 
community. On a case by 
case basis, NGOs may 
consider supporting the most 
disadvantaged families with 
a hardship allowance during 
the project.  
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Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Providing post-disaster recovery support) 
Condensed meaning 
One of the key things is the availability of a livelihood option. I think 
where you work... where you do shelter projects... and you do it 
alongside a livelihood program, it is much more likely to be 
successful because you provide somebody a means for living. (P11) 
After the earthquake, people were up and running pretty quickly in 
terms of opening markets and something to produce, because people 
need to earn money and people need to eat. (P12) 
In a difficult economic situation the livelihood issue is of utmost 
importance and I think reconstruction projects need to respond to the 
community need for housing as well as livelihood. (P3) 
Rebuilding houses only, is not the only reason for people's 
encouragement. We have witnessed that people often return to places 
where there are other services such as health, water, school and some 
sort of livelihood there. (P7) 
I think it would be hard for a single NGO to help much in this sort of 
situation. I think a number of well experienced NGOs, who can 
coordinate different aid projects, with an aim to rebuild the entire 
community, would do much better. (P2) 
I think we need to be very cautious about doing shelter-only projects, 
unless we were aware there were other NGOs meeting the other 
needs of the community as well. (P13) 
“I think what you need is consortiums. It is not an NGO. I mean there 
are a few NGOs who have got all the skills that you need to actually 
fix an all-around problem. I think you need to have a comprehensive 
plan”. (P15)  
I think NGOs working in the field of post-disaster reconstruction need 
to coordinate their efforts. I have witnessed where multiple NGOs 
bought and supplied the same tools and materials, while in fact they 
could coordinate as to which NGO can undertake which particular 
reconstruction effort and in what particular affected area. (P6) 
Reconstruction projects 
should seek to provide for 
permanent housing as well as 
reliable sources of 
livelihood. Rebuilding 
housing is most effective 
when it is done alongside a 
livelihood programme, 
because people need houses 
and a regular income to be 
able to continue with their 
life. NGOs operating in post-
disaster settings need to 
coordinate their effort to 
jointly respond to 
community needs for 
residential dwellings and 
livelihood.  
 
  
Appendix E 
Zabihullah SADIQI Page 293 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Important assumptions) 
Condensed meaning 
The NGO per se... I don’t think so because it is very difficult for them 
to point fingers at themselves... but the donor community, yes, they 
should be monitoring the projects more often. They should do field 
visits., They should have their own interviews with beneficiaries and 
give the feedback to the NGOs... and the rising the level of 
expectancy... Okay, that would put the NGO in the position to watch 
itself in the mirror... I mean to revise or redesign the whole 
structure.(P10) 
If they don't know what to do, or they might not care, or they are a 
corrupt organisation, then they wouldn't probably do anything... but 
they might do a bad job... and too many NGOs, I mean there are 
many NGOs have good will, but do it badly, or they are corrupt. 
(P12)  
You have got the issue of time restrains, so if you’re trying to build 
NGO capacity at the same time as they are trying to implement 
projects, I think it could become very difficult to develop, so I think a 
lot of this perhaps needs to be done in advance of a disaster 
happening. (P13) 
NGOs cannot do much about their capacity at the time when they are 
actually implementing their projects; they need to think carefully 
about what they are capable of doing before they plan their 
projects.(P2) 
NGOs might or might not be able to work to improve their 
competency, but the problem is that in many cases NGO employees 
are members of the same family. In Afghanistan, more than half of the 
NGOs do not have the required capacity.(P4) 
After the collapse of the Taliban, when NGOs flooded to Afghanistan 
and many more were created locally, funds were given to them 
without first checking their capacities, and as result, lots of aid money 
were wasted.(P2) 
INGOs who were committed to working in an area could begin to 
think who they would partner with and be committed to build local 
partnerships outside of the disaster context and once the disaster hits 
you have already built some capacity in these local organisations who 
you going to partner with.(P13) 
We have ongoing partners so that in countries in which we work we 
have partnerships that [are] kind of long term which means that we 
already know our partners, so when a disaster happens then they 
would be the first people that we talk to. (P14) 
 NGOs implementing 
reconstruction projects must 
have the required capacity to 
be successful in meeting 
project objectives. NGOs 
must understand their 
capacity and plan their 
projects accordingly. NGOs 
are more likely to fail than to 
achieve project objectives, if 
they do not have the required 
operational and managerial 
capacity. NGOs may not be 
able to develop their capacity 
at the same time as 
implementing or setting up 
their project. It is in the best 
interest of both the affected 
community and donors to 
have already-established, 
long-term partnerships with 
local NGOs, that can also be 
partnered with in the event of 
a disaster. 
 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Important assumptions) 
Condensed meaning 
In my opinion, here the most important role is played by donors. The 
donors must make sure that the funding is given to an NGO that has 
the required competency and capacity. And if they find out that the 
project is not being implemented according to the design and the 
project proposal, they must stop the project and divert funding to a 
more competent NGO. (P1) 
 Donors can play a crucial 
role in selecting the 
appropriate implementing 
partners for their projects. It 
is vital for the NGOs to have 
the required capacity when 
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It is the responsibility of the donor community when selecting NGOs 
working in areas hit by a disaster, which can sometimes be very 
difficult, because not all competent and well-known NGOs could have 
reached the area, and you [donors] might be forced, in one way or 
another, to use NGOs with lower capacity.(P10) 
An NGO wanting to implement projects has to get... in theory, has to 
get an NOC [No Objection Certificate] from the government to allow 
them to work. Well, I am not sure how, obviously there is a lot of 
corruption out there so, I am sure some NGOs were able to bypass 
the system.(P13) 
To make sure that the NGOs have the capacity and competency, there 
must be a reliable audit of their capacity.(P3) 
Donor agencies should not rely only on what NGOs write in their 
proposal. It is crucial to determine whether the NGO has adequate 
technical capacity by visiting them in the field. (P4) 
Donor agencies must ensure the NGO they give funding to has the 
right capacity and competency to be able to implement the 
project.(P3) 
First of all, I think reconstruction projects and funding should only be 
given to those NGOs or contractors that have adequate resources and 
capacity. Effort should be made to identify and select those 
organisations which have experience, knowledge of reconstruction 
and functional and workable processes. Bad NGOs will perform 
badly, no matter what. (P7) 
Donors should look at the social side of the project and examine 
whether the project has been planned and designed with the affected 
people, and if the NGO has the right capacity and understanding of 
the importance of community participation before the funding can be 
allocated for the project.(P9) 
There is also a huge problem in the bidding process. Projects can 
have higher success rate if the bidding process is transparent. I am 
aware that in most commercial bidding, there is corruption, and 
projects are often given to commercial NGOs based on the 
percentage they pay to the employees of the donor organisation. (P7) 
Donors must also have the required capacity to effectively and 
rigorously supervise and monitor reconstruction projects. There is 
also a degree of corruption in some donor agencies and they, too, 
have low competency. (P1) 
planning a reconstruction 
project. Donors must make 
sure this important condition 
(assumption) is satisfied 
before they fund the project. 
Unless this assumption is 
realised, reconstruction 
project cannot progress to the 
next level in the activity 
description.  
 
Natural Unit  
(Participants’ quotes on Important assumptions) 
Condensed meaning 
I remember even in Afghanistan the number of time the Mayor shut 
down our projects... you know... and every time you had to go to the 
office and had to discuss with him. (P11) 
Government can influence whether the community can be part of it or 
not. They can influence projects. I mean... the government has a real 
good stake in projects because, that is how it works. All the 
international community, be it the donor, be it the NGO implementing 
the project, has to have a close link with the government or the local 
authorities. (P10) 
Host governments are the 
main stakeholder in 
reconstruction and can have 
a great influence on the 
whole process of 
reconstruction. NGOs are 
required to establish a 
professional relationship 
with the host authorities and 
plan their operation in 
cooperation with them. 
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The good advice, however, in disaster reconstruction recovery, is to 
work through government structure where you can, because 
ultimately it is around better governance and around better, stronger 
government that is more representative and accountable to its people, 
and is able to act accordingly. (P12) 
You need good functioning government and local government. 
Wherever possible you need to encourage good behaviour there and 
to support them in it, even though you know that in many of these 
situations it is fairly corrupt or doesn’t work. You still need to go 
through the effort of trying to do it and even getting their rubber 
stamp to at least allow you to do the right things. (P11) 
We [the donor] and NGOs who were implementing construction 
projects were obviously bound by the government, by the government 
policy. We had to make sure that our projects were implemented in 
line with the government policy.(P13)  
The local government and NGOs can work together effectively as a 
team. (P7) 
The Government, NGO and the UN polices need to support each 
other to work together more effectively. NGOs’ work may not 
contribute to achieving the bigger development goal if it is not 
aligned with the government development policy. (P8)  
Effective post-disaster 
housing reconstruction 
projects can only be planned 
and developed alongside a 
government that is 
representative and 
accountable to the affected 
beneficiaries.  
 
Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Important assumptions) 
Condensed meaning 
One of the big, big issues after a disaster is the whole thing about 
land tenure. I think sometimes, if you go too quickly, it is very easy to 
go and build a house and then find out... you know... there are some 
legal problems. And then people don’t actually have the right... you 
know... to stay there anyway, so you have wasted money. (P11) 
The houses only tend to be built when they have their papers in order.  
You do not take the land which is not properly clear and build on it, 
because the entire investment will be wasted. And it is not just the 
money that was spent into, it is the whole process and the energy and 
people involved, not to mention the problems that were caused. I 
mean there were some really life threatening issues in these kind of 
situations. (P10) 
So there are options [short term renting, putting pressure on 
government, buying land] but, that said, it’s really, really hard. And it 
is a developmental issue not an emergency issue and that is where the 
problem is. Then you know it takes a lot of money a lot of time. (P12) 
I can't recall that our partners ever directly purchased land. I think it 
would have been just the communities purchased the land. (P13) 
The NGOs can't always do much... held up by government officials. 
(P15) 
I don’t think a newly established local NGO would ever be able to 
influence or even effectively discuss the issue of land with the 
government. (P2) 
NGOs cannot provide land for affected people. This is a huge issue 
and is out of the scope of the NGOs. NGOs together with the affected 
 Land issue is one of the 
major concerns and the 
hardest part in reconstruction 
to address. It often takes a 
long time to establish land 
tenure and even longer for 
the government to allocate a 
new site for building 
permanent houses. It is a 
complex issue which is well 
above and beyond the scope 
of most NGOs to deal with. 
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community can talk with the local authorities and request them to 
provide land for a reconstruction project. Other than that, I don’t see 
any other way that can be effective to solve the land issue. (P4) 
NGOs do not have the capacity to either give or purchase land for 
people. This is a government related issue and the government needs 
to help in this regard. Land acquisition is not within the mandate or 
working policies of NGOs. (P6) 
 
Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Important assumptions) 
Condensed meaning 
The NGO who is doing the reconstruction project needs to talk with 
the government before the project can start, so that the NGO will 
build the house for them and the government will have to provide the 
land. There is a real need to support poor families they have the 
priority. (P1) 
You often have the opportunity to speak up on behalf of communities 
and I think it is even better if you can work with the communities and 
help them to know how to tackle local government and try access 
their rights. I think, as much as they need things, a lot of communities 
don’t understand what their entitlements are, and if you can help 
people to understand and help them to access it. (P11) 
NGOs cannot just decide whether someone owns some land or not. 
The only thing they can do, really, is to facilitate the kind of process, 
so whether that is kind of helping the community facilitate the 
negotiation with the government or whatever it is. they can help to 
know what rights they have. (P14) 
I think an NGO can help, let’s say facilitate the process between the 
community and the government, but I am not really sure what else an 
NGO can do, because they cannot buy and sell land in the same way, 
and it is going to be between the community and the government. 
(P14) 
NGOs, together with the affected community, can talk with the local 
authorities and request them to provide land for a reconstruction 
project. Other than that, I don’t see any other way that can be 
effective to solve the land issue. (P4) 
Effective communication with the government offices is of utmost 
importance. When there is no clear communication strategy, you can 
expect conflicts at any time during the lifecycle of the project. (P6) 
NGOs need to have a strong representation of the affected 
communities with them. If an NGO can have the support of a wider 
affected community, here the government will listen to the NGO; 
again if the project is in conflict with the current government policies, 
neither community nor NGOs can do much. (P8) 
Here it is important for the NGO to have the role of a facilitator, train 
people how to argue their case and talk using positive negotiation 
tools. If needed, NGOs’ representatives can sit in meetings to support 
people when they are discussing issues with the government. (P9) 
Affected people are often 
confused about the role of 
many agencies they have to 
deal with and the many 
procedures for rebuilding. 
NGOs can play an important 
role in facilitating the 
process between the 
survivors of the disaster and 
the government. NGOs can 
establish and maintain an 
effective communication 
channel between people and 
the government.  
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Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Important assumptions) 
Condensed meaning 
Absolutely! Do you want me to spell that word? Absolutely! When you 
say ‘community’, one does not divide it, elders' community, 
youngsters’ community, women’s community or children’s 
community. Community as whole! (P10) 
It is crucial to have women in the reconstruction, not because they are 
smarter or they know more, or... I mean, in various parts of the world 
they might not know what they are going to say, but one thing they 
know is their needs, and they can articulate much better than anybody 
else what their needs are, because that is what they live with 
everyday. (P10) 
Greater empowerment of women is important. (P12) 
Women ABSOLUTELY need to be involved in the design of that 
property. They are the ones that spend the majority of the time at 
home. They are the ones that cook for the family. They are the ones 
that care for the family. So they definitely need to be consulted. (P13) 
There are instances where NGOs come up with the design and then 
the women say, “Where are we going to cook? You haven’t thought 
about where we are going to cook.” So, definitely, women need to be 
involved in the design. (P13) 
Women are the prime users of the house in terms of where they cook, 
where they need the children to reside and all the issues around safety 
and security. (P14) 
I definitely think that is really important. I think, again, it is quite 
challenging. I think you often, very much get the men who often speak 
about the women's need. It is quite difficult sometimes to ask, and get 
an independent opinion from, the women in some culture. (P14) 
Who will use the house most often? It is actually the woman. If you 
build the house, it is the women who are always there. The men are in 
the field most of the time. So in a society like Afghanistan, where 
women don't get out very much, well... if they are, then, the main user, 
then they should have something to say in terms of design, what make 
sense, what is good.(P15) 
The quality of information we got from the women was unbelievably 
significant and the maps they drew were of high value and 
significance as well. We were amazed by the quality of their drawing. 
The type of information we got from women was never given to us by 
men, for whatever reasons. (P2) 
It is very important to let women participate in a reconstruction 
project and their opinion and ideas about the housing reconstruction 
must be sought. (P4)  
I think women's participation is very important in any project, 
because women have their own specific needs, they have their own 
priorities, their own opinion. And then half of the community is 
women. (P5) 
There maybe things that men do not consider or even pay any 
attention to, but women do because they are significantly important 
for them. Even the opinion and needs of young people are different 
from those of the elderly and vice versa. (P5) 
 
Women make one half of 
any society. They absolutely 
need to be involved in 
reconstruction primarily 
because they are the main 
user of the house. They also 
know their specific needs 
and can articulate them far 
better than anyone else. 
Women’s contribution in the 
development of a community 
and in their home is more 
than that of men. In spite of 
the many challenges women 
often face in relation to their 
involvement in 
reconstruction, NGOs must 
make sure that women’s 
roles, as active members of 
the community, are 
accommodated by the 
project.   
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We talk about half of the society – indeed, women make half of the 
society from the view point of their number and their right. We must 
consider their right as the right of a human. (P6)  
Women spend more time at home. They have more interest in the 
design of their house. They know what size a house they need, or what 
colour or paint they want to use. (P7) 
It is important to consider gender issues when a project is designed. 
(P8) 
One of the major reasons why Afghanistan is not progressing is the 
lack of, or weak participation of, half of its population, who are the 
women. Women are sitting at home and no one ever seeks their 
opinion. Mothers have a significant role in educating and nurturing 
their children. I can tell you, if women's voices are not heard and 
their opinions are not considered, in the design of any reconstruction 
project, and if they are not given the opportunity to have their input, 
Afghanistan can never be rebuilt. Women have an absolute role that 
they can play in reconstruction. (P9) 
 
Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Important assumptions) 
Condensed meaning 
Again, it is important to be very transparent and earn their trust. This 
is a very effective way to reach women and to involve them in 
reconstruction projects. (P1) 
Members of the community must be informed, and explained to, that 
collecting woman’s opinions is part of the project. It must be clearly 
explained to them how women will be organised, who will meet with 
them, and why we need to have their opinion in the project. (P6) 
Those opposing the idea of women's participation in reconstruction, 
need to be contacted and informed of the need for women's 
participation in the project. Meetings should be held with them, to 
discuss women's involvement and reasons for women's participation. 
They should also be informed of the arrangement for approaching 
community women. (P9) 
I think there are ways that women can be involved, if not overtly in all 
construction processes, but in some of the most important ways. (P13) 
It was sometimes quite challenging to get them to understand why it 
was important to get the women's kind of input into reconstruction. In 
a context like that, it is getting the balance between seeing it really 
important that we get that kind of participation, but also balancing 
that with the fact that, actually, we need to be sensitive, to some 
extent, to the situation, and not to obviously aggravate the community. 
(P14) 
Now the downside of this, you know... kind of... skipping to maybe 
some other cultures, is that if women (and we found this with 
livelihood projects) is that... there is a risk, if you increase the power 
dynamics towards the women, it can increase gender based violence. 
(P11) 
If women become more empowered, that will change family dynamics 
and possibly, because women would want perhaps be out working, the 
men feel at risk. They feel undermined because they have got vocal 
wives or mothers or whatever. Yes, it will change the whole dynamics 
at the family level, at the community level. And we have to be aware 
NGOs are more likely to be 
successful in having 
community support if they 
can clearly explain and 
justify why women need to 
be involved in the project.  
NGOs need to be aware of 
the risk associated with 
women’s participation. 
Women’s involvement may 
lead to gender violence in 
the family if it changes the 
relationship dynamics more 
holistically. 
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of that and prepare for that consequence. (P13) 
 
Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Important assumptions) 
Condensed meaning 
This is a very effective way to reach women and to involve them in 
reconstruction projects. People will have less, or no, problem with 
you if you respect their culture and social norms. (P1) 
It is a process. You cannot just go there and say, ‘Look, we come here 
as a commission and we want to talk to your wife.’ It doesn’t work 
like that. The NGO has to take into consideration that women talk to 
women. (P10) 
All I know is that you get to know the culture of your community and 
you can have quite a big impact. (P11) 
Changing culture and behaviour is not going to happen in a matter of 
months, weeks, even in year or so. Perhaps this will take a long time 
to change. I think we have to be realistic about what change we can 
expect of gender relations in the community. (P13) 
I think we could. It is easy for us to say, ‘Yes, it is a good thing that 
women are involved,’ but I think it is the practicals of getting through 
many layers of kind of cultural challenges to getting that, and trying 
to understand what participation of women looks like within that 
cultural context. (P14) 
In Afghanistan, under the Taliban, you know... our program was one 
of the few that wasn't shut down ever, because we were trying to work 
within the rules. So, sometimes, it is just to find [a way] around it... 
follow the rules without disadvantaging any side. (P15) 
It is wrong to say that women are not capable of participating in 
reconstruction efforts, but we also need to take the culture and 
tradition of people into account. (P2) 
In every project, women's involvement must be considered, but with 
consideration given to the sensitivities that exist in the community. 
However, gender issues, and their related problems, are different 
from one region to the next. (P2) 
NGOs need to pay attention, and give meaningful consideration t,o 
the prevailing culture in a community. They need to have a good 
study of the community culture and make their decision in compliance 
with that. (P2) 
The other important point is that the NGO employees who are 
collecting opinions must talk the way the community speaks and 
understands. (P3) 
It is very important to let women participate in reconstruction 
projects and their opinion and ideas about the housing reconstruction 
must be sought. However, there are issues of culture, tradition and 
religion that need to be very carefully considered. (P4)   
NGOs, or other agencies that are implementing reconstruction 
projects, need to know and understand the prevailing culture in the 
community. It is not right to do anything that is not in line with the 
community culture or clashes with the community cultural norms. 
(P5) 
As I said before, when a project is designed, the NGO needs to have a 
Understanding the culture of 
the affected community is 
important. Any attempt to 
involve women in 
reconstruction must be 
guided by the dominant 
principles and cultural norms 
of the community.  Past 
experiences have shown that 
respecting community 
culture and religious values 
is key to sustainable 
implementation of 
reconstruction projects. 
Women are allowed to 
participate in reconstruction 
projects if the approach to 
their participation doesn’t 
conflict with the community 
culture.  
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study of the area, it must understand the culture and tradition in the 
community. For example, can men go to the community to interview 
community women? If they can't interview women, they need to find 
an alternative way to get to women, which is employing a female in 
the project to meet with community women. (P8) 
 
Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Important assumptions) 
Condensed meaning 
In our projects, we have teams of two people, a man and a woman, 
and they either are husband and wife, brother and sister or father and 
daughter. (P1) 
We are talking about women's opinion... not having the women sitting 
in the same room with the men, and discuss about the reconstruction 
project. We want their opinion. If you are talking about strict rules of 
the society, there are no strict rules which prohibit me [female] going 
and talking to the wife of the shora [community council]. The society 
would accept me as a guest, and I can talk to his wife, and there is 
nothing wrong with it. (P10) 
Well, to do the assessment and, specifically, find women, and that is 
the challenge, and that needs to be women doing assessment with 
women, almost always, especially in traditional societies - take 
Northern Pakistan. (P12) 
NGOs need to make sure they have women staff on board too, first of 
all. They are able to access the women in the community. (P13) 
One of the things that we did was that we actually had kind of 
community liaison officers and we had a female community liaison 
officer, so that she could go into the women's... kind of gather the 
women of the community together in... maybe... somebody’s house, in 
order to go through the scheme and... kind of... gather women's 
opinions. (P14) 
The women that we recruited were from the local area, so they were 
all from the same kind of tribal group, or... you know... people group. 
Hmm... they all spoke Kashmiri. Hmm... so they were very much 
...kind of... familiar to the women there. I don't recall it posing any 
concern at all for anyone, and I think the community leaders were 
happy as well. (P14) 
I mean... if you allow female staff, I mean as we have quite 
successfully demonstrated in a lot of our projects, for example: If in 
doubt, employ a couple. You know... get a man and his wife as a team, 
and they go out together, and the woman talks to the women, and the 
man talks to the men, and when they come home they compare notes. 
(P15) 
We had planned our project in such way that information can be 
collected from both men and women. We had teams of male staff and 
a team of female employees. When we approached the target area, 
our men’s team would go and meet with men and the women’s team 
would go and talk with women in the area. (P2)  
I gave you an example earlier, for example, in Kabul, we didn’t have 
any problem. Men employees could talk with both men as well as with 
women. There was no restriction on men talking with women in Herat 
either. However, in distant, remote villages we had to employ women 
to talk to women. (P2) 
In some locations women are 
not allowed to talk with men 
because it is considered 
immoral and against the 
cultural and religious norms 
of the community. NGOs can 
ensure women participation 
in reconstruction by having a 
women employee on board 
to access the women in the 
community.   
While, culturally, it is not 
always appropriate for male 
members of the project to be 
talking to women, there are 
no restrictions at all on 
female staff talking to the 
women in the community.  
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NGOs must have female employees to get access to women and 
collect their opinions. In a conservative society, like Afghanistan, it is 
more important to have a couple (husband and wife) in a team, to 
safeguard against any suspicion, by the community, of unlawful 
relationship… The wife can go and talk to women, and the husband 
can meet with men. (P3) 
NGOs can employ women to reach the affected women, to collect 
their opinions and information about their needs. This is the current 
practice, today, in Afghanistan, which has been very successful. This 
method has worked and has been employed even during the Taliban 
times. (P4) 
There are ways to consider: NGOs have female staff. They employ 
husband and wife, or other relatives (brother and sister or father) and 
when they go to an area, women meet with community women and 
men with men, to collect their opinions. This is an effective way, and 
NGOs often adopt this approach. This method is proven effective and 
very successful. (P5) 
Based on my experience the only effective way to reach affected 
women is to have teams of female employees. Women can meet freely 
with the affected women, I don’t think it is in conflict with the 
community culture, if NGOs female staff meet with women in the 
affected community. (P7) 
NGOs need to have female staff to collect women’s opinions in the 
project. Women's opinions can also be collected through the 
community members themselves; their opinions and needs can be 
passed through the male members of the community. It is easier for 
the community members to collect women's opinion because they 
know each other. (P8) 
NGO’s female staff can approach community women and discuss 
their needs with them and also make plans for any training that might 
be needed for women. (P9) 
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Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Important assumptions) 
Condensed meaning 
NGOs implementing reconstruction projects, in places where there 
isn’t enough security, need to talk to the local council. The local 
council needs to represent the entire local population. The decision to 
support the reconstruction project should be the decision of the entire 
community and should not be based on the interests of a few 
influential persons. (P1) 
The way that it functions... we had a map and it was saying green, 
yellow and red, ok? And between the green and the red there was this 
yellow spot. The local community was arranging armed guards by 
themselves, not the state police, not the local authorities, nothing as 
such. Armed people from the community were guarding the project 
team until the end of the yellow point, when they were returning back 
to their base. (P10) 
We have always involved communities in our projects. If the 
insecurity is due to an armed group or criminals in the area, we often 
seek assistance from the government. However, in situation where the 
insecurity is due to political reasons, and in the area where 
government has little influence or military presence, we involve 
community members. The good things about these projects are that 
they are heavily supported by people. People have networks with both 
government and the opposition, so if and when a problem arises, the 
community can very well solve it. (P2) 
When the government cannot provide you with adequate security, you 
will not be able to work in that area. The community may provide 
security to you and to the project when you are in their area, but who 
can assure you that you will reach the affected area safely. (P6) 
Having a strong relationship with the community is essential. NGOs 
cannot implement their projects in remote and insecure places 
without community support. Communities can provide security to the 
NGO personnel and properties. (P8) 
NGOs can still work in such places and reach the areas provided they 
can establish a relationship with the community people. Again, it 
comes down to the effectiveness of the NGO, and their interest in 
supporting the community people by providing the necessary training 
to a representative group of the community. The most important 
factor here, again, is to earn their trust and explain clearly to them 
the objectives of the project and what is expected from people and 
what people can expect from the NGO. (P9) 
  In the events of major 
insecurity NGOs may seek 
security assistance from the 
affected communities. 
Implementing recovery and 
reconstruction projects in 
insecure areas can be risky. 
NGOs need to have the 
agreement and protection of 
the tribal communities before 
delivering their projects in 
areas lacking adequate 
security.   
 
Natural Unit 
(Participants’ quotes on Important assumptions) 
Condensed meaning 
We agreed, we said, “Okay, we are giving you the raw materials and 
you have to build the houses by yourselves. We need pictures of the 
processes once in two weeks.” We would have pictures from the 
Shoras of the community coming to us telling us what the progress of 
the house was and we arranged on our own... our own ways... to 
monitor the reconstruction project. At the first stage, we got a slap [A 
slap in the face] because everybody believed that they were going to 
sell the materials and the beneficiaries will not see any of it. At the 
In a situation when there is 
no access, or staff movement 
to and from the affected area 
can be dangerous, NGOs 
may consider implementing 
a reconstruction project 
remotely, without being 
physically present in the 
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end of the day it was well used... up 90%, up to the 90% of the goods 
went to the right destination. (P10) 
It does work. I know of examples where it worked. It is quite hard for 
you to fully verify, so the two examples I have... We had a project 
running in Afghanistan where they were remotely monitoring and 
managing it... you know... and it is all about having local partners 
and local... kind of... networks... you know... people that you can trust. 
(P11) 
In some of the places in Somalia, where you just cannot get access to, 
and what was critical is having local partners and working out 
systems and processes that you could get the resources in for them to 
do it. But there is still a risk. It is quite difficult for you to monitor that 
it is happening. (P11) 
That would depend, I think, on the advice of the security advisors, and 
on the trust you would have in the remotely located project team, and 
the ability of the project manager over all, to be responsible and 
responsive, and to have an exit strategy for those people that is 
realistic if something bad happens. So the safely of the aid workers, 
trust, resources and security advice, I think, are some of the factors 
relating to that. (P12) 
I would like to think it would have a positive impact in terms of 
people's feelings that they participated in the whole process. Whether, 
technically, it results in a good outcome, I don’t know. That would be 
an interesting assessment to make. (P13) 
I mean... we actually worked in a number of places in a remote 
management model. In fact, Kandahar is one area where we work in 
a remote management model. I definitely think that it can happen. I 
think quite a lot of it comes down to... you need to have the right 
people in that community. (P14) 
I mean... something that we are working on at the moment, because 
we have got an issue with Fatah... I can't go to Fatah, and we are 
trying to monitor what is going on. Again, technology is your friend. I 
mean... there are more and more things that you can do with 
technology. (P15) 
We did have reports about mine incidents in remote areas and 
insecure areas. The only effective way to help the community was to 
create community base demining groups, because it was not possible 
to send our normal demining teams to the areas. We had incidents in 
which our deminers were killed. They killed deminers from MDC and 
ATC. (P2) 
Yes, there is a possibility to identify skills and/or train members of the 
affected community, and hire people from that community. 
Reconstruction projects can then be remotely monitored and 
evaluated. It may be difficult. You may not get the desired outcome 
from your first project, but by having an effective monitoring and 
control mechanism you may be able to do a project. (P3)   
I think such projects are not very successful. It is correct that there is 
maximum community involvement in remote managed projects, but 
they can face enormous technical difficulties and also their 
management is difficult. NGOs need to work side by side with 
communities, and not just rely on the report coming from the affected 
community. There are issues with managing funding, and also other 
technical requirements that need managerial skills, which may not be 
available in the affected community. (P4) 
In all projects, whether remotely or closely monitored, there must be 
affected area. Remotely 
managed projects represent 
their own challenges. They 
are difficult to monitor and 
the quality of housing cannot 
always be assured.   
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NGO representation. Affected people often do not have all the 
required capacity to implement a project themselves. Providing 
training to a credible representative body of the community may help 
with the implementation of such projects. (P7) 
Look, if there is no possibility to work in or reach the affected area 
due to security concerns, the NGOs can still implement and manage 
their project remotely. (P9) 
 
